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Abstract 
The changing climate will globally force drastic changes in how people live. Globally, 
governance supports its own interests while the multitude everywhere bear the burdens 
that rest between such interests and climate vacillation. That the multitude is composed of 
those who everywhere precede and exceed governance, who are necessary to its 
constitution but don’t necessarily need it, suggests that the multitude tautologically self-
governs somehow through concepts. These concepts are things that have managerial and 
governmental faces in whose creation the multitude participates but may or may not like. 
This cultural study understands that by relating to each other and the earth through 
general capacities of sociality, humanity solidifies cultural ways of being human, and that 
these cultural ways are governing creations. This study thinks through the ways that 
culture, beside or beyond formal governance, can best support multitudinous human 
relations towards general livability in the time of climate change. The Barcelona-based 
Plataforma De Afectados Por La Hipoteca (PAH), an autonomous movement fighting for 
housing rights, serves as a means to model how social relations reorganize governance in 
the multitude’s interest. Virno’s refinement of Marx’s theory of general intellect, and the 
even more general sociality suggested by Spinoza, describe the immediate social 
capacities demonstrated by the PAH. This study also works through the UK-based 
climate poetry journal, the Dark Mountain Project, to grasp issues attendant to climate 
and governance and cultural work. Culture is discussed anthropologically and art 
historically – critically discussing Hegel’s conceptions of universal qualities in relation to 
feminist, post-colonial and autonomist Marxist theories, thereby suggesting ways for 
cultural workers to think through cultural forms and ways that support multitudinous 
being in variable relation to governance and the changing climate. 
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Introduction 
 
Aim and structure of argument 
Climate change poses a threat to planetary survival, forcing individuals and groups to 
change the ways they live their lives. Human existence in this time of climate change is 
pinched between the variable, human-defined ways and laws for living, and the 
seemingly natural world that is so rapidly changing.1 Because it is assumed that human 
governmental efforts will not adequately respond to these challenges,2 the aim of this 
study is to contemplate in general terms how cultural work might adequately respond, 
with its adequacy evaluated in terms of its alignment with the common capacities of the 
multitude. As culture need not demonstrate affinity with any series of governing concepts 
or governance, or work to further articulate governmental efforts, this study asks in what 
ways cultural work can be done in the interests of the multitude’s being. As multitude, 
people in general will be left exposed to the mess wrought by climate change and respond 
in some way. On the experiential social terrain, cultural work has the general capacity to 
facilitate the multitude’s abilities to respond in and beyond these crisis situations. 
Therefore, the aim of this study is to articulate the general ways and ends that cultural 																																																								
1 In other words, the situation of humanity is such that it is contingent to its own rules and the  
laws of nature.  See Negarestani (2011) for a useful discussion of how situated contingency  
relates to human variability, and Foucault (1998) for a key discussion of variability in relation to  
cultural and social being. 
 
 
2 Eric Swyngedouw (2010) argues that certain apocalyptic fears regarding climate change are  
normative because they develop imaginaries that become “an integral and vital part of the new  
cultural politics of capitalism.” This study assumes that capitalist governance will fail to meet the  
challenges of climate change, and aims to support methods which embrace other ways of being  
outside of or besides capital that will have to emerge through the transformative experiences of  
the multitude, including the experience of fear becoming something else. 
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work meaningfully relates to this multitude's praxis. 
 
This initial introduction describes the aim and structure of this study, then goes on to 
discuss a methodology and its justification. Following this is a more detailed discussion 
of the study’s key terms, which allows for a deeper articulation of the project’s position 
and argument within the wider literature and discourse.  
 
This study understands that much of the existing cultural work on climate change3 is 
aimed at critiquing, suggesting or organizing forms of governing culture and law, rather 
than responding to the general multitude’s common ways of being and forming in relation 
to the changing climate; as this study aims to do. Law and cultural work are organized in 
relation to the social sphere; primarily to serve accountable interests. In this normative 
way, the multitude experiences climate change through cultural things as much as 
through nature– for this reason this study understands climate as a thing that is 
necessarily both natural and cultural.  
 
That culture exists in relation to the multitude and does not just simply emerge from it 
allows this study to see a relation between the cultural and the social that mirrors the 
relation between governance and the multitude. The policy suggestions this study ends 
with are not the work of the multitude, rather, they are based upon observation and 																																																								
3 Detailed further under in the study's definitions of climate, multitude and culture, this study  
recognizes the significance of T.J. Demos (2017), Davis and Turpin (2015) and the Haus Der  
Kulturen der Welt’s Anthropocene Project’s efforts as touchstone cultural responses to climate  
change. Primary governmental efforts, through the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change,  
are detailed in Chapter 2. 	 	
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research on how climate change reaches through cultural work to impact the 
multitudinous ways of human organization, and how humans multitudinously reorganize 
themselves in relation to these changes in relation to culture in and over time.  
 
The multitude has properties, but no policy as it has no unified voice and only the most 
general of shared interests; the multitude simply contains capacities and potentials to be 
in generally particular ways, and to be other than how it is. By attending to these 
capacities of self-organization, cultural work can support the multitude’s way of being.  
 
 
Method 
This thesis is anchored by the study of two distinct projects, chosen for the particular 
ways they illuminate how, in exchange within the cultural and natural world, the 
multitude lives over time. The first project, The Dark Mountain Project, is a UK-based 
poetry/arts journal and editorial group which claims that its work makes an exceptional 
cultural contribution regarding how people can live through climactic change. Dark 
Mountain members claim their work is indispensable for the consideration of life in the 
time of climate change because their editorial perspective accepts as inevitable the 
civilizational ravages of climate change; they suggest that with this foresight they can 
write about climate change's disruptions avant la lettre. In order to understand and 
evaluate their claims, this study considers Dark Mountain’s creative contributions in 
relation to international governing bodies like the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, and also other organizational, civilizational and theological (and as 
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such, cultural) underpinnings attendant to their own cultural contemplation. Ultimately, 
this study finds Dark Mountain to be open to the same kinds of critiques leveled at many 
Western projects; Dark Mountain’s editorial line helps organize the governing concepts of 
socio-economic and political relations that produce inequality and environmental 
calamity. That is, though they claim otherwise, Dark Mountain works in favor of 
governing interests that leave the multitude dangerously exposed. Nevertheless, through 
an examination of the concepts and practical arrangements they need in order to appear 
culturally meaningful, particular things about climate, Western cultural governance and 
general cultural ways are discussed.  Moreover, this discussion of the limits of Dark 
Mountain’s conceptual relation to the multitude reveals particular ways this study must 
conceive of the multitude in order to address the space that governmental failure opens, 
as the multitude's exposure to a changing climate. 
 
The Platform for People Affected by Mortgages (the PAH), a Spain-based social 
movement, is the second object of this study. By organizing among themselves in their 
cities while in contact with a broader movement, the PAH organizes against a socio-
economic and political climate and the governing lines that have driven its members into 
bankruptcy, foreclosure and possible homelessness. Through participant observation with 
the Barcelona PAH organization, the study focuses on how its members’ experiences lead 
people who once seemed to be culturally (legally, performatively, psychologically) 
locked within a set of behaviors, to free themselves from such arrangements through 
other cultural and social exposures (via conversations, images, procedures, behaviors) – 
and therefore institute different ways for themselves (as common humans) to be, within 
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and across the broader society.  Formalized here in academic thought and writing, the 
activities of the Barcelona PAH serve as a model for some of the multitude’s common 
organizational capacities. 
 
Together, these two objects of study allow for an investigation of some ways that cultural 
work does and does not facilitate the capacities of the variable multitude in and over time. 
Contemplating differences between these two objects – the work of Dark Mountain 
Project is only seen at the end of its mostly hidden production, whereas the open praxis of 
the PAH is continually mediated within and across society – reveals ways that the 
multitude can relate to more or less abstract, intimate and less intimate cultural work. By 
discussing the ways in which culture impacts across the particularities and generalities of 
multitudinous difference – how culture operates intimately and as a completely foreign-
seeming thing as general facts of what culture does in place and across history, the study 
is able to draw its conclusions about culture and the multitude. 
 
Justification of the research methodology 
One motivation of this study is how the multitude’s lives are and will be impacted by the 
effects of climate change. The polar caps are melting, the oceans are filling up with 
plastic and the sea levels are rising, species are being driven to extinction at an alarming 
rate as formerly sustainable ways of life are coming to an end– while governmental 
efforts seem to continue along as always in the favor of its own familiar ways. Thus, 
another motivation is fact of the seemingly blind continuation of this state of affairs that 
seems to organize all kinds of activities in the interests of the centers of capitalist 
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governance so that they may continue to operate as if unaffected by the world around it. 
Cultural thought is often enthralled by the clearly articulated lines that governing efforts 
provide even though these lines are only partially descriptive of the total human ways for 
being.4 The fact of this enthrallment leaves disorganized many ontological and 
theological questions whose disarray exposes the multitude to further violence. While 
cultural thought that follows disciplinary lines addresses what governance directly orders, 
by identifying a praxis of the multitude which exceeds but is in relation to worldly and 
particular governance, this study aims to see how other ways of being beside governance 
can be supported. As discussed below, when referring to governance, this study means 
both the clearly articulated, top-down, often financed human projects and large scale 
seemingly natural forces and their general affects. 
 
That is why both the PAH and Dark Mountain have been selected as objects of study – 
Dark Mountain for their writing about the inevitability of climate change and their (false) 
understanding of the limits of politics in relation to culture, and the PAH for how it can 
model, beyond the most formal of political or cultural ways, how people effectively 
respond to systemic, government-organized crisis. Both differ in their general approach to 
how humanity constitutes and is constituted by climate; the seemingly universal and 
abstract cultural management that Dark Mountain's practice demonstrates is more closely 
affiliated with governing logics than the PAH; despite how nature is the content of their 
work, Dark Mountain primarily operates with a concept that defines climate as something 
beyond of the human. The PAH, on the other hand, primarily addresses what has 																																																								
4 Within this introduction and throughout this study, the facts of this enthrallment is primarily 
confronted through the discussion of Western cultural thought informed or reflective of Hegelian  
thought.		
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traditionally been understood as anthropocentric economic and cultural climate and 
demonstrate an immediate praxis of relating to ongoing problems and conflicts. The PAH 
expresses a disinterest in cultural politics while Dark Mountain’s claims to not be 
political are based on their supposedly universal perspective – which, as will be 
established, stands well within the frame for cultural work attendant to the Western 
governmentality that greatly help constitute the climate crisis. 
 
As such, though Dark Mountain’s particular editorial concepts quickly reveal themselves 
to be lacking in relation to the goals of this study, they nonetheless serve as a useful 
frame through which to consider the political, organizational and theological 
ramifications of governance and governmental failure. When the examination of pertinent 
concepts that Dark Mountain helps explore is exhausted, the study pivots to other sources 
that helps complete the analysis. 
 
As the term ‘Anthropocene’ suggests, this is an era when the human impact upon nature 
must be considered. The crisis that the PAH responds to is caused by financial 
mismanagement and not flooding, but there are strong justifications for focusing on this 
group in a study of responses to climate change. There are only particular differences 
between a housing crisis that is caused by finance or flood, and both have financial 
ramifications. Both causes for change force people from their homes. Climate change is 
an issue as much for the way we regulate ourselves in relation to the world as for the fact 
that the global average temperature is rising or that the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere 
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is increasing. Climate change results from the financialization of nature,5 and climate 
change and its future effects of displacement have been worked into contemporary 
systems of financialization.6 This study is interested in how people everywhere 
multitudinously experience climate change in particular and general ways regardless of 
governmental action (like climate's financialization), and the ways that cultural work 
might assist the multitude in their responses. Within particular situations, outside of 
power, the PAH has been able to bring about significant changes against powerful 
governing forces, thereby resituating practices of living that such forces try to disallow. 
 
The PAH’s success is partially due to how they alter common-sense understandings of the 
ways people should be allowed to live in this world. They provide insight into the ethic of 
how a cultural policy of the multitude might be culturally instituted beside multitudinous 
sociality rather than through state organization, in context in Spain and across difference 
in the wider world. 
 
Actual embedded research with the PAH documents grassroots capacities for 
transformation to drive wider change as more than just a conceptual possibility. The 
multitude, common people, do effectively respond to crisis situations; the study’s 
documentation of the PAH provides material for demonstration and study of their 
relatively successful efforts. Over the course of research, events hosted by Dark 																																																								
5 Sassen (2014) looks at how contemporary nature/culture dispositifs of capital drive both greater 
dispossession and environmental destruction, while Moore (2015) describes this process over the 
longue durée of Western capital. 
 
 
6 This financialization is the See Leonardi (2017) and Beuret (2017) for accounts of how carbon  
trading contributes to climate destruction, and Klein (2008) on disaster capitalism. 
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Mountain were attended for possible inclusion into the project. These events were not 
process-oriented or situated beside community practice, rather they were singular affairs 
whose pre-production occurred behind closed doors and whose eventival proceedings 
supported the serial release of their journal. Like the words they print, Dark Mountain’s 
events were meant for contemplation rather than action. Therefore, it was decided that 
this study should focus on Dark Mountain’s printed work. The PAH, on the other hand, 
demonstrate in context how normal people come together in crisis, produce, and work 
beside cultural material to actually change the world in which they live. In relation to 
what could be a seemingly hopeless situation, they demonstrate one example of what in 
social and cultural organization can help the multitude drive cultural and political change. 
 
Terminology 
The terminological discussion below highlights the ways in which properties contained 
within the terms “multitude”, “culture”, “climate”, “policy”, “governance” and 
“government” are accentuated for usage within this study. Through this process, the 
study’s arguments are further refined in relation to contemporary debates regarding these 
terms. That this study is anchored toward the ‘multitude’, a thing that is defined in 
indeterminant relation to forms of governance, is of primary importance. Subsequent 
definitions are built upon the variable multitude that is often only definable by degree and 
in relation; as such, many of the study’s concepts are understood to be in orbit around 
definitions rather than operating under strict definitional terms.  
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Multitude 
Most contemporary philosophical use of the term ‘multitude’7 is based on the work of 
Baruch Spinoza; the multitude’s political nature is described within his Political Treatise 
(1677/1951) based on the metaphysical ontology he lays out in his Ethics (1677/2001).8  
According to Spinoza, the fact that people as individuals and common bodies are 
governed by their passions (and then reason) suggests that by definition they never totally 
transfer their rights to any government;9 people reserve the right to be led by passion. 
Spinoza’s multitude is the one and many people whose being precedes and exceeds 
governance, whose being is needed for the composition of government, but for 
themselves require no particular form of it. Yet, because he understands that people 
cannot live without some form of law,10 Spinoza’s political treatise describes his key 
political concerns. His inquiry involves the multitude as he recognizes that any state’s 
stability and the common happiness it might organize is contingent to the total 
collaborative process between it and the multitude that it governs.11 Though Spinoza sees 
																																																								
7 Some key reference points for contemporary debates around the multitude include Negri, Hardt  
and Negri (2004), Virno (2004, 2008), Balibar (2008), Read (2016) and Morfini (2018).  
 
 
8 Balibar (2008 122) concurs. 
 
 
9 “...if we weigh the matter aright, the natural right of every man does not cease in the civil state. For man, 
alike in the natural and in the civil state, acts according to the laws of his own nature, and consults his own 
interest.” (Spinoza 1953 Ch.3 Sec.3) 
 
 
10 “For men are so situated, that they cannot live without some general law.” (Spinoza 1953 ch1 #3) 
Balibar (2008 56) echoes this interpretation.	
 
11 “dominion may be duly established, it is necessary to lay solid foundations, to build it on;  
from which may result to the monarch safety, and to the multitude peace; and, therefore, to lay  
them in such a way, that the monarch may then be most independent, when he most consults the  
multitude’s welfare.” (Spinoza 1953 ch.6 sec.8) 
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nothing unnatural in human activity,12 he posits that the state does wrong when it “suffers 
to be done, things which may be the cause of its own ruin” (1951 ch.4 sec.4); based on 
misunderstanding the capacities and interests of what it composes and in what ways and 
for whom it has been composed. 
 
This is an ambiguity that this study embraces regarding the multitude – that it constitutes 
government for its own management without being definitionally constituted by it. This 
study sees the multitude as being in autonomous relation to any form of governance that 
it relates to; that is, while some in the multitude might seek to constitute some forms of 
government, the whole of the multitude will not be satisfied by the relation. The study 
agrees with Virno (1996 200) when he writes that the multitude, “shuns political unity, is 
recalcitrant to obedience” but disagrees when he says that it “never achieves the status of 
a juridical personage and is thus unable to make promises, to make pacts, or acquire or 
transfer rights.” This study simply suggests that the multitude does as it will in the time 
that it has.13 
 
“We know that the multitude is opposed to the people, to the ‘one will.’ It would be a 
mistake, however, to believe that the multitude can dispose of the One as such.” (Virno 
2008 42) This study is interested in the simple and indeterminately necessary relationship 
between the one and the many; and understands this ‘one’ in relation to the many 																																																																																																																																																																					
 
12 See Spinoza (2001 chapter 1) for an elaborate proof of the natural existence of anything that  
humans can conceive. 
 
 
13 This definition of the multitude relates to the concept with transidividuality and the capacity of  
subjectivity to transform itself and here relates to Read's (2016) understandings of the multitude. 
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particular and general governing forces in the world. In many but not all ways, this study 
is disinterested in the distinction Virno goes on to make between the people and the 
multitude, and how he ultimately qualifies the “one”.14  Nevertheless, his initial 
qualifications are useful for subsequent discussions; “The 'one of the many’ is not 
different, then, from the regularity that stimulates the behavior of the disoriented animal.” 
Here Virno suggests that the one provides routine and corrects behavior. Another way he 
defines it is as a “conglomerate of species specific faculties (verbal thought, cognitive 
aptitudes, imagination, the ability to learn, etc.) that the history of big industry has tossed 
onto center stage.” (41) 
 
In that the multitude is an amorphous and transitional body15 – without an analysis of 
what proper governance is, in some ways the total relationality of governed to governing 
would suggest that the multitude is always in a state of self-governance. Without a 
concept for what people should do or government should achieve, it would be difficult to 
see social organization as anything other than the way it should be. As Balibar (2008 
122–123) says, for Spinoza “nature is also history: a history without purpose.” In one 
light, the multitude could be seen as varying in relation to any state of affairs purely as an 																																																								
14 He relates “the one” to the Marxian concept of the “general intellect”, a concept this study discusses in  
some detail in Chapter 3. But to discuss the nature of his characterization now distracts from the task of  
defining terms. The conditioning of political terms matter, as Virno agrees – “It is worth it here to make an  
observation about terminology: these political systems seem ‘irregular'’ to theoreticians of sovereignty  
precisely because they provide an institutional expression for the regularity lying beneath the rules. For  
Hobbes, the '‘leagues'’ and concourses are inconsistent in their application of (or eventually in their failure  
to apply) the current laws in force on the strength of the extra-juridical parameters that is the '‘common  
behavior of mankind.'’ (Virno 2008 42) 
 
 
15 In this way, the use of multitude has qualities of the pre-individual and transindividual; see  
Roberts (2010), Simondon (2012), Basso (2012) Read (2016). 
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effect of the cultural mediation they affected.  In fact, Hegel is said to have criticized 
Spinoza’s conceptualization of human developments because he saw Spinoza providing 
no tool to actually think through a praxis of ongoing human organizationality.16 Balibar 
understands Spinoza differently, seeing that for Spinoza, reason provides perspective and 
guidance to manage and direct ongoing events.17 
 
It is important to distinguish this study’s conception of the multitude from one that 
conceives it as an essential actor within a political project written against Hobbes’ 
shadow. Spinoza’s multitude and the dominion they organize through common sense18 
and affective composition is often theoretically placed in opposition to Hobbes’ “people” 
and their sovereign. Through legalistic logic, Hobbes (1651/1922) conceptualizes a 
commonwealth outside of nature and grounded in law. The law sets forth an 
“anthropological machine”19 that transforms people into citizen-subjects, who transfer 
																																																								
16 This is not to agree with Hegel, but rather to begin a discussion of his work as his thoughts are  
important for this study.  
 
Macherey’s (2011) Hegel or Spinoza analyzes Hegel’s work in relation to its proximities to  
Spinoza’s. He suggests that Hegel considered his own relation to Spinoza, and. Macherey  
suggests that Hegel misreads the implications of Spinoza’s concept of how history develops from  
god’s initial act of creation. Rather than a proper reading of how Spinoza articulates humanity’s  
ongoing creative efforts, Macherey suggests that Hegel mistakenly highlights how Spinoza sees  
all being as a singular expression of god’s initial creation of everything and that “according to his  
position in history, the philosophy of Spinoza is necessarily insufficient or defective.” (212) 
 
17 “By analyzing all the possible historical configurations of the '‘dialectic; between reason and 
passion that structures the life of the City, we come to know human itself –- and thus, nature in  
general. But politics is the touchstone of historical knowledge. So if we know politics rationally –  
as rationally as we know mathematics –- then we know God, for God conceived adequately is  
identical with the multiplicity of natural powers.” (Balibar 2008 122–-123.) 
 
18 As discussed under the term policy, Spinoza understood that “common notions”, or shared  
understandings contribute to the composition of human orders and projects. 
 
19 See Popp-Madsen (2014 50) 
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their rights to the sovereign in order to maintain the peaceable functions of the state.20 
Hardt and Negri (2004) and others endow the multitude with the task of overturning this 
bourgeois state of affairs that Hobbes conceptually establishes:21 
Whereas the nascent bourgeoisie needed to call on a sovereign power to guarantee 
its interests, the multitude emerges from within the new imperial sovereignty and 
points beyond it. The multitude is working through Empire to create an alternative 
global society. Whereas the modern bourgeois had to fall back on new sovereignty 
to consolidate its order, the postmodern revolution of the multitude looks forward, 
beyond imperial sovereignty. The multitude, in contrast to the bourgeoisie and all 
other exclusive, limited class formations, is capable of forming society 
autonomously; this we will see, is central to its democratic possibilities. (xvii-
xviii).22 
 
This study endows the multitude with no destiny besides its possibilities to exist, and to 
instigate or participate in contextual, particular or general order or disorder. Moreover, it 
is this study’s understanding that the multitude exists in relation to any government or 																																																																																																																																																																					
 
20 According to Hobbes, people must accept their position in relation to the sovereign, which is  
unlike how Spinoza articulates how multitude can collaboratively can strives to embody social  
peace or let their structures collapse. Though much is made of the distinction, Spinoza clearly  
understands that not all choices made by the multitude are for hopeful reasons. “There are  
certainly some subjects of fear for a commonwealth, and as every separate citizen or in the state  
of nature every man, so a commonwealth is the less independent, the greater reason it has to fear.”  
(Spinoza 1953 ch.3. sec.9) 
 
21 Virno (2004, 2008) also writes about the opposition between Hobbes'’ people and Spinoza’s 
multitude, while Balibar simply recognizes that Spinoza wrote with a knowledge of Hobbes'’ 
work. 
 
22 The early 2000’s popularity of Hardt and Negri’s multitude-as-progressive-hivemind provided  
one raison d’etre for the concurrent development of network technologies, and is viewed by this  
study as one of many governing concepts that might be impressed upon the multitude. 
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governing force, across place and time.23 A cultural policy in relation to the multitude is 
meant to forward the multitude’s own definitional capacities to compose among itself and 
through culture in relation to governing force. 
 
Culture 
Culture relates to that grey area between the multitude and governing force. It is grey 
because it can be unclear where one element ends and the other begins. Culture is what is 
identified as the ways people are, and how they actively describe their being in the world, 
and their ways of relating through things in it. From his ethnographic work, Pierre 
Clastres (1977) defines culture as that which stands between people and the forces of the 
natural world. His Guarani informants understand nature as being powerful and as having 
the force of “coercion.” Because of its capacity to coerce, human governmental force is 
included within the Guarani definition of nature. (34–35) 
 
When Virno describes those “species specific faculties” (2010 41) mentioned above, he is 
referencing the tools that compose cultural comprehension of what has been thrown on 
this stage of human aesthesis by government and governance. Like the forces it 
encounters, what is cultural can be described as changing over time in relation to what the 
multitude of humanity encounters through whatever form, governmental or otherwise. In 
relation to the cultural, the “social” is constituted by the less formalized but ever-present 
particularities of human interaction; it is through sociality that culture encounters its 																																																								
 
23 Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise (1951 123) utilizes the term multitude to describe the  
Israelites standing before Moses with the ten commandments, recently received from God on  
Mount Sinai.	
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meaning and human force. Human culture changes with its changing cultural perceptions. 
Nevertheless, what is called culture or cultural is, by its nature, formally shared as either 
rule or meaningful proposition – culture can be conceived as either fixed or debatable in 
relation to how humans think through their faculties in the world. Western thought gives 
to the cultural a contemplative element – Kant (1790/2007), for example, discusses 
culture in relation to the judgement of taste. 
 
Important for the discussion of the definition of climate and the overall discussion of the 
project; while in Phenomenology of Mind (1977), Hegel discusses culture as negotiable, 
he also describes it as something akin to law. “It is therefore through culture that the 
individual acquires standing and actuality.” (298) This individual has affinity with 
Hobbes’ “person” and relates to Commonwealth’s anthropological machine that produces 
for humans a formal way of being in relation to the state.24 Through an evaluation of 
culture and cultural forms across the anthropological world, Hegel justifies civilizational 
and racial hierarchies. (423) Macherey (2011) describes Hegel’s conceptual positioning 
of the individual in history against the void of being that Hegel sees in Spinoza’s 
concepts;(21) this ordering of culture besides law allows for Hegel’s conceptions of 
agency. This study does not affirm the truth of Hegel’s dialectics; however, it does 
appreciate how discursive conclusions drawn through cultural thought can take on 
juridical, law-like functions. Culture, as Virno (2008) may suggest, has a “regularity that 
stimulates.” (41) 																																																								
24 “Thus, Hobbes performs the theoretical operation of letting the social contract work as an  
Agambenian anthropological machine, which not only produces man in contrast to the animal,  
but produces a specific version of man: the individual with rights and duties towards the  
sovereign.” (Popp-Madsen 2014 51) 
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Chakrabarty (2009 217-218) suggests that the Western cultural complex that Hegel’s 
philosophy helps elaborate puts the totality of Western-oriented cultures in a significantly 
different relation to the oil-economy than other people. He comments that Western people 
are regularized towards a petroleum-fueled economy, suggesting that through this 
particular temporal and status-oriented assumptions about human being and becoming are 
normalized. Nevertheless, it should be clear that as multitude, no person has any proper 
way of culturally being other than to be somehow become subject to and participant in 
the creation and movement cultural forms. It’s just that people (Western or otherwise) 
become routinized into ways of being until other things occur. 
 
Culture – as objects, idea, and as dispositifs and objective ways of being and doing – 
obtains a law-like force due to how it serves as the mediated-but-finally-unmediatable 
juncture for so many particular concepts, ways of doing and being. Culture is not law 
(though laws are cultural) because it is just the particular and sum-total name given to 
any particular grouping of thought, action and production. But because culture does this, 
it has value to human organization.25 This value allows culture to consequentially 
organize26 without seeming to organize human relations in particular ways.27 As a result 
of this fact, cultural thinking is a premeditated and organizational project, giving logic to 
																																																								
25 For a detailed conversation on this point, see Toscano (2008). 
 
26 Here, the study points to the concept of biopolitics and the ways that the state deploys through  
culture a means to organize, develop and regulate populations and their ways of being. 
 
27 The literature here is rich, but see for example Adorno (1977, 1997), Kracauer (1995) Debord  
(2012), Bürger (1984) Sholette (2011), Stakemeier and Vishmidt (2016). 
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the academic disciplines of art, anthropology and cultural studies (among other things), 
and for corporations and governments to have cultural policies.28 Nevertheless, regardless 
of the consequentiality of formal Western cultural practice, culture is not law (unless 
codified law is the specific subject of discussion), but varieties of more or less 
consequential ways of thinking through and organizing human relation in the world.29 
 
This study hopes that those who work with culture acknowledge that though all the 
possible applications of their work are indeterminable, their efforts are nevertheless 
imbricated in varieties of value systems. For this study’s interests, cultural workers are, 
generally, those who somehow work with cultural forms (that is, everyone), though the 
term more specifically refer to all those who somehow creatively work with culture, 
sociality, politics and human communication. On the importance of conscientiously 
working with culture, this study looks to Clastres (1977) and how he describes the 
connections that Guarani people make between culture’s translational relationship with 
coercive powers. He writes that the Guarani recognize that “power’s transcendence 
conceals a mortal risk for the group, that the principle of an authority which is external 
and the creator of its own legality is a challenge to culture itself.” (35) Cultural activity 
that is attendant to interests from below can serves as a check to the force of cultural 
activity determined from above.  
																																																								
28 See, for example Foucault (1966/2006) for the way that epistemes of knowledge have the  
capacity to organize the world. 
 
29 Countless writers make this point. This study singles out Chakrabarty (2007, 2009) for his  
particular identification of techno-logistical cultural constellation of Western cultural commerce  
against the backdrop of other possible organizations in the world. See also Mbembe (2003),  
Wynter (2003), Rivolta Femminile (1991). 
 
	 27	
 
Climate 
Culture can both organize or protect from coercive natural forces in varieties of ways. 
The definition of climate to which this study attends is particular to how it understands 
the multitude’s potential to respond beside culture to governance and climate change. 
While Hardt and Negri and Virno see the multitude as potentially capable of confounding 
the ascribed state/subject relationship, this study understands that the multitude is and 
will be confounded by climate change in the pinch of state’s governing activity. The 
standard Western conception of climate as fully independent from humanity30 allows for 
culture to “apolitically” sit beside the effects of human activity on things understood as 
nature and on the general effect of climate on human being and becoming. This 
governing and dominant conceptualization of climate as having no meaningful 
contribution to general ways of being was conceived during the now-eclipsed geological 
era of the Holocene.31 
 
The Holocene, characterized by its relatively stable climate and geology, allowed for 
Western philosophical, cultural and political thought to conceive of humanity as outside 
of nature. The conversation around the term Anthropocene seeks to correct this Holocenic 
misconception by highlighting the world-historical effects of humanity on weather and 
geology.32 Jason W. Moore (2016) provides a correction to the term Anthropocene: 
																																																								
30 This is the standard conception of humanity existing outside of nature. Among others,  
Indigenous scholars observe how this conception of human outside nature is purely a Western  
construct. See for example Todd (2015), Hall (2015). 	
31 See Chakrabarty (2007), Renn and Laubichler (2014), Tsing (2015), and Haraway (2015). 
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‘Capitalocene' places responsibility for climate change upon human forces organized by 
capitalism rather than upon humanity in general. This study appreciates Donna 
Haraway’s (2015) contribution to the Anthropcenic nominations; 'Chthulucene', is a term 
meant to emphasize the need in this era to recognize the entanglements of relations that 
any human activity is caught up in. This entanglement mirrors the amorphousness of 
positions people occupy between being multitude, their cultural being, the wastes they lay 
and their variable relations to nature and culture as governing forces. 
 
It is through the entanglement of weather, geology, culture, habits, politics, projects, 
economies ideas, other species and so on that this study encounters the multitude. A 
precept that motivates this study is an awareness that much of the contemporary 
scholarship around visual cultures in relation to climate change does not attend to how 
the multitude actually experiences climate change; rather, much of it follows and enforces 
political lines. To exemplify the prefiguration of a “post-fossil fuel world” T. J. Demos’ 
(2017) Against the Anthropocene: Visual Culture and Environment Today highlights a 
kayak and leisure craft blockade of a mobile oil-drill rig in the waters off Seattle. 
Nicholas Mirzoeff (2014a) utilizes art historical tools to describe how power works 
through classical natural imagery to forward racist and exploitation-oriented relations, 
and discusses how critical work might undo that. McKee and McLagen (2009) describe 
the goal of their work as twofold: to tracing activist imaginaries, and to follow how 
power represents itself to make targets perceptible and possible allies visible. Mirzoeff, 
McKee, McLagen and Demos have good reason to marshal cultural thought along 																																																																																																																																																																					
32 See Zalasiewicz et. al. (2008). 	
	 29	
Marxist and anti-capitalist lines – these policies and industries most responsible for the 
wreckage of the climate must stop. Understandably Demos (2017), Mirzoeff (2014b) and 
others see the fight against capital as the primary political conflict in relation to climate 
change. Demos favors Moore’s portmanteau, Capitalocene, over the Anthropocene, as the 
former properly lays the direct blame for the crisis upon capitalism. 
 
Along with Žižek (2010 330–336), Demos and Mirzoeff also criticize post-colonial 
theorist Dipesh Chakrabarty for his use of the term Anthropocene – Žižek for his analysis 
that the humanity that he sees Chakrabarty as blaming for climate change is not a 
properly Hegelian subject and therefore implying that capitalism is let off the hook in his 
writing. “The key struggle is a particular one: one can solve the universal problem (of the 
survival of the human species) only by resolving the particular deadlock of the capitalist 
mode of production.” (334) 33  Žižek's attention turns to Hegelian concerns in the light of 
the climate to find actionable political solutions to the problem. 
 
Chakrabarty (2009) counters that though, indeed, capitalism must take the direct 
immediate blame for the problem, its effects will be felt everywhere. 
It seems true that the crisis of climate change has been necessitated by the high-
energy consuming models of society that capitalist industrialization has created 
and promoted, but the current crisis has brought into view certain other conditions 
for the existence of life in the human form that have no intrinsic connection to the 
logics of capitalist, nationalist, or socialist identities. They are connected rather to 																																																								
33 Demos (2017) and Mirzoeff (2014b) follow Žižek’s general argument in their 
critiques of Chakrabarty. 
 
	 30	
the history of life on this planet, the way different life-forms connect to one 
another, and the way the mass extinction of one species could spell danger for 
another. (217) 
Ultimately, this study has no stake in the epistemological debate related to the usage of 
Anthropocene, Capitalocene, or Chthulucene; it understands that each focuses on a 
different aspect of the problems associated with human-caused climate change. What it 
finds useful in this exchange however is how Chakrabarty makes clear the crisis that 
humanity faces exceeds the scope of normal political considerations; ending capitalism 
will not save the rest of the world from the ravages of climate change, and the rich will 
not escape the era unscathed.34 Regarding the universal nature of the problem, 
Chakrabarty says that climate change affects all, in accordance with the very particular, 
individual or collective ways that life has been differently organized across the globe.35 
The goal of this study is to somehow culturally stand by all these multitudinous 
differences of how people experience climate change. Though it finds affinity with such 
projects as Demos’, its goals are not to impress governmental lines upon the multitude, 
which already feels in numerous and entangled ways the governing effects of climate. 
The human condition is such that life is experienced in relation to forces that are external 
to it; to stand by the multitude, this study requires an appreciation of how these forces 
affect it. Natural and human force, and violence bear down upon the multitude in 
different ways in different places; unknown or unyielding forces cast us all into a position 																																																								
34 “Unlike in the crises of capitalism, there are no lifeboats here for the rich and the privileged  
(witness the drought in Australia or recent fires in the wealthy neighborhoods of California).”  
(Chakrabarty 2009 221) 
 
35 Climate change “calls for a global approach to politics without the myth of a global identity,  
for, unlike a Hegelian universal, it cannot subsume particularities.” (Chakrabarty 2009 222). 
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of needing to respond in considered and unconsidered ways. 
On its most elementary level the “toil and trouble” of obtaining and the pleasures 
of “incorporating” the necessities of life are so closely bound together in the 
biological life cycle, whose recurrent rhythm conditions human life in its unique 
and unilinear movement, that the perfect elimination of the pain and effort of 
labor would not only rob biological life of its most natural pleasures but deprive 
the specifically human life of its very liveliness and vitality. The human condition 
is such that pain and effort are not just symptoms which can be removed without 
changing life itself; they are rather the modes in which life itself, together with the 
necessity to which it is bound, makes itself felt. (Arendt 1998 120) 36 
 
Arendt’s embodied description of how necessity and violence, toil and trouble, bear upon 
laboring people informs this study’s articulation of how the multitude experiences climate 
change. For Arendt, laboring has no voice; yet its capacity for aesthesis and its experience 
of the actual coming and going of itself in the world, is what provides life with meaning. 
For the multitude, climate is felt in the entanglement of forces that seem to come from 
beyond, and against which its individual and common practices must orient its ways of 
living here and now and in some beyond. 
 
For Arendt, the meaning of labor has an existential and moral component – without toil, 
she suggests, life would be alien to itself. (Arendt 1989 89) Arendt recognizes how her 
conclusions stand in contradiction with certain Marxist understandings of the potentials 																																																								
36 As the home in this world is the point from where we experience the world, note the Greek  
root for home (oikos) in both economy and ecology. 	
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of Species Being under what she sees as the goals of communist development, of 
common being oriented around the natural essence of humanity to the exclusion of other 
natural forces and without labor and toil.37 This study sidesteps the argument between 
Arendt and Marx; its task is not to choose one human horizon over another – this is a 
question upon which the multitude disagrees. Rather, the study simply embraces Arendt’s 
description of how she describes human experience providing orientation and meaning in 
life; that it is through actual aesthesis with the forces of the world that humans activity 
gains orientation. Thus, rather than engaging in scientific or language-oriented debates 
around the term, this study simply understands climate as that which the multitude 
experiences as compelling forces that seems to emerge from powers beyond itself.  
 
Policy 
Though policy can be something else,38 based on its capacity to be institutionalized 
through bureaucratic means and  to follow governing interests, policy can be defined as a 
top-down project instituted by governing forces to normalize and standardize its own 																																																								
37 Arendt (1989 89) writes, “Within a completely ‘socialized mankind,’ whose sole purpose 
would be the entertaining of the life process-and this is the unfortunately quite unutopian ideal 
that guides Marx's theories-the distinction between labor and work would have completely 
disappeared; all work would have become labor because all things would be understood, not in 
their worldly, objective quality, but as results of living labor power and functions of the life 
process.”  
 
She than suggests that such a world would be a completely alien construction, “Marx's 
original charge against capitalist society was not merely its transformation of all objects into 
commodities, but that ‘the laborer behaves toward the product of his labor as to an alien object’ 
(‘dass der Arbeiter zum Produkt seiner Arbeit als einem fremden Gegenstand sich verhalt’ 
[Jugendschriften)-in other words, that the things of the world, once they have been produced by 
men, are to an extent independent of, "alien" to, human life.” (ibid.) 
 
38 As will soon be discussed, policy can be attuned to and instituted by bottom-up grassroots  
interests, culturally formalized but working with the multitude’s capacities for common sense  
organization of human affairs and activities. 
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interests and efforts.39 The invention of what is commonly called policy emerged, 
according to Foucault (2007), through the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, as a top-down 
structure intended to organize social peace throughout the states of Europe, to make 
“good use of the state's forces.” (314) The definition of what is “good” is one reason why 
this study attends itself to theological concerns40 –- 'good' is rarely a universal concept 
but rather one that the multitude assembles and dis-assembles around. The 'good' can be a 
political concept that relates to what can be socially organized to the benefit of any 
particular class,41under the possible illusion that what is good for one is good for all. 
 
Politically, “policy” can be attendant to politically indeterminate things – this is reflective 
of how culture variably relates to the powers of coercion and force. In this age of still 
ascendant neoliberal culture, cultural policy matters can be attendant to a variety of 
concerns. Cultural policy can be attendant to top-down or insurgent interests and played 
out through all kinds of dispositifs of people, ideas and possible organizationality. So, 
conversations from a variety of political perspectives that coalesce in conversations 
																																																								
39 Some key reference points for contemporary debates on cultural policy in relation to top-down  
liberal cultural management include Giddens (1994), Bennet (1998), Florida (2004), Lewis and  
Miller (2008), and O’Brien (2014). 
 
40 This study ultimately articulates the need for human-organizational horizons as theological  
interests –- which may or may not be atheistic. Theology is understood as the cultured ways for  
organizing collective horizons of being and becoming across distance and time; providing  
orientational perspective for living and dying. As theology is understood here as a meaning  
architecture, a deity is simply an inessential element who may or may not provide a transcendent  
perspective within or of the architecture. For this study, in relation to these questions, this study  
draws see, most notably on the work of Wynter (1995), Laruelle (2002, 2012), Agamben (2005),  
Esposito (2011), Dean (2012). 
 
41 In relation to politics, Rancière's definition of policy is the making structural of whose voice is  
accounted for and who is rewarded for being counted. (Rancière 1999, 29) 
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around the creative or smart city,42 degrowth,43 and new municipalism44 (for example) 
can all be considered as policy debates with some affinity to the concerns of this study – 
considering that they somehow organize populations and their living and consuming 
habits (their cultural habits) in relation to what a state or potential state can order. The 
theoretical work of art historians and visual culture scholars like Demos and Mirzoeff can 
also be described as policy-interested in that they are laying out ways and providing 
institutional logics for political projects to be carried out across the contested cultural 
terrain. While this study's policy focus finds affinity with these projects, it looks 
elsewhere – towards the less politically consolidated field of the multitude – but, as stated 
above, not with the immediate project and task given to it by Hardt and Negri. 
 
This study claims that there can be a cultural policy that can be in some way attendant to 
the general interests of the multitude and be affirmatively affected by it in all its ways. 
Such a policy would organize cultural work in support of general multitudinous 
capacities for being and doing rather than in affinity to any particular political or 
theoretical project.45 This focus then relates to the universal nature of human being,46  																																																								
42 See for example, Jacobs (1961/2011), Davis (1990), Harvey (2000), Florida (2002), and 
Sennett (2018). 
 
43  See for example, Herman (1972), Carlsson (2008), Czech (2013), Giacomo D'Alisa, Demaria  
& Kallis (2015). 
 
44  See for example, Harvey (2013), Observatorio Metropolitano (2013), Colau & Alemany  
(2014), Baird (2015), and Russel & Reyes (2017). 
 
45 As such, such lines would become a line by which to discipline the multitude for articulated  
interests that may or may not benefit the multitude. 
 
46 Marx's (2009) conceptualization of Species Being demonstrates the powerful basis for a  
political program, of the scope of communism, that launching a project based on a whole of  
humanity's essential being might suggest. 
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though through a conception of the multitude’s variable capacities to conceive of its own 
common-sense practices of being and doing. This is a universal though non-
universalizable conception,47 as it focused in multitudinous relations to processes rather 
than transcendent truth.  Deleuze (1988) utilizes Spinoza's conceptualization of common 
notions to discuss how universal horizons demonstrate a capacity for common 
organization and an incapacity for humanity to ever truly orient towards any singular 
transcendent universal. “Spinoza radically rejects the notions of eminence, equivocity, 
and even analogy (notions according to which God would possess the perfections in 
another form, a superior form)”. (52) 
 
The multitude's ways of doing and being, which can be understood as the multitude's 
political anthropology48 relates to the ways in which the multitude can be that body which 
is necessary for any form of human governance– for it is the multitude which does make 
politics possible. Making worlds allows for multitudinous ways of being and doing 
within those worlds. That is, the multitude’s ways of being and becoming are its universal 
but not-universalizable processes of organizing and prioritizing the expansive range of 
activities that are then refined through the mesh of “common sense.” 
 
This study understands common sense through Spinoza’s (2001) conceptualization of 																																																																																																																																																																					
 
47 The interest in working with concepts that are universal but not-universalizable relates to the  
debates signaled above between Chakrabarty and Žižek and that are further fleshed out  
throughout the thesis. Sylvia Wynter’s (see Wynter and McKittrick 2015), of thinking about the  
limits of a purely “'biological”' definition of the human become a key concept for this study, as  
does Foucault's (1998) approach to working with human variability.   
 
48 This articulation of the multitude’s capacities is taken from Read (2016). 
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'common notions'. For Spinoza, understanding is worldly, embodied, processual and 
relational – and mediated through 'common notions'. 'Common notions', which describe 
the procedural way of reflecting on the world, mediate the range of habits and routines, 
and ultimately define how people assess whether or not their ideas are “adequate or 
confused.” (2P36 – 2P39) The varied processes of organizing common sense represents 
the multitude’s own capacity to define its relations to culture and politics horizons.  The 
PAH demonstrates this process for this study; in a related way, The PAH also 
demonstrates how common sense that is drawn from and across the common sociality of 
people can define from below what people demand of their culture and politics- therefor 
being the particular multitude comes to define policy.  
 
Common sense understandings of the world are generated around common experiences 
of objects and concepts.49 Objects and concepts can become subjects of policy from 
above or below,50  here, Agamben’s concept of “the whatever object” emerges as an 
important concept to describe how objects can be employed to carry a policy out.51 The 
study's turns to questions of objects and concepts in terms of their relationship to 
culture52 in the time of climate change, because such crisis generate situations where any 																																																								
49 See Saito (2010) for a discussion of how aesthetic and object-oriented affections contribute to  
the mundane order of human organizationality. 
 
50 The critical art discourse known as institutional critique is a useful corollary here, as it  
describes possible dissonance between intention and effect across the variety of institutional  
players. See for example Raunig & Ray (2009), and Bennett (1998). 
 
51 Agamben's (1993) concept of the whatever object identifies the fact that objects can carry out 
varieties of meanings   and that as potentially universal things, they can be unmoored from any 
originary concepts or contexts. In this study, objects are understood to mean any variety of things 
that can be conceptually or actually identified – that is, anything that might be a noun. 
 
52 For committed political reads of how politics may move through objects, see Thoburn (2010),  
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culture’s common sense bumps up against its own governing concepts.  Within crisis 
situations53 common sense practices must reveal themselves as actual management tools 
for establishing or mediating multitudinous being across and towards a variety of 
horizons.54 Importantly, common sense may or may not demonstrate ethical 
considerations of what should be common human practice, the terms of the debate for 
what is commonly sensed is ultimately open to human variably and the wide margins of 
human judgement. In order to maintain its progressive orientation in relation to the 
multitude, this study does develop an ethical matrix through which to evaluate cultural 
forms in relation to the multitude’s variable common sense functions. This matrix’ ethic 
is to support the ongoing variability of the multitude’s efforts and their common sense 
orientations in relation to its being pinched between law and climate.55  
 																																																																																																																																																																					
and Shukaitis (2013). 
 
53 This study observes how Autonomist Marxists (see for example Clover 2016, Dupont 2003)  
understand the labor crisis of capitalism, and to Feminist (for example Irigary 1996, Rivolta  
Femminille 1991), and Post-Colonial (for example Mbembe 2003, Wilderson 2014) thought for a  
more systemic look at issues of social reproduction in a global capitalist and Western order. 
 
54 See Quarantelli (2001) for a leading sociological/disaster account of general human capacities  
in disaster and Solnit (2009) for her account of the ways that humans generally recover from  
disaster through common capacities; and the politicization of common response. Speaking about  
Hurricane Katrina and crisis situations generally, Solnit writes: 
 
“Today Cain is still killing his brother” proclaims a faded church mural in the Lower 
Ninth Ward of New Orleans, which was so devastated by the failure of the government 
levees. In quick succession, the Book of Genesis gives us the creation of the universe, the 
illicit acquisition of knowledge, the expulsion from Paradise, and the slaying of Abel by 
Cain, a second fall from grace into jealousy, competition, alienation, and violence. When 
God asks Cain where his brother is, Cain asks back, “Am I my brother’s keeper?” He is 
refusing to say what God already knows: that the spilled blood of Abel cries out from the 
ground that has absorbed it. He is also raising one of the perennial social questions: are 
we beholden to each other, must we take care of each other, or is it every man for 
himself? (Solnit 2009 2–-3) 
 
55  Here, again, Foucault (1998) provides essential guidance.  
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For culture to peaceably organize a policy through sociality – or, inversely – for 
institutional policy to be reflective of what would satisfy the multitude without resorting 
to violence, it still needs in some way to appeal to common sense so that there is some 
logic to the order.56 Witness, for example the crisis that Jo Freeman (1970) famously 
describes in her Tyranny of Structurelessness essay57. Policy is fully open to politics from 
above or below and either way may or may not be beneficial to the multitude.58  
 
Governance and government 
Power is what is experienced through the climate, whether it is the potency of a good 
economic climate, a fierce and destructive storm, a cop, or the meaningful danger in a 
neighbor's threat. The multitude, with the things it must relate to, work in some way to 
govern, utilize, ignore, avoid or escape power. Government is the most formal of ways 
that humanity conceptualizes its own organization in relation to the rest of the world, be 
this in relation to the wind’s power,59 or the army of another government.60 Unless 
																																																								
 
56 Here, in this way of generating an actual policy attendant to the multitude, this study is  
indebted to the Monster Institutions issue of the European Institute for Progressive Culture (2008) 
 
57 Freeman (1970) writes: 
 
A "laissez faire" group is about as realistic as a "laissez faire" society; the idea becomes a 
smokescreen for the strong or the lucky to establish unquestioned hegemony over others. 
This hegemony can be so easily established because the idea of "structurelessness" does 
not prevent the formation of informal structures, only formal ones. Similarly "laissez 
faire" philosophy did not prevent the economically powerful from establishing control 
over wages, prices, and distribution of goods; it only prevented the government from 
doing so.  
 
58 Here is the ambiguous tie that Virno (2008) makes between the one and the many. 
 
59 In their own ways, Negarestani (2008), Woodard (2012), and other Object Oriented  
Ontologists adequately describe the governing forces that objects and things exert in the world.  
Coole & Frost (2010) provide a more political discussion of the nature of matter organized in the  
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otherwise noted, the term “'government”' here suggests the entanglement of (financial, 
bureaucratic, biopolitical, academic etc.) institutions that entanglements of finance and 
states orchestrate, as an ultimately singular entity that we commonly call “'the 
government”.61   Governments have identifiable interests and chains of command that 
carry out their directives in effort to achieve measurable goals. As a singular entity, this 
government is the opposite of the multitude. 
 
Governance is a more vaguer term and relates specifically to things that exert force, 
whether that force is geological, economic, climatological, political, a tasty cookie or a 
stoplight.62 Governing concepts are ideas that seem to be meaningful and therefore orient 
thought, policy and activity in their suggested direction.63 Governments, governance and 																																																																																																																																																																					
world. 
 
60 While government suggests an active partner in the making of history in time, cultural and  
ecological inheritances from the past, scaffolded into ecological and social relations entangle  
actual being within a network with a limited framework for actual rearrangement. See Odling- 
Smee (1998), Povinelli (2006), and Renn & Laubichler (2014). 
 
61 This study is indebted to the work of Foucault (1991, 2003, 2007) for his tracing of the  
genealogy of government’s entanglements with economics. Though this study appreciates the  
multi-levelled and entangled nature of governance, it ultimately uses the word to point through  
those entanglements to suggest an identifiable power structure –- one that ultimately has the  
biggest guns and loudest voice, or as Foucault (1991 91) puts it, that which has the “transcendent  
singularity of Machiavelli’s prince” – be that prince a formal or informal organization, a family or  
a single individual. 
 
62 The concept of governance has been discussed as descriptive of the multi-layered approaches  
to managing social problems (Swyngedouw 2005) or in criticism of how the term depoliticizing  
and obscuring governmental action (Walters 2004). Neither usage is intended by this study – the  
use here is meant to be purely descriptive of the fact that things, human-caused or otherwise, have  
managing effects on other things. Further, these managing effects may or may not have anything  
to do with what has been traditionally been described within political theory as having anything  
to do with decision making processes. 
 
63 This concept here relates here to developments within professional and academic disciplines,  
where particular orientations and inquiries become, for a time, hegemonic. Foucault (1966/2006),  
Smith (2016), and Chakrabarty’s (2001) work about the boundaries of academic disciplines in  
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governing concepts are not necessarily universal; rather, they are institutions or naturally 
occurring effects that people look to, are told to look towards, or are forced to orient by; 
perhaps sometimes for leadership or for profit. Nevertheless, through their scale of affects 
(which is by definition large and therefore more than conceptually related to the climate) 
they bend relationally towards the universal. Without governing concepts, 
governmentality can be understood as a simple diagram or a patterning of force relations 
that is employed through human cultural and nature/cultural relations. In difference to 
this apolitical pattern of power, for this study any mode of governmentality (and therefore 
the policy statements of this study) definitionally sits (comfortably or not) upon the back 
of and in some way in difference to the multitude. 
 
Chapter outline 
Subsequent to this introduction, Chapter 1 expands upon the relation between nature and 
culture and demonstrates the roles that governing concepts play in organizing particular 
nature/culture relationships. With examples drawn from art and anthropological literature, 
the chapter demonstrates how culture can be attendant to governing interests rather than 
the interests of the multitude. This demonstration is done, in order to clearly define the 
goals of the project, its terms and concepts. It lays out the basics of both Hobbesian and 
Spinozan political theory in order to begin a discussion of how the multitude relates to 
both worldly being and governance. The chapter identifies this study's definition of the 
multitude via a discussion of Virno. 
 																																																																																																																																																																					
relation to political and cultural developments have been instructive for this study, while Foucault  
(1998) has been central. 
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Chapter 2 looks at how culture confronts what is traditionally defined as natural force, 
and how politics are contingent to whatever is posed in this particular relation between 
nature and culture. The chapter starts out with a discussion of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change and how Dark Mountain responded to the 2015 Paris Climate 
Summit. The writing and politics of Dark Mountain are examined in relationship to 
cultural thought contingent to and in affinity with the group. Finding the project’s 
position generally inadequate at helping think through how cultural forms might best 
respond to multitudinous interests in a changing climate, the chapter’s conclusion looks 
toward other objects and concepts within contemporary culture, in relation to political 
theory, in order to identify what sort of cultural conceptualization is needed to address 
this study’s concerns. 
 
Chapter 3 looks at where political leadership, individual need, creativity and common 
sense converge in the social movement organized through Barcelona’s PAH. The chapter 
begins with an introduction discussing how to consider the PAH in relation to common 
definitions of people in struggle, in order to see how the study of the PAH might 
generally relate to the multitude. It identifies how popular social movements relate to 
general questions of leadership, expressed through an exploration of classical political 
thought. It connects these questions of leadership to the experiences of people in crisis, to 
the socio-political constructions of mental health, and also the concept of the 'general 
intellect'. The chapter then lays out, from research and fieldwork observations, the variety 
of orientations and actions that the PAH goes through to effect political change in its 
effort to house its members. 
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The fourth chapter begins to synthesize concepts discussed in the previous chapters in 
relation to an understanding of ecology and climate change, as the particular encounter 
between nature and culture. It does so in three interrelated ways: first by working through 
the previously discussed concepts in relation to evolutionary biology, then in relation to 
governmental concepts of law and economics, then in relation to theological and cultural 
questions. It identifies the variable spaces between all these conceptual structures as 
places where the multitude may or may not find the social play that would allow for the 
development of other common sense ways of being. Through this process, the chapter 
also brings into view the study’s most general definition of the multitude’s ethical 
interests in relation to broader governing forces. 
 
The final chapter draws connections between statements and conclusions seeded 
throughout the previous chapters and brings them together to lay out an eleven-point 
policy statement. 
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Chapter 1 
An Introduction to the Problem 
With the possibility of an eleven foot sea level rise, ocean acidification, a five degree 
increase in average global temperature, heightened extinction rates, etc., climate change 
will force changes in how humans live in relation to the earth and each other in particular 
and general ways.64 These changes could be catastrophic. While this study asserts that 
governmental activity will fail to meaningfully address the challenges that climate change 
presents to humanity, this belief means little to the study’s actual facts. While not 
ignoring governance, this study is decidedly disinterested in the perspective of what 
formal government can produce by itself. Rather, this study is interested in describing a 
policy in relation to the multitude, that body of people everywhere that according to 
Paolo Virno (2004) “shuns political unity, resists authority, does not enter into lasting 
agreements, and never attains the status of juridical person because it never transfers its 
own natural rights to the sovereign.” (25) The multitude exists by its unaccountable 
sociality which prescribes and informs particular individual meanings and behaviors that 
are beside, with, against and indifferent to governance and law while also being capable 
of transforming these very forces of governance. It is this multitude, which this study sees 
as potentially descriptive of all humanity in relation to law, that this study aims to support 
through cultural work. This is because it is the multitude’s experiences of climate change, 
rather than governments’ experiences, that matter. Government is ultimately a tool – the 
multitude are beings. 
  
A cultural policy of the multitude is written upon what the multitude, in its myriad ways 
and possibilities, already does. In terms of livability in the time of a changing climate, the 																																																								
64 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states: “Climate change impacts, 
adaptation, and vulnerability span a vast range of topics. With the deepening of knowledge about 
climate change, we see connections in expanding and diverse areas, activities, and assets at risk. 
Early research focused on direct impacts of temperature and rainfall on humans, crops, and wild 
plants and animals. New evidence points to the importance of understanding not only these direct 
impacts but also potential indirect impacts, including impacts that can be transmitted around the 
world through trade, travel, and security. As a consequence, few aspects of the human endeavor 
or of natural ecosystem processes are isolated from possible impacts in a changing climate. The 
interconnectedness of the Earth system makes it impossible to draw a confined boundary around 
climate change impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability.”	
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cultural policy is not meant to explain things to the always-variable multitude who 
through their experiences feel the changing climate’s effects. Rather, the study is meant 
for the consideration of those who work culturally within and in relation to the multitude. 
This study’s cultural policy and twelve-point conclusion is written for the consideration 
of cultural workers (loosely defined as people who consider their activities or work to be 
relationally meaningful to others) in order to clarify how they may best calibrate their 
cultural efforts in relation to the others of the multitude.  
 
Properly speaking, the human multitude has no particular cultural policy – no rules for 
how to behave other than in relation to the limits of all possible behaviors.  The human 
multitude has no particular cultural policy as it has no formal interests outside of those 
that are general to all living organisms. By its very nature the multitude ignores, exceeds, 
inverts or contradicts any policy made for and by it. As human history demonstrates, and 
as this thesis investigates, multitudinous actors particularly produce things and concepts 
that transform particular relations and relational capacities with historical impact. To 
create a cultural policy, the relation between abstract cultural forms and their relation to 
how they structure the living of life must be understood. Therefore, the methodology 
investigates the systems and objective natures of cultural work in relation to the systems 
of being, knowing and doing that construct the intimate and abstract frames for 
multitudinous sociality. In terms of multitudinous sociality, the study’s model (presented 
in Chapter 3) is based upon the Spain-based Plataforma de Afectados Por La Hipoteca 
(the PAH), a grassroots social movement that helps individuals fight against the banks 
and state for the right to housing. In terms of cultural work, the study expands upon the 
United Kingdom-based Dark Mountain Project (presented in Chapter 2) that produces 
poetry and art in relation to climate change. 
 
Though multitudinous actors’ formal identities are as variable as the world, formally 
speaking, when one works to create cultural forms to manage, govern or relate to the 
multitude, one acts in relation to them rather than being a part of them. In terms of the 
worldly actors, some are the cultural workers for whom this study is written. Others who 
behave like actors have no discernable face at all – the climate and other “natural” actors 
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loudly demonstrate their governing roles in this time of climate change. A changing 
climate and a poisoned world have the capacity to cause mass extinction or just totally 
demand major adjustments in how beings live on the earth. The ecological components of 
the world have been, and are in relationship with the multitudes. That climate change’s 
effects are experienced by the multitude means that culture must allow for ways for the 
multitude to live in some way with them. To live “in some way” with climate change’s 
effects does not suggest a capacity to govern climate change’s effects, however. Rather, to 
live in some way with these effects is understood here to describe ways to support the 
multitude’s capacities of coming to terms with the social and biological realities of the 
changing world.  
 
Definitional conversations around the Anthropocene65 demonstrate the role that humans 
have played in affecting the climate and changing the earth’s chemical composition. 
Western thought has finally begun to acknowledge the role that climate, and its unsettling 
play, both in setting the grounds for and governing particular human possibilities.66 Other 
terminology has been generated to define this era of human geological impact. Jason W. 
Moore (2016) uses the term Capitolocene67 to clearly identify “capitalism as a way of 
organizing nature – as a multi-species, situated, capitalist world-ecology.” (6) While 
Moore’s conceptualization of capitalism’s relation to nature comes to matter in this study, 
it is Donna Haraway’s term Chthulucene68 that seems to most meaningfully define this 																																																								
65 Though throughout anthropological history, humans have been aware of their impacts on the 
earth, Dutch atmospheric chemist Paul Crutzen is credited with popularizing the term 
Anthropocene in around 2002. (Zalasiewicz et. al. 2011) The author of this study became familiar 
with the term through the 2013 Anthropocene Project at Berlin’s Haus der Kulturen der Welt, and 
via Latour (2013), Diederichsen & Franke (2013).	
 
66 See Chakrabarty (2009) for a concise essay on the changing role climate has begun to play in 
Western historical thought.  
 
67 For Moore (2016), the term Anthropocene “shows Nature/Society dualism at its highest stage 
of development,” (3) and is one way of framing this fraught relationship. In an effort to suggest 
alternative names for the era, Moore wants terms that more clearly represent what is at stake and 
what needs to be done in relation to the Anthropocenic moment.  
 
68 “Poeisis is sym-chthonic, sym-poiesie, always partnered all the way down, with no starting 
and subsequently interacting ‘units.’.” (Haraway 2016 37) 	 		
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moment. As Moore says of Haraway’s concept, with the Chthulucene, “[w]e begin to see 
human organization as utterly, completely, and variably porous within the web of life.” 
(5) Haraway’s (2016) poetic69 capacities describe the stakes of this moment: “The 
Chthulucene does not close in on itself; it does not round off; its contact zones are 
ubiquitous and continuously spin out loopy tendrils.” (37) This study shares with 
Haraway an awareness of relationality and the absolute stickiness of conceptual 
distinctions that are only partially distinct because their differences are real or conceptual 
– or contain no difference at all. The multitude is the one and the many, it needs the 
governmentality that it exceeds and disobeys. Thinking through how cultural forms work 
within this knotted contradictory mess is at the heart of this project. How, through the 
fixed set of things of this ecological world set by relations, can we generate different 
outcomes? 
 
The effects of cultures’ concepts (like the concept of peace, or a necktie) are singularly 
maintained and vary across the different scales of life that act as regulatory networks and 
logistical infrastructures. The ability to maintain singular cultural ways and means across 
different fields is what is understood as that which makes something attendant to policy. 
Besides policied things, with such structures the multitude’s activities are varied in 
particular relation to the world and to the multitude itself. In this study, it is understood at 
a basic level that all things cultural are natural. The policy statements that conclude the 
work summarize the natures of culture that matter to the multitude in the time of climate 
change; and identify how culture’s meaningful characteristics appear to differently 
support the viscous multitude. This study has a social, rather than material focus, looking 
at how cultural forms bear on and orient social relations. So, singularly material subjects 
like green architecture, green planning, green industrial design and ecologically oriented 
fine arts immediately fall out of the specific focus of this work. Only to the extent that 
they inform or are subjects of human relationality, are these subjects of general interest. 																																																								
69 “How can we think in times of urgencies without the self-indulgent and self-fulfilling myths of 
apocalypse, when every fiber of our being is interlaced, even complicit, in the webs of processes 
that must somehow be engaged and repatterned? Recursively, whether we asked for it or not, the 
pattern is in our hands. The answer to the trust of the held out hand: think we must.” (Haraway 
2016 39)	
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By theorizing the different capacities of what is ultimately cultural in any creation, what 
is affirmed here in cultural work is how it informs relations between the multitude and 
things in the world.  
 
1 Culture and Nature 
Nature and culture have been conceptualized in different ways across history and place; 
Western thought70 has generally considered properties that humans seem to share with 
other natural organisms as “natural,” and properties that are presented as unique to the 
potentials of human life and its technical survival as society, as “cultural.”71 Against these 
distinctions, the multitude straddles the nature/culture divide: the multitude lives as it 
does, rather than as either “cultural” or “natural.”  
 
In addition to the multitude having no particular cultural policy, a generally human 
cultural policy is also fairly indistinct, as that which can be described as the particular 
general interests of humans beyond things of general interests to all other organisms is a 
slim matter.72 The general cultural policy of all species, expressed through their relational 																																																								
70 Simondon (2011) writes a concise history of ways Western philosophy has conceptualized the 
similarities and differences between the human and other earthly organisms. He draws a sharp 
dividing line between Descartes and Aristotle. He describes how, upon priestly Christian thought, 
Descartes judged animals one way and varieties of humans another; Aristotle non-systemically 
draws relations between all creatures’ capacities and behaviors. Ultimately, this study’s 
conceptualization of the multitude’s nature is more akin to Aristotle’s conceptualization, that 
Simondon describes thusly: “[W]hat comes out of the teachings of Antiquity is that what occurs 
in man and what occurs in animals is comparable. Comparable. Not identical but comparable: it is 
with the same mental categories, the same regulating concepts, and the same schemas that we can 
further our understandings of human and animal life, inside the general teachings of existence, of 
our relationship with the world, reincarnation, polygenesis, or the gradation and degradation of 
existence.” (58–59).	
 
71 Perhaps, if proper to a collection of people, they may be termed civil. Hobbes (1929 64) 
describes two types of philosophical knowledge; one natural, one civil. One is a result of 
“Consequences from the accidents of Bodies Naturall; which is called Naturall Philosophy,” the 
second demonstrates, “Consequences from the Accidents of Politique Bodies; which is called 
Politiques and Civill Philosophy.”	
 
72 The philosophical, theological and biological conversation around the particular nature of each 
organism is beyond this study’s interests. Noting that all organisms have natures particular to 
what, who and how they are is sufficient.		
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behavior, is comprised of their interest in living and therefore surviving over time. 
Nevertheless, interested human thought has made much of distinctions between human 
and other species’ general cultural policies.73  
 
So, this first chapter expands upon what is meant by the multitude, and also what it 
means for the multitude to have a cultural policy. Delineating an ontology that a 
nature/culture divide allows for in narrating particular human anthropologies is at the 
core of cultural life and is the task of Chapter 4. In that chapter, one finds a discussion of 
Jason W. Moore’s distinction between capitalism’s nature/culture divide and that of all 
other ontologies that is essential to this study’s conclusions. Chapters 2 and 3 work 
through the particular concepts revealed through the study’s nominal subjects, the Spain-
based Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca [Platform for People Affected by 
Mortgages] and the United Kingdom-based Dark Mountain Project. The discussion of 
Dark Mountain also helps with a discussion of general concepts contingent to climate 
change. The PAH chapter opens up a discussion of political leadership that figures into 
the multitude’s organization of self-management in relation to governance.  
 
1a On the Nature of Cultural Things 
All this, regardless of the fact that the nature/culture divide is narrative and fictive, and 
that destiny is written in time rather than culturally predetermined in advance. As 
philosopher Catherine Malabou (2017) concludes, geology, biology and cultural history 
historically coalesce into human behavioral patterns to meaningfully inform human 
agents for future world-changing events, even though their humanity suggests no proper 
horizon and no necessary destination of human becoming. “This ‘species’ the human 
remains a pure void concept.” (52) Climate change is an issue because of how it 																																																								
73 While not a focus of this work, this comment is partially meant to acknowledge the possibility 
for other ways to culturally orient relational thought; much literature and global historical and 
anthropological documentation can be seen to capture a diversity of ontologies. In terms of 
contemporary writing, this study looks towards Eduardo Viveiros de Castro’s oeuvre as a 
concerted effort to crystallize non-Western ontological thought, or, more specifically, 
“Amerindian thought.”  This comment is also meant to suggest that the co-species arrangements 
that, for example, Pollan (2002) suggests. Finally, outside of a properly human ontology stand 
ontologies proper to the general production of geological stratum over time (see Negarestani 2008 
and Woodard 2012).	
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continues to bear down on pre-existing cultural arrangements made in relation to nature. 
Culture decidedly and fictively distinguishes itself from nature regardless of the fact that 
the fictive division nevertheless has a deep narrative utility – it is through the 
nature/culture division that human behavior is given order, process and hierarchy. This 
division helps humans conceptualize distinctions between being in time and being over 
time; animality is often associated with being timelessly in the moment, and being 
culturally human is associated with possessing a history that can be analyzed and used to 
strategize towards specific outcomes. Culture gives logic, order and process to sustain 
activity towards organizational ends. In the face of the Chthulucene’s changing natural 
world, particular human efforts to maintain particular cultural arrangements further 
dispossess others of their place in the world. This cultural policy suggests ways to work 
through and against this dispossession and towards particular outcomes revealed over the 
course of this study.  
 
By naming nature as ongoing, and culture as capable of enacting different relationships to 
nature’s temporality, a useful shorthand for a complex metaphysics is achieved. The 
complexity of these metaphysics can be grasped in recognizing the schizophrenia 
inherent to the seamless conceptualization of the differences between being in time and 
existing over time. Regardless of how being in or over time is cut, the surgery divides the 
same body. In recognizing that the multitude’s social body is divided by governing 
concepts, what otherwise might be a strange but useful conceptual operation becomes a 
recognition of the total fact that humans everywhere live in moments afforded by 
structures and routines generally organized to serve something over time. From the 
multitude’s perspective, being in and over time provides the window and extended frame 
of being, in difference or similitude. The multitude’s organizationality may serve many 
things; things may be organized to profit others, for profit-sharing, or for the multitude’s 
own intimate needs.  
 
Beyond the particularities of each human life stands an awareness of what, naturally, 
human collaborations within and between nature and culture have allowed; the multitude 
as a general population has organized and lived in incalculably diverse, naturally cultural 
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situations. Within this worldly ecology – which means differing ecologies, differing 
economies, histories, climates etc. – different things contribute everywhere to the 
particularly scaffolded ways of just generally being human. And so, it is possible to say 
that while humans generally live in the same natural way (are born after the fertilization 
of a mother’s egg by the sperm of a father, with blood coursing through their veins and a 
general need to eat and sleep), over time they relationally structure for themselves 
“culturally” particular ways of just socially being. These ways are formally recognized as 
proper and particular to (for example) regions, organizations, lifestyles, employment, 
religion, ideology, and as proper to family or clan. These ways are also recognized as 
variable over the course of an individual’s lifetime. The concepts that generalize 
particular social organization in place or way are defined here as anthropologies of 
culture.74 
 
It can also be said that while humans generally live in the same natural way, they also 
meet the same but different ends. Everyone dies. The collective panic about 
anthropocenic climate change is not about death in general; in some ways culture has 
always worked to manage life and its transitions to death. The collective panic about 
anthropocenic climate change is about deadly ways in particular – that climate drastically 
alters cultural assumptions about human relational possibilities to life’s potentialities: 
what it means to have lived a good life attendant to how death can be understood as 
having been as good as life, in general. That everyone lives their own death, but with 
death being generally made contingent to a few people’s75 ways of life, is one reason why 
the multitude’s, rather than governments’ experiences of climate change matters. 
Governments fall apart but do not die; people die.  
 
Anthropologies conceptualize the cultural structures and routines for particular lives that 
hold true even across great distances. Beyond conceivable description, however, are the 																																																								
74 Anthropologist Edward Taylor (1920 1) defines culture in this way: “Culture, or civilization, 
taken in its broad, ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, 
art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of 
society." 	
75 By a few people, this study means very rich people who control vast resources.	
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myriad particular, common and generally human social encounters where particular 
people share innumerable thoughts, actions, activities and meaning even across great 
difference. This study names these shared interactions “social”. Particular life is built in 
social comparison, conflict, dialogue and collaborations whose micro-political logics 
manage things differently from governmental anthropologies. Their differences from 
cultural norms are multitude. This study attempts to conceptualize the organization of the 
multitude through conceptual frames like the whatever, the spectacle and the general 
intellect, among others. Ultimately, the discussion returns to concepts of culture – how 
cultural things orient activity. This function of culture is different from the 
anthropological understanding of culture; it is more attendant to concerns of culture as 
theorized by fine art and media theory.  But through both definitions, culture is discussed 
in Chapter 4 as having either law-likely or lawless effects, as related to their participation 
in law-like human dispositifs of governance.  
 
The multitude shares a common world in the way that the global atmosphere, the 
common features of human beings, a common language, a city, a psychedelic experience 
or unequal economic system can be shared. Marx’s concept of the general intellect76 can 
also be considered in these terms; as shared intelligence. The generality of “sharing” is 
built around the common human faculty to conceptually relate to things, regardless of 
position. It can be said that cultures, at a variety of scales, share across the commons of 
relationality.  Scales constitute the layered, concurrent and contradictory folds that nature 
and culture allow as the lived terrain for humanity.77 To the extent that they are 
concretized processes, scales policy cultural objects and concepts so that they express 
outcomes that culturally appear so limited in variation that the results appear as if 
enforced by law. Matters of sharing are innately cultural, what this study defines as 
“policy” are the ways in which anthropologies enculture and organize concepts and 
objects over the open possibility that a multitudinous nature suggests.  																																																								
76 This study mostly works, in Chapter 3, with Virno’s (2008) refinement of Marx’s (1993 704–
712) concept of the general intellect. 	
77 Both folds and scales can be understood as nominations of variation or difference within or 
across the same or related material. Through Deleuze (1991) they can be understood 
psychologically and philosophically, through Cowan (2014) logistically.	
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Across shared life within and across scales, one can recognize that human-made cultural 
objects and structures (artistic, social, political, architectural, logistical, financial, etc.) are 
classifications and objectifications of forces that help to ecologically relate with other 
forces in the worldly ecosystem. The multitude is fluid in relation to the world, not just in 
relation to itself. The question of how culture makes the multitude relate, according to 
contingencies, is the subject of this debate. While Dark Mountain produces cultural 
objects, their production begins with books intended to culturally orient readers. Within 
the United Kingdom, their work is relatively well known, and their editors contribute to 
The Guardian. Each book and its contents mediate relations between a reader and other 
things through the environmental frame they are interested in. Chapter 2 works through 
Dark Mountain and their claim that their work is “not political;” a claim that if true 
would suggest they might contribute to this study in a unique way. Though the grounds 
for this claim prove insufficient in helping structure this study’s policy suggestions, 
analyzing their work opens up a necessary discussion on the political nature of cultural 
systems and organizational scales. 
 
After a theoretical introduction, Chapter 3 provides an example of where the multitude 
re-orients its relations to governance, which itself is a cultural thing. The chapter follows 
the social activity, within Barcelona, of the Platform for People Affected by Mortgages. 
Focusing on the commons of housing in Spain, the PAH finds play with social relations 
contingent to housing. The chapter demonstrates how the PAH reformulates common 
notions of what social arrangements can allow for, despite pre-existing law. Acting here, 
the PAH operates beyond the constraints of formal culture and governance. Informal 
sociality is the praxis of the multitude, and the PAH channels such informality in 
particular ways. According to this study, the PAH’s uncommon success is based on the 
extent to which they engage with the genuine diversity across the common terrain of the 
city. The PAH employ grassroots sociality across scales of difference, over, alongside and 
through cultural forms. In this way, the PAH cannot ignore formal governance that 
determines scaled relations.  
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2 On the Tautology of the Multitude in Self-governance 
The PAH demonstrate nominal autonomy within the multitude; nominal because the 
multitude is caught in Chthulucenic entanglements. How their autonomy is  
conceptualized with the assistance of the seventeenth-century philosopher Baruch 
Spinoza. Spinoza conceptualizes how individual and social experience can be organized 
to generate common ways of doing things differently – a process this study refers to as 
working through common notion, based on Spinoza’s theorizations of common 
conceptualization. This common way of working through individualized issues balances 
the Chthulucenic tension between autonomy and collectivity.  Spinoza’s work is 
discussed here to explain this process, and for his conceptualizations of the multitude 
that, along with Hobbesian thought introduced later in this chapter, focuses in on the 
tension between multitudinous activity and governmental logic.  
 
Étienne Balibar’s (2008) study of Spinoza’s multitude nominates them as the individual 
or group that is often internally divided and prone to both divisive and unifying 
passions.78 And yet, because the multitude comprises a body that can cohere, Balibar 
recognizes in Spinoza’s conceptualization a deeply political question: “to what extent is 
the multitude capable of governing its own passions?” (50) For this study, Spinoza does 
not provide a perspective on the multitude’s relation to an independently conceivable 
governance (Virno’s work is discussed for this reason at the chapter’s end) so much as he 
demonstrates how a perspective on an anthropology of the multitude informs ethics and 
governmental thought. The question of the multitude’s own governing capacities is in 
regards to its own intimacy with its living processes that must contend with worldly 
forces of governance – which includes human and natural law.79  																																																								
78 According to Balibar (2008), “[the multitude] lacks the minimum of coherence that would 
allow it to correct its errors, to adjust ends to means. In most societies, moreover, it is denied both 
rights and access to information. It is simply a medium in which different passions resonate with 
one another, in which the ‘fluctuations’ of the city's soul are amplified, often to extremes.” (71) 	
79 Spinoza makes clear that his Tractatus Politicus (1951) is in dialogue with his Ethics (2001) 
concerning the question of how the multitude manages its individual human passions in relation 
to others. He suggests that the best governmental forms are not those led by rational leaders, but 
rather are founded upon solid systemic thought derived from the “general nature or position of 
mankind” (1951 289) that coordinates humanity’s multitudinous ethics.  
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As it is the embodied multitude’s experiences with life, law and climate change that 
matter, this project aims to bolster the multitude’s capacities for self-governance through 
cultural form. This affirmation does not ascribe this nominating capacity of governance 
to the multitudes alone. That is, contrary to some conceptualizations of the multitude,80 
this study does not see the multitude as being uniquely capable of self-governance. The 
multitude has no identity other than in its ability to formally vary; variation in relation to 
nothing is not variation – it is the movement of static relations over time. Rather, the 
multitude is understood as that population that is everywhere contingent to particular 
things – contingent to things that make life livable and unbearable at a variety of scales.  
 
Timelessly present and defined by potential, the multitude precedes, exceeds and is 
necessary for the composition of any form of governance to which it relates, though the 
multitude needs no particular form of governance. (Virno 2004 23 and Balibar 2008 xvii) 
The creation of human governing forms is derived in some ways by, or as reflections of, 
the multitude, regardless of how multitudinous behavior is considered. In this way, the 
multitude is capable of unqualified self-governance in relation to anything. One could 
say that in necessary collaboration with things, the multitude is capable of self-
governance.  This thesis is necessarily general and should be understood as almost a 
tautology; the multitude, in relationship to things, is capable of self-governing because 																																																																																																																																																																					
 
Spinoza is not blind to the role that reason can play in governing human action, but his faith in the 
multitude is not placed in reason as such, or as he puts it: 
 We showed too [in Ethics, 2001], that reason can, indeed, do much to restrain and 
moderate the passions, but we saw at the same time, that the road, which reason herself points 
out, is very steep; so that such as persuade themselves, that the multitude or men distracted by 
politics can ever be induced to live according to the bare dictate of reason, must be dreaming 
of the poetic golden age, or of a stage-play. (298) 
 
 As such, this study understands Balibar’s question, focused around whether the	multitude 
is capable of governing its own (collective) passions, to be the same as governing itself.  	
80 In Hardt & Negri (2000, 2004) the multitude is primarily employed as a class that exceeds but 
is in relation to classical Marxist conceptions of labor. Though they acknowledge that the 
multitude preexists governance – by following Marxist conceptualizations of class composition, 
Hardt and Negri describe the multitude as that which must be composed for the sake of a global 
democracy understood as proper to the multitude's own nature.	
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this is how governance and humanity have always operated; excluding the unlikely 
possibility for divine origins of governmental structures, humans have only 
autonomously managed themselves as a species – in relation to their creations, to each 
other and to the wider earth. This tautology defines the central knot of this study. 
 
In the following quote, Spinoza views the multitude as contentious, self-centered and 
ungoverned: “[I]t follows that everyone is so far rightfully dependent on another, as he is 
under that other’s authority, and so far, independent, as he is able to repel all violence, 
and avenge to his heart’s content all damage done to him, and in general to live after his 
own mind.” (Spinoza 1951 295) Yet, according to Spinoza elsewhere (2001), individuals 
and groups can also work through whatever “common notion” (2P38corr, 2P39)81 to 
articulate and make commonly understandable the things that animate or afflict them. To 
the extent that it is possible, Spinoza gives to the multitude the right to independence 
from its afflictions; humans needn’t be defined by their suffering. This is their autonomy. 
Humans can collaborate, together, with joy, to meet their needs against affliction. 
Importantly, their convergence as a group contains a measure of joyous potential that 
their particular organizationality allows.82  
 
As a thing, the multitude “is not a representation but a praxis” (Balibar 2009 71); it is 
descriptive of a way of being. Spinoza describes it as a total way of human relation in the 
world. Governed by brutality and/or compulsion by force or desire, the multitude bodily 
and culturally interprets and coordinates with the intimacies of life by socially 
encountering and working through governing concepts; therefore practicing the general 
human contingency to particular conceptual developments that are functions of social 
being. This work can occur in a flurry with little consideration or be a practice of 
considered social engagement. Upon encountering contingencies to things in the world, 
multitudinous praxis conceptualizes, accepts, socially and relationally affirms or 																																																								
81 In keeping with the habit of others, this study utilizes Spinoza’s (2001) own indexing system.  	
82 “If two come together and unite their strength, they have jointly more power, and consequently 
more right over nature than both of them separately, and the more there are they have so joined in 
alliance, the more right they all collectively will possess.” (Spinoza 1951 296)	
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disassembles these contingent relations. For Spinoza, to assemble and disassemble is a 
right and injunction of the multitude. As Balibar summarizes, “[t]hose rights are 
compatible which express powers that can be added or multiplied together; those rights 
are incompatible which correspond to powers that will mutually destroy one another.” 
(62)  
 
Spinoza’s metaphysics, methodically spelled out in Ethics ([1677] 2001) and Political 
Treatise ([1675] 1951), clarify how the multitude's self-governance is based upon 
common notions of things. For Spinoza, all things literally begin with a God whose 
nature is infinite and eternal (2001 1D6) and co-equivalent with the natural.83 For 
Spinoza, this beginning with God and nature is literal; he understands that anything 
knowable has spun out in and over time from a distant past that started with initial 
divinity. God’s absolutely infinity is ultimately unknowable: composed of all that is 
conceivable and beyond.84 God and nature’s existence contains no negation; all that is 
conceivable proves its existence through its conceivability (1D1); and in its 
conceivability, proves itself as a Godly attribute. Despite the fact that everything 
conceivable exists, Spinoza distinguishes between things that only conceptually exist and 
those things that have a worldly existence. (1P7, 1P9) Through multitudinous activity, the 
multitude thoughtfully and thoughtlessly tests limits between that which can really exist 
and that which is only conceptually possible.  
 
When conceiving things, people sense attributes and essences of God/nature extended in 
reality via things in the world. (2D1) People only know the world as well as they know 
their own bodies – which, according to Spinoza, is not very well. The human body is an 
instrument for knowledge that is connected to the worldly things that affect it. (2P20 – 																																																								
83 Spinoza (2001 1P29) makes it clear that nothing happens in the world outside of nature, which 
he names as God. This is given as one proof of his purported atheism.  	
84 Spinoza axiomatically describes the development of things in the world thusly: 
 1. Everything which is, is either in itself or in another. 
 2. That which cannot be conceived through another must be conceived through itself.  
 3. From a given determinate, cause and effect necessarily follows, and, on the other 
hand, if no determinate cause be given, it is impossible that an effect can follow. (Spinoza 
2001 4)	
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2P31) As things and concepts of connectivity, cultural things incorporate people within 
dispositifs of worldly relationality. When really connecting to an attribute of Godly 
nature, the experience generates a particular affect: joy. Distinguishing joy from the other 
affects is a worthwhile task; joy is a central affect for Spinoza because it affirms the 
goodness of life – it confirms life’s potential and potency (3P11), and acts as a signaling 
route to more joy. (3Aff2) Undo brutality and unfulfilled need may bring sorrow, which 
flags routes towards decay and waste. (3Aff3) That climate change’s entanglements with 
capitalism enforce sadness on the multitude, whether or not they attribute their sadness to 
the effects of climate change under capitalism, would seem a fair assertion to make.  
 
“[W]e cannot here recognize any distinction between desires, which are engendered in us 
by reason, and those which are engendered by other causes; since the latter, as much as 
the former, are effects of nature.” (Spinoza 1951 Ch2.2) Spinoza’s appreciation of 
embodied knowledge clarifies how people are driven to act whether or not they clearly 
grasp what it is that they are acting upon. In this way the PAH’s transformation of 
depression, into feelings that motivate systemic change, constitutes a type of autonomy 
within a system of relations in which people experiencing bankruptcy would normally act 
differently. Nevertheless, for Spinoza, reason refines what is known in the world through 
more considered thought. Together people can reason for a greater understanding of the 
things that matter; different perceptions of what is the matter occur, as people can have 
different perceptions of that common thing. Common notions can be so generally 
regarded that their apprehension is universal. (2P40) Hunger, for example, is nearly 
universally apprehended. By coming to know all that is related to hunger and collectively 
acting to alleviate it, people come to better know the world, themselves, nature and the 
nature of hunger.  
 
Spain’s housing crisis demonstrates the limits of capitalism’s capacity to meet common 
housing needs; the PAH’s notional autonomy works through common notions to socially 
disassemble from the national housing policy to form something else. It was state policy 
since Franco that all Spaniards should become homeowners. (López & Rodríguez 2011)  
In order to grow the GDP, from the '80s on, it was also economic policy to push the 
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economy through home construction. (Alemany & Colau 2014 30) Because of how many 
people across all classes in Spain bought homes, the 2008 financial crisis was broad 
enough to affect all classes in a common way – bankruptcy became a common enough 
occurrence. Spinoza adequately frames the PAH’s common discursive practice, though to 
describe frameworks for governance’s actual functions this study will turn to Hobbes’s 
concepts of the state and ends with Virno’s conceptualization of the multitude’s relation 
to governance. What comes first, though, is a continued focus on the role ‘the concepts 
itself’ as things of pure relationality set between particular existence and universal 
meaning– as relationality, the particular, the universal and the objects that traverse them 
for social and cultural meaning-making matter for this study. 
 
3 “Whatever” cultural things and concepts  
This chapter has suggested that the nature/culture division is a fiction that nevertheless 
can frame being in and being over time as distinct things. To ask, “how long is a moment 
of being?” and “how long does a moment last before it can be considered as occurring 
over time?” demonstrates the narrative-based nature of the task of concepts – and how 
answers are also only contextually available. These questions demonstrate how the 
common notion of time opens controversies around which other concepts can coalesce. 
The concept of the common notion has a quality similar to Agamben's definition of the 
theological concept whatever, with a difference. Spinoza’s “common notions” identify 
how sociality can refine knowledge by thematizing concepts in relation to things; while 
Agamben’s notion of the whatever demonstrates how each particular concept-thing opens 
up space for limitless relation.  
 
The whatever allows for a discussion of the conceptual thing from which concepts 
emerge; philosophized by, among others, Aristotle, Saint Thomas, Duns Scotis, and 
Agamben. The conversation around whatever regards the nature of how any concept 
relates to the thing’s particular form and its universal nature. A concept’s particularity 
relates to how it is made apparent in its localization as an example of something bigger; 
the particular thing is identified as really existing (or conceptually existing in real ways) 
through what made it notable to stand for that greater meaning. The universal presents 
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itself in scalar relation to the particular, but also as an abstract field of universally 
accessible concepts that conceivably exist in and for themselves. Through language, 
whatever thing loses its particularity to be the general thing it is named as (a rock, a song, 
a cartoon character). For itself, whatever is the home of pure conceptuality without 
qualities; Agamben (1993) relates how Christian Scholastics conceptualized limbo – 
where being is suspended between particular life and universal meaning – through 
whatever.85 The whatever is the realm that intelligence draws from, from where meaning 
is guided through objects to discern what it (universally) is.86  
 
As Agamben puts it, the whatever in itself stands indifferent to what others see it 
expressing in the particular or universal – others’ conceptualizations are contingent on 
different things than the immediate what and how that whatever can offer. That particular 
objects exceed what others might possibly see them expressing, this exceeding finds 
parallels with the multitude that precedes and exceeds any governing concept. By 
exceeding its own self, conceptuality is defined by potential that can neither be contained 
in the particular aspect for which it is initially noted, nor by the name through which it 
singularly is universalized; conceptualization suggests the possibility to be anything. 
Whatever, the space from where to draw potentially particular concepts conceptually 
exists for itself and is nonetheless referenced as the space from which universal concepts 
emerge. “Common and proper, genus and individual are only the two slopes dropping 
down from either side of the watershed of whatever.” (20) Besides Spinoza’s commoning 
of notions for their particular political refinement stands whatever’s indifference;87 what 																																																								
85 Agamben (1993 5) discusses Saint Thomas’ articulation of limbo as the place for the 
unbaptized dead who cannot be judged. They joyfully reside there in a state of animal-like 
ignorant bliss.	
 
86 Agamben (1993 1) describes anyone’s nomination of whatever as what they see as intelligible 
in and what one wants to articulate of the world. Intelligibility is associated with love and 
becoming. “Love is never directed toward this or that property of the loved one (being blond, 
being small, being tender, being lame), but neither does it neglect the properties in favor of an 
insipid generality (universal love): The lover wants the loved one with all of its predicates, its 
being such as it is.” (2). The effort of identifying and articulating what one wants or sees in the 
real or abstract world is associated with moving the concept as object “not toward another thing 
or another place, but toward its own taking-place…” (2)	
87 After discussing Spinoza’s distinction between what comes into existence (as singularities) 
and what matters (in Spinoza 1953, 2P37), Agamben (1993) writes, “Whatever is constituted not 
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is nominated is a refinement of the thing which appeared to matter and not the thing 
itself. Agamben refers to the particular appearance and nomination of whatever as “an 
infinite series of modal oscillations.” (19) That which appeared to have politically 
mattered and thus stands as a conceptual example for politics is never the full thing itself, 
but rather a name given to it to stand within another relational and conceptual line that 
matters for those who conceptualize it.  
 
Critically, Agamben qualifies whatever’s particular appearance today in relation to 
dominant capitalism, in an important way. Agamben (79) positions Debord’s spectacle88 
to qualify how, through capitalist reproduction, whatever appears becomes universally 
apprehended as singular things, contingent to nothing but its own being and its 
independent capitalist valuation. The spectacle strips whatever of its relations and 
obscures any Chthulucenic embeddedness, further driving everything’s alienation from 
everything else. Conversely though, Agamben89 (and Virno90) recognize that whatever’s 
spectacularization makes socially sensible the translatability and equivalence between 
everything, revealing whatever as the pure empty vessel of social translation. So, while 
the spectacle policies culture to enforce ongoing lines of capitalist development, by 
conceptualization’s exceeding nature, it can suggest sociality’s unbound potential to 
reorganize relationality through whatever means toward whatever ends. The whatever 
demonstrates how things become narrativized connections for and between other 
particular things in the wider world. 
 																																																																																																																																																																					
by the indifference of common nature with respect to singularities, but by the indifference of the 
common and the proper, of the genus and the species, of the essential and the accidental.” (19) 	
88 “It is clear that the spectacle is language, the very communicativity or linguistic being of 
humans.” (Agamben 1993 80) 	
89 Agamben associates this fact with the possibility of organizing life in real terms beyond state 
organization, saying, “For this very reason, however, the era in which we live also that in which 
for the first time it is possible for humans to experience their own linguistic being – not this or 
that content of language, but language itself, not this or that true proposition, but the very fact that 
one speaks.” (Agamben 1993 80)  	
90 Virno (2008) writing regarding the connection between the spectacle, innovation and sociality 
are detailed in Chapter 3.	
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Writing in the 2016 collection Ecologizing Museums for L’Internationale, a pan-European 
organization of progressive art museums, publisher and curator Clémence Seurat reflects 
on her curatorial work in Paris during the 2015 Climate Summit. She looks towards the 
examples of the arts to find concepts for responding to the ongoing ecological 
catastrophe: 
We are entering a period of transition that has rendered the fiction of nature and 
the “Great Divide” narrative inoperative. Faced with the perils of our modernity, 
the ecological situation calls for us to develop alternative stories. The aim is not to 
swap the former narrative for another, but to move away from unifying 
approaches that subtract from our understanding and to seek the “proliferation of 
multiplicity.” (36) 
 
Seurat shares this study's doubts of the summit’s capacity to find solutions for the climate 
problem – she sees the summit as a staging of a financial act rather than a search for 
solutions. Governance here has deemed that financial instruments are capable, even 
though finance hardly dissects the complex of problems associated with climate change; 
the Paris summit suggested that finance – compensating impacted countries – could 
reduce carbon emissions without finding anyone liable for damage. Seurat says that 
financial measures share the same logic as the measures and policies that organized and 
prolong the problem: the financial response is narrow,91 seeking only to re-narrativize the 
continuation of wealth’s accumulation “guided by the ‘invisible hand’ of the white man, 
who relentlessly digs deeper and deeper” (35) at the expense of the rest of the world. As 
there is no attention given to other ways of being, Seurat suggests that greater disasters 
are set to unfold. This study sees that historically, governmental responses have tried to 
contain problems92 and shift outcomes to benefit their own interests93 rather than, for 
example, facilitating social change to meaningfully transform the whole arrangement. 																																																								
91 For an analysis of the aims and interests and limits of the financialization of climate change, 
see Leonardi (2017). 
 
92 See Foucault (2007), Esposito (2011). 	
93 See Klein (2008).  	
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Seurat suggests that what is needed are narrative-based responses that provide other ways 
to live through an “absence of future [that] has already begun.” (40)  
 
To this end, Seurat quotes Donna Haraway, saying that humanity could stand “being in 
mud” more. (47) Being in the mud implies a reconsideration of worldly and multilayered 
human relations in order to find creative solutions to problems that far exceed the limited 
frame of finance. Seurat connects to anthropologist Barbara Glowczewski’s (47) focus 
upon the universally native nature of humanity, that humanity is always indigenous to the 
earth (and in the mud). 
 
For Agamben, the whatever does not provide a narrative framework for possible political 
action. Rather, his contention is that the ambivalence and possibility of whatever helps 
people recognize that muddiness is the general situation of being particularly embedded 
in the world that is conceptually rearrangeable through the plasticity of social relation and 
meaning.94 Whatever is indifferent; it is merely the shared space for abstract thought, 
planning and theoretical spectatorship. As the condition of possibility of narrativity, it 
allows for abstract contemplation of social translation across difference.95 Agamben 
(1993) translates whatever from the Latin quod libet, meaning, “being such that it always 
matters.” (1) That is, what matters in whatever object are all the things it autonomously 
possesses in addition to all that might universally strive to translate it. In that way, while 
being in the mud and relating to whatever objects of the world matters, whatever being 
also points out that simply being properly muddy and in dialogue with whatever has 
particular orientations, so that it also matters how its meanings get expressed.  
 
The following are two examples of cultural thought in relation to political situations. 																																																								
94 “Whatever is singularity insofar as it relates not (only) to the concept, but (also) to the idea. 
This relation does not found a new class, but is, in each class, that which draws singularity from 
its synonymy, from its belonging to a class, not towards any absence of name or belonging, but 
toward the name itself, towards a pure and anonymous homonymy.” (Agamben 2007 76)  	
95 “This has nothing to do with the simple affirmation of the social in opposition to the State that 
has often found expression in the protest movements of recent years. Whatever singularities 
cannot form a societas because they do not possess any identity to vindicate nor any bond of 
belonging for which to seek recognition.” (Agamben 85–86)	
	 63	
Both situations work through whatever concepts and demonstrate how whatever thought 
is orientationally policied, and thus narratively driven towards particular universal 
meanings. One example is drawn from anthropology, the other from art.  
 
3a Universality, narrativizing abstract governance 
When discussing the simple matter of human survival in response to crisis, anthropologist 
Glowczewski’s (2015) Resisting The Disaster: Between Exhaustion and Creation is clear 
– humans survive disaster. “Survival responses exist everywhere, and the collective 
intelligence that leads to micro-social experiments is a wave of hope for the world.” (2) 
Glowczewski focuses on art and law, two things that open up survivability by connecting 
the universal to particular contexts. “[W]hat is at stake here is to find the force of life that 
will spark a response to the deadly force of destruction that threatened the group.” (11) 
 
Glowczewski demonstrates how nominated cultural concepts provide frame and spark for 
sociality to relate with and through crisis situations in order to transform them. She 
describes how cultural things “spark a response to the deadly force of destruction that 
threatened the group” (11) and can vibrantly reformulate pre-existing order to allow for 
different ways of being. Glowczewski interrogates different places where the terrain for 
human activity has been foreclosed upon in the vise of ecological disaster and 
financialization: 
As I here try to show that one cannot separate natural catastrophes from social 
disasters, emergency policies from long-term ones, knowledge of the present from 
historical memories, humanitarian responses from the agency of victims, I believe 
that anthropology is particularly called to engage in analyses that consider all 
those relations in a critical way in order to trigger local and global reflection 
towards new social alternatives. (19) 
 
In thinking through how individual and community practice and consciousness is 
reorganized, Glowczewski refers to Gregory Bateson and focuses on Felix Guattari’s 
Three Ecologies (2014). Through these thinkers she describes a rhythm of human-
relational creativity that works with culture to help restore balanced negotiations with the 
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cosmic world comprised of “rain, wind, fire, tsunami, climate excess, etc.” (5) To 
demonstrate this, she surveys several communities’ situated efforts to realign how they 
relate to the natural and socio-political world via whatever: for example in an effort to 
affirmatively reorganize themselves after a volcanic eruption she points to an Indonesian 
community's cultural resilience, described in terms familiar to anthropology.96 Next, she 
identifies how contemporary art helps a Brazilian community respond to exposure to 
radioactivity.97 (5–8) This anecdote demonstrates the social capacity of artwork to 
narrativize and heal emotional wounds.  This study similarly affirms art’s capacity to 
heal, and considers Guattari’s schizoanalytic cartographies to be analytically useful.98  
 
Yet, at the expense of the communities facing situational challenges, her examples of 
what and who does meaningful relational crisis work expands situationally outward 
towards the universal. For example, she traces the rise and fall of a community’s 
prosperity along the Bamako-Dakar train line; after an initially prosperous period the 
community decayed when the line was privatized at the hands of a multinationals. She 
follows the area’s possible resurrection as a tourist destination through solidarity aid from 
European trade unions and culturally-minded NGO’s. (9–11) Glowczewski expresses 
hope that regional, national and international laws are capable of coordinating with the 
needs of wrongly dispossessed populations. But Glowczewski swerves towards universal 
																																																								
96 “The latter [the village] had been completely destroyed by the seismic activity of the Merapi 
volcano in May 2006, following the tsunami that had struck their island two years before. The 
villagers called on to their [NGO’s] responsibility should another earthquake and volcanic 
eruption occur, but thought it could be prevented if they kept on making offerings to the volcano 
and living at its base. They completely rebuilt their village using the systems inherited from 
collective solidarity (traditionally mobilized to irrigate the fields) as well as by inventing a new 
ways of working together.” (Glowczewski 2015 5) 
 
97 “During the South American Biennale, held in 2005 in Porto Alegre, the internationally 
renowned artist Cirone Di Franco exposed an installation of hospital beds made of blue concrete, 
each one bearing the imprint of a body or of an object signifying the personality of the victims of 
radioactivity. In those individual traces, he crystallized the collective memory of his city, which 
was reshaped by that disastrous event.” (Glowczewski 6–7) 
 
98 See Guattari (2014, 1995). Guattari’s schizoanalytic cartography describes a non-linear model 
of healing creative activity, cycling between four nodes of human-autopoetic capacities in 
relation between routine, invention, application and decay. 
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theology when suggesting that art generated in the height of crisis has “possibilities that 
redeem human condition” even if it can’t help those in the context of crisis itself. This 
Hegelian99 turn (12) seems to create a system of pure relationality – where the 
particularities of life are superseded by the universal abstract benefits of art and legal 
thought.100 Rather than remaining within the territory where life must be lived and can be 
reorganized even in relation to these abstract concepts,101 Glowczewski affirms a 
universality contingent on no particular situation but universality, and on anthropology’s 
conception of a universal humanity, rather than on the particular communities’ terms.102 A 
cultural policy of the multitude stays with the variation of any particular multitude, for as 
Glowczewski initially suggests, this multitude is cued into its own relational horizons 
rather than the general horizons of a general multitude whose cultural orientation can be 
understood as skewing towards narrativizable universal concepts that serve professional 
interests as much as those of the particular realm.  																																																								
99 Glowczewski’s (2015) narrative traces a path of particular situations where particular life 
becomes consecutively more unlivable. Rather than turning to politics or the creativity of 
embodied social organization, she turns towards abstractions of fine art and literature. 
 “But when the collective installation in the place of revival is hindered, the transmissions 
start crumbling down, culture is lost and, most of all, the collective life is threatened once again,	
notably in its ethical aspect. The power of action does not have a collective field of expression 
any longer: the existential territory erodes, there is no projection anymore, and no creation is 
possible. However, precisely when this exhaustion hits rock bottom, it becomes the source of a 
new hope. Weren’t many beautiful French and Russian literary texts born in the midst of late 20th 
century melancholy?” (12) 	
100 “However, precisely when this exhaustion hits rock bottom, it becomes the source of a new 
hope. Weren’t many beautiful French and Russian literary texts born in the midst of late 20th 
century melancholy? Didn’t the suffering of the colonized, the deported and of the soldiers of so 
many wars generate countless novels and films in the southern hemisphere or among the 
diasporas of the 20th century?” (2015 12) 	
101 “I believe that anthropology is particularly called to engage in analyses that consider all those 
relations in a critical way in order to trigger local and global reflection towards new social 
alternatives.”(Glowczewski 2015 19) 	
102 The epigraph, a quote from Chakrabarty (2009) reads, “Climate change poses the question of 
a human community, of a we; it points to a figure of universality that escapes our capacity to 
experience the world. This universality stems rather from the shared sense of a catastrophe. It 
calls for a global approach of politics, but without the myth of global identity, for, unlike the 
Hegelian universe, it cannot comprise particularities. We could temporarily refer to it as a 
negative universal history.” 	
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3b Nominating abstraction from the terrain of life  
Though his work highlights North American and European political artists, media 
activist, and theorists,103 Art historian Yates McKee (2016) embeds the narration of 
Contemporary Art and the Post-Occupy Condition within the social stream of New 
York’s activist movements. In that way, it is different than Glowczewski’s study that 
telescopes into situations across the globe. The main section of McKee’s work focuses on 
Occupy Wall Street, the relatively heterogeneous protest movement that staged protest 
camps throughout the United States and Western Europe between 2010 and 2013. The 
camps occupied public spaces through a variety of legal and extralegal tactics.104 Famous 
for not having specific demands, its concerns emerged out of questions of general social 
precarity in the face of formal governmental activity/inactivity. Rather than an analysis of 
its concrete social composition or political successes, McKee works through Occupy to 
describe, “the unknown possibilities and impassioned energies it unleashes for the 
present.” (19) The possibilities that McKee is interested in are those that create the space 
for a common public life that is “at odds with current forms of state power as well as 
fantasies of ‘the people' as an all-inclusive harmonious consensus.” (20)  
 
To these ends, McKee traces a variety of notable artistic, mediatic and theoretical 
manifestations105 that occurred before, during and after Occupy. The great extent of 
actual relations between the art world and the event of Occupy justifies McKee’s focus. 																																																								
103 The title of Yates McKee’s first chapter is “Contemporary Art and the Politics of Democracy, 
1987 – 2011” (2016 37–83) and additional critical and artistic work by McKee	in the context of 
The Journal of Aesthetics & Protest appears within this chapter. 	
104 For an expanded conversation on how zoning laws and protest in relation to Occupy and 
beyond, see Shiffman et al. (2012).  	
105 Though contemporary work on the topic is more critical, Nicolas Bourriaud’s seminal 
Relational Aesthetics succinctly describes the task of much contemporary socially relational work 
in response to concepts like Debord’s spectacle: “These days, communications are plunging 
human contact into monitored areas that divide the social bond up into (quite) different products. 
Artistic activity, for its part, strives to achieve modest connections, open up (One or two) 
obstructed passages, and connect levels of reality kept apart from one another.” (Bourriaud 2009 
8). 
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McKee makes explicit the compositional, ideational and intellectual support that Occupy 
received from artists106 and art institutions, and poses interesting questions for the art 
world. (82) McKee details how the movement leveraged the social capital of respected 
and canonical artists that participated in the movement (119 and 125) in an effort to 
secure and expand Occupy’s general interests.107  McKee’s conceptualization of the 
relation between art and politics is indebted to Rancière and his notion of the “partition of 
the sensible”. For McKee, the sensible means, “what is seeable, hearable and sayable as 
legitimately political in a given social order.  Rancière understand politics as the opening 
of a void of possibility in the partition of the sensible wherein new political subjects 
emerge in excess of the “police principle”. (14) In this logic, Occupy stands as a 
meaningful, democratic stage for presenting legitimately political projects.  
 
Discussing artwork done in advance of Occupy, McKee highlights “social practice 
artwork” whose aesthetico-political utility is, in the first instance, manifest in its 
capacities to motivate and socially interact with specific viewers in time.108  He details 
Camp Campaign, a 2006 video made by New York City-based artists and organizers 
Rene Gabri and Ayreen Anastas. Camp Campaign lyrically documents Anastas and 
Gabri’s cross-country drift, stopping at a variety of campgrounds, prisons and community 
spaces in order to “test out Agamben’s thesis that ‘the camp is the nomos of the modern’ 
”.109 (82) McKee sees their camp project exceeding “the politics of democracy,” and 																																																								
106 McKee details the role that artists (for example: Not an Alternative, The Illuminator, Amin 
Hussain and Nitasha Dhillon, Josh MacPhee, Molly Crabapple, Phillip Glass and Laurie 
Anderson) played in developing Occupy’s communicative strategies and their particular successes 
in pushing forward its general agenda. For example, he recounts the Illuminator whose surprise 
first appearance as a “bat signal” projected above an Occupy march took advantage of aesthetic 
strategies of disruption. (114–115) 	
107 See for example McKee 2016, p.125, where he discusses the efforts of Lou Reed and Phillip 
Glass to “leverage” their celebrity status in effort to secure a space for Occupy. 	
108 Rather than posing theoretical questions as an expository manner within confined space, the 
object of social practice artwork places whatever in social play within a more open social 
situation. Art historian Grant Kester (2013) describes the ability of social practice to aesthetically 
forward “the modulations of agency, the moments of creative insight and stasis, and the ways in 
which the participants accommodated or challenged the authority of state or public agencies.”  	
109 This is in reference to final chapter of Agamben’s (1998) book Homo Sacer “The camp is the 
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finds that its concerns and manifestations are an “uncanny prophecy of a different kind of 
camp campaign that would unfurl several years later at Wall Street.” (83) With Swiss 
social practice artist Thomas Hirschhorn, McKee finds another forerunner to Occupy’s 
precarious staging. He observes the different ways in which Hirschhorn’s110 work and 
Occupy’s actual encampment reference precarity; Hirschhorn’s as simulacra produced by 
“leading institutions,” while Occupy itself articulates “precarity in a very different 
manner, albeit one with its own aesthetic and symbolic logic. The camp comprised finite 
human bodies and perishable architectural structures rendered from materials scavenged 
from the urban environment.” (107) 
 
Within the internal tumult of Occupy, McKee traces the autonomous development of 
certain artistic projects completed by professional artists and collectives in association 
with the movement. To narrativize the value of individual artistic practitioners working 
within movements, McKee references a panoply of philosophical concepts and other 
artists. Referring to Occupy’s General Assembly that tried to coordinate these constitutive 
forces, McKee (2016) writes, “As a technical apparatus of democratic decision making at 
a large scale, however, it was notoriously dysfunctional, and indeed many of the 
significant decisions made during the occupation were crafted by smaller groups of 
influencers who would then either generalize their vision through various means, or 
simply undertake their work autonomously.” (110)111 Perhaps in effort to deal with the 																																																																																																																																																																					
nomos of the modern” (166–180).	
110 McKee describes Hirschhorn’s work as a simulacra of precarity and says his social space-
cum-informal philosophical monuments presage Occupy’s precarious thematics, cardboard 
aesthetics and zoning concerns. Papastergiadis’ (2014 98) characterization of Hirschhorn’s work	
demonstrates a similar reflection on his aesthetic: “an installation of functional sculptures made 
from common materials such as cardboard and duct tape, as well as the staging of discussions, 
lectures, poetry readings and impromptu performances.” 	
111 McKee comes around to connect the precarity that Occupy stood for to the general system of 
social reproduction today. He suggests that Occupy Wall Street’s encampment was a “common 
household” (109), capable of opening the conceptual horizons of its attendees to the vision of a 
commonly organized alternative world. 
 
 McKee (2016 101) references the definition of biopolitics cited in Protest Camps by 
geographers and sociologists Ana Feigenbaum, Fabian Frenzel and Patrick McCurdy (2013) who 
propose that the social reproduction necessarily occurring in a camp (its kitchens, sanitary 
requirements, mental health care etc…) present in situ a politicizing assemblage capable of 
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unwieldy nature of its collectivity, the concept of Occupy as a noun, verb, and event (20–
25) seems to be the work’s final organizing concept. He narrates conceptual and artistic 
bits and pieces as grammars that make conceptual or actual appearance to him over the 
course of his activist engagement. 
 
As Chapter 2 of this study discusses, the art history to which McKee attends runs parallel 
with society, from which it is distinct. McKee’s text nominates sets of actors and 
concepts that he as an art historian and activist finds interesting. While Occupy appears as 
his milieu, it is equally the conceptual play of art history to which his interests are 
attuned. Glowczewski does a similar thing, by addressing a universal conversation of 
anthropology. Conversely, this study’s cultural policy of the multitude is grounded in and 
organized for particularly situated socialities working with the problems where life is 
lived. That is, rather than tending to the universality of anthropology or art history, this 
study attends to the universal multitude. Following through with this requires something 
other than generated stories and enumerated concepts; it requires a studied look at how, 
generally, multitudinous being exists between itself and its own possible horizons and the 
governing forces that intimately mediate these two things.   
 
4 Governance: things we carry on our backs 
Like Occupy Wall Street, the PAH utilizes aesthetic strategies, albeit with a different ethic 																																																																																																																																																																					
prefiguring ‘alternative worlds’. 
 
 For McKee, the nomos of the camp is its ability to stage biopolitical relationships. 
Through his citation of Protest Camp (2013), McKee’s use of the term biopolitics seems to work 
with Hardt and Negri’s understanding of biopolitics as the polarized capacities for governments to 
organize either emancipatory and repressive modes for social reproduction. Hardt and Negri see 
biopower in a manner equivalent to Agamben, though they pose biopolitics as having a radically 
affirmative potential. Describing the Zapatistas and the Palestinian Intifada, they write, “Their 
center is their resistance to domination and their protest against poverty or, in positive terms, their 
struggle for a democratic organization of the biopolitical commons.”	(Hardt and	Negri 2004 89).		
 McKee posits how Occupy’s “household” was visibly maintained through necessary, but 
unglamorous, reproductive kitchen and cleaning labor that he identifies as “feminist”. He further 
observes, however, that “it would be a mistake to imply that the ‘household’ of the occupation 
was inherently a feminist space; as was the case with anti-racism, any significant feminist 
empowerment that did occur was uneven, and hard-won through persistent struggle by women 
over the internal ‘partition of the sensible’ of the movement itself.” (109)	
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of creative practice: Occupy characterized itself as a “movement of movements” that may 
have measured its effectiveness on its appearance through the media, while the PAH has 
at its heart an ongoing and implicitly anti-capitalist practice of providing people with 
shelter despite legal structures and dispositifs. Thus, the PAH finds relative success not 
by appearing politically but by shifting notions at the core of the human organization so 
as to reshape how people socially access shelter.  
 
Debt and the financial industry around which the PAH decomposes social relations does 
not appear “natural” in the common sense of the word; common sense understands 
financial debt and human governance as human creations. This study affirms that all that 
occurs is natural; moreover, insofar as the multitude experiences finance as a life-defining 
force that is mostly beyond its control, finance’s effects share much with other natural 
forces that cause structural crisis: floods, disease, food shortage, etc. Like a flood, debt 
drives people from their homes; like disease, debt has bodily effects. The economy is a 
governing force in similar ways that floods and disease are; they are phenomena, or 
organize phenomena, and produce a focused array of effects and outcomes.  
 
In order to articulate how the multitude tautologically collaborates with itself in self-
governance with these and other phenomenon, it is useful to discuss historic 
conceptualizations of governance. Through different manners, both Hobbes and Spinoza 
consider human-organized things and the multitude as natural forces in relation to 
governmentality. In their conceptualizations of governing systems, both Hobbes and 
Spinoza consider the multitude; by this fact the multitude’s behavior can be seen in some 
way to determine their conceptualizations. Hobbes wants to contain the multitude while 
Spinoza utilizes its ethic as the logic for its systemic development.  
 
Published in 1651, Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan (1929) is recognized as foundational to 
contemporary Western political thought. In it, Hobbes lays a theoretical groundwork for 
what has become the sovereign/citizen and state/citizen relation. Leviathan begins with a 
methodological discussion of his observations of nature in order to explain how natural 
functions serve to systematize and energize his ideal state. In its utilization of natural 
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forces, Hobbes conceptualizes the state as an automaton, that he names either “the 
commonwealth” or Leviathan. “Nature (the Art whereby God hath made and governes 
the world) is by the Art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it 
can make an Artificial Animal.” (8)  
 
The human faculty that allows for the state’s creation, identified by Hobbes as that which 
distinguishes the human from other species, is the language God gifted to Adam – this 
gift:  
whereby men register their Thoughts; recall them when they are past; and also 
declare them on to each other for mutual utility and conversation; without which 
there had been amongst men, neither Common-wealth nor Society nor contract, 
nor Peace, no more than amongst Lyons, Bears and Wolves. (24) 
 
Without Commonwealth, the multitude lives in a state of nature. Hobbes famously 
describes the state of nature as a “warre of every one against every one,” (99) where by 
natural right all have the right to everything. Hobbes considers everything within nature 
as perfect; as there is no law to divine what is good or bad activity, everything is simply a 
multitudinous battle of the right to possess. Nevertheless, within nature individuals can 
learn and construct ideas and projects that prove over time to be functional for individual 
human interests, or not. The same project-nature of man holds true within Hobbes’s 
artificial-in-nature Commonwealth. In this constructed world of men, people are capable 
of error and fault, the multitude can be judged to have acted with good or bad intent. In 
Commonwealth, people make covenant with the sovereign to live outside of nature’s 
brutal state so as to live without the fear of violence. When under such a contract the 
multitude exchanges its wildness with the sovereign for the natural rights afforded all 
men; this is the liberty granted by the sovereign. In Commonwealth, all citizens live in 
covenant with sovereign power under agreements enforced by the ruler’s sword. 
 
“Liberty, or Freedome, signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition; (by Opposition, I 
mean external Impediments of motion)”. (161) Liberty is the right to live in peace under 
the sovereign and to live according to laws that subjects should expect the sovereign to 
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enforce – being able to expect the sovereign’s action is to the citizen’s benefit. Liberty 
ensures that the sovereign will enforce any legally binding plans and contracts that 
citizens make under law; through the law and stability that the sovereign provides, 
property and inheritances are preserved. Liberty guarantees that if contracts and 
covenants are broken or in dispute, a citizen can sue and have arguments peaceably 
settled. Within Commonwealth, all activities are the subject of judgment, legal or 
otherwise. Within and beyond the realm of Commonwealth, where actions are not under 
covenant and contract, citizens are within their natural right to act as they see fit. In this 
way, liberty ensures the wealth of the commonwealth, as it allows for the pursuit of 
private and common interests within and beyond the domain.  
 
Much has been made of the inverse relation between Spinoza and Hobbes’s conception of 
the multitude,112 and also between that of Spinoza and others, such as Hegel, whose 
formal interests connecting law and culture align with those of Hobbes.113 Balibar states 
that Spinoza must have been familiar with Hobbes’s work – and that in the moment of 
authoring Tractatus Politicus, his most politically prescriptive work, Spinoza may have 
been seen as sharing innovative governmental concepts with Hobbes (2007 54). 
Nevertheless, a key difference between Hobbes and Spinoza’s conceptualization of the 
state is that Spinoza “explicitly rejects the distinction between ‘natural right’ and ‘civil 
right’, along with the concepts of the ‘social contract’ and ‘representation’.” (56) These 
are meaningful differences, even while both states structure relationships at a variety of 
organizational and logistical scales. The nature/culture divide sets a chasm between 
Hobbes’s Commonwealth and the rest of the world; by rejecting differences between civil 
and natural rights, Spinoza’s state stands ambivalently upon Hobbes’s ontological line. 
This matter of difference shows them to have highly contrasting relations to the 
multitude.  Hobbes’s Leviathan logistically holds back the multitude within the state of 
nature and confines the multitude within through fallible but enforceable law. For 
Spinoza, all human activity and possible relations exist as natural; to say that one man 
innately has more right than another would, to him, seem illogical.  																																																								
112 See for example, Balibar (2008), Agamben (2007). 	
113 See for example Macherey (2011).	
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Though a sovereign rules Commonwealth, political scientist Popp-Madsen (2014) notes 
that Hobbes’s model, with its propositional schism between nature and man, initiates a 
transition from sovereign to biopolitical rule. Rather than just ruling, the covenant makes 
the sovereign ever more responsible to relations that support and maintain life in 
particular states. In this relation, biological power, knowledge and the concept of the state 
merge, as states strive to provide more and better things than nature.114 The process of 
becoming citizen is an “anthropological machine” (50) through which citizens become 
beings endowed with particularly human duties attendant to the demands of sovereignty 
and law.  This human may come to appear as the natural human through the nomination 
of their being “culturally human”; further cultural interventions maintain and manage 
particular behaviours for their utility to state affairs. With the sword of the state 
protecting property and contractual relation by cultural intervention, multitudinous action 
is conceptually isolated within, or excluded by, legal and biological frameworks stretched 
over a complex of other fixable relations. Under the logic that the state is composed of 
replaceable parts, the blame for the failure to pay rent, as results in homelessness within a 
system of legal claims and agreements, rests squarely upon the debtor. 
 
Spinoza sees the naturalness of the world in chains of relations rather than as isolatable 
systems – the adequacy of any system can be confirmed by the extent to which it brings 
joy.  
For the bounds of nature are not the laws of human reason, which do but pursue 
the true interest and preservation of mankind, but other infinite laws, which regard 
the eternal order of universal nature, whereof man is an atom; and according to 
the necessity of this order only are all individual beings determined in a fixed 
																																																								
114 Popp-Madsen (2014) says, “The simplicity and clearness of the Hobbesian models lies in 
man’s transcendence of his flawed animal life and attainment of a qualified, political life.” 
Madsen continues with a quote by Italian critical theorist, Norberto Bobbio, “For Hobbes, the 
state is one of these machines produced by human beings in order to compensate for the 
shortcomings of nature, and to replace the deficient products of nature with a product of human 
ingenuity“ (51) 	
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manner to exist and operate.115 (Spinoza 1951 295–296)  
 
While Hobbes’s state preserves order as an experiment in judgment for the sake of an 
abstract fixity,116 Spinoza sees the multitude as capable of building up states of things for 
its interests, until what they structure fails. Spinoza’s ideal state is constructed upon 
relational affirmation and trust. So, if the biopolitical is understood as the power of the 
sovereign to “foster life or disallow it to the point of death” (Foucault 1990 138) it is 
debatable whether within Dominion biopolitics is an applicable concept. With Spinoza’s 
conceptualization, it would be proper to say only that through Dominion particular life is 
supported to the extent that it is by tending to its networks of relationality. 
 
Within Spinoza’s schema, if a state affronted its existing compositional relations, this 
state would bring itself to ruin. (Spinoza 1951 311) A great state is one that makes clear 
its core interdependencies and interests so that all within can act with an awareness of the 
entire system. This state is governed through particular relationality across all its territory 
rather than just through its leader. Only by misunderstanding the nature of its composition 
can such a reasonable state act in error. Errors are those that ask for relations to fulfill 
what they cannot; “If, for instance, I say that I can rightfully do what I will with this 
table, I do not certainly mean, that I have the right to make it eat grass.” (310) The 
multitude’s forgivable errors within such a state are equally and inconsequentially 
foolish.   
 
As stated above, a precept of this study is that when cultural workers act, formally 
speaking, they are not a part of the multitude. This study’s given definition of a cultural 
worker is someone who considers their activities or work to be relationally meaningful to 																																																								
115 Balibar (2007 51) notes Spinoza’s heresy of suggesting that the bible was not a sacred 
history. He identifies the heresy as one based on the idea that concepts lead history, not God: 
“History is now subordinate to theory, for which it provides both a field of investigation and a 
source of illustrations. It is no longer the directional framework whose irreversible ‘moments; 
inscribe the constraints within which politics has to Operate.” 	
116 Latour (1993) demonstrates how Hobbes orders scientific and social science’s facts under the 
politics of sovereign representation so as to preserve pre-existing order despite any revolutionary 
innovation that such scientific facts might suggest. 
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others. Under these terms both Hobbes and Spinoza can be seen as cultural workers 
whose conceptualizations are in relation to but not properly of the multitude. Virno 
(2004) reads Leviathan as Hobbes’s timely response to the horrors unleashed by the 
passions of the multitude during the English Civil War. (22–23) Spinoza, whose affinity 
with the multitude is clear, writes his philosophical treaties in immediate relation to the 
struggles of the emergent Dutch Republic.117 Therefore, both philosophers’ work can be 
said to place the multitude in particular rhetorical relation to governance. Hobbes 
rhetorically narrativizes new relations (people as governed citizens) against the multitude. 
Spinoza rhetorically demonstrates how the multitudes can relationally compose 
themselves under certain governmental conditions. Both demonstrate rhetorical variation 
contingent to the multitude’s tautological capacities for self-governance. Cultural 
thoughts’ varying rhetorical approaches to governance are a constant throughout the 
thesis and are multitude118 – here what must be recognized is that neither Hobbes nor 
Spinoza offer an objective description of the relationship between the multitude and 
governance; this study turns to political theorist Paolo Virno for its definition.  
 
In general, this study finds little use for Virno’s (2004) distinction between the people and 
the multitude, where people are subject-citizens of a state and the multitude comprised of 
schizophrenic actors in governance’s eyes. Yet below, in a quote from Multitude Between 
Innovation and Negation (2008), it is put to good use when articulating the relation 
between the many of the multitude and the one of governance:  
The ‘many’ introduce uncertainty into the public sphere, and also the 
undifferentiated potential of the animal that, being deprived of an environmental 
niche, is open to the world. We know that the multitude is opposed to the people, 																																																								
117 “These aims were also those of the social groups with whom Spinoza was, of his own will, 
most closely associated during his lifetime; foremost among them, the governing elite of the 
Dutch Republic. For in fact this elite had by then begun to describe itself as a 'freedom party". It 
had grown out of a national liberation struggle. It championed civil liberties against a monarchist 
conception of the State similar to that which currently held sway over ‘absolutist’ Europe. It 
defended freedom of individual conscience, the autonomy of scientific research and scholarship, 
and (up to a certain point) the free circulation of ideas.” (Balibar 2008 3) 	
118 As will be discussed throughout this study, while this study finds that Spinoza informs many 
key concepts of this study, to ignore the reality of what law in governance has structured is to 
condemn billions more to short lives and painful deaths.	
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to their “one will.” It would be a mistake, however, to believe that the multitude 
can dispose of the One as such. The exact opposite is true: the political existence 
of the “many” in as much as the word “many” presupposes something of a 
community, is rooted in a homogeneous and shared environment, and stands out 
against an impersonal background. The One, from which the “many” becomes a 
community, is certainly not state sovereignty. Rather, it is the conglomerate of 
species-specific faculties (verbal thought, cognitive aptitudes, imagination, the 
ability to learn, etc.) that the history of big industry has tossed onto center stage, 
to the point of making these faculties the genuine mainstay of modern production. 
We might say: the One which the many always carry on their backs coincides in 
many aspects with the transindivudual reality that Marx called general intellect or 
“social brain”. The general intellect is the name that refers to the ordinary human 
faculty of thinking with words, and this, in turn, becomes the principal productive 
force of mature capitalism.  (Virno 2008 41)  
 
If the multitude can also be understood as that which precedes and exceeds any form of 
governance but is necessary to its composition, then any governmental One which the 
multitude carries on its back are the things that dispossess humanity but are also needed 
(whether useful or imposed) in the process of relating in self-governance. The 
“conglomerate of species-specific faculties” are, in the logic of this study, much more 
than directly governmental systems but are also other dispositifs working through design 
objects, concepts, food, the climate – whatever things that the multitude can conceptually 
carry or be burdened by in the continued relational practice of being human in the world.  
 
For this cultural policy, what is of particular interest is the ambivalent relation between 
the multitude and formal governance. It can be said that rather than being ambivalent to 
governance, McKee and Glowczewski amplify governmental logics by following 
abstract thought’s interests through multitudinous contexts. A cultural policy of the 
multitude takes ambivalence to governance as a norm, by recognizing that it is the 
multitude’s effects that matter. In this time of climate change, this cultural policy does 
not aim to dispel ambiguity around governance – rather it hopes to provide grounds for 
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continued governmental variation, through a variety of cultural works that inform the 
particular sociality of the multitude for its own tautological self-governance.   
 
The specificity of what sort of ambiguous variation the project hopes to culturally support 
is informed by the study’s analysis of multitudinous capacities for self-governance, 
modeled through the PAH, and also by contemplating the realities of a changing climate 
change– discussed in Chapter 2 through Dark Mountain.  
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Chapter 2 
On the Dark Mountain: Cultural Management in Abstraction 
Rather than writing about the end of humanity full stop, the Dark Mountain Project 
writes about a particular civilizational formulation; “This time, the crumbling empire is 
the unassailable global economy, and the brave new world of consumer democracy being 
forged worldwide in its name.” (Hine & Kingsnorth 2014 4) Their focus is on the end of 
a Western Civilization, though they see collapse as a general trope. “What war 
correspondents and relief workers report is not only the fragility of the fabric, but the 
speed with which it can unravel.” (ibid.) What distinguishes Dark Mountain from other 
environmental and ecological projects in the eyes of this study are their claims to be 
working with an acknowledgement of the realities of what is to come with climate 
change, and that their work is non-political. The mundane fact that they continue to 
publish over a period of time to articulate their perspective makes it a relatively rich 
archive to work with, as well. This study has no other claims regarding Dark Mountains’ 
exemplary status – these facts are good enough.  
 
This chapter first demonstrates the scope and situation of climate change in the eyes of 
governance, looking at the 2014 report issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (the IPCC) ahead of the 2015 Paris climate summit. This demonstration is then 
echoed with Dark Mountain Journal culturally situated response to these global 
governing structures. The chapter’s theoretical investigation then broadens to interrogate 
multiple conceptualizations of the term “culture” in order to begin evaluating what a 
cultural response to climate change might look like and how Dark Mountain’s project fits 
into this evaluation. From there, guided both by Dark Mountain’s critical interests and 
this study’s interrogation, the chapter looks at Kant and Hegel’s conceptualizations of the 
Enlightenment and the political ramifications of the Enlightenment cultural formations 
through which the “non-political” project of Dark Mountain is evaluated. Because by 
chapter’s end Dark Mountain proves to be an unsatisfactory guide, this study briefly 
looks for other ways to think through what is meaningful within cultural work, guided by 
feminist, post-colonial and autonomist Marxist precepts. Throughout this chapter, as is 
fitting for a literary analysis, Dark Mountain excerpts are presented at some length. This 
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is so the reader might have a sense of the journal’s variety of approaches and voices.  
 
1. Climate change 
1a IPCC and the scale of what is manageable  
The latest (and fifth) assessment119 of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) was released in 2014. The IPCC was organized by the United Nations as the 
international body to study the facts and effects of climate change and its implications for 
policy and economy. The IPCC’s (2014) Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability for 
Policy Makers lays out impacts attributed to climate change, broken down in terms of 
physical systems (including impacts on glaciers, snow, ice and permafrost melt, bodies of 
water and drought, and coastal and sea-level effects), biological systems (including 
terrestrial and marine ecosystems, wildfire cycles) and human and human-managed 
systems (in food production, and within livelihoods, health and/or economics). Wading 
through the document’s sober analysis does not minimize the chill of such lines as: 
“Climate change can be expected to affect the world’s human population. Severe climate 
change might even lead to a catastrophic collapse of the population, and even to the 
extinction of human beings.” (IPCC wg. 3 chapter 4  223)120 This study understands 
extinction as within the realm of the possible in the Chthulucene, but as will be discussed, 
approaches death as an ongoing effect in relation to life rather than as a dramatic and 
singular end-point. 
  
The report details climate change’s regional variation and how it bears down differently 
upon the scales contingent to current global socio-political orders. Its overall analysis is 
conclusive: “Human interference with the climate system is occurring, and climate 
change poses risks for human and natural systems.” (IPCC 2014, wg. 2, 3) It is a 
multidisciplinary report, authored by a large group of international academics, covering a 
wide range of topics – from geophysics to ethics – in an effort to grasp the scope of the 
global situation. One chapter begins with the following discussion: 																																																								
119 The IPCC's sixth assessment is scheduled to be released in 2020, according to their website: 
http://wg1.ipcc.ch/AR6/AR6.html. 	
120 This study uses the IPCC’s referencing system.	
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This section explores the determinants of Sustainable Development, emphasizing 
how each influence the extent to which societies can balance the economic, social, 
and environmental pillars of sustainable development, while highlighting 
potential synergies and tradeoffs for the building of mitigative and adaptive 
capacity and the realization of effective and equitable mitigation and adaptation 
strategies. (IPCC 2014, wg. 3 chapter 4 296)  
 
The chapter moves towards policy suggestions, and its conclusions seem to portend the 
non-binding though monumental 2015 Paris Climate agreement. “Some analysts argue 
that the legacy of development and interrelated issues of equity so cloud global climate 
negotiations that ad hoc agreements and voluntary pledges are the most that can be 
achieved.”(IPCC wg. 3 chapter 4 297) The enormous scope of the IPCC’s research 
project seems also to portend this policy outcome; tasked as a research and policy group, 
they seem lost in the weeds of research. If the climate crisis is as dire as it seems, how 
could the IPCC’s inability to come up with direct responses to this threat be seen as 
anything but a failure of its particular governing bodies? While the 2015 Paris summit’s 
acknowledgement of climate change’s reality, and its statements regarding the need for 
collective responsibility for its future impacts is laudable, what seems to also have been 
achieved in Paris 2015 is a deflection of responsibility from egregious carbon-
contributors.  
 
Another policy discussion within the 2014 report summarizes debates on ways policy 
alters human behavior along the interested line of sustainable development. Disregarding 
the reports’ prioritization of sustainable development121 over other approaches to climate 
change (such as simply agreeing to end fossil fuel extraction or severely limiting its use 
tout court), this IPCC chapter (2014, wg. 3 chapter 4) looks at human behavior and what 
tools can be employed to effect it over time. The IPCC identifies several levers to alter 
behavior, including a narrative on values;122 																																																								
121 For one of the many discussions regarding the limits of sustainable development discourse, 
see Lippert (2004). 	
122 “The relevance of values to sustainable development and, particularly, to ecologically 
	 81	
Values have been defined as “enduring beliefs that pertain to desirable end 
states or behaviors, transcend specific situations, guide selection or evaluation 
of behavior and events and are ordered by importance.” Values provide 
“guides for living the best way possible for individuals, social groups and 
cultures’ and so influence actions at all levels of society – including the 
individual, the household, the firm, civil society, and government. Individuals 
acquire values through socialization and learning experience and values thus 
relate to many of the other determinants discussed in this section. Values may 
be rooted in cultural, religious, and other belief systems, which may 
sometimes conflict with scientific understandings of environmental risks. In 
particular, distinct values may influence perceptions and interpretations of 
climate impacts and hence climate responses.” (IPCC wg. 3 chapter 4 299–
300) 
 
Strikingly measured, given the report's ecological focus, is its discussion regarding the 
value of natural systems and non-human organisms: 
It is very difficult to measure non-human values in a way that makes them 
commensurate with human values. Economists address this issue by dividing 
value into use value (associated with actual use of nature – instrumental value) 
and nonuse or existence value (intrinsic value of nature). As an example, 
biodiversity might have value because of the medical drugs that might be 
discovered among the diverse biota (use value). Or biodiversity might be valued 
by individuals simply because they believe that biologic diversity is important, 
over and above any use to people that might occur. The total amount people are 
willing to pay has sometimes been used as an economic measure of the total value 
(instrumental and intrinsic) of these features. As the discussion of the past few 
paragraphs has suggested, nature may have additional value, over and above the 																																																																																																																																																																					
conscious (consumer) behavior, is related to the nature of environmental issues as ‘social 
dilemmas’, where short-term narrow individual interests conflict with the longer term social 
interest. Researchers have highlighted the role of non-selfish values that promote the welfare of 
others (including nature), noting that some but not all indigenous societies are known to focus on 
‘collective’ as opposed to ‘individual’ interests and values, which often result in positive resource 
conservation strategies and wellbeing.” (IPCC wg. 3 chapter 4 300)	
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values placed by individual humans. (IPCC wg. 3 chapter 3 220–221) 
 
Given the IPCC study’s global scope and measured tone, it is not surprising that so few 
levers for behavioral change are directly named: 
[B]ehavior experiments suggest there is no ‘silver bullet’ for fostering 
ecologically conscious behavior, as favorable actions (e. g., to conserve energy) 
are triggered by different stimuli, including information, regulation or economic 
rewards, and influenced by the nature of the issue itself. (IPCC wg. 3 chapter 4 
300)  
 
Concurrent with a human-oriented conceptualization of governance, it is notable that 
nature’s “governmental” acts of flood, heat wave, famine and water shortage are mostly 
sidelined by policy discussions, creating an overall sense of a human-manageable world 
that can be crafted through voluntary pledges around carbon emissions, and abstract, 
poorly-defined promises for future action, despite the fact that these things and their 
effects are the very reason that climate change is important to governance.  
 
1b Dark Mountain’s abstract responses 
Against all this, it is useful to read what the Dark Mountain Journal’s writers think about 
the current socio-political order and beyond. 
 
Dark Mountain co-founder Paul Kingsnorth (2016) writes: 
When I look at the state of the world right now, I see an arc bending towards 
something that dwarfs any parochial concerns about particular presidential 
elections or political arrangements between human nations, and which should put 
those events into deep perspective. I see a grand planetary shift that has not been 
seen for millions of years. I see that half the world’s wildlife has gone, and half 
the world’s forests, and half the world’s topsoil. I see that we have perhaps two 
generations of food left before we wear out the rest of that topsoil. I see 10 billion 
people needing to be fed. I see the highest concentration of carbon in the 
atmosphere since humans evolved. I see coming waves of political and cultural 
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turmoil resulting from all of this, which makes me fear for my children, and 
sometimes for myself.  
 
Dark Mountain’s art editor Charlotte Du Cann (2016) describes how she deals with the 
trauma resultant from this moment of change: 
This alchemical moment has nothing to do with social justice, or 
environmentalism or any of the grassrootsy stuff I have found myself advocating 
during last decade. There are initiatives and networks around the world focusing 
on these worthy things, but none of this transforms anything if we are the same 
people inside, if we haven’t dealt with our stuff – as we used to say in the ’90s – if 
we haven’t uncivilized ourselves, made contact with the layers of dead under our 
feet, in the sky, in the rivers. If we haven’t stood with the Lakota, or with the yew 
trees, with the rainbow serpent, with the glacier, with the tawny owl. If we haven’t 
found a way to dismantle the belief systems that keep us trapped in the cycles of 
history, if we haven’t dealt with our insatiable desire for power and attention and 
found ways to live more lightly on the planet, we are not going to make it through 
this stage. And it is a ‘we’ because, in England at least, we are on a very crowded 
island and no matter how much we say we don’t like our neighbors, they live next 
door.  
 
Frequent Dark Mountain contributor and farmer/anthropologist Chris Smaje (2017) 
compares the care he gives to his farm to the care needed within the world in this time of 
change. Through caring, he finds systems that are both cyclical and linear, “Work gets 
done or it doesn’t. Nature brings her own designs, full of gifts and challenges. The 
seasons swing around and the farm year takes shape out of all those little monologues.” 
He continues: 
But after this year, I see it differently. The further we progress towards fascism or 
other points on the compass of authoritarian nationalism the less traction we will 
have to do anything else that matters. I fear that in the past I’ve spent too much 
time worrying about climate change, energy crisis and the grand ecological 
realignments facing humanity, too much time embracing the certain end of the 
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existing order in the abstract, and not enough on giving myself to basic decencies 
that might see us through to somewhere else. Lofty disinterest made sense while 
our political economy reached the wild heights of its stalling point, but it won’t 
serve for the fall.  
 
Arch druid John Michael Geer (2017) discusses how to overcome the West’s lack of an 
affirmative future-oriented imaginary capable of overcoming the climate crisis: 
Though we’re not going to the stars, in other words, our species will nonetheless 
be journeying to worlds stranger than any of our dreams. Instead of traveling 
through space, humanity has launched itself on a journey through time at the 
dizzying speed of sixty seconds every minute, and the destinations ahead will 
more than likely be entirely free of t-shirts, energy bars, iPhones, or the 
increasingly dreary and dysfunctional conventional wisdom of our age. To me, at 
least, that’s an enticing prospect; while none of us can expect to see the worlds of 
deep time that await our species, we are at least free to dream – and perhaps even 
to take steps to see that as many of the useful legacies of our time make it through 
the impending crises of our age to the waiting hands of the deep future.  
 
This wider rhetorical range of Dark Mountain’s writers’ considerations stands against the 
objective and rational climate politics of the IPCC. The IPCC is tasked with creating 
formally governmental responses to a particular global consensus of what constitutes the 
problems of climate change. That particular global consensus bends towards the interests 
of powerful states and international finance. Dark Mountain presents multitudinous 
thinking in relation to the problem, seemingly unfettered by but by no means ignorant of 
governance. Their thought is qualified as multitudinous because in relation to 
governance, it wanders as thought does rather than following governmental lines. Though 
multitudinous, it hardly represents all the thoughts of the multitude. It does not. The Dark 
Mountain Journal is just a tiny selection of all mental and social variation (multitudinous 
activity) contingent to the current socio-ecological crisis. Nevertheless, in its variation 
from law, Dark Mountain’s writing provides a useful object from which to exact a level 
of critical awareness in order to determine what in culture might best help the multitude 
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in particular respond to the current socio-ecological-cultural crisis.  
 
The next task of this chapter is to work through the conceptual utility of the sorts of 
abstract thought at play in projects like Dark Mountain. Dark Mountain’s work is deemed 
abstract because of how it is conceptually propositional: it proposes concepts seemingly 
beyond dispositifs of formal governance and outside the embedded exchanges of social 
life and intimate economies. These qualities seem to form the reason behind Dark 
Mountain’s self-description as “not political.” (Hine & Kingsnorth 2009/2014 23)  Over 
the course of this chapter, the sort of cultural work they do is qualified as “bourgeois 
cultural work” or just “cultural,” which is conceptually distinguishable from a general 
“anthropological” culture that is defined as being suffused through life. Within this 
chapter, bourgeois cultural forms are discussed in terms of how they relate to the 
Enlightenment ideal of abstractly and particularly employing reason in a specific 
development of the world. Abstraction is understood as a transhistoric and transcultural 
capacity of the human, though with Dark Mountain it is identified as operating under a 
specific logic laid out for bourgeois art and the “non-political” within the Enlightenment 
tradition.  
 
2. Dark Mountain’s not political 
Co-authored and released by Dougald Hine and Paul Kingsnorth in 2009, The Dark 
Mountain Manifesto that launched the Dark Mountain Journal makes a claim of 
particular interest to this study’s cultural policy of the multitudes. The claim regards the 
sort of literature that Dark Mountain Project aims to support. Their “uncivilized” writing 
is “not political writing, with which the world is already flooded, for politics is a human 
confection, complicit in ecocide and decaying from within.” (Hine & Kingsnorth 
2009/2014 13) Dismissing politics as poison, they propose art as the appropriate response 
to climate change. Their claim to not be political is provocative, for it suggests that Dark 
Mountain operates in a notably different register from other writing projects dealing with 
the organization of humanity and nature.  The inquiry of this chapter consists then of 
investigating the validity of Dark Mountain’s antipolitical claim, and of questioning their 
perspectival capacity to make such claims. For if, indeed, they had found a way to 
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operate differently between the concerns of humanity and nature, it would surely be 
interesting to consider their difference as a potential model for cultural policy in a time of 
climate change.   
 
Therefore, this section (2) begins its investigation by observing how Dark Mountain 
conceives of politics and the arts. To grasp their editorial vision, what follows is a 
discussion of the project’s founding, and a discussion of the political tendencies 
represented by Kingsnorth and Hine’s editorial collaboration.  Following this is a 
presentation of their conceptualization of the “uncivilized” writing promoted by their 
journal. “Uncivilized” writing intends to critique the effects of the Enlightenment; what 
follows then is an explication of what they see as attendant to the Enlightenment. Dark 
Mountain’s critical use of terms like “civilization” and “the Enlightenment” ultimately 
sets up the rest of this chapter’s inquiry, which first concerns the nature of the “cultural” 
and the “anthropological” and leads to an interrogation of other universal and general 
concepts contingent to the Enlightenment.  
 
2a Dark Mountain’s understanding of politics and art 
Frequent Dark Mountain contributor Chris Smaje penned what stands as the journal’s 
timely response to the 2015 COP21 Paris Climate Summit meeting.  His article “After 
Paris” describes the summit:  
It resulted in a potentially legally-binding consensus agreement by the majority of 
the world’s governments or their representatives, which included the commitment 
to hold the global average temperature to “well below” 2 degrees C above pre-
industrial levels and to “pursue efforts” to limit it to 1.5 degrees... (Smaje 2015)  
 
He laments that even a 1.5 degree increase has catastrophic ramifications, and that the 
agreement contains few details on how its paltry goals will be achieved. He worries that 
the agreement ignores until 2020 conversations about how countries will meet their self-
defined goals. Finally, he is struck by the fact that the agreement makes no mention of the 
greatest contributor to anthropogenic climate change, fossil fuel. For Smaje, the 
ambiguity at the heart of the agreement is its cloaking of macro-economic issues with 
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micro-economic ones. Smaje sees it as government’s failure to deal with the facts at the 
heart of climate change. Smaje’s analysis, concurrent with the Dark Mountain, this study 
and that of other scholars123 is that climate change is not a straightforward “set of 
‘problems’” that can be addressed by ancillary economic fixes. Climate change, for 
Smaje, is a complex. In lieu of further analysis, he turns to poet Audre Lorde ‘s classic 
formulation, “For the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house. They may 
allow us to temporarily beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us to bring 
about genuine change.”.124 
 
Technocratic solutions, according to Smaje, are the master’s tools. As master’s tools, 
green energy and nuclear power at best “buy time for people to conjure less homicidal 
and biocidal ways of life before catastrophic climate change puts such niceties out of 
reach.” He suggests that rather than a policy that tries to “decarbonize the supply of 
energy” through technocratic measure, it would be best to organize a counter-intuitive 
process that aims to “de-energize the supply of human wellbeing.” This process develops 
a consciousness that replaces petroleum-dependent social capacities with means of 
achieving emotional fulfillment organized beyond a carbon economy. The de-
energization he describes is aware of the affirmative capacities of governance but does 
not bow down to it – to quote Smaje: “No, your technocracy got us into this crisis, and 
even if we need some technocracy to help us out of it we’ll be watching you vigilantly, 
and you will not placate us with your leave-it-to-the-experts rhetoric.”  																																																								
123 See, for example, Beuret (2017), Leonardi (2017). Beuret critically describes how climate 
change has been constituted as a mathematical object whose form and scale suggests that national 
governments and international bodies are the only ones with the capacity to properly respond. He 
suggests a need for a “thick justice” response that “focuses on the constitution of material 
conditions themselves, on what forms of life infrastructure enables and disables, produces and 
inhibits.” (7) Leonardi’s research supports his claim that carbon trading's dogma is in the interest 
of capitalist marketization of risk, rather than aimed at directly addressing the social and 
ecological realities of climate change. 	
124 Originally from a speech, Lorde ([1984] 2007) discusses the space between dialectically 
opposed differences, identifying that which recognizes minor differences rather than polarities 
between positions as that which works with things other than the master’s tools. “Within the 
interdependence of mutual (nondominant) differences lies that security which enables us to 
descend into the chaos of knowledge and return with true visions of our future, along with the 
concomitant power to effect those changes which can bring that future into being. Difference is 
that raw and powerful connection from which our personal power is forged.” (74)	
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Smaje calls for the re-invigoration of locally scaled politics. He recognizes this as 
incongruous with his previous statement concerning the macro-economic responses; he 
allies more locally-scaled manners with “the politics of less ‘civilized’ peoples” who are 
characterized by “infinite decorum” and “a crafty impetus to get things done”. What 
needs to be done, according to Smaje, are those more local things that can be done by any 
means, in order to support the particularities of human existence.  
 
Though Smaje’s thoughts regarding wellbeing are not unique to Dark Mountain, overall 
this study finds much to agree with in Smaje’s analysis.125 It hardly seems worth parsing 
the differences here, because Smaje’s is but one contribution to a journal whose overall 
appearance he hardly affects. In fact, while Smaje identifies his thoughts as contiguous 
with Dark Mountain’s uncivilization politics, the Dark Mountain editors are explicit that 
they don’t forward politics, but rather uncivilization poetics. Dark Mountain Project 
organizes arts festivals and journals, not activist convergences. Since their 2009 founding 
and with their first issue in 2010, they’ve published The Dark Mountain Journal (now 
past its eleventh issue), otherwise titled “a journal of uncivilized art”. “Ecocide demands 
a response. That response is too important to be left to politicians, economists, conceptual 
thinkers, number crunchers; too all pervasive to be left to activists or campaigners. Artists 
are needed.” (Hine & Kingsnorth 2014 20)  
 
So, while in this essay Smaje identifies a politic he finds inherent to uncivilization, Dark 
Mountain itself aims to be something rather more poetic. From their initial manifesto, 
they are interested in “uncivilized” writing that can “look over the edge, face the world 
that is coming with a steady eye, and rise to the challenge of ecocide with a challenge of 
its own: an artistic response to the crumbling of the empires of the mind.” (Hine & 
Kingsnorth 2009/2014 21) Uncivilization writing is one that seeks to autonomously 
“stand outside the human bubble” to write the human into a more balanced relation 
within the webs of nature. The writing claims to have autonomy from embedded human 																																																								
125 For an analysis of the affective nature of petroleum-based society and creative possibilities in 
this culture’s replacement, see Sonjasdotter (2016) Bloom (2015).	
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relationality while observing a human difference from nature. The chasm they see 
between the human and the rest of world has come about, in their analysis, by the egotism 
and violence of the human species and the Western Enlightenment project.  
 
Uncivilization and their conceptualization of the Enlightenment are discussed later on in 
this chapter. Ahead of this, it is important to understand what the project is and who the 
project’s founding editors are. Like the PAH, the spark that led Dark Mountain’s to form 
came during the 2008 financial crisis. But unlike the PAH, rather then re-invigorating an 
activism at the chasm of social and economic collapse, Dark Mountain’s goal was to 
write from among the emotional litter of the collapse’s rubble. Dark Mountain co-
founders Hine and Kingsnorth originally met in online activist discussions. After a 
chance pub meeting, they began penning what would become the Dark Mountain 
Manifesto.126 
  
The text which became Uncivilization: The Dark Mountain Manifesto took shape 
over a period of six months, starting in the summer of 2008. From this distance, it 
already seems like the last summer of another age. Not an innocent age – no one 
would call it that – but an age in which certain delusions were easier to sustain. 
Then, wham! Lehman Brothers came down and for a few weeks we saw the 
naked fear of powerful men with no idea how much of their world will be left 
standing... As the mayhem of those weeks subsided, as the months that followed 
became years, we found ourselves in an age where crisis has become the normal. 
An age of widened extremes and darkening horizons, when outbreaks of hope 
spark sporadically like broken power lines across networks and onto the streets, 
but the future no longer holds the promise it used to. (Hine 2014 viii–ix) 
 
Between them, Hine and Kingsnorth’s backgrounds reveal diverse approaches to culture 
and politics. At the beginning of the project, Hine was working in London as an activist, 
BBC freelance journalist and also hoping on the success of a web start-up he was 																																																								
126 The manifesto’s launch received print media coverage in the Independent, the New Statesman 
and elsewhere. 	
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involved with. He was also involved with the experimental urbanist platform called The 
Space Makers.127 And he participated with The Space Hijackers128 activist art collective, 
which he described as a “collective of anarchitects, psychogeographic pranksters and 
sworn enemies of Starbucks”129. (Hine 2007) The Space Hijackers follow the progressive 
alterglobalization movement’s demands for corporate responsibility, using artivistic 
tactics. Artivism is defined by curator and theorist Peter Weibel as modeling political 
freedom upon artistic freedom. (Weibel 2015 60) Artivistic practitioners Andrew Boyd 
and Dave Oswald Mitchell (2012) describe artivism as “rhizomatic movements marked 
by creativity, humor, networked intelligence, technological sophistication, a profoundly 
participatory ethic and the courage to risk it all for a livable future”130. (2) Reflecting on 
his heterogeneous scene of artists, activists, architects, designers, social entrepreneurs and 
policy makers, Hine writes: 
Over time, I came to think of the connection between these groups in terms of 
“bringing new things into social reality”. This was how the world changed, not by 																																																								
127 From their website: “We create projects, publications and interventions to help make our 
cities, buildings and spaces work better. We specialize in reactivating dead spaces; harnessing 
unused potential in a community; and getting inside the machinery of regeneration, and using its 
levers to come up with something more interesting.” (http://www.spacemakers.info/) 	
128 From their website, “The Space Hijackers are a group of Anarchitects which was set up at the 
beginning of 1999. Our group is dedicated to battling the constant oppressive encroachment onto 
public spaces of institutions, corporations and urban planners. We oppose the way that public 
space is being eroded and replaced by corporate profit making space.” 
(http://www.spacehijackers.org/)	
 
129 Naomi Klein’s No Logo (2000) describes anti-corporate protest of the 1990s and 2000s as 
being against the rapid expansion of transnational capitalism and its intendment demolition of 
labor and environmental conditions via the seeming dematerialization of production via the 
prioritization of intellectual property. She describes Starbuck’s corporate policy (144–148) of 
entering regional markets by targeting local cafes and cannibalizing their customer base.   	
130 On his blog, Hine quotes a Space Hijackers’ press release for an action where they intended 
to critically intervene at the 2007 DSEI London Arms Fair which reflects the playful logic 
reflected in Boyd and Mitchell’s descriptions of artivism: 
On the last two occasions we have attempted to infiltrate the fair, embarrass the dealers 
and cause a ruckus. In 2003, we caught the trains to the fair with the arms dealers. Suited 
up and looking business-like we pulled prosthetic limbs (arms) from our cases and 
attempted to sell them to the dealers. In 2005, worried about their obsession with phallic 
objects such as rockets we attempted to sell sex toys to the dealers to make up for their 
lack of “weapons capabilities”. Generally however we are escorted out by the police. 
(Hine 2007)	
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the repetition of familiar arguments, but by the shifting of the boundaries of what 
people saw as possible. There was a craft to this, but it was a craft of observation, 
of working with what the world threw at you. It required the exercise of will, but 
in relationship with reality, not in stubborn opposition to it. (Hine 2010) 
 
Paul Kingsnorth was a noted writer before Dark Mountain. His 2008 book Real England: 
the Battle against the Bland reached a wide audience and was quoted in speeches by the 
Archbishop of Canterbury and the then prime ministerial-candidate David Cameron. By 
his own telling, he’d evolved from being a direct-action activist in the UK’s 1990s anti-
roads movements to an NGO-styled campaigner and deputy-editor of The Ecologist.131 
He ambivalently recounts his path through eco-activism in the first issue of the Dark 
Mountain Journal: 
Today’s environmentalism is about people. It is a consolation prize for a gaggle of 
washed-up Trots and at the same time, with an amusing irony, it is an adjunct to 
hyper-capitalism; the catalytic converter on the silver SUV of the global economy. 
It is an engineering challenge; a problem-solving device for people to whom the 
sight of a wild Pennine hilltop on a clear winter day brings not feelings of 
transcendence but thoughts about the wasted potential for renewable energy. It is 
about saving civilization from the results of its own actions; a desperate attempt to 
prevent Gaia from hiccupping and wiping out our coffee shops and broadband 
connections. It is our last hope. (DM 1 59) 
 
One might assume that while Hine thought to joyfully prank Starbucks for their corporate 
takeover of a lovable coffee culture, Kingsnorth would have seen such actions as 
distractions from the brutal anthropocentrism of humanity in general. Kingsnorth’s tenure 
with The Ecologist reveals a stark difference to Hine’s left orientation. Kingsnorth 
worked under the editorship of Conservative Party member Zac Goldsmith. Goldsmith’s 
father James Goldsmith was the founder of the Eurosceptic 'Reform Party' that is 
understood by its style to be the immediate forerunner of the UKIP party that successfully 																																																								
131 The Ecologist was a UK-based environmental journal published from 1970 until 2009. It 
continues with an online presence today. 	
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pushed through the 2016132 Brexit referendum that Kingsnorth voted for.133 Zac 
Goldsmiths is also the nephew of controversial134 Ecologist founder Edward ‘Teddy’ 
Goldsmith. Edward Goldsmith’s eco-philosophy has been critiqued for its cultural 
determinism,135 patriarchal world-view, support of forced sterilization and its 
Malthusianism.136 The Malthusian concept – that the ecology can only support a certain 
population size, determined by a particular social order nominated as capable of judging 
who is to be included in that population, has cast a dark shadow on ecological137 thought 																																																								
132 For more on the connections between James Goldsmith, the Reform Party, UKIP and Brexit, 
see Goldsmith (2015), O’Grady (2016). 	
133 Kingsnorth’s (2017) Guardian essay, supporting his Brexit vote on the grounds that smaller 
borders count conceptually, allows for a more effective grasp of what is to be protected. His 
argumentation equates the threats neo-liberal globalization imposes upon the UK as a sovereign 
nation with those that have historically been placed, for example, upon Native Americans and 
other Indigenous peoples by systems in which they continue to be deprived of any meaningful 
voice. Rather than seeing complex machinations of dispossession, he sees globalization as a 
threat to a diversity of identities, which justifies his vote.  
 
 This essay has been roundly criticized by, among others, Out of the Woods (2017) and	
The Base (2017) for its antisocial nationalism and its wispy efforts to describe an 
environmentalism without global concerns. The essay is excluded from the main content of this 
study, due to its publication in the Guardian rather than in the pages of Dark Mountain.  	
134 In a section of Kingsnorth’s (2007) laudatory biographical article on Goldsmith, he does not 
obscure Goldsmith’s New Right ties. Yet, in order to suggest that Goldsmith was an equal-
opportunity offender, he writes “He has been called 'an extreme right-wing ideologue' (by Dutch 
Stalinist Eric Krebbers, who disliked Teddy so much that he invented the word 'fascistoid' 
especially for him), a 'Bolshevik' (French magazine l'Actuel), a 'wacko-communist-liberal' 
(viewer of the US C-Span TV network) a 'Jacobin terrorist' (US writer Lyndon Larouche), an 
'enemy of the state' (President Suharto of Indonesia), a 'Gaian-sociobiologist' (Wolfgang Sachs), a 
'madman' (Professor Lewis Wolpert) and even, allegedly at any rate, 'the anti-Christ' (the Catholic 
Archbishop of Bologna).”  	
135 Journalist George Monbiot, writes of Goldsmith, “Goldsmith, as the former editors later 
pointed out in their paper ‘Blood and Culture’, assumes that culture is a rigid, immutable thing: 
that different communities can live only within the boxes nature has assigned to them.” (Monbiot 
2002) 	
136 See Draper & Maré (2003), for a left-wing case against Goldsmith.  	
137 See Normandin & Valles (2015), for a discussion of how Malthusian thought, re-
conceptualized through writing of 1960s ecologists Paul R. Ehrlich has fueled anti-immigration 
policy and split mainstream environmental groups. 	
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since its German founding138 and has played out in right wing139 and fascist governance 
over the course of recent history.  
 
Anti-fascist ecologists Biehl and Staudenmaier (1995) demonstrate the relation between 
concepts of population control and ecology: 
…important tendencies in German “ecologism,” which has long roots in 
nineteenth-century nature mysticism, fed into the rise of Nazism in the twentieth 
century. During the Third Reich, Staudenmaier goes on to show, Nazi “ecologists” 
even made organic farming, vegetarianism, nature worship, and related themes 
into key elements not only in their ideology but in their governmental policies. 
Moreover, Nazi “ecological” ideology was used to justify the destruction of 
European Jewry. (3) 
  
Peter Staudenmaier (1995) describes how the German philosophers and scientists who 
began the study of ecology were xenophobic anti-Enlightenment racists. He describes 
zoologist Ernst Haeckel, who coined the term ‘ecology’, as a proponent of social 
Darwinism, and how Haeckel’s hierarchizing of peoples greatly informed Nazi ideology.  
 
Kingsnorth does not seem to be a fascist, though he did write (2007) an appreciative 
biographical article about Edward Goldsmith that fails to meaningfully criticize 
Goldsmith’s willingness to work with Europe’s ethno-nationalist Right. Kingsnorth 
justifies Goldsmiths’ politics with the political math that for the Left of Goldsmith’s day 
the primary organizational unit was workers, for Conservatives it was the state, and that 
for the Greens it was the planet. Kingsnorth explains that Goldsmith’s political thought 
depended on: 
one, central idea that had not changed in Teddy's thinking for 50 years: that small-
scale, "traditional societies" are the only ones that work, and that humanity needs 
to return to such a way of life if it is to have a future. 																																																								
138 See Biehl & Stuadenmaier (1995). 	
139 Block and Sommer (2014) argue that from their origins, Malthusian views of the world’s 
limits have informed governmental arguments against social welfare policy.	
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Teddy's adherence to this notion has cost him friends and allies as the green 
movement has moved gradually away from it – and him – during his lifetime. A 
bit of historical context explains why. The early green movement had a wide 
variety of adherents and founders, from former communists to nationalists, and 
even a few notoriously far right sympathizers. The early greens aimed to be 
“beyond left and right”, to transcend not just contemporary political divisions, but 
industrial society itself. (2007) 
 
Kingsnorth and Hine’s backgrounds demonstrate multitudinous responses (be they 
agreeable or not) to the scaled organization that maintains current order. Despite their 
differences – Hine’s left/urbanist anti-corporate activism and Kingsnorth’s right-wing 
misanthropocism – they found ample room for collaboration. Hine describes their terrain 
as a shared one, built upon political disillusionment; “We were disillusioned with the 
state of environmentalism. It seemed that sustainability had come to mean sustaining the 
western way of living at all costs, regardless of whether this was possible or desirable”. 
(Hine 2014 x) Therefore, coming from a diverse activist milieu, Hine and Kingsnorth’s 
“not political” project seems to be “not political” as based on its willingness to critique 
direct action and NGO activist approaches, in favor of a self-reflective consideration of 
concepts imminent to climate change.  
 
2b On Dark Mountain’s uncivilized writing 
Disillusioned by activism, Dark Mountain’s editors constructed a cultural platform to 
articulate something they considered different: “We were disillusioned, too, with the state 
of literature and the cultural landscape.” (Hine 2014 x) Hine says they found current 
literature willfully ignorant of the ecological costs of Western cultural and economic 
achievement. Even for literature with this ecological awareness, their general political 
critique is brought to bear: 
Even on occasions when writers did their best to face the entangled ecological, 
economic and social crises that surround us, the results tended to be unsatisfying: 
art deadening into a communication tool for messages from scientists and 
campaigners, soap-opera scale stories playing out against a backdrop of melting 
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icebergs and failing negotiations. The literary tools inherited form the recent past 
seemed ill-adapted to the times into which we were heading. (Hine 2014 xi) 
 
Other writers, according to the manifesto, are ill-adapted because they emerge out of a 
political consciousness whose ends have been proven, by experience, to lead towards 
destruction. The legacies of these literatures’ political relations prove that through them, 
humanity cannot properly steward the world – that neither a Christian God, political 
reason nor Marx’s revolutionary insights have saved humanity thus far from its collective 
fate. Quoting poet Robinson Jeffers, from whose work their name Dark Mountain 
derives, Hine and Kingsnorth explain their interest in a writing that achieves the 
following:  
The shifting of emphasis from man to notman: this is the aim of Uncivilized 
writing. To “unhumanise our views a little, and become confident / As the 
rock and ocean that we were made from… 
 
They continue in their own words:  
It is to accept the world for what it is and to make our home here, rather than 
dreaming of relocating to the stars, or existing in a Man-forged bubble and 
pretending to ourselves that there is nothing outside it to which we have any 
connection at all. (2009/2014) 
 
These notions of uncivilization from their initial manifesto find definition through the 
project’s more than eleven printed journals, countless blog and chat posts, and within its 
schedule of events. Their journal contains poetry, critical writing, expository essays, 
literary non-fiction, photography, painting, drawing and other artwork documentation 
gathered through open submission calls and editorial selection. Each issue’s open call is 
thematic, and contributors include both lesser-known and better-known writers and 
thinkers.140 In addition to organizing book launches, creative and poetry writing 																																																								
140 Dark Mountain has reprinted articles from well known authors including Naomi Klein, David 
Graeber, and Bill McKibben, among others.	
	 96	
workshops, they have also held at least three large “Uncivilization Festivals” – discussion 
and performance events. Frankly speaking, beyond the thesis’ interests, the issues’ 
creative and thoughtful writing makes for pleasant reading. 
 
On its own terms, Dark Mountain’s explicitly literary project meditates upon the 
following understanding: “If we are indeed teetering on the edge of a massive change in 
how we live, in how human society itself is constructed, and in how we relate to the rest 
of the world, then we were led to this point by the stories we have told ourselves – above 
all, by the story of civilization”. (Hine & Kingsnorth 2014 17) Revealing and reworking 
civilizational narratives is the critical task, says Dark Mountain; their insight seems to be 
informed by the vision of a more humble and chastened human. To these ends, ripe with 
literary reference, their manifesto focuses on undermining particular myths:  
As the financial wizards lose their powers of levitation, as the politicians and 
economists struggle to conjure new explanations, it starts to dawn on us that 
behind the curtain, at the heart of the Emerald City, sits not the benign and 
omnipotent invisible hand we had been promised, but something else entirely. 
Something responsible for what Marx, writing not so long before Conrad, cast 
as the “everlasting uncertainty and anguish” of the “bourgeois epoch”; a time 
in which “all that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned.” Draw 
back the curtain, follow the tireless motion of cogs and wheels back to its 
source, and you will find the engine driving our civilization: the myth of 
progress. (6–7) 
 
Within Marx’s Communist Manifesto (Marx & Engels 1848/2007) excerpt that is 
referenced here, all that is solid that melts into air are the spiritualities, intensities, 
meaningful relations and values that are understood to have stabilized pre-capitalist 
society. Bourgeois capitalism renders these particular concerns meaningless, to be 
playfully reordered or swept away by relentless innovation in the rational quest for profit. 
Yet in the time of climate change, it is ever-greater climactic variability as much as 
capitalism that reveals social life to the unstable face of melting, though what Dark 
Mountain sees as melting is the objective myth of progress – that somehow things get 
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better:  
Onto the root stock of Western Christianity, the Enlightenment at its most 
optimistic grafted a vision of an Earthly paradise, towards which human effort 
guided by calculative reason could take us. Following this guidance, each 
generation will live a better life than the life of those that went before it. History 
becomes an escalator, and the only way is up. On the top floor is human 
perfection. It is important that this should remain just out of reach in order to 
sustain the sensation of motion. (Hine and Kingsnorth 2014 7) 
 
Dark Mountain collapses the concept of progress onto the goals of capitalism; even 
though there are other notions of progress besides increasing capacity for greater profit. 
Dark Mountain’s proposal for uncivilized writing comes in response to the failure of the 
whiggish141 notion of progress suggested by the promise of the Enlightenment, which 
they directly link to capitalist development:  
This then, is Uncivilized writing… We tried acting as God’s steward, then we 
tried ushering in the human revolution, the age of reason and isolation. We failed 
in all of it, and our failure destroyed more than we were even aware of. The time 
for civilization is past. Uncivilization, which knows its flaws because it has 
participated in them; which sees unflinchingly and bites down hard as it records – 
this is the project we must embark on. (26) 
 
2c Dark Mountain’s collapse and Enlightenment ends 
The concept of Uncivilization is an effect of the doom that Dark Mountain thinks even 
politicians and scientists recognize as humanity’s fate. Uncivilized writing “bites down 
hard” on the record of civilization’s failures rather than spitting them up. It emotionally 
owns these failures. Yet to Dark Mountain’s detractors who call them “collapsitarians” 
																																																								
141 Whiggish history is one that suggests that history has an inevitable end-point. Discussing the 
results and meaning of 2016 Brexit and Trump elections, Kingsnorth (2016) discusses the 
whiggish ideal that history that has an ethic “[l]ike a dammed river bursting its banks, progress 
will inevitably resume its natural course, sooner or later.” 
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gaming for civilization’s collapse, 142 they respond: 
… why would we bother? It doesn’t need overthrowing: the historical force of 
gravity is already acting on it. When something is falling, the best move is often 
to get out of the way. We are facing the end of the world as we know it; but this is 
not the same thing as the end of the world full stop. The decline or stuttering 
collapse of a civilization, a way of life, is not the same thing as an apocalypse. It 
is simply a reality of history. (Kingsnorth & Hine 2010 3–4) 
 
Despite Kingsnorth’s affiliation with political reactionaries, the Dark Mountain Project’s 
inversion of the Enlightenment shares only a basic similarity with, for example, the alt-
right neo-Hobbesianism of Nick Land’s (2012) Dark Enlightenment project. Though both 
find error in the effects of Enlightenment thought, Land finds total error in the manner in 
which the Enlightenment was politicized. Dark Mountain just seems to lament the 
Enlightenment’s capacity to be an object of political organization in any direction. In 
Land’s conceptualization, Hegel and the progenitors of the modern state are lampooned 
as “Cathedral”, a moniker he utilizes to dismiss those who posit statist, liberal and moral 
notions of a common human being. “Cathedral” foolishly holds out common and 
idealistic horizons for many to share in and collectively produce. Land’s racist 
accelerationism, theoretically fueled by an antisocial reading of Deleuze and Guattari, 
wants private capital to drive a limitless exploitation of biology and nature in gravity-free 
politics whose real costs are borne by everyone and everything but the rich. Land’s 
weightless vitalistic imaginary envisions financial capital as the electric current capable 
of obliterating whatever ecological or social value in favor of wealthy men’s pride. In 
sharp contrast, Dark Mountain only stands chastened in awe of the scale of logistical 
undoing by the forces of nature to come – appearing as the final wretched return of the 
Enlightenment. Where Land announces cruel apocalypse, Dark Mountain takes the 
position of humbled and tempered spectator. 
 
Also meriting discussion here is the Left-accelerationist work of Nick Srnicek and Alex 																																																								
142 A 2014 article about Dark Mountain and Kingsnorth states, “He and his sympathizers were 
branded “doomers,” “nihilists” and (Kingsnorth’s favorite epithet) “crazy collapsitarians.” (Smith 
2014)	
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Williams (2013, 2015) as it might stand as a popular Left mirror image to the particular 
horrors of Land’s Dark Enlightenment. While Land imagines hyper-capitalist innovation 
for the benefit of Randian heroes, Srnicek and Williams demand fully automated luxury 
communism organized by their paradoxical formulation of a “universalism from below”. 
(Srnicek & Williams 2015 ch.4) A critical discussion of how Enlightenment’s 
universalisms are conceptualized as providing narratival orientation from above to 
political thought and movements follows in subsequent sections of this chapter. Beyond 
their understandable call for economic justice, Srnicek and Williams paradoxically begin 
with a denigration of the “from below” from where the actual need for economic justice 
emerges in the experiences of the multitude. One notion on which this study agrees with 
Srnicek and Williams, contra Dark Mountain, is that modernity is not “simply a cultural 
expression of capitalism.” (Srnicek & Williams 2015 ch.4) But Srnicek and William’s 
disinterest in the ways of particular life, along with their blithe disregard for “folk 
politics,” seems, at best, politically naïve – as others have stated,143 Moreover, and as 
even Dark Mountain Issue 5 editorial suggests in reference to Left Accelerationism, 
unfettered luxury communism along the lines of current consumption habits writes a 
muddy ecological death sentence for the world. Muddy because, counter to Dark 
Mountain’s contentions, the realities consummated through truly progressive elements in 
the Enlightenment (cf. Wynter & McKittrick 2015) are not the material gifts of capitalism 
but extended capacities for thought that may or may not be realized. 
 
Over time, Dark Mountain’s awareness of what is contingent to systemic collapse is 
developed by some writers into a more situated awareness of reality. Smaje’s comments 
above provide one example of this, and another can be found in co-editor Hine’s five-
year reflection on the project: 
This leaves us with a challenge that goes deeper than argument: to extricate 
ourselves from deeply ingrained habits of thought, and to do so with care, with an 
attention to how we treat one another, with a realism about our vulnerabilities and 
our ongoing dependence on systems with which we are often far from 
comfortable, with an imagination capable of finding infinity in an hourglass. The 																																																								
143 See for example Noys (2014), Wark (2015), Lowrie (2016).	
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Dark Mountain Project is not a political incubator, hatching the ‘down-wing’ of 
some new vertical alignment of politics (as if what the world needed were another 
binary opposition). Nor is it exactly what we thought it was, five years ago, when 
we wrote a manifesto for something like a literary movement. If only things were 
that simple. (Hine et. al. 2014 2–3) 
 
Dark Mountain appreciates certain Chthulucenic bonds that make contemporary society 
socially capable. Yet at its core, for Dark Mountain the Enlightenment sits as reference to 
any abstract system, that by its abstract nature must be allowed to unwind as it is battered 
by the forces of nature beyond human control. Dark Mountain suggests that the weak 
binds of abstract social organization also serve as the path of this eventual undoing. 
Through their performed autonomy, Dark Mountain posits the possibility of a distanced 
observation of this undoing, from “outside the bubble.” Seated outside society, they do 
not imagine their own lives as falling apart. They are spectators rather than 
schizophrenics of collapse; witness for example, the perspective in the poem 
Rearmament, by 1930s American pacifist Robinson Jeffers, which serves as an epigraph 
to their manifesto:144   
These grand and fatal movements toward death; 
 The grandeur of the mass 
Makes pity a fool, the tearing pity 
For the atoms of the mass, the persons, the victims, 
 Make it seem monstrous 
To admire the tragic beauty, they build. 
It is beautiful as a river flowing or a slowly gathering 
Glacier on a height mountain rock-face,  
Bound to plow down a forest, or as frost in November,  
The gold and flaming death-dance for leaves,  
Or a girl in the night of her spent maidenhood,  																																																								
144 Besides his poetry, Jeffers designed and built an architecturally significant stone house on the 
wind-swept Central California coast, and has been noted for founding a school of thought, 
inhumanism. Inhumanism’s central insight was man’s blindness to the world’s beauty because of 
his own self-consciousness (Coffin, date unknown).	
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 Bleeding and kissing.  
I would burn my right hand in a slow fire 
To change the future… I should do foolishly.  
 The beauty of modern 
Man is not in the person but in the  
Disastrous rhythm, the heavy and mobile masses,  
 The dance of the  
Dream-led masses down the dark mountain.  
(Jeffers 1935) 
 
As a heart-felt and humbled literary reserve, the non-political premise of their work might 
appear as an ethically resigned position from which the folly of the masses can be 
avoided. In the eyes of Dark Mountain, political incubators are complicit with the fool’s 
errand of organized politics. There is more to say about how Dark Mountain 
conceptualizes the autonomy of the arts – as a weightless space outside of the “bubble of 
humanity.” They propose this bubble as distinct from politics and other organizational 
narratives they see as irrevocably tied to engines of destruction. But, in the following 
discussion that clarifies the Dark Mountain editors' understanding of humanity through 
an ongoing exchange with the Guardian’s George Monbiot, a less ideal picture of their 
concept of human relations emerges.   
 
2d Dark Mountain’s anthropological imaginary 
To state the obvious, Dark Mountain is an institution whose editorial goals are forwarded 
in print with the aim of structuring meaning via the continuation of thought over time. 
Befitting the longevity of institutional time, the pressing of words onto the page saves 
them from melting into air.  The seriality of Dark Mountain’s appearance demonstrates 
their belief that uncivilization isn’t achieved by shouting to devotees from the 
mountaintops for all to decamp and head for other hills. To the contrary, Dark Mountain 
continues publishing. Poetry’s roots in oral culture distinguish it from contemporary 
poetry not only by its lack of printed output, but also by the more general distinction 
between societies and their modes of organizing activity and thought. This organizational 
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difference can be witnessed in the results of the printing press' invention. Media theorist 
Marshall McLuhan (1964/1996) wrote that with the social organization necessary for 
printed books’ publication and consumption comes “the first assembly line – mass 
production” (50) and the creation of mass publics. (68) Today’s poetry distinguishes itself 
from the rest of social order by having its own unique spot and operations within the 
market economy, just like anything else. Under contemporary conditions, poetry can find 
a space for itself outside of all other organizations but the market. San Francisco Bay-
based poet David Buuck’s writing about poetry and Occupy Oakland demonstrates one 
political effect of such autonomy: 
Certainly, being a “good” poet has nothing to do with one’s activism, just as being 
an activist does not in itself make my poetry “better” or more interesting, or even 
more “political.” Is an affinity group made up of poets necessarily any different 
than one made up of, say, carpenters, who would at least seem to have a more 
useful set of skills to bring to the table? Or as Oakland poet Lara Durback puts it, 
“I like poets in action more than poets at the action doing poetry.” (Buuck 2014) 
 
This sentiment runs only slightly counter to the narratival role art plays in Yates McKee’s 
discussion of Occupy. Both describe art’s capacity to be in distanced relation to activist 
movements rather than indistinguishable from life in struggle and its expression. In both 
Buuck and McKee’s formulation, art is understood as consciously staged for a time and 
in appropriate places rather than as culturally enmeshed in place and time. 
 
So, to the logic of Dark Mountain’s poetics in a published exchange between Guardian 
columnist George Monbiot and Paul Kingsnorth, Monbiot writes, “I detect in your 
writings, and in the conversations we have had, an attraction towards – almost a yearning 
for – this apocalypse, a sense that you see it as a cleansing fire that will rid the world of a 
diseased society.” (Monbiot & Kingsnorth 2009) To this, Kingsnorth responds, “You say 
that you detect in my writing a yearning for apocalypse. I detect in yours a paralyzing 
fear,” and goes on to describe the space he’d like Dark Mountain to create as “a managed 
retreat to a saner world” with a poetry that will help get the world there. By the logic of 
autonomous art, Kingsnorth could rationally counter that Monbiot misidentifies Dark 
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Mountain as political actors rather than as the poets they aspire to be. The imagined 
autonomy that Dark Mountain maintains through the practice of contemporary poetry 
runs counter to the popular anthropological imaginary alluded to above with Marx – of a 
world where saga and myth are embedded within and throughout a society’s social fabric. 
This mythical way of being is also somehow the cultural approach that Dark Mountain 
hopes to nurture through its articles and attitude.145  
 
Because of their romantic notions of a mythic human being, despite their embeddedness 
in a social form counter to it (made explicit with the serial printing of a journal), this 
study finds Dark Mountain’s artistic claims of difference based on its autonomy a little 
ironic. Autonomy is the functional logic of the contemporary culture industries, it is 
surely how most professional poetry, and much writing and art gets done today. Besides 
their performed imaginal autonomy stands their performance of the common claim to 
uniqueness.146  
																																																								
145 This mythical way appears throughout the pages of the Dark Mountain Journal. For many of 
their writers, modern society is distinct from an equally general indigeneity characterized as an 
organic society suffused with meaning and connection to a spiritual world, to which modern 
society apparently needs to reconnect. 	
 A conversation between Paul Kingsnorth and outdoor sporting goods magnates Doug and 
Kris Tompkins, who as philanthropists founded the Foundation for Deep Ecology, serves as an 
example. Doug Tompkins explains that his activism exceeds any pragmatism, that he is moved by 
a spiritual awareness that coincides with this above anthropological imaginary: 
I don’t mean “religious” in the sense of organized religions; but it seems to me that 
one either believes in one’s deepest core that life is sacred – all of life, from other 
non-human species, to forests, oceans, mountains, the entire planet as a living 
massive organism that generally we know as “nature”, but we have a thousand names 
for it, from Mother Nature, Pachamama, Gaia; depending on the culture you are 
from. This is nothing new, of course – indigenous cultures created vast numbers of 
their narratives and myths around this most basic concept, and although the surface 
expressions of it varied, the core story is quite the same. So as children of industrial 
culture we are trying to reconstitute a new narrative, and it comes out in such forms 
as the current of eco-philosophy of the Norwegian philosopher and thinker Arne 
Naess, what’s known as “deep ecology”. It’s one way those of us coming from the 
techno-industrial culture can try to get a grip on the idea that we need to share the 
planet with other creatures. (Kingsnorth and Tompkins et. al. 2012 148) 	
146 Agamben (1994) is very clear about the necessity for originality within the contemporary 
arts. 
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3 Cultures  
Dark Mountain seems to conceptualize their “not political” journal as a space for work to 
culturally be without actually being. To expand on this autonomy, it is useful to look 
further into the abstract discursive, cultural space that Dark Mountain Project identifies 
as the Enlightenment’s legacy. It should be understood that when used in the unqualified 
manner within this study, the term culture is understood to mean “proper to the ways in 
which humans relate by, in and to the world.”147 There are a variety of definitions for the 
term culture, though this chapter will primarily be concerned with just two 
understandings: “bourgeois culture” and “anthropological culture”. The term 
“anthropology” is used in a more ambiguous manner – it is understood as both a general 
theory of the human and also the particular project of drawing out an understanding of 
the universally human, emerging out of the European Enlightenment.  
 
The task of this section (3) is to provide a deeper understanding of the nature of this 
staged manner of human culture that Dark Mountain imagines as simply outside politics. 
First is a discussion of the function of culture in general. This is followed by an analysis 
of culture’s staging, by way of distinctions between fine arts’ bourgeois culture and what 
is grasped through the Enlightenment’s cultural anthropologies. Then comes a discussion 
of what, by conceptualizing the Enlightenment, the anthropological staging of the human 
as an intellectual project has achieved. Throughout this interrogation is an ongoing 
critical evaluation of Dark Mountain’s editorial logic. 
 
To begin a discussion of culture in general, it is useful to look at what is common and 
exclusive to anthropological and fine arts’ culture. In The Savage Mind (1962), Claude 
Lévi-Strauss writes that cultural work can be understood as either a particular project of 
bricolage or as a massive project of engineering. Engineered culture creates social 
stability by changing meaning structures in spaces perceived as beyond society, while the 
bricoleur acts by piecing new relations within what already seems to be ordered by 																																																								
147 This definition comes from the field of cultural anthropology. For example, Anthropologist 
Clifford Gertz explains culture this way: “…man is an animal suspended in webs of significance 
he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs…” (Gertz 1973 5)	
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society. (15) Both ways piece together cultural relations as formulas for how societies 
balance their need for change with their need for stability. The need for change comes 
from the need to adjust to all the things that vary in the world. The need for stability 
comes from the need for an ordered way to continue with life’s collaborative processes. 
Lévi-Strauss’s formulation clarifies how, within all societies, signs orient stable life 
through abstract (and thus variable) relation to myths, allowing for an abstract 
imagination of particular continuity despite change. Lévi-Strauss discusses the nature of 
abstract thought, a quality he ultimately associates with both bricolage and engineering. 
He demonstrates that abstraction is just a marker for something that any culture focuses 
on with “intensity and attention to detail.”(2) The particularity of focus explains why one 
culture might have a developed vocabulary for minor botanical differences and another 
might have developed computational algorithms. Attention to details marks what any 
society focuses on to achieve stability: by bricolage making due within a seemingly 
closed universe; or by artistic, scholarly and scientific engineering that makes particular 
tools to expand the universe from a seemingly fixed vantage point.  
 
Ultimately, rather than utilizing Lévi-Strauss’s terminology, this study utilizes the general 
concept of “anthropological culture” and the specific formation of “bourgeois culture.” 
The bricoleur and the engineer do not specifically map on to these terms. Yet, through 
Lévi-Strauss’s framing, one can grasp how distinctions between the general ways of 
being and particular modes of doing are common properties of human activity. In an 
always-changing world, life has had to make peace with its own contingent being over 
time (through a multitude of manners Lévi-Strauss just happens to name bricolage) and 
its changing contingencies in time (as innovation engineered by art or science). The terms 
“anthropological culture” and “bourgeois culture” utilized here assist the managerial and 
policy interests of this study. “Anthropology” comes to terms with the general ways of 
people and populations. What are the cultures of the cultural industries, commonly 
referred to as “the arts” and here termed “bourgeois culture”  (or just culture) generally 
works with abstract things meant to operate as relational bridges within the particular 
terrains of life and as the field of innovation and inquiry.148 What follows in these next 																																																								
148 This role that Lévi-Strauss ascribes to the arts (1962 14) is congruent with the role described 
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two sections are further definitions and discussions of these terms. They matter because a 
cultural policy of the multitude must begin its anthropological relation to the multitude 
through the stable ways its life currently exists.  
 
3a Anthropological culture 
Within the academic discipline of Cultural Anthropology, the difference between “our” 
culture’s arrangements and the arrangements of another culture is only qualitative – to the 
extent that “our” culture seems to be different, it is because “we” are the ones arranging it 
from within. The basic project of Western Anthropology as the study of the universal man 
is rooted at the concurrence of the Enlightenment and the European colonial project of 
rationally getting to know the world through the discursive and material commerce of 
warfare, coercion, research and trade. Anthropology rests upon an assumption of a 
necessary superiority of its authors over a population that evolves, at least theoretically, 
towards the author’s image. (cf. Fabian 2014) This anthropological imaginary rests on 
biological, material, theological and temporal suppositions regarding the nature of the 
universal human; that there is a singular core of what it is to be human throughout 
history. Critical theorists Sylvia Wynter and Denise Ferreira da Silva, and anthropologist 
Johannes Fabian identify in notions of this universal human a biological assumption that 
privileges DNA’s coding of male-species homo sapiens. This DNA-defined human comes 
with an existential need for food, shelter and self-reproduction – this logic of a species 
coded through DNA is the barest of life’s descriptions, it strips humans of their generally 
particular ways of being unique. The temporal assumption of human development 
progressing towards the Anthropologist’s perspective, contingent upon the definitional 
objectivity of the observer, coincides with an understanding of cultural or historical 
development as progressive – moving towards some ideal. This culture’s theological 
assumptions are grounded by a secular Christian trajectory, which assumes that mythical 
end-point and origin have little role in setting and determining fate. To that end, it is 
assumed by many social scientists that material history, rather than mythical intervention 
or narratival preconception, plays a primary role in the actual development of cultural 
expression and historical development. Dark Mountain’s critique of progress somehow 																																																																																																																																																																					
by Deleuze and Guattari (1994).	
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addresses these general assumptions of modernity. Throughout this chapter, especially in 
relation to Hegelian thought, other critiques of modernity emerge. 
 
What this universal imaginary allows for is a seemingly objective and sometimes 
politically progressive149 understanding of the human as an individual, and for a 
continuity of elements available for arrangement across the historical scope of 
existence.150 This cross-cultural, universally legible human appears in today’s global 
media, through an exchange of images confirming the existence of other places to be seen 
and in some way considered.  Cross-cultural contacts, the circulation of trade-goods and 
literature as well as legacies of colonialism may have contributed to a similar sensibility 
in the past. Anthropology seems based on the assumption that there is nothing absolutely 
foreign in human experience across time and geography, just new spaces and times for 
human experiences and relational arrangements to unfold in particular ways.151 For a 
cultural policy of a truly global multitude in the time of climate change, it is necessary to 
provide an account of what is grasped and what is missed in this conception of the 
anthropological.  
 
The academic discipline of Cultural Anthropology would be inconceivable without the 
above assumptions about universality. For example, note how anthropologist Franz Boas 
(1914) allows for the inference that all that is cultural is legible to any other culture, 																																																								
149 Anthropologist and post-colonial theorist Talal Asad (1973) allows that despite the 
anthropology and the Enlightenment project’s complicity with horrific violence, part of it was 
motivated by sincere idealism and sense of shared humanity.  	
150 Anthropologist Margaret Mead asserts that aesthetic capacities are equally spread throughout 
culture and history, hinting at how cultural bias might blind others to the appreciation of any 
culture’s art: “When only single arts were compared, primitive cultures had little to offer; but if 
one took these cultures whole – the religion, the mythology, the everyday ways of men and 
women – then the internal consistency and the intricacy was as aesthetically satisfying to the 
would-be explorer as was any single work of art.” (Mead 1959 vi) 	
151 Historian of Science Justin E. H. Smith (2016) makes a similar point concerning the contents 
of philosophy: “While professional philosophers in the developed world today might not wish to 
acknowledge that when they speak of ‘doing philosophy’ they are speaking of a particular 
professional activity akin to practicing law or doing hospital rounds as a physician, it is unlikely 
that many of them would admit that philosophy is something that can be ‘done’ in Tibetan 
monasteries or the winter encampments of the Inuit.” (8)	
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regardless of possible error. Witness, for example, his discussion of a folktale “picture” 
told by the Tsimshian people of the North American Pacific Northwest: 
As might perhaps be expected, all the essential features of their life – the village, 
its houses, the sea and land hunt, social relations – appear distinctly mirrored in 
this picture. It is, however, an incomplete picture. It would seem that certain 
aspects of life do not appeal to the imagination of the story-tellers, and are 
therefore not specifically expressed, not even implied in the setting of the story. 
(397) 
  
Boas assumes to know all the distinct features of life, and that what is not expressed by 
the Tsimshian storyteller is anyway somehow legible to the researcher, rather than 
occluded by absolute difference. By this logic, translation across cultural difference is 
always possible and has an equal chance for failure or success in any context – it is 
variability, rather than absolute difference, that drives any meaning’s abatement.152  
 
For this study, one thing that matters about a general anthropology of the universally 
human is how it informs the logic of governmentality over any population. A generally 
human people, in the eyes of liberal and neo-liberal governance, have no needs 
specifically unique to themselves. By helping a population’s translatability and ability to 
self-re-invent, a general anthropology of the human helps ensure a degree of competent 
management over a territory.  Foucault’s (2007) Security, Territory, Population 
demonstrates these implications. Within, Foucault explains the Paris-based government’s 
re-orientation of France’s economic policy from a mercantilist to free-market model 
during the eighteenth century. Physiocrats, whose political interests concerned 
agriculture’s relation to the state, introduced free-market governance in response to 
famine, and by doing so transformed a series of concepts held by state and subjects that 																																																								
152 Boas (1914 397) expresses this equality of differences in this manner: “How accurately the 
cultural background of the life of the people is reflected by the form of its tales, appears in the 
diversity of form in which the life of various tribes of the North Pacific coast is mirrored in their 
traditional lore. Although the general form is much the same in all, the reconstructions based on 
the evidence of their tales exhibit sharp individualization, and emphasize the differences in social 
organization, in social customs, in the importance of the secret societies, and in the great diversity 
in the use of crests and other supernatural gifts.”	
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would ultimately strengthen governance’s position in relation to its populations. 
Previously within France, cyclical famine was interpreted as a portent of evil or divine 
judgment upon human affairs. Government, to avoid judgments by divine logic, felt 
responsible to ensure the sustenance of its individual subjects. The Physiocrats' 
governmental innovation was to transform the fear associated with scarcity into 
something more mundane. (36) They did so by normalizing the concept that with a free-
market that allowed goods to cross borders, an anti-scarcity system would naturally come 
to be. Local crop failure could be compensated by abundant crops elsewhere. This 
allowed the appearance of famine to be transformed into a natural event of fluctuating 
nature rather than a punishing blight. In this new framework, death by hunger could 
become understandable. It would become logical that a percentage of French people 
would die by hunger, for, as such logic goes, ending in death is just the course of nature.  
 
By naturalizing the state as protector of free markets rather than of individuals’ lives, 
actions like this seem to transfer state management from the state to the self-management 
of subjects and social groups now conceptualized as rational actors. Rather than through 
divinely or communally ordained activities, individuals now rationally innovate and self-
manage their responsibilites for meeting and translating their needs and capacities into 
any number of need-fulfilling activities within the market. By this logic, those that fail to 
meet their own needs no longer serve as demonstrations of governmental or market 
failure – rather, they just serve to mark the limits of an apparently natural system whose 
accounting is the market and whose lives can either occur within, or exceed, the state’s 
natural boundaries. Individual death serves only to signal the apparently nature-given 
limits of existence – made apparent through rational thought or understood as ecological 
carrying capacity. Individual death only translates to individual failure. All the while, and 
nevertheless, state management continues with the Hobbesian logic that it acts as 
guarantor of life through natural-seeming rules, in some engineered way.  
 
Understood generally, cultures trace the sum total of ways in which people extend 
livability into and through particular situations over time. To the extent that anthropology 
attempts to describe how people have managed to govern themselves successfully over 
	 110	
time, it informs universal governance towards similar ends. Anthropologies help people 
govern themselves by defining what it is to be human against what it isn’t. This does not 
suggest that universal governance or anthropological descriptions are flawless, they are 
not. Criticism of anthropological logics are multitude and thus valid; critiques represent 
multitudinous efforts to either carry or cast off particular logics of governance from the 
multitude’s back. Theological critiques of secular anthropological imaginaries, issued 
within and beyond the ‘five great religions’ are common currency even within popular 
culture today – claiming, for example, particular divine human origins rather than earthly 
ones. Of equal weight are indigenous challenges to truths running against the values of 
secular anthropology’s myths, in the favor of (for example) other myths, forms of science 
and origins for property relations.153 Dark Mountain flirts with several of these spiritual 
and secular currencies with its own heterogeneous anthropology of the human’s mythical 
being, in order to come to terms with the ends of the West, of civilization, of apocalypse 
or just the end of a particular way of life.  
 
Elsewhere, efforts at either purely secular, or new myth anthropologies are equally 
multitudinous, dwarfing any sample pool that might contain, for example, Land’s genetic 
will to power, the science-fictions of Drexciya and Ursula K. Le Guin, or François 
Laruelle’s purely secular efforts to socialize the effects and phenomenology of philo-
theological end-times. These critiques of temporal, biological and material assumptions 
of what the human is are also somehow attendant to theological concerns, some of which 
will be discussed in a following sections on the Enlightenment, Hegel and Marx. 
Nevertheless, Silvia Wynter’s insistence that other secular ways of being human exist 
beyond the anthropological subject framed by Enlightenment parameters should be 
flagged here, along with very brief discussions of the exceptions Irigaray and Fanon also 
take to the universal human.    
 
Luce Irigaray (1996) asserts the existence of absolute womanly difference from the 																																																								
153 There is much to reference here, but of particular interest are those that challenge the legal 
definitions of sovereignty and property in relation to settler-colonial narratives (Darian-Smith 
2016) and those who have used indigenous spirituality to give earth a legal standing. (De la 
Cadena 2010)	
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anthropological male, and identifies the impossible capture of the female in theory. She 
states that women will always remain other to whatever male theory, project or plan. 
Fanon (2008) finds difference between the socially encrypted white man as Universal 
ideal and the embodied experience of those who can never be assured that they meet such 
standards. Silvia Wynter (2003) identifies language as socially pre-programmatic in favor 
of the Male and his ends; for existing as a capacity to determine overarching outcomes 
over time by embedding whatever behavior (such as the discursive practices of 
anthropology) in meaning networks oriented ultimately towards (for example) particular 
Western goals.  
 
Wynter recognizes that racial concepts, built upon no meaningful biological difference, 
enforce social imaginaries that determine distinctions between master and slave. She sees 
concepts of race and the limits of social awareness as necessary for the common sense 
governing justifications of today’s power relations. Language constitutes meaning over 
difference, legislating racialized relationships that carry across gender to maintain 
particular social projects (like global inequality) over time.154 Universal definitions that 
bend towards EuroAmerican power frame awarenesses determine in what guise, and for 
who, cultural praxis is objectively bent. For Wynter, there is no Universal human, there 
are just many linguistic and social compacts that share similar words but work towards 
different ends. Some compacts set up long-lasting determinations that assign, for 
example, “rational” behavior to European performers, despite multitudinous examples of 
European irrationality. 
 
In addition to the biological parameter for life, Wynter identifies sociality and language 
as having an equally powerful, differential coding that determines human experience 
beyond bare life’s DNA. She sees the “naturalness” of bare biological life as European 
Christian secularity’s replacement for and generalization of its own mythical 
determinations of origin and fate. The above example of French grain policy provides a 																																																								
154 In her read of Irigaray, Philosopher Danielle Poe (2011) makes a strong case that Irigaray’s 
biological grounding for gender does not exclude transsexuality from its desired gendered class, 
asserting that gender is a social, relational-class of difference rather than one biologically 
determined.	
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clear example of how linguistic play transforms theology from one bound by heavenly 
judgment to one where fate is “naturally” settled by the nature of the market and weather.  
Such play creates new ways of being human, where culturally determined outcomes 
become “law-likely” through their own organizationality. It becomes law-likely that a 
certain population will face hunger and government will not be to blame. For Wynter, 
overall social determinations are as necessary to life as biological ones. Linguistic codes 
of power flow through whatever cultural objects to maintain social interests unless 
sociality is totally rewritten in other ways.  
 
3b Bourgeois culture 
Against Dark Mountain’s editorial approach of  “uncivilization”, Wynter presents a steep 
challenge. The challenge has little to do with the abstract thoughts and forms that make 
Dark Mountain’s work legible and worth reading. Rather, anthropologically speaking, it 
has to do with who Dark Mountain defines as human. Their anthropological imaginary is 
firmly set within a bourgeois market-earth that can hardly bear to give any more to the 
multitude. Kingsnorth’s pro-Brexit vote is a clear manifestation of this imaginary taking 
form of as an editorial tendency. Dark Mountain proposes a poetry that will build a 
movement to manage the retreat of Western Civilization in the interests of Western 
subjects. Their immediate forms for culture, that prioritize speculative tools for cultural 
management, are the subjects of this section.  
 
The Guardian debate between George Monbiot and Paul Kingsnorth further demonstrates 
how the climate apocalypse Dark Mountain hopes to manage works through the social 
limits that bourgeois culture allows, and how the collapse they imagine maintains the 
political agency of those that benefit from the ongoing political status quo. In response to 
Kingsnorth’s claims that the world of contemporary capitalism is uniquely destructive 
and therefore should be allowed to collapse, Monbiot recognizes the threats of capitalism 
but suggests that the capacity for environmental destruction is a human-historical 
capacity, and is not a unique capacity of humanity in capitalism.155 Monbiot suggests that 																																																								
155 To Kingsnorth, Monbiot writes, “You maintain that modern industrial civilization ‘is a 
weapon of planetary mass destruction’. Anyone apprised of the Paleolithic massacre of the 
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rather than writing stories that narrate civilizational collapse, work could be done to 
forestall and soften such a collapse’s effects. He writes that the “immediate consequences 
of collapse would be hideous: the breakdown of the systems that keep most of us alive; 
mass starvation; war. These alone surely give us sufficient reason to fight on, however 
faint our chances appear.” The societies that survive collapse, he suggests, will not be 
happy Tolkien shires, their ensuing order “is likely to be imposed through violence. 
Political accountability will be a distant memory.” (Monbiot & Kingsnorth 2009) 
 
Over the course of three years of exchanges between Monbiot and Kingsnorth in print, 
Monbiot comes to understand poetry’s role in confronting climate change, especially in 
relation to the question of how “the green movement has torpedoed itself with numbers." 
Monbiot (2011) references Kingsnorth’s suggestion that activists “might perhaps start by 
observing that worlds are not 'saved' by the same stories that are killing them.” Yet in the 
same article, he judges that Dark Mountain has not produced any “convincing account of 
how people could be persuaded to turn their backs on manufactured products, advanced 
infrastructure and public services.” This contention, that Dark Mountain has not managed 
to come up with devices to change human behavior, makes clear that what both 
Kingsnorth and Monbiot are debating are the management techniques of politics by 
poetry and culture. By the fact of access to the national stage of The Guardian, both 
Monbiot156 and Kingsnorth are members of a political class whose mediated concepts 
play out beyond the printed pages of their work. There is an expectation that such writers’ 
words have import – the fact that their poetry, prose and politics are judged by how they 
manage to move people belies the fact that poetry and art have governmental functions: 
to build and lay out convincing arguments.   
 																																																																																																																																																																					
African and Eurasian mega fauna, or the extermination of the great beasts of the Americas, or the 
massive carbon pulse produced by deforestation in the Neolithic must be able to see that the 
weapon of planetary mass destruction is not the current culture, but humankind.” (Monbiot & 
Kingsnorth 2009) 	
156 As a journalist, Monbiot demonstrates an appreciation for the responsibility that comes with 
his platform – in a recent (2016) article he blames the failures of climate’s governance not on 
corporations or governments, but on journalists that stand silent witness to climate change’s 
reality beside the deadly union of corporations and governments.	
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What Monbiot is pointing towards, and what this study finds unconscionable in 
Kingsnorth’s work is the Malthusianism inherent in his editorial interests. The first article 
(2009) of the Monbiot-Kingsnorth exchange is titled, “Is there any point in fighting to 
stave off industrial apocalypse?” and is clearly framed by the subtitle, “The collapse of 
civilization will bring us a saner world, says Paul Kingsnorth. No, counters George 
Monbiot – we can't let billions perish.” Throughout their exchanges, Kingsnorth 
consistently presents his diagnosis of capitalism as destructive in nature. He suggests that 
capitalism be contained by its self-inflicted and inevitable collapse. He describes most 
human-interested culture as inherently at odds with nature. In his ‘Confessions of a 
Recovering Environmentalist’ printed in Dark Mountain Journal issue 1, Kingsnorth 
(2010) writes: 
Now it seemed that environmentalism was not about wildness or ecocentrism or 
the other-than-human world and our relationship to it. Instead it was about 
(human) social justice and (human) equality and (human) progress and ensuring 
that all these things could be realized without degrading the (human) resource 
base which we used to call nature back when we were being naïve and 
problematic. Suddenly, never-ending economic growth was a good thing after all: 
the poor needed it to get rich, which was their right. To square the circle, for those 
who still realized there was a circle, we were told that “(human) social justice and 
environmental justice go hand in hand” – a suggestion of such bizarre inaccuracy 
that it could surely only be wishful thinking. (Kingsnorth 2010) 
 
The managed collapse Kingsnorth oversees through his writing and editorial work may 
turn a blind eye to the link between environmental and social justice because his 
definition of justice157 seems determined by capitalist definitions.158 He recognizes no 																																																								
157 Wynter (2015) observes that post-colonial national determination after World War II followed 
the path highlighted by global economic governance rather than being a blossoming of different 
political determinations. This matter, for her, explicitly demonstrates the programmatic effects of 
language, and that the concepts by which post-colonial leaders were educated within colonialism 
predetermined this outcome.  	
158 Autonomist Marxists Tiqqun‘s (2012) reformulation of dispossession and poverty – “the 
opposite of poverty is not wealth but misery…” is one counter-narrative to the concept that in the 
appropriate counter to deprivation is inordinate wealth. Tiqqun continues, “Poverty designates 
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other just imperatives of the multitude besides motivations for cash-money. In his eyes, 
the people simply want to profit. Suffice to say here (as this is the topic of the next 
chapter) this study asserts that the relationship between just human organization and 
earthly resources are far more flexible than Kingsnorth allows. Thus, it is important to 
consider the Malthusian ethic that can conceptualize an environmental carrying capacity 
as justification for ruling class disinterest in the wellbeing of those whose ends they 
nevertheless help determine – namely the poor and dispossessed of the world. This logic 
of an expendable population is amplified by governance through its rational market logic. 
As political sociologists Fred Block and Margaret R. Somer (2014) suggest, Malthus’ 
social naturalism “ignores the variety of social mechanisms that societies have used to 
manage population growth and to augment the supply of food.” (39) 
 
This, especially in light of Kingsnorth’s support of Brexit, seems worthy of further 
consideration. In framing his position, he explained that those within the UK who voted 
to remain within the EU see border walls as racist, while “[to] a nationalist, they are 
evidence of a community asserting its values and choosing to whom to grant citizenship.” 
(Kingsnorth 2017) Looking at Kingsnorth’s Brexit support based on environmental 
grounds reveals that how he flatly ignores any consideration for the terrestrial needs of 
climate refugees of any species. Kingsnorth’s management ethos essentially says that 
nothing is to be done for those others because the system of progress is broken. In this 
way, he disregards the unequal effects upon the global populations that climate change’s 
effects are projected to have.159 While other Dark Mountain articles hint at other politics 
(cf. Smaje 2016), editor Kingsnorth’s thanocratic logic simply ignores the human 
capacity to rearrange particular global relationships to suit different ends in time. Things 
could be different, but Kingsnorth is not interested.  
 
Having identified a central attribute of Dark Mountain’s “uncivilization” – its disinterest 																																																																																																																																																																					
someone who can use everything, having nothing of his own, and misery the state of someone 
who cannot use anything, either because he has too much, or he lacks the time, or he is without a 
community.” (88)	
 
159 See Nicholls (2007), and Brown (2007).	
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in being an affirmative poetic agent in the general management of social rearrangements 
– it is useful now to witness the perspectival shift from the generally anthropological to 
the specifically cultural. Anthropology’s task is to demonstrate things essential to a 
general human based upon pre-existing narratives of what the human is. With the 
“bourgeois culture” of Dark Mountain, culture utilizes objects within to determine the 
culture’s own development in time.  
 
The use of the term “bourgeois culture” is informed by critical theorist Peter Bürger 
(1984). In Bürger’s work, the term functions to distinguish between bourgeois uses of art, 
and art made within previous European epochs – Sacral Art in the Middle Ages, Courtly 
Art of the Renaissance, and Bourgeois Art in the industrial period up until today. Bürger 
traces the transition of European social relations in toto from an anthropological culture 
“organically” unified under ecclesiastic rule, to one fractured and then structurally 
ordered by bourgeois relations. Bürger follows the materialist teleology of Marx. This 
bourgeois cultural restructuring occurs over fissures the bourgeoisie drove through the 
“all that is solid” commons of life, that melted “into the air” the common practices that he 
names “collective craft”. (48) In this way, the collective practice of life moves into 
domains now navigated by individuals. Under this bourgeois conception of being, 
cultural production, like all other forms, exists as an independent sphere “autonomous” to 
all others. Here, the artistic sphere is imagined as distinctly comprised of professionals: 
of artists and other cultural workers who are tasked with proposing values and techniques 
that float independently from particular needs and interests. These values and techniques 
are seen as apparently disinterested with anything other than a naturally existing and ill-
defined general public. 
 
This paradigmatic shift from the sacral to the modern demonstrates dramatic 
cosmological and anthropological reorientations. These orientational shifts expose new 
ways of being human that Wynter alludes to. Marxist Feminist scholar Silvia Federici 
(2009) observes how these transformations are concurrent with in-time scholarly 
reorientations of classical Judeo-Christian narratives that forward the notional 
perfectibility of individual humans through reason. Federici describes good and evil 
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rewritten in the “age of reason” not as the play of supernatural forces beyond human 
reach, but as playing out in each and every body as a battle between the rational and the 
wild. Attendant to these paradigmatic shifts, says Federici, are the earthly aims of church, 
state and capital to “transform the individual’s power into labor-power” for the interests 
of capital. (133) (cf. Wynter & McKittrick 2015) Federici echoes Hobbes in her 
description of rationality’s really imaginal play within the social body as “a conglomerate 
of mechanical motions that, lacking autonomous power, operates on a basis of external 
causation, in a play of attraction and aversion where everything is regulated.”(139) 
 
More than a century after Hobbes, one of Enlightenment’s greatest proponents, Immanuel 
Kant, finds little need for the sovereign to play so active a role in organizing life when 
individualized rational thought can become a primary governing concern. In An Answer 
to the question; What is Enlightenment, Kant (1784/2009) declares,  “Laziness and 
cowardice are the reasons why such a large portion of men, even when nature has long 
emancipated them from alien guidance, nevertheless gladly remain immature for life.” 
His prescription is clear:  “Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred 
immaturity.” (1) Kant suggests that public reason stands for the good sense and ethic of 
letting the human capacity for informed thought, not habit, guide decision-making; that 
individual reason is of public benefit. Kant, appealing to his sovereign, the Enlightenment 
patron Frederic the Great of Prussia, conceptualizes a state not ordered through Hobbes’s 
singular sovereign but rather one made up of publics with competing behaviors, interests 
and habits that must be rationally mediated. A state ordered by generalized reason, rather 
than force would exist to its own profit. 
 
One thing the Enlightenment suggests, in specific relation to the arts, sciences and 
humanities, is that society entertain as rational the forward-thinking position of individual 
thought speculatively employed to produce concepts and objects whose impacts are not 
yet accounted for, but may become meaningful. Bourgeois cultural forms are produced as 
objects intended as possible material and immaterial guides and guideposts for personal 
and collective behavior, to manage rational thought or to guide material activity. Through 
Marx’s (1992) notion of the general intellect, abstraction’s weightless and speculative 
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productions have a greater potential for value than objects and concepts produced strictly 
as the habitual reproduction of life. Therefore, though different, the line between the 
academically defined cultures as anthropologies and those produced by bourgeois 
institutions dedicated to art and entertainment are not absolutely different. General 
anthropologies of life in contemporary society continue to be “written” in actual living 
practice while the cultural work of formally “cultural” institutions purposefully aim to 
push actually lived experience in particular, performative, directions. The blossoming of 
cultural forms that speculate on multitudinous possibility allows the state and economy to 
manage or co-develop lines of particular interest besides the ongoing developments of 
multitudinous thought. 
  
Though Gregory Sholette’s (2011) Dark Matter is specifically oriented within the realm 
of the fine art, it is not a difficult leap from the subject of his work to the broader 
recognition that the actual compositional labor and contingent infrastructures of the wider 
contemporary (bourgeois) cultural realm is wider and deeper than its headlining stars. 
Those who headline reflect the juncture between who can be commonly appreciated and 
what has been nominated by finance; but also, as Sholette suggests, what also sometimes 
appears are the residues and hints of meaningful resistance movements. Audiences are 
attracted to things of public concern. The dark matter of contemporary culture, that 
individual association as consumers is bound to formal cultural production in a 
significant economy – creates a powerful political and social economy that blends the 
anthropologies of life with what bourgeois culture represents and presents in the 
representational. The dispositifs of cultural industries can make cultural forms more law-
like – where the hippy living next door to the office manager really is a hippy. This 
sphere where the image of the living masks over the actual ways of being is classically 
formulated as Guy Debord’s spectacle.160 
 
In not wanting to be political while waiting for collapse, Dark Mountain hopes to be seen 
as part of the dark matter of anthropological life. In this way, they can be seen as simply 																																																								
160 Here referring to Debord (1967/2012). 	
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being; outside their actual reliance upon bourgeois political stasis.161 Left and right, many 
of Dark Mountain’s authors can work with that which accompanies climate change as 
long as their own material conditions are only taxed by what appears to occur naturally, 
but not by what can be organized socially. To some editors and contributors, as long as 
the fact of their writing makes it appear otherwise, their rationality allows for a 
Malthusian cull on the grounds that the deaths of others seem natural. Writers and artists 
within this dark matter do not want to appear to be managing life in the Chthulucene as 
such explicit management would call for either a social re-organization that would lead to 
their loss of property – or for the other’s social death. Though reason might suggest that 
life can be reorganized differently, within the terms of bourgeois life, common sense 
often suggests that individual property trumps society. 
 
To the extent that Dark Mountain preserves the wealthy West’s cultural capital by 
appearing to care while not doing it, it is not a praxis of the living, but rather the 
management of a political economy laid on top of biology and leading towards biology’s 
ends, as well as towards its own ends through the continued monetization of bare life. 
Alberto Toscano’s (2008) Open Secret of Real Abstraction seems instructive and provides 
a way to think through the circulation of Dark Mountain’s thanatotic abstractions. The 
cynicism of this Dark Mountain’s Malthusian narrative openly circulates in the free 
market of capitalist ethics162 beside the project’s own enthusiastic critiques of capital. To 
the extent that its concept of uncivilization circulates as a management technique for 
collapse through political stasis, their work is open to serious critique. Nevertheless, Dark 
Mountain’s content is heterogeneous, and this study is hesitant to condemn the whole 																																																								
161 Though Noys (2014) describes how today’s political logjam as afforded by the domination of 
financialized relations, he identifies fantasies of environmental collapse as reactionary, for in 
them, only the “right” people survive, or everyone dies to no one’s particular advantage: “This 
rupture of the capitalist continuum results in an apocalyptic imagination that produces dreams or 
nightmares of a world ‘cleansed’ of humanity, from 2012 to the History Channel’s Life After 
People. These fundamentally reactionary fantasies can only imagine redemption of our fallen 
world on the condition that humanity ceases to exist, or is reduced to the ‘right’ number of the 
‘saved’.” (52)	
 
162 According to Toscano (2008), the open secret of any abstraction with capitalism is that the 
abstract form, however critical or meaningful it appears, is potentially captured in meaning and 
effect by the capitalist system that circulates it. 
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project even if there are some highly unsavory editorial lines. Writers and readers come 
to Dark Mountain with activist hopes and wounds expecting some political succor, and 
find within it some meaningful writing. 
 
In relation to the idealism capacitated by abstraction that helps it exceed whatever system 
that produces it, the following section traces the question of possibility in abstracted 
objects. If a cultural policy intends to connect through cultural things to the global 
multitude, it must consider the nature of the abstracted things that are circulated to carry 
out policy. This continues the conversation of whatever from the previous chapter, but 
begins with a conceptualization of universality through German Idealism.163 The initial 
object is Hegel’s notion of the universal concept. Universality is the appearance of a 
thing’s general translatability based on its identification as a singular concept that seems 
to connect across difference. These questions of universal thought related to Hegel matter 
to this study for at least two reasons. First, Hegel’s concepts narrate one logic for how 
culture is imagined to develop general humanity over time towards particularly universal 
ends in a manner through law-like functions. Second, much political thought attentive to 
the multitude critiques Hegel’s work.  
 
4 Universal thought 
Ringing with Eurocentric and theological undertones, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit 
(1807/1977) is an influential text concerning the nature of universal concepts.  Hegel 
suggests that with exposure to bourgeois culture’s laws, objects and procedures, all men 
are set on a path to self-consciously appreciate the universal Spirit of humanity. For 
Hegel, when all people164 embark on his processual journey towards self-consciousness, 
the Enlightenment is made flesh. (296) This enlightenment pathway is guided by cultural 
activities and objects that most align with the Enlightenment. These things constitute 																																																								
163 “There is more chance of an entire public enlightening itself. This is indeed inevitable, if only 
the public concerned is left in freedom.” (Kant 2009 2) 	
164 For Hegel, all men are equal, though not in the political sense. Equality for him was a 
philosophical concept rather than a legal one, as men and women and different classes of people 
are afforded different legal statuses within his system. See for example Ethical Action, Guilt and 
Destiny in Hegel. (1977 267–278) 
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Hegel’s particular class of bourgeois culture, which can be distinguished from general 
culture. General culture is organized by divine law, which like Hobbes’s state of nature 
and Aristotle’s zoe, organizes familial relations, but does not organize meaningful 
relations between men. For the most part, Hegel takes for granted the arrangement of 
home relations. His interest appears not to be the organization of life, but the organization 
of something he finds superior to it.165 
 
Divine law organizes familial relations and what today might be called social 
reproduction.166 Against the stable relations of divine law, Hegel proposes that the 
individual is oriented by human laws that reveal positive social approaches toward an 
appreciation of the universal Spirit. Though Hegel does not use the term, to recognize his 
cultural objects and manners as bourgeois marks how he values alienation, abstraction 
and judgment that are also necessary for bourgeois marketization. With bourgeois culture, 
Hegel finds that the individual “moulds itself by culture into what it intrinsically is, and 
only by so doing is it an intrinsic being that has an actual existence; the measure of its 
culture is the measure of its actuality and power.” (298) The individual’s alienation 
coincides with this world-alienating process of measuring, abstracting, marketing and 
valuing resources and people beyond their own place of activity. Hegel’s anthropological 
measure of people is two-fold; all people are apparently equal, though the European male 
is better. 
 
Dialectically, anything’s appearance reveals what it is and what it isn’t. Self-conscious 
negation in thought is central to Hegel’s process of dialectical cultural development. In 
Phenomenology’s “Religion” chapter (410–478), Hegel rests the dialectical process upon 
an anthropology of human cultures that clarifies his bourgeois ideal.167 In his ideal 																																																								
165 “It is the simple genus, which in the movement of life itself does not exist in this simplicity 
for itself; but in this result points life towards what is other than itself, namely, towards 
Consciousness for which life exists as this unity or as genus.” (Hegel 1977 63)	
 
166 See Hegel (1977 466–478). 	
167 Phenomenology of Spirit was written as Napoleon’s army, which Hegel supported, had 
pushed into Germany; writing about revolutionary capacity for change implicit to his own 
dialectics, Hegel (1977) says, “This revolution gives birth to absolute freedom, and with this 
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society, individuals demonstrate an appreciation of universal Spirit by maintaining social 
unity despite the varieties of difference within their state. Next to, but not quite equal to 
this ideal sits Islamic culture whose spirit is formalized in central religious icons like the 
Kaaba at Mecca. For the philosopher, Islamic culture’s need to formalize collective 
consciousness individually disallows the self-awareness necessary for a true appreciation 
of worldly Spirit. (423) On the other extreme of the Western ideal, Hegel places 
pantheistic societies that he characterizes as chaotic, suffering from low self-awareness 
and devoid of self-governing reason.168  Hegel’s ideal society maintains social peace 
across this unequal plane of relations through real and abstract laws written in legal 
documents but also with reflection on fine arts, architecture, religious iconography as 
well as in pure philosophical abstraction. In such an ideal society, Hegel suggests that the 
formal unity of Christian iconography allows for diverse readings that do not concretely 
congeal society into one concrete and immovable sociality.169  
 
For Hegel, abstraction is a process of “the rooting-out of all immediate being” in order to 
expose “pure being”. (113) This abstraction is the production of Universal essences, 
dialectically purified through a process:  
[Stripping] off the traces of root, branches, and leaves still adhering to the forms 
and purifies the latter into shapes in which the crystal’s straight lines and flat 
surfaces are raised into incommensurable ratios, so that of Understanding and, at 
the same time, its essential nature – incommensurability – is preserved for the 																																																																																																																																																																					
freedom the previously alienated Spirit has completely returned into itself, has abandoned this 
religion of culture and passes on to another region, the region of moral conscious. (296) 	
168 Hegel (1977) describes the spirit of pantheistic societies as a “host of separate antagonistic 
national Spirits who hate and fight each other to the death and become conscious of specific 
forms of animals as their essence; for they are nothing else than animal spirits, animal lives which 
separate themselves off from one another and are unconscious of their universality.” (420) 	
169 Hegel suggests that the particular historical measure of a society’s Enlightenment can be 
observed by the extent to which the individual, using reason within existing relations of civil 
society, exerts his latent power in work over time while maintaining order. “[T] he other side of 
its (Spirit’s) becoming, History, is a conscious self-mediating process – Spirit emptied out into 
Time…” (Hegel 1977 492) Put another way, the working of a complex, but unified society is the 
dialectical process completing itself as “spirit completing itself in itself”. (488) 	
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Understanding.170 (427)  
 
Hegel orients Understanding against faith. Understanding is more than simple 
acceptance of universal Spirit. Understanding is the use of reason to actively reflect 
upon the goodness of the existing world toward conscious appreciation of worldly 
Spirit. Through reason, rather than faith or some revolutionarily different order, the 
Enlightenment project realizes the existing universal Spirit of the world’s actual here 
and now. In this way, “In its hostility to faith, as the alien realm to essence lying in 
the beyond, it is the Enlightenment.” (296) 
 
By individual acts of reason, Hegel’s universal bourgeois Spirit traces an ecology of a 
world that necessarily relates through difference; though it is an ecology without 
materiality, tracing only conceptual relations.171 Hegel devalues the innumerable material 
and social relations that compose the worldly social ecology as it is, in order to find the 
world, as it is, in perfection.  
 
4a Hegel’s Ends, managed stability and death 
In a curious inversion of Hobbes’s fear of violence, Hegel recognizes war’s (negative) 
enlightening ethic to shake up relations that have stayed fixed by habit.172 He recognizes 																																																								
170 According to Hegel (1977) essential nature has little to do with an object’s appearance, for 
objects are just inorganic (universal) essences in organic references. Objects are how singularities 
appear in “environment and habitation”. (427)	
 
171 This Spirit is not aimed at actual revolution. Rather, the awareness of Spirit in the world is 
more like the awareness that the world functions like clockwork and self-awareness is the 
attending to the cleanliness of the gears that compose clockworks: 
 It is for them neither the divine, essential Light in which unity the being-for-self 
of self-consciousness is contained only negatively, only transitorily, and in which it 
beholds the lord and master of its actual world; nor is it the restless destruction of hostile 
peoples, nor their subjection to a caste-system which gives the semblance of organization 
of a completed whole, but in which the universal freedom of the individuals is lacking. 
On the contrary, this Spirit is the free nation in which hallowed custom constitutes the 
substance of all, whose actuality and existence each and everyone knows to be his own 
will and deed. (Hegel 1977 425) 	
172 By actions of war the individual “raises conscious self into freedom and its own power.” 
(273)  
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that pain sits on the philosophical shelf as a useful metaphor for what drives 
philosophical development. In Hegel’s ecology, the actual world’s innumerable parts sit 
inconsequentially in place while a virtual, theological, scientific, and aesthetic 
monotheism clarifies truthful higher orders to facilitate the meaning of individual 
activity.173 This meaning is guided by awareness of one’s developing relation to concepts 
that are in essence true, and beyond what one can conceive without them. Truths are 
proven true because of how they conceptually connect the particular to a larger order of 
things. This order of things, this world Spirit, is the “power of the whole,” (272) and is 
conceived as the sum result of all relations which must be as they are for things to in be 
as they are, as perfect divine order revealed through human activity. To the extent that 
this narrative for truth has played out through historical events, its conceptual weaknesses 
are multitude.  
 
For political philosopher Achille Mbembe (2003), Hegel’s Spirit works the bulk of the 
world’s individuals towards social or actual death via its politics. By its politics, abstract 
truths dialectically feed human and other relations and materialities through a negational 
engine of Western bourgeois interests that only recognize anything’s ultimate measure, its 
abstract essence, in death. Note above the poetic brutality that Hegel enacts upon nature 
to strip it to its bare essence – Mbembe finds this conceptual brutality enacted within the 
bourgeois production of life174 – with violence becoming the state of nature with culture 
being only a recognition of life’s accounting. “Within the Hegelian paradigm, human 
death is essentially voluntary.” (14) In his reading of Hegel, Mbembe sees the facts of 
anyone’s life accounted to justify the final fact of their apparently natural death. For 
example, the deadly capsizing of a refugee’s boat appears as meaning and judgment of 
their poverty, lawlessness and incapacity to fulfill their own needs. Death’s voluntary 																																																																																																																																																																					
 
173 “Spirit is, in its simple truth, consciousness and forces its moments apart. Action divides it 
into substance, and consciousness of the substance; and divides the substance as well as 
consciousness.” (266)	
 
174 “First, the human negates nature (a negation exteriorized in the human’s effort to reduce 
nature to his or her own needs); and second, he or she transforms the negated element through 
work and struggle. In transforming nature, the human being creates a world; but in the process, he 
or she also is exposed to his or her own negativity.” (Mbembe 2003 14)	
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nature also demonstrates a bourgeois definition for freedom, exemplified here in the 
refugee’s risk of death so to be differently accounted. 
 
The impetus for Dark Mountain’s Issue two editorial, Control and Other Illusions 
(Kingsnorth & Hine 2011 1–3), is the irony they see nestled between the clarity of 
thought and the muddy reality of life. Their editorial contrasts clearly articulated anti-
capitalist and ecological critique with an unclarity of what might actually constitute 
meaningful activity in the time of climate change. “We can see humanity’s utter 
degradation of the rest of nature, but we don’t know how to stop doing it – or, rather, we 
know exactly how to stop doing it but we are not prepared to even contemplate making 
the changes necessary, because they would break our stories open and leave them 
exposed to the wind.” (2) Dark Mountain sees political projects as simply unachievable 
because of myths that hold social formations in check against other ways of being. In 
relation to the burden of this current sixth great extinction, some of their writers ponder 
how those in the West can deal with their guilt by association through their 
conceptualization that nothing meaningful can be done. By placing the burden on abstract 
stories, rather than speculating on current social capacities for change or dealing with the 
muddy nature of sociality to rewrite the story towards actual social transition, their 
foreword allows for a sunset of the Western story.  
 
An article by venture capitalist and aid worker Vinay Gupta (2011) addresses the 
inconsistent narratival space between the practice of life and a theory of living by 
approaching death as the thing that ultimately joins the two. Gupta writes of his 
experience being born into the Hindu cult of Kapalika, whose members “traditionally 
operated under a simple vow: they could only eat out of a bowl made from the top part of 
a human skull. It is one way to live intimately with death.” Rhetorically, he asks, “what is 
the social role of one who understands that all this will end?” (77) He has two answers; 
the first of which is as follows: 
The social function of the Kapalika is only to know. This does not sound so much, 
only to know, but to live in the awareness of the truth accomplishes dual 
functions. First, it slowly compels one to act differently, by degrees. Perhaps we 
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say one ton of carbon each is our real limit and then over ten years try to approach 
it. Perhaps we say each meal I eat from this bowl is one meal nearer becoming as 
dead as its donor and then try to live right, whatever that means by our lights. This 
individual function, to change what we live, to be in accordance with the truth that 
things end, is the fundamental satyagraha. (77) 
 
The second answer, he considers to be “a bone of hope”; that the Kapalika bears the truth 
that the avoidance of death’s truths is worse than death itself. That, “Death cannot be 
avoided, but its avoidance can be avoided.” Living with death for Gupta means being in 
ongoing sumptuary relation as articulated in the following manner:  
Go to Paris one last time. Enjoy the steak. As you bite off and chew these 
experiences of the outgoing global order, consuming a little of the death of 
the world, taste it fully, this life of unbridled excess and borrowing against 
the accounts of future generations.  
It tastes good, regardless of what it means. 
And then, one day, in awareness, the bitterness behind the sweetness can be 
tasted, and we lose all desire to live by the suffering of others, and honest, 
non-destructive labor becomes enough. (78–79) 
 
Hegel’s concept of abstract essence and the universal Spirit sits differently in relation to 
Agamben’s description of whatever. The whatever is that thing that sits independently 
from both the particular and the universal; it conjoins them. By Hegel’s logic, the 
particulars of life and the whatever singularity exist only in reference toward a brilliant 
universal. Hegel’s project diminishes the particular and the objective example as pale 
translations of universality. What this study refers to as bourgeois culture, and what Hegel 
simply refers to as culture, is employed as abstract law to orient society towards its own 
monumental universality. By the time of Gupta’s writing, the monument of capitalism has 
been erected for he and Kingsnorth to comfortably watch it sinking back into the earth. 
This is the uncivilized writing Dark Mountain describes: morose, wan and only slightly 
shocked at the appearance of its own bio-cultural limits.  
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What is unsatisfying from a political standpoint in Gupta’s musings is how his writing 
foreshortens the ethical horizons of this interrogation. His concern for climate change 
stops at the edge of his class horizon by suggesting that having that last glass of wine in 
Paris is the final point of possible suffering and the greatest of ethical allowance. It’s 
romantic, yet ethically shortened bearing in mind how current research suggests that 
climate change will only exacerbate current inequality.175 To the extent that Hegel’s 
Enlightenment ontology helped colonize and industrialize the globe through its ontology 
of relational negation and abstract evaluation that shares much in common with the 
abstractive power of capital and finance; and to the extent that it helps maintains the 
current political order, it sets the stage for the crisis of global ecology as a singular 
apocalypse. This is the argument that political ecologist Karsten Schulz infers when 
critiquing the ontological turn in relation to the concept of the Anthropocene noting that 
both “epistemic and ontological hegemony coincide with the appropriation and 
reinterpretation of indigenous art, language and culture.” (128) The appropriation of other 
narratives by bourgeois forms only bolsters bourgeois relations on a dying planet.  
 
In the same issue of Dark Mountain, author John Rember questions life and its stories as 
though he were a pragmatic Hobbesian or morose Hegelian. A pragmatic Hobbesian 
because of his appreciation of the stability that moral and ethical law provides; a morose 
Hegelian because he recognizes the psychological and social harm that these lawly 
universal narratives promulgate. Like Gupta, Rember’s prose is sincere and engaging. 
And though Gupta and Rember’s roots are continents apart, they both only encounter the 
ontological crisis of climate change in the Euro-American context. Rember’s article 																																																								
175 Shulz (2007) describes how inequality has been ontologically written into not only the 
north/south divide, but also upon the access of gender in relation to who historically has been 
deemed worthy of having meaningful interests: “A long history of violence, racism and 
discrimination that is related to western industrialization and colonial appropriation is certainly 
testament to the fact that not all humans always count as human, and that animals and the	
environment often count as mere things. Simultaneously, it must be acknowledged that the 
historically instituted fracture lines of inequality that still pervade contemporary biosocial 
relations are not simply geographical and economic in nature. While the global North-South 
divide continues to be a highly influential concept for the analysis of geographical and economic 
power asymmetries, various lines of inequality are also drawn according to categories such as 
species, gender, race, class, or sexual orientation.” (128) 
 
 See also Agarwal and Narain (1991).	
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comes to a crescendo through a shadow narrative featuring the figures of a pair of men 
named Frank and Dave. In this narrative, Frank’s belief in the risks of climate change 
move him to Alaska, while Dave is a climate skeptic who gains from its panics through 
stock market investments. As Rember concludes:  
Fortunately, Frank and Dave are headed for consensus. Eventually Dave will 
join Frank in Alaska for cabbage-and-bear stew or Frank will move south to 
join Dave’s brokerage as a junior partner. They are bound together in ways 
they don’t consciously understand. In spite of their friendship and good will 
toward each other, each of their false selves is fighting for its life when they 
get into an argument. The false self that wins gets to write the story for the 
false self that loses. That’s the nature of Frank and Dave, and unfortunately for 
their and our real selves, that’s the nature of humanity. The false selves of the 
winners get to write the narrative for the false selves of the losers, which is 
another reason not to place your faith in History. (2011 19) 
 
For Rember, the crisis of having meaningful ends is but a sport bound by North American 
finance, geography and the inconsequential game of abstract winners and losers. These 
are the rational ways these people manage the crisis, on a personal level, though judged 
through a relatively stable public stage. For him, the unasked question that the crisis begs 
is answered thusly: “Buddhists say there’s no such thing as a real self, but suggest that 
reality can be found in chopping wood and carrying water, which is a gnomic way of 
saying that reality – and the authentic self, if it exists – lives in doing and not in being…” 
(19) Within another context, with different order and laws, his spiritual inquiry might 
matter differently. Yet within the North American field made of market players, this is 
literally the spirituality of free finance over fixed capital. It is also, by Hegel, the dialect 
of the worldly Spirit rationally working itself out.  
 
Dark Mountain’s writers are but one collection of a multitude of voices; as individuals 
their personal interests surely can be forgiven. Gupta and Rember’s shrinking from the 
collective to the individual can be justified. Why as individuals are they tasked with 
providing answers to a crisis of at least 500 years, made on the backs of colonized people, 
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creatures and landscapes? Beyond Hegel’s conceptualization, but informed by his logic, 
when one abstractly looks at such individual responses to real crisis, one is again 
reminded of the concept of the general intellect. “The general intellect is the stage at 
which mental abstractions are immediately, in themselves, real abstractions.” (Virno 2004 
64) In the realm of abstraction, any way to socially relate has the possibility of being 
valued in a universal system; Rember asks the reader to trust in this spirit via finance with 
the faith that the market will abide. For Hegel, divine law unconsciously organizes social 
life, while human law allows for society’s meaningful development. For Marx (1993), the 
general intellect is a competence of the general class of all people, and reflects the sum 
total of all available knowledges and competencies working within and through capitalist 
relation. Virno (2004 66) and Toscano (2008 284) agree that for itself, the general 
intellect has no ends but to trace and further develop social dynamics, contingent to 
capitalism. For Toscano, the general intellect’s primary activity is not worker 
emancipation but the facilitation of cognitive capitalism, where social intelligences are 
universally utilized to biopolitically continue capitalist development within and against 
the interests of the general populations. (285) 
 
4b Art History and the making of autonomous objects  
Regardless of what Dark Mountain thinks about the Enlightenment, as established earlier 
with McLuhan, as a matter of practice, magazine publishing normalizes cultural practices 
that are central to modernity. Magazines normalize modernity by circulating notions 
seemingly stripped bare of the particular contexts of their production. They – like all 
journals, magazines, fine art and other things culturally produced in societies that are heir 
to the bourgeois revolution – value ideational, aspirational or other conceptual notions in 
their distributively autonomous form. 
 
The relative ease of distributing abstract things today appears as a non-event, and the ease 
of distributing abstract thought contributes to common intelligence and the Marxian 
“general intellect”. So, despite its focus on uncivilization, Dark Mountain carries on. 
Their particular editorial work is made opaque behind their books’ front matter that, 
rather than accounting for the particular logistical achievements in each issue’s 
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completion, simply lists editors’ names, typesetter and name and location of the book’s 
actual printing. Perhaps in a nod to its ecological ethic, the issue has a seal from the 
Forest Stewardship Council ensuring that its paper comes from sustainably managed 
forests.  
 
On Issue Five’s cover, artist Eunah Cho’s fractal drawings push an unfolding pattern from 
front to back cover. On this cover there is no journal name; Dark Mountain appears on 
the book’s spine though Cho’s exuberant image obscures it. The word Dark is lettered 
bigger than the Mountain in a way suggesting that Cho’s drawings may have caused the 
word to shrink. Cho’s statement in the front matter suggests the prosaic ease with which 
she is drawn to abstraction: 
I don’t remember the day anymore. Probably I started by sitting in front of the 
white paper as usual. Not a map, but eager anticipation is useful to find an 
unknown thing. 
I kept gazing at the white blank till some lines appeared, first forming shapes, 
then colors and textures seemed to follow. 
I felt like jumping over a wall to peek into something. It was very short but 
remained as a shuddering sensation. Everything was new but familiar. I have had 
it before and I get it back now. 
I am playing with the mysterious universe and my work is the record of my 
experience. One more thing, I met a friend who has so many names. Guess who? 
(2014) 
  
Seemingly contingent to nothing, abstraction appears to expand upon an open field. As 
Lévi-Strauss suggests, the capacity for abstraction and its circulation is a trans-historic 
capacity distinct from capitalism and the recent historical era. The example of the pre-
Colombian cross-continental sign language176 employed by North Americans attests to 
the exchange of ideational and material abstractions177 across great distance. Seemingly 																																																								
176 See Wurtzburg and Campbell (1995) for a discussion of the use of sign language as a pre-
Columbian, transcontinental communication technique. 	
177 See for example Graeber (2001, 2014) on how, anthropologically, things have been utilized 
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unhindered by the notion of collapse that it entertains because the collapse only makes 
conceptual appearances, Dark Mountain keeps publishing serial issues. And yet, its 
abstraction is not directionless; definitionally bound to its editorial decisions and 
forwarded by the magazine’s techniques of distribution, its movements are necessarily 
directional within an abstract plain. In order to continue describing the organizational 
capacities of abstractions within bourgeois culture, it is useful to look at the invention of 
the discipline of Art History.  
 
Within Aithesis (2013), Jacques Rancière describes Art History’s disciplinary emergence 
in Germany just before Hegel’s era. Rancière begins his account through a reading of 
Johan Joachim Winckelmann’s essay History of Art in Antiquity, originally published in 
1764. In Rancière’s view178, Winckelmann’s work writes into history a class of objects 
(fine art) that previously had no unique history. Winckelmann’s project introduces the 
conceptual separation of works of art from whichever society that particularly produced 
them – it is this separation that inaugurates Art History. Previous to his study, historians 
understood the arts as enmeshed within any society’s general modes of being, or in 
certain cases, the proof of the vision of unique individuals. Art objects had not been 
conceptualized as having a unique developmental history internal to themselves across 
space and time. Winckelmann’s work is said to have influenced Kant, whose concept of 
aesthetic judgment echoes Winckelmann’s quest for a transhistoric concept of beauty.179 
It certainly influenced Hegel, who identified with Winckelmann’s quest for universal 
truths.180  
 
Winckelmann’s study enacts an objective view upon a class of objects named Art. By 
doing so, his thought process develops a historical trajectory, not of humanity but of 																																																																																																																																																																					
as both mediums for and objects of exchange across the scope of human history.	
 
178 Winckelmann’s work was renowned in his era. Hegel (1988 63) credits him with the 
invention of an art history, Goethe retraced his travels throughout southern Europe (Bell 2016) 
and his philosophical legacy was subject to debates between Hegel and Herder (Gjesdal 2006). 	
179 See Friborg (2015). 	
180 See Friborg (2015), Gjesdal (2006).	
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things that can independently develop in dialogue with humanity. Like the history of a 
newly declared nation, Art History creates an autonomous order to be narrated as art’s 
history. Winckelmann constructs this narrative line in order to critique and influence the 
development of artwork contemporary to his day. He does so by constructing the 
retrospective art historical form, building this thought upon a fragment of Greek statuary 
resting in the Vatican – the Belvedere Torso; he found it to be beautiful. His writing 
makes art a transhistoric and autonomously existing project aimed at crystallizing the 
beautiful thing as something special for all to engage with, rather than as fetching objects 
that require only ordinary regard. Rancière connects the invention of art history with the 
near-contemporaneous conceptualizations of whiggish history: and narratives of national 
destiny. “[F]or art to exist as the sensible environment of works, history must exist as the 
form of intelligence of collective life.” (Rancière 2013 Ch1) 
 
Attendant to the notion of a nation with a history and an art with a destiny is a public 
whose role it is to distinguish and participate somehow in these achievements. Here, 
artists’ intentions are subsumed by the meaning that any viewer sees revealed through 
their forms. Art History, and the bourgeois concept of Hegelian universality besides 
dispositifs of economic and state reality help interpret meaning. Discovery of political 
import in reception rather than through authorial intention aligns with this study’s method 
of finding meaning in Dark Mountain’s (or any other cultural thing’s) published words 
rather than by directly interviewing the authors. Further, this suggests a key ethic of 
abstractions – that abstractions can serve as plastics tool for whoever encounters them. 
Remember, Winckelmann was making political in his day objects that were authored 
centuries beforehand.  
 
Dark Mountain curates a range of opinions and moods regarding the eventuality of 
collapse. This collapse occurs on Western terms, demanding little in way of social 
reorganization in its advance. For most writers, the collapse demands a reckoning that is 
at once extreme and mundane. Extreme when it reflects on death, mundane when it 
proposes, as Rember does, that such death is but a game of one person’s gain and 
another’s loss. An evaluation of Dark Mountain’s “non-political” nature recognizes that 
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its abstract forwarding of potentially meaningful content through a seemingly 
autonomous conceptual realm remains within the bourgeois tradition. Their non-political 
imaginary obscures other political ways of organizing life in difference to the current 
mode of capitalist and abstract management. 
 
5 Politics  
To complete the critical evaluation of Dark Mountain, this section begins with a 
discussion of Marx and Hegel’s conceptualization of what universal political thought 
brings. In comparison, Dark Mountain’s conceptualization is found to be lacking in terms 
of its general usefulness to the multitude. Therefore, this chapter concludes by looking 
across contemporary political theory in order to gather productive concepts for a cultural 
response to the era of social trouble that the Chthulucene highlights. 
 
Hegel imagines his dialectical process of negational thought to be painful, for it is borne 
of displacement and alienation. Alienation is the painful recognition that one is not in 
absolute harmony with the other – for Hegel, it is painful that difference exists in the 
world. Recoiling against any further universal accounting, Dark Mountain assumes that 
the West will bear emotional pain in the witnessing of other people’s actual suffering. 
Beyond sadness, Dark Mountain offers nothing. Their position finds affinity with the 
master that Hegel metaphorically employs in his Master/Slave dialectic. The dialectic 
describes the functioning of the Enlightenment process within the realm of human 
culture.  Hegel aligns the Master with the universal, which is “the independent 
consciousness whose essential nature is to be for itself”. The slave he identifies as “the 
other” and is “dependent”, as its “essential nature is simply to live or to be for another.” 
(115) Though Hegel recognizes the ties that bind the Master to the slave, it is his 
supposedly Universal interests that must win in this game. This metaphor’s structuring 
logic bases individual power in abstraction beyond fear of death rather than in contingent 
life; it orients dialectical action towards universal idealism rather than to concrete and 
entwined sociality.  
 
In his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, Marx critiques Hegel’s ends of 
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world history in universal Spirit for his fidelity to ideas rather than to the labor of 
remaking the world saying, “The only labor which Hegel knows and recognizes is 
abstractly mental labor.” (2009 67) Marx’s work is one of the most politically impactful 
responses to Hegel’s ontologies. Rather than revealing Spirit, Marx suggests that 
remaking the world is a material task to be played out through human history. By 
highlighting Dark Mountain’s ends of history in relation to Marx’s proposal, this study 
points towards conversations regarding real political organizing that are continued in 
Chapter 3 with a discussion of the PAH. Insofar as it is ‘not political’, Dark Mountain 
offers little of unique value for the study beyond its ability to host an open-ended 
investigation around forms of cultural thought. So, after a discussion of Marx’s contra-
Hegelian politics, this section defines the political limits of Dark Mountain,181 as well as 
those of Hegelian and Marxist discourses, in order to posit what can be affirmed in 
cultural work beyond the sociality of political organizing.  
 
Marx’s criticism of Hegel’s dialectical process is reserved for its ends rather than its 
means. He recognizes, like Hegel, the unique capacity of humans to rationally remake the 
world;182 it is the ends of that remade world that hold the difference. “The philosophers 
have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it” he says. (Marx 
& Engels 1998 571) Marx affirms Hegel’s dialectical process of historical development, 																																																								
181 An early critique of the Manifesto occurred in a literature review by John Gray (2009) in the 
New Statesman. Gray’s thoughts mirror initial critiques leveled by Monbiot – that though Dark 
Mountain suggests that people do nothing but reap the benefits of civilizational collapse, “The 
result has never been the stable anarchy that is sometimes envisioned in the poetry of Jeffers. 
Instead, it is the thugs and fanatics who promise to restore order that triumph, whether Lenin and 
Stalin in Russia, Mao in China, or Hitler and assorted petty dictators in Europe. It is the old 
Hobbesian doctrine – one that has never been successfully superseded.” 	
182 Marx’s (2009) thought directly relates to the previous chapter’s focus on the nature/culture 
split. According to Marx, under capitalist relations, individuals become strangers to each other, as 
labor is alienated and estranged from humanness and the means of production. Capitalism 
removes the great majority of people’s innate socio-political capacity to co-develop the world, 
thereby reducing their being to the status of mere animals. “[E]ating, drinking, procreating, or at 
most in his dwelling and in dressing-up, etc.; and in his human functions he no longer feels 
himself to be anything but an animal.” (30) Marx distinguishes the purely animal human from the 
being of the human-species – of a species with world-making capacities. For Marx, the collective 
spirit of humanity is not an abstraction, it is species-being – the conscious collective capacity 
through labor to construct and maintain the world for overall human benefit. (31) 	
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but critiques the formulation in at least two ways. First, he takes issue with who the active 
agent is within the dialectical process of alienation and self-conscious return. Marx thinks 
that the dialectical process is driven not by alienation from who each human individually 
is,183 but by alienation from what humanity could be. Second, Marx points to Hegel’s 
mystification of an ideal universal Spirit, recognizing that this ideal is a social construct 
whose qualities and appreciation are historically variable, contingent and not 
definitionally universal. Rather than consider them spiritually helpful, Marx finds abstract 
ideas to be useful in terms of their concrete assistance in developing the worldly 
environment. Ideally for Marx, abstraction is “man’s essential powers put to work and 
that they are therefore but the path to the true human world.” (Marx 2009 66) 
 
Marx’s relation to abstraction shares key qualities with Hegel’s dialectical process, 
despite the fact that the particular for Marx has real political weight.184 For both Hegel 
and Marx, truths affirm abstract ideals. For Marx, the oscillations between particular and 
Universal relations only serve to occlude a common species-being.  
Man is a species-being, not only because in practice and in theory he adopts 
the species (his own as well as those of other things) as his object, but – and 
this is only another way of expressing it – also because he treats himself as the 
actual, living species; because he treats himself as a universal and therefore a 
free being. (31)  
 
For Marx, the universal provides absolute human freedom, which is his understanding of 
communism. Here Marx is an idealist, a modernist who recognizes the potency of 
Enlightenment when labor realizes its universal potential under the negating anvil of 
wage relations.  
 																																																								
183 Marx identifies in Hegel an individual egotism made universal: “The self-abstracted entity, 
fixed for itself, is man as abstract egoist – egoism raised in its pure abstraction to the level of 
thought.” (2009 67)	
 
184 Hegel (1977 140–141) judges reasonable action on the basis of its distance from the bindings 
of the master/slave relation: “the consciousness which is this truth has this path behind it and has 
forgotten it, and comes on the scene immediately as Reason; in other words, this Reason which 
comes immediately on the scene appears only as the certainty for that truth.” (141) 
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For Kingsnorth, to protect pure nature is to defend the spirit of the world. While taking 
for themselves a certain benefit from nature and labor’s objectifications, the “non-
political” at Dark Mountain’s core runs counter to Marx’s idealization of man’s 
objectified power as a species, based upon concerns regarding the ecological results of 
such objectification. Through these environmental justifications, they confuse production 
of wealth with social justice and recoil at the sight of a global humanity. Within 
Marxism’s broad field of inquiry, there are Marxists that differently concern themselves 
with results of overproduction,185 though here the focus remains momentarily on Dark 
Mountain. Kingsnorth critiques politics and sustainable development, which he thinks is 
the main thrust of contemporary environmental activism. With romantic politics inspired 
by the “the ridiculous beauty of coral, the mist over the fields at dawn,” (58) Kingsnorth 
is upset that human questions are mixed within green politics. Rather than rebalance total 
human relations, Kingsnorth imagines that ecology and Dark Mountain should only 
angrily concern themselves with socio-politics when witnessing ecological destruction 
caused by the general relational nature of the human.186  
 
The Robinson Jeffers (1935) poem Rearmament that provides Dark Mountain its name, 
suggests that “To change the future… I should do foolishly. / The beauty of modern / 
Man is not in the person but in the / Disastrous rhythm.” Dark Mountain finds human 
capacity for abstraction to bend in at least two ways: one towards the individual, poetic 
and intellectual powers, the other towards a disastrous species-being. As a collective 
editorial project though, Dark Mountain’s output is less misanthropic, rather, it just asks 
to remain as it is, abstractly. To the extent that Dark Mountain actually dismiss 
enlightenment reason, its collapsitarian-shaming detractors misapprehend the group’s 																																																									
185 For example, sociologist and eco-philosopher John Belamy Foster’s (1999) focus on the 
concept of the metabolic rift, a process that he conceptualizes as occurring as a result of the 
transition and the second agrarian revolution whose technical interventions into soil science in the 
mid-nineteenth century allowed for the great population boom that Malthus feared would starve 
the world. He refers to the metabolic rift as the quality of alienation in work required for humans 
to sustain levels of agricultural production that natural systems by themselves cannot sustain. 	
186 Based on the idea that democracy aligns with consumer society, the Dark Mountain 
Manifesto warns against “dupes that talk democracy.” (Hine & Kingsnorth 2009 24)	
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interests as apocalyptic. Their first issue’s editorial identifies what they see as mainstream 
culture’s penchant for dualistic thought, which can only trace either utopian or 
apocalyptic narratives. Dark Mountain rightfully, by this study’s estimation, warns 
against such dualisms by critiquing conceptualizations that:  
the future will give us either unbroken progress or apocalypse, and there are no 
spaces between. The spaces between, however, are the spaces in which our real 
future is likely to be played out. They represent a gap in our cultural imagination; 
a gap in which the Dark Mountain Project has pitched its camp. (Kingsnorth & 
Hine 2010a 3)  
 
Nevertheless, Dark Mountain’s “uncivilization” is built upon a political articulation that 
purposefully, or not, condemns much of the globe to unquestioned and unnecessary 
exposure to brutality and death. It shares with Hegel a bourgeois disinterest in particular 
relations, though in practice favors actual relations structured by the law and state 
violence and not some gnostic universal.187 Their general disinterest in human 
organizational capacities provides little of help to thinking through how culture might be 
able to reshape multitudinous human relations in the face of the climate crisis. In order to 
go forward, in dialogue with all that has been previously discussed, this study must look 
elsewhere for political thought regarding how cultural forms participate between the 
particular contexts where they are multitudinously experienced and the universal from 
where the forms seem to arrive.  
 
5a Other politics in the face of collapse and need 
It is useful to continue with attention to the anthropological. For it is on the 
conceptualizations of humanity that managerial forms intercept with the actual human 
limits of the multitude. Sylvia Wynter (2003) conceptualizes the anthropological 
alienation that other-racialized and other-gendered people who are never 
anthropologically considered in themselves, but only for the sustenance of Western 
Judeo-Christian secular society (2003). She notes how by normalizing Darwinian 																																																								
187 Wynter refers to these universals as things of “Nation-state subunits of human symbolic (m2) 
reproduction.” (Wynter 2003 271–270)	
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thought’s “survival of the fittest” through capitalist logic, and by seeing all people as 
having naturally advantaged or disadvantaged natures, Western regimes are able to 
dominate because of how they stilt all questions within a ethico-poetic matrix that gives 
the “natural” economic, political and social advantage to those that just happened to be 
born richer, whiter, more Male and within the actual boundaries of Europe and North 
America – because of the facts of life. Accordingly, all reasoning that is uncritically 
worked through this matrix bends in praxis to their favor.  
 
Critical theorist Denise Ferreira da Silva (2015) identifies Wynter's project as one that 
questions the political effects of answers that must, because of how their questions seem 
to relate to the whole world, have universal answers. In light of this, Ferriera da Silva 
asks:  
[W]hether or not justice can be imagined from within the available modalities 
of knowledge, which includes Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical 
tools along with the already known historical and scientific tools, with all the 
necessary erasures and engulfments they presuppose and entail. As we saw 
earlier, for Wynter, scientific knowledge, specifically the natural sciences, 
may play an important role by unveiling the nonhistorical or extrahuman 
(natural / biological) structuring of cultural or ideological mechanisms. 
Foucault, however, conceives of knowledge, the modern versions of it, as sites 
of exercise of domination, which produce the very subjects it subjugates. 
(103)  
 
Ferreira da Silva considers Foucault’s understanding of how knowledge is the ultimate 
determining factor in the outcome of an event. She sees Foucault as informed by the 
Hegelian logic of universal truths when he gives to knowledge (not narrativity) the 
juridical-political capacity to cut across categories of life as the “principle of right”. 
(103–104)  An example of such a movement, as discussed above, is Foucault’s (2007) 
description of the Physiocratic use of reason within the boundaries of state practice to 
transform French biopolitical and social relations. Foucault (2003) defines the general 
order of contemporary state logic as a particular dialectical process – one that works, with 
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biopolitical power as its engine, through state discourse between who it imagines its 
people are historically and who they (philosophically) could be. By “principal of right”, 
Foucault is not arguing that knowledge bends towards justice, but rather that knowledge 
is effectively employed by state-interested actors across difference to organize either the 
same or other ways of being naturally – with the state always appearing as a generous 
actor in relation to whatever determination of facts it chooses, (58) and employed to 
make the decision seem rational. Foucault sees Hegelian dialectical reasoning as taking 
the philosophical place of the juridical-political position previously held by Aristocratic 
state functionaries – reason universally opens up as public logic the more private interests 
of the historically sovereign state. Yet, to the extent that Foucault understands he is 
describing an apparently undeniable effect of knowledge, da Silva reads him as blind to 
the definitional birthing moment of contemporary government. The final aims of the 
latter are, according to da Silva, to maintain bourgeois power. Da Silva recognizes the 
universal man of Hegelian rationality as “exclusive to post-Enlightenment Europe”. 
(2015 98) That is, even in non-European states, the employment of rational judgment 
opens up and policies state performances towards Eurocentric logics and concepts, 
logistics and infrastructures. Or, in Foucault’s example, not in favor of knowledge but in 
favor of the one who can most simply appear knowledgeable because they have always 
controlled the narrative by a variety of means.  
 
Neither this study nor da Silva (102) discount opportunities when concepts like Universal 
Rights can be employed to argue for the relief of dispossessed people in front of, for 
example, the International Criminal Tribunal, or through human rights frameworks. But, 
as the problem with Foucault’s definition of knowledge reflects, such techniques rely on 
“one ‘descriptive statement of the human’” (102) and therefore end up replicating over 
the longer-term many of the ongoing issues that such legalistic presentations seek to 
resolve. The problems that a cultural policy of the multitude hopes to resolve must, by 
definition, function with an awareness that its solutions must function for many 
definitions of the human, and not to one particular human’s benefit.  
 
This is what is so unsatisfying about Dark Mountain – that its abstract non-politics appear 
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to offer so little to other people. The question of policy in this thesis is a political problem 
whose answers are by nature Universal, which includes people on the wrong side of the 
Mediterranean or Rio Grande. As the discussion of bourgeois art demonstrates, 
abstraction communicated in form and thought appear as a weightless encyclopedia188 of 
managerial actions employable to whatever ends, that if uncritically utilized bend towards 
Western power. The task at hand is to find a model for how, as cultural policy, these 
forms can be multitudinously utilized in a manner such that they don’t bend in utility 
towards relentless social violence that also indifferently drives climate change.  
 
As response to her question, da Silva offers two methodological prompts – Irigaray and 
Rivolta Femminile are also instructive alongside da Silva’s. Irigaray, because of her 
awareness of political systems is instructive in relation to da Silva’s first point; that 
though it is not possible to write an answer to this question that is inclusive of all ways of 
being human, an attempt should nevertheless be made. Irigaray’s (1996) I Love to You 
(1996) is written to a male comrade in the context of a polarized Italian Feminist, one 
where Rivolta Femminile (1970/1991) would audaciously write Lets Spit on Hegel based 
on their repulsion at the Male world-ordering that Hegel’s universality completes. 
Irigaray is familiar with and employs a similar argument against Hegelian Universality – 
she reads Hegel for his chapters on the family and observes how in his dialectical process 
of history, women serve as martyrs. (13) She also recognizes that the Marxism of her day 
had objectively failed women by placing the woman/other as second within a male 
phallocentric communism. (19) Nevertheless, to her male comrade and to the project of 
communism, Irigaray remains committed. “The universal – if this word can still be used 
here – consists in the fulfillment of life and not in submission to death as Hegel would 
have it.” (24) For Irigaray, the continuation of any human political project must 
acknowledge the split nature of humanity – as male and female: gendered difference is 																																																								
188 Discussing the development of the concept of a general ecology of abstract knowledge 
managing the world, media and cultural theorist Erich Hörl discusses philosopher Gilbert 
Simondon’s concept of the three stages of encyclopedic imagination. He names the “ethical 
encyclopaedism of the Renaissance, the technical encyclopaedism of the Great Encyclopedia and 
the Enlightenment, and finally, the technological encyclopedias of his own cybernetic era.” (Hörl 
119) Hörl goes on to suggest another current phase where knowledge is utilized to modulate 
processes rather than to control their outcomes. 	
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the human-historic necessity of actual human social reproduction. For Irigaray, there is a 
necessity for civil law to recognize the multitude of difference that is the gendered 
becoming of humanity. Through this law, relation should be understood as a conversation 
between one and the other whose ultimate difference cannot be properly accounted for. 
For Irigaray this unknowing suggests the law needs to support rather than define 
difference.189 As Poe (2015) suggests, gender is the essential but non-essentialized 
relation of a male and a female; where one is, the other must be other and essentially 
somehow different in ways that are not defined as biological genders. Following da 
Silva’s suggestion, this study must then have a political cultural policy, though one that 
acknowledges at its core the unknown other that will find other ways of being beside it. 
 
To da Silva’s second point then: and here also in reference to Rivolta Femminile’s essay 
condemning the sexist through-line drawn from Hegel, Marx, Engels and Lenin universal 
notions and the actually existing appearances of socialism. Against whatever state 
project, Rivolta Femminile writes, “We will no longer allow anyone to treat us as the 
bearers of the species. Our children belong to nobody; neither to their fathers nor to the 
state. We will give them to themselves, just as we reclaim ourselves to ourselves.” (55) 
Their call for a Feminist movement is instructive, “There are no goals, there is the present 
of our here and now. We are the world's dark past, we are giving shape to the present.” 
(59) This insistence of politics having no politics imminent to anything but to freely be in 
this world as it is, is suggestive of da Silva’s notion that new theory “should begin with 
asking different questions, methodological rather than ontological ones: instead of the 
question of who and what we are, we need to go deeper into the investigation of how we 
come up with answers to the questions.” (da Silva 2016 104) The questions she refers to 
are those who by their nature relate to the universal. Between da Silva’s theory and 
Rivolta Femminile’s call, this study looks to an anthropologically human (multitudinous) 
praxis that does not, to whatever possible extent, allow the world’s dark past to shape its 
present by paying for it through the order of the future. The culture of this policy must 																																																								
189 “Sexual difference is, as it were, the most powerful motor of a dialectic without masters or 
slaves. This dialectic does not have to be tragic because it renders obsolete a certain number of 
oppositions required for the dialectic of a unique and solipsistic subject.	It necessitates a law of a 
persons appropriate to their natural reality, that is, to their sexed identity.” (Irigaray 1996 52)	
	 142	
seek multitudinous ends rather than ends that fix the multitude to with abstract law.  
 
Cultural concepts in this time of collapse play out as whatever torque that rests between 
the scales of living – between the particulars that organize life in the near term via 
particular ways of being commonly human and more general long-term governing 
concepts. Some of Dark Mountain’s culture looks towards Western particulars that are 
not yet organized because climate change and capitalism have not yet ravaged everything. 
These longer-term concerns work in a theological manner that Monbiot does not address; 
one with a (secular or neo-pagan) spiritual conception of meaning attendant to life and 
death. As objects produced in this time of climate change, this study acknowledges Dark 
Mountain’s rightful place among the multitudinous common library of speculative and 
managerial notions for culture.190 They name their notions “uncivilization” – and as 
multitude rather than as being usefully political, their contemplative work finds 
resonance; for example, it is fascinating to read what a EuroAmerican Arch Druid might 
say about death. Yet ultimately, their primary theoretical utility is simply that they 
continue to publish on the topic over a period of time and are just useful to help 
contemplate a variety of concepts. Against their ‘uncivilization’, a meaningful culture, as 
Irigaray, Wynter, da Silva, Rivolta Femminile and others suggest, other things circulate 
without foreclosing on other ways of future living.  
 
Unsatisfied by Dark Mountain, this chapter moves towards a synthesis whereby politics 
are identified from within the contemporary discursive field according to their usefulness 
for a discussion of how culture can autonomously carry multitudinous meaning through 
Chthulucenic ecological collapse.  
 
5b Differently political responses to dispossession  
Briefly then, this section presents cultural thought based upon multitudinous activity 
generated in affirmative response to dispossession; where the dispossessed are 																																																								
190 Bernard Dionysius Geoghegan’s (2011) From Information Theory to French Theory: 
Jakobson, Lévi-Strauss, and the Cybernetic Apparatus notes that the encyclopedia upon which 
cybernetics is built remains as a benefit to humanity, cybernetics’ failure as an interdisciplinary 
project to teleologically determine historical outcomes through cultural thought is clear. 
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understood as those who are forcibly made other to whatever law. This study finds 
Monsieur Dupont’s (2003) two-stage anti-political formulation to be useful in this regard. 
In their essay Nihilist Communism, Monsieur Dupont points out that it is in contexts and 
through events rather than through abstract revolutionary consciousness that possibilities 
for radical change actually occur.191 They describe how in the context of fleeting events, 
factories are easily occupied, and that such radical gestures can lead to much more.192  
For the interests of this study, we take the word “factory” to mean any site of conflict, 
including but not limited to those related to social reproduction.193  The interest in social 
reproduction is important in the context of climate change, for it is assumed that the 
capacities everywhere for social and biological need are and will be stressed by climate 
change. Cultural politics matter conceptually to Monsieur Dupont’s second phase; after 
the factories have been occupied, “universal humanity” has the potential to ideologically 
insert itself into the occupation. (9) As all that precedes in this chapter demonstrates, 
difficulty arises around the assertion of what it is that constitutes “the human”. Monsieur 
Dupont’s way of avoiding the inhuman in defining the human is to simply avoid 
following or constructing ideological definitions. (17) They do this because they 
recognize ideology to be at the base of all things inhuman; ideology allows activity to 
bend towards law, not care. When the “objective conditions” of what is political are 
formalized against contextual situations, governmental violence appears. (17) 
 
To an extent soon to be made clear, this study agrees with Monsieur Dupont’s basic 
precepts; a meaningful cultural policy of the multitude is based on a cultural and then 
social praxis that opens the world to particular human rearrangements that never 																																																								
191 In describing the particulars of the first phase, Monsieur Dupont says, “How the working 
class goes about the first stage of the revolution we can only guess at…” (10)	
 
192 By the relationship between working class consciousness and the Communist or other parties, 
Monsieur Dupont says that workers here find themselves in a “non-conscious holding of 
productive power by the working class.” (10) 
 
193 Monsieur Dupont ask for a stricter read saying, “The working class is nothing but the 
collective position of those who are brought closest to the machinery of the capitalist system”. 
(16) Without discarding the possibility that particular sites of conflict may be more meaningful 
than others, this study discards their definition according to class, seeing that climate change 
affects all relations in every way, and that the conflict between the multitude and capital are wider 
than those seen exclusively within the limits set by the factory.	
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foreclose other possibilities. This study also agrees that the grounds for radical practice 
are based on the multitude’s intimate relation to changing material and social conditions. 
Again, it is the multitude’s experience of climate change that matters, not the law’s. It is 
assumed that climate change provides abundant contexts for transformative possibility to 
emerge. 
 
Poet and critical theorist Joshua Clover’s Riot. Strike. Riot. (2016) analyzes the Marxist 
implication of insurrections that are made easy by actual historical and cultural conditions 
– for example where hunger makes clear that structural relations no longer meet the needs 
of the multitude. The riot is interesting because, as Clover suggests, it is a seemingly 
spontaneous eruption of unrest, occurring with an ease that mirrors the sudden occupation 
of the factory according to Monsieur Dupont. Clover further suggests that only the 
material conditions of capitalism produce the need to communize resources or relations 
and that there are no other grounds for the political riot. Clover’s “communization” is 
akin to Monsieur Dupont’s “making human” in that both are the ideal horizon towards 
which they strive in political struggle. In positing that only material conditions in 
themselves are imminent to communization,194 Clover embodies theorist Benjamin Noys' 
(2011) observation that the Communization tangent (to which Dupont and Clover belong) 
is disinterested in articulating meaningful universality outside of the commune. In Noys’ 
articulation, the unity of Communization’s conceptual trans-historic commune is made 
materially sensible only upon the awareness of immediate needs to negate particular 
material conditions, communicated as a “promise of a total revolution that will achieve its 
aim in process.” (Noys 2011 15) Under Clover and Dupont’s articulation, anything 
beyond immediate process posited as universal ideal needlessly opens itself up for 
exploitation. For Clover (2016) the moment is what matters: “Things fall apart, core and 
periphery cannot hold. We turn round and round in the night and are consumed by fire.” 																																																								
194 Clover here suggests that the commune of the riot contains its organizing principles within it 
saying, “Within the transformations of the present, the form of the commune is unthinkable 
without the modulation from traditional working class to an expanded proletariat. That is to say, it 
is not oriented by productive laborers, but rather by the heterogeneous population of those 
without reserves.” (90) With regards propaganda beyond the event of the commune, Clover 
asserts the material conditions of life within the contradictions between capitalism and the 
dispossessed will serve as propaganda enough. (89)	
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(91)  
 
Yet, if climate plays a role in the nature of things falling apart, climate must be 
understood as a long-term governing effect in relation to capitalism rather than an 
immediately independent variable governed by capital. Climate, by the force of tidal 
wave or earthquake has dispossessed people for millennia, regardless of capitalist 
governance. Historic climactic relations and other things that govern human organization 
exceed the capitalist praxis that structurally allows for the possibility of dialectical 
negation; nature’s wildness is indifferent to whatever human organization, including 
markets. An indifference to the relative autonomy of nature is not unique to either Clover, 
insurrectionary Marxists or Marxists in general. But what is of interest here is the extent 
to which insurrectionary Communists foreshorten their view of the commune’s relation 
with the human, discounting other meaningful relations that bind humans in nature. 
While within Marx, the whatever remains oriented towards a universal of Communist 
species-being, Communization posits that the sensible particulars of life are what 
determine means and ends, without much attention to universal temporalities that 
nevertheless frame any particular humanity and its commune. Humans like any animals 
need some consistency over time and space; relationality across difference and time is 
culturally maintained and cannot be discounted.  
 
Political theorist and activist Bue Rübner Hansen’s (2015) analysis of the crisis of social 
reproduction attendant to the Communization theories aligns with this study’s 
understanding of necessary temporal awareness. Hansen also affirms Communization’s 
precepts that politics most meaningfully emerge within the particulars of crisis – but 
concurrent with Toscano (2011a, 2011b) and Noys (2011) he agrees that Communization 
obfuscates particular and more general time and distance-based relations and practices 
that help organize necessary relations within and between the commune and others. 
Hansen recognizes struggle as an ongoing practice195 as much as it is a momentary event. 																																																								
195 “Taking seriously the fact that resistances and networks of solidarity preexist irruptions of 
open struggle means to go beyond the faith in spontaneity. This entails an ethics of militant, 
embedded research, knowledge production, and popular pedagogy, which proceeds through 
practices of collectively mapping the possibilities of composition, and reflections on how to 
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Focus on relation and ongoing practice allows the dispossessed to remain together with 
the “possibility of mass action rather than the barbarism of the war of all proletarians 
against all.” (11) Hansen’s observation deepens the meaning of whatever culture’s 
contingent universality in relation to climate change; whatever culture’s being is 
concerned with the preservation of possibilities as much as the making possible. The 
universal is more than any one crystalline singularity, like “communism” or “peace.” 
Rather, Hansen also finds that the cultural universal is an idea that, like the multitude, 
exceeds itself and should be approached multivalently.196 
 
Anthropologically, to regard the preservation of the possible as much as the making 
possible requires paying attention to creative possibilities contingent to the precarious 
social multitude, contexts and the cultural contents of contexts that are affirmed or 
negated by governance (climate or human), or that need to be negated or affirmed. 
Transformation and struggles are things built over time and that also occur in time. 
Chapter 1 demonstrated through Glowczewski and McKee how easily universal cultural 
notions can be employed in, or abstracted from, particular situations in ways that go 
beyond the concern of the situation. The introduction also states how a cultural policy for 
the multitude is relational to the multitudes rather than to governmental practice. The fact 
of this relation turns out to be consequential. A cultural policy must understand how 
cultural objects are encountered everywhere in immediate social life that is imbedded and 
only partially distinguishable from ongoing cultural ways. While particular ways for 
long-term livability become particularly destabilized in the Chthulucene, the multitude 
encounters concepts that are objectively distinguishable or indistinguishable from who it 
is or what it wants to be. That cultural workers can critically recognize their distinction 
makes their labor independent of immediate being. Between da Silva and Hansen, what is 
learned about the autonomous cultural forms produced by cultural workers under this 																																																																																																																																																																					
connect and extend networks of trust and solidarity. It implies sharing tools of organizing and 
tactics of struggle, taking measure of the rumors and whispers, and engaging in small struggles in 
ways that can help them transform fear and mistrust into courage and solidarity.” (Hansen 35–36)	
 
196 “Communism is not an abstract Kantian ‘ideal’ nor a plan, nor a universal and global horizon 
from which to judge all struggles or find hope. Communism, instead, is best described as a 
possible emergent telos in processes of combination, when they fold back on themselves and 
become self-reproducing, self-organized and capable of defending themselves.” (Hansen 37)	
	 147	
policy is that they must preserve possibility for particular multitudinous ways of being, 
while also relating possibility over time with others that also socially navigate a changing 
life. The following chapter, which focuses on the Plataforma de Afectados Por La 
Hipoteca (the PAH) takes care therefore to recognize the varying faces the multitude puts 
on in relation to the managerial/governmental objects they encounter, to socially work 
through how to relate to (cultural) governance while remaining open to the variable 
world.  
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Chapter 3  
Multitudinous Leadership: the PAH 
The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate one example of the multitude’s reorientation, 
through a variety of discursive and performative actions, in relation to the reality of 
systemic change. Here, the multitude works to reorient common sense in relation to 
governmental arrangements that no longer meet the multitude’s interests. The PAH is 
understood as multitudinous, while governmental arrangements are understood as 
cultural; this is ultimately a narratival difference. Before turning to the engaged 
summaries written partially from embedded research with the Barcelona PAH, this 
chapter begins with a theoretical discussion regarding the general intellect and the idea of 
leadership versus governance, among other things. Theory is presented here to help the 
reader understand how multitudinous activity may come to stand in for leadership within 
crisis, and how the PAH’s sociality provides it with real currency to drive social and 
political change. 
 
A core concern of this study is the multitude’s intimate experiences with systemic 
failures; as multitude, the PAH offers an opportunity for participant observation with a 
group of people transforming their feelings of helplessness, resulting from systemic 
failure, into something different. The financial crisis of 2008 resulted in countless home 
foreclosures and evictions throughout Spain – destabilizing both homeowner and renter 
experiences. PAH members felt the injury, brutality and loss from capitalist governance 
and its cultural appearance throughout the crisis. PAH members affected by the crisis 
transformed their situations and through this have been able to halt evictions, squat 
homes, change housing policy and help transform regional and national politics. The PAH 
is at the core of the thesis because of how they manage as multitude to reorganize 
relations to themselves, the city, the banks and law – by collectively processing 
experiences of the crisis within social relations. So, in relation to any culture this policy 
aims to organize stands the PAH’s sort of relational thinking that the policy hopes to 
encounter.  
 
Following initial theoretical discussion, the chapter is divided into two sections that 
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articulate the valence of activity of the PAH and its members. It describes how social 
relationships in, to and through the PAH operate; in relation to the debt they have 
incurred and how their processing reorients active relationships to the wider world. The 
writing style is detailed and expansive rather than empirical, in order to demonstrate ways 
in which being exceeds the frameworks that are nevertheless necessary to make sense of 
things. The first of these subsections (Section 2) focuses on enrollment into the group; it 
describes experiences of endebted people, their incorporation into the group and how the 
PAH alters people’s perspectives. Then, Section 3 focuses on what the PAH composes 
beyond itself, first among the informal and general field of social life and then against the 
cultural practices and laws of the banks and state. These four orientations – incorporation, 
self-recognition, recognizing the other and the self, working in relation to laws – become 
meaningful to the study’s conclusion.  
 
These orientations demonstrate activity upon the variable axes that the common livable 
horizon for which the synecdoche named “hope” appears. Hope appears because it is 
socially constructed upon immediate dispossession. The PAH processually reveals this 
hopeful horizon by keeping open an active social space to negotiate and perform results-
oriented individual and collective activity across this multi-scaled dispositifs of 
governing dispossession. Within the PAH, this hope is sometimes articulated with the 
term “dignity” – actively defined by the PAH through discourse and performance in 
protest. This study understands this dignity as a social ground for structuring forgiving 
social and political (and therefore cultural) systems that specifically promotes possible 
livability – a relational concept more clearly articulated throughout the chapter.  
 
Though this chapter may seem to portray the PAH as having governmental capacities that 
a simple conceptualization of the multitude might want to deny, the PAH is composed by 
and for the multitude. It is worth remembering Virno’s (2008) description at this point, of 
the relationship between the multitude and governance: “the One which the ‘many’ 
always carry on their back coincides in many aspects with the transindivudual reality that 
Marx called ‘general intellect’ or ‘social brain’. The general intellect is the name that 
refers to the ordinary human faculty of thinking with words…” (41) By tracing the PAH’s 
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multitudinous relation to a variety of self and externally given governmental forms, the 
chapter demonstrates the general intellect as an aptitude general to the multitude. To be 
multitude here means nothing less than to be capable of having varying relations to 
governmental determinations, and to remain when governmental structure has failed 
multitudinous interests.  
 
Central to this chapter’s methodology are three periods of participant-observation 
research within the Barcelona PAH, occurring during the summer of 2013, and in January 
and May of 2015. As discussed below in section 3b. Bringing the outside inside, the 
Barcelona PAH has an introductory process for researchers so that they can smoothly 
organize their scholarly pursuits within the group. I used this route for my 2015 visits, 
after my initial 2013 encounter. Additionally, I had significant interface with the group 
between 2013 and 2015 through my efforts as publishing editor for the English 
translation of PAH activists Ada Colau and Adria Alemany’s book Mortgaged Lives 
(2014), translated by media artist Michelle Teran.  
 
This chapter in not a complete history of the PAH and provides no detail on its ongoing 
internal developments, conflicts and challenges. It represents a slice in time and only 
anecdotally accounts for the group’s origins and ongoing developments. Social 
movement organizations throughout history have had dynamic periods and eras where 
they have seemed less relevant. This is not to suggest that in seemingly less relevant eras, 
nothing of import happens. Rather, the focus on the PAH coincided with the author’s 
period of research; at the time of fieldwork, it appeared as a group that faced challenges 
with a response that warranted a general hope. The focus on the Barcelona PAH is not to 
suggest that the group has and will continue to develop along the lines suggested within 
this chapter. 
 
1 Meaningful thought  
The following sections provide a theoretical background to this chapter’s description of 
the PAH. The initial section (1.a) succinctly summarizes the PAH’s notable response to 
governmental failure; this summary is of critical importance to the study’s concern about 
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climate change. Then, based on a discussion of concepts related to the general intellect, 
the next section (1.b) theoretically explains why social leadership that exceeds 
governance matters, as demonstrated by the PAH. Virno’s refinement of the concept of 
the general intellect serves to conceptualize the PAH’s capacity for developing innovative 
concepts. The next section (1.c) introduces a slight variation of Virno’s conceptualization 
of innovation through a discussion of Spinoza’s conceptualization of common becoming 
as it grounds the PAH’s social currency.  
 
1a Innovation against dispossession 
Since the start of the 2008 financial crisis within Spain, suicide has been the leading non-
health-related cause of death.197 Studies demonstrate that areas threatened with 
bankruptcy and home eviction have high rates of depression198 and suicide.199 Suicide 
and depression can be understood as a severe way that crisis is made sensible, that is, 
they represent the dramatic sensation of the crisis’ personalized effects. Due to its finality, 
suicide appears as an ultimate consequence of crisis. Other studies demonstrate the 
negative reverberations of the crisis on social reproduction – on childcare, education and 
family life – emerging from the threat of eviction.200  PAH activists imply that eviction 
causes a process of social death and has many knock-on effects within family and 
community life.201 In response, as social scientist Pradel-Miquel (2016) succinctly 																																																								
197 According to Spain’s National Statistics Agency, suicide rates jumped 20% since the start of 
the crisis and it continues at a heightened rate. There were almost twice as many deaths from 
suicide as from auto accidents, which is the second highest cause of non-disease related death per 
year. In 2014, the latest year for which data is available, there were almost 4,000 suicides 
reported. (Fonseca 2016) 	
198 It has been reported that in 2012, 34% of all suicides were by people affected by the housing 
crisis. (Alerta Digital 2013) 	
199 Marí-Dell’Olmo et. al. (2016) demonstrates the high prevalence of depression and suicide 
attempts by those who are displaced by the mortgage crisis.  	
200 A study completed by the Barcelona based Observatory of Economic, Social and Cultural 
rights and the PAH documents the impacts on family and child health and well-being, including 
schooling and care issues as a result of housing instability. (Observatorio DESC 2015) 	
201 “The anxiety felt before an impending eviction and the financial death of families causes 
severe psychological disorders, which on occasion result in, among others, violent episodes, 
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describes, “One of the first and main tasks of the PAH was to provide psychological 
support to victims, showing that they are not responsible for their situation.” (15) This 
active and affective shifting of the narrative is central to what makes the PAH 
noteworthy.  
 
Spain’s national economic policy was, for decades, based upon home construction. Its 
constitutionally guaranteed right to housing202 became justification for channeling people 
into home ownership.203 By 2006, 84 percent of the population was registered as 
homeowners. (García-Lamarca & Kaika 2016, Vásquez-Vera et. al. 2016) When the 
mortgage-lending banks were bailed out in response to their failure in the economic 
turmoil of 2008, the people who had given the state’s financial distress through the 
structurally predictable crisis received no equal relief. Banks were bailed out, but not the 
people. Depression and the threats of homelessness are both related as sensible effects of 
this governmental failure. The PAH’s response to the situation is anchored in a 
recognition that depression is structurally produced, with governmental dispossession at 
its systemic root. Their ongoing diagnosis of governmental failure within the social 
terrain gives the PAH membership grounds for social innovation. The PAH respond204 																																																																																																																																																																					
alcoholism, child neglect, family tensions, increase in domestic violence and suicide attempts.” 
(Colau & Alemany 2014 33) 	
202 Article 47 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 states: “All Spaniards have the right to enjoy 
decent and adequate housing. The public authorities shall promote the necessary conditions and 
establish appropriate standards in order to make this right effective, regulating land use in 
accordance with the general interest in order to prevent speculation. The community shall have a 
share in the benefits accruing from the town-planning policies of public bodies." 
 
 Spain’s economic policy forwarded home construction and home ownership and the 
neglect of rental property and created a situation such that, in 2006, the average young home 
owner was paying 67 percent of their income towards housing costs with the average in 
Barcelona at 79.5 percent. (20 Minutos 2006)	
 
203 See García-Lamarca & Kaika (2016) on the biopolitical project of homeownership by the 
Spanish government. 	
204 Besides other activities that will shortly be described, the PAH maintains a website that lists 
the names of people in Spain who’ve killed themselves in the face of the eviction process. 
http://15mpedia.org/wiki/Lista_de_suicidios_relacionados_con_desahucios 	
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differently to the loading of public debt on private individuals that the government 
psychosocially mandated through ruling dispositifs. Spain’s government assumed that 
through their victim’s dispossession, dejection and poverty, common sense would identify 
the poor as socially dispensable.205 The PAH overturns the Malthusian logic whereby 
poverty is proof and justification for dispensability. Dispossession and the PAH’s 
response connects the group to situations imminent to climate change. With flooding, 
famine, and general social strife, many people will suffer in relatable ways. This chapter’s 
descriptive analysis demonstrates how and in what ways the PAH are noteworthy for this 
cultural policy. 
 
1b Informal social leadership and the general intellect 
In light of their innovative approach to crisis, the PAH brings people together. It brings 
people, affected by mortgages, together – as if they were gathering around a table in a 
manner that resonates with Hannah Arendt’s (1998) suggestion: “To live together in the 
world means essentially that a world of things is between those who have it in common, 
as a table is located between those who sit around it; the world, like every in-between, 
relates and separates men at the same time.” (52) The people that the PAH gathers meet 
in a space not fully equivalent with the broader natural world. Rather, those who gather 
are not concerned about what is nature and what is culture; they gather – just like most 
people – in a space defined in relation to nature, but intended by humans to address 
human need. Arendt sees that different natures and activities within the common world 
act to separate people simply as individuals. For Arendt, the table represents the general 
public sphere – and what for her stands against the dehumanizing generality is the 
particular nature of every human individual. 
 
In contrast to Arendt’s general public, the lexicon of social science identifies the PAH’s 
milieu as the informal sphere.206 Pradel-Miquel (2017) characterizes the informal sector 																																																								
205 The term “victims” is embraced by the PAH. PAH members who have been affected by the 
housing crisis call themselves “victims”.	
 
206 Formal and informal modes of governance operate in varied ethical and modal relation 
between strictly legal and strictly social relational modes. For more on the informal, see Scott 
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that the PAH operates within through its ambivalence to formal law. That ambivalence, in 
its own right, acts as a common regulatory and redistributive force at the limits of 
governmental reach. Both Pradel-Miquel and anthropologist James Scott (1998) describe 
informal governance as fulfilling distributive needs through cultural practices that operate 
over cultural scales and across time, rather than through methods formalized by law.  
 
Arendt and Pradel-Miquel provide interesting ways to think about what is happening in 
the PAH. Arendt’s table allows us to recognize their simply human manner of 
reorganizing relationality towards change. Pradel-Miquel’s methodology and lexicon 
demonstrate how social performance and public personae, without active attention to 
individual politics, can generally compose meaningful activity regardless of formal 
governance. But the identification of PAH’s members as either abstractly performing 
social bodies or uniquely unclassifiable individuals overlooks the particular socio-
political constellation that the PAH as any group of individuals collectively constitutes. 
PAH members are historically situated people whose active social being makes them of 
general interest. Framing them as individual actors with redistributive capacities doesn’t 
define the compositional element particular to their sphere. It affirms that throughout 
history some people have acceded to change but fails to capture how the PAH might be 
understood to be moving towards something distinct from the tender horizon of Western 
political metaphysics. Western metaphysics are ultimately anchored, as the reader will 
remember from last chapter’s discussion of Wynter and da Silva, in the financialized 
accounting of racially oriented Western power. So, while Arendt (1998) recognizes that 
anybody, as a representative of the human species, is capable of sitting at a table to 
negotiate new deals, as Virno (2004) says, her idealism does not frame “the structural 
characteristics of political activity” (54) of what is entailed in a grounded reworking of 
the basically political that Arendt, via Aristotle, names activity.  
 
In relation to developing meaningful innovation within politics today, Virno looks 
towards the particular structural characteristics of the political defined by post-Fordist 
relations. Post-Fordism centers the dispossessive capacities of capitalism in between the 																																																																																																																																																																					
(1989), Fairbanks (2011), and Pradel-Miquel (2016).	
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informational and organizational capacities of labor and the appearance of potential 
resources. So, this juncture between actual laboring conditions and the possible social 
organization of labor, resources and politics is the definitional space within which one 
can describe the active space of the general intellect. Virno highlights the general intellect 
as the zone where the liberatory tools of today’s multitude are generated, as well as the 
realm from within which innovation is capitalized. Within post-Fordism, it is said that 
innovation can be removed from pre-existing contingencies and valued as an abstract 
thing in itself.  To work with the general intellect means to dialogically funnel whatever 
apparent knowledge, sensibility or thought into any given social context to see what can 
be made with their mixture. The many ways in which the PAH works with the general 
intellect are notated throughout the second and third sections of the chapter: through 
dialogical processes of figuring out how to squat a building, for example. The PAH’s 
history of innovative organizing is a result of an ongoing composition of people sitting 
around and reflecting on their own and others’ situations, and also upon all available 
knowledges, in order to work out proper courses for action. Simply put, this process is 
one of activist labor within the social field these activists are able to organize. 
 
Virno follows Arendt and Aristotle’s general definition of labor, naming it the quotidian 
and foreseeable exchange with nature.207 Note that this definition exceeds a Marxian 
lexicon that might limit labor’s definition to having a variable contingency with capital. 
By working with both Arendt and Aristotle, Virno recognizes the transhistoric need for 
humans, however socially organized, to enter into exchange with the world for general 
socially reproductive needs, and other things. Post-Fordist economies strive to capitalize 
these relationships, too. Virno’s multitude’s political nature distinguishes itself from 
Arendt’s anthropologically human in the very particular ways that Post-Fordist power 
relations illuminate labor’s (as the general capacity of the human to exchange with the 
world) general social discursivity, understood as its generally intellectual capacity to 
work actually particular social relations. Arendt, according to Virno, proposes abstract 
and possible governmental relations through whatever towards a meaningful common 																																																								
207 “Labor is the organic exchange with nature, the production of new objects, a repetitive and 
foreseeable process.” (Virno 2004 50) 	
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horizon without attention to the existing political.  
 
The general intellect focuses social innovation based upon thinking through what the 
social can organize with the things that are known in the place, rather than as a 
contemplative general capacity (as what occurs at Arendt’s table) for action.208 Pradel-
Miquel’s and Scott’s  “informal” or “non-state” can name a relational terrain where 
meaningful cultural activity might occur, but lacks political utility when failing to 
describe what might meaningfully produce the genuine political difference that Wynter 
and da Silva point towards. 
 
For Virno’s multitude, the general intellect209 shines a light upon the total relational scope 
of what the human experience can constitute through labor. Virno suggests a particular 
relation between the general intellect and Debord’s spectacle: “The spectacle, according 
to Debord, reveals what women and men can do.” (60) Where human communication 
becomes a commodity in spectacle, the general intellect can be understood as the realm 
of possibility – the general thought-space that speculates on and through human thought, 
performance and activity. The general intellect can grimly frame what can be composed 
by slavery, pay, brutality, mass-dispossession or in nihilism; equally it can optimistically 
recognize the common human organizational capacity for brilliance and grace and the 
fact that, regardless of pain, humans have demonstrated a lot of capacity to do great work. 
Humans have acceded, in many ways, to change. This is why Virno holds out for the 
general intellect to identify common social way forward in particular ways, for  he sees it 
as idealizing human potential through whatever form it decides upon. For Virno, the 
contemporary political threading of the needle is to organize plausible human projects 																																																								
208 This argument traces a critique that Virno makes of Arendt’s understanding of the meaning of 
contemporary capitalist/labor relations. (51–55) 	
209 The general intellect, a concept originally discussed within Marx’s well known “Fragments 
on the Machine” section of the Grundrisse, is an “automatic system of machinery” (1992 692) 
and the “organs of the human brain, created by the human hand; the power of knowledge, 
objectified.” (706) Virno (2007 4), whose work has greatly refined the concept, suggests the 
general intellect is Marx’s response to Rousseau’s concept of a volonté génerale [general will], or 
the concept of nous poitikos [the active mind, a mind that is actively thinking] that Aristotle 
expresses in De Anima.	
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through better means. In relation to the post-Fordist elevation of the general intellect 
Virno asks:  
is it possible to split that which today is united, that is, the Intellect (the general 
intellect) and (wage) Labor, and to unite that which today is divided, that is, 
Intellect and political Action? Is it possible to move from the “ancient alliance” of 
Intellect/Labor to a ‘new alliance’ of Intellect/political Action? (68) 
 
The PAH’s innovative leadership composed by and in social dialogue with social 
relations demonstrates that the labor’s general intellect needn’t bow down before the 
colonizing ethic of sovereign power or Capital. While surrounded by profit-seeking post-
Fordist relations, the PAH seeks to remove social relations from profit. In general, post-
Fordist domination of the realm of seemingly free human arrangements makes 
arrangements seem contingent to a certain fact – that human organization with and for 
money is the absolute ends and means for total human potential. With money’s 
governmental insertion between human social relations (like Spain’s monetization of 
housing relations), Virno recounts the active contradiction that was Hobbes’s raison 
d’état – granting each individual their natural right to act freely. Within Spain’s private 
debt-driven economy, this created a situation where, “mortgage contracts enrolled not 
only personal income, but also the practices of everyday life as well as community and 
family relations as cogwheels into the global speculative financial strategies.” (García-
Lamarca & Kaika 2016) By appearing to order society with the policing capacity to 
enforce its demands, the state steps in between the general human and its own 
capacities.210 The generality of the Hobbesian state’s intervention into particular life, 
besides other ongoing state biopolitics,211 collaborates to constantly insist that the logics 
of capitalist necessity are common ones. But the general intellect is general not because 
of the capacity of the state, but because thought, communication and sociality are general 
capacities of the multitude.   
 																																																								
210 This ever-growing state intervention is the birth of biopolitics. 	
211 For example, the management of water resources. 	
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Reading Aristotle’s212 thoughts on governance and leadership beside Virno’s general 
intellect213 makes surprising connections between innovations and mental health that are 
arguably central to the PAH’s practice. For this study, the question of health relates to 
how the PAH transforms depression into something political. For Aristotle, the skills of a 
superior leader are comparable to those of a good doctor. Intended as guidance for 
leaders, Aristotle wrestles in his Politics (1998) with concerns of fairness, justice and 
what is right in relation to structural governing inequalities contingent to life in general, 
and in particular to lives within civilization. He grapples, for example, with how Greek 
society might condemn a good man to a life of slavery.214 In observing that the status of 
the slave is socially constructed,215 he strives to come to terms with the actual social, 
legal, political and ethical inconsistencies of this fact. Coming to terms with these 
inconsistencies is important for the construction of social peace – so that master and slave 
can be friends.216 He suggests that friendship is only achievable if leadership finds ways 
to enhance the position of both master and slave. Reading through the facts of the slave 
society at the founding of Western political philosophy is unsettling. It is a little 
surprising then to find at this philosophical birth a consideration of the limits and 
philosophical challenges of human governance rather than a Manichean prescription for 
legal and political obliteration of the social recognition of difference. Here, political 
thought is not to strategize control (that Aristotle sees as always as situationally given), to 
provide order (as in Hobbes) or to be used for the limitless accumulation of individual 																																																								
212 Here, looking at Aristotle (2004) Nichomean Ethic, (1998) Politics, (1986) De Anima. 	
213 Virno spells out some of his debt to Aristotelian thought in Virno (2007), and Virno et al. 
(2005). William Clare Roberts’ (2010) scholarship on this subject is also of great use for this 
study. 	
214 “But when people say this, they are in fact distinguishing slavery from freedom, well born 
from low born, in terms of virtue and vice alone. For they think that good people come from good 
people.” (Aristotle 1998 40) 
 
215 Aristotle is unsure if slavery is a classification appropriate to a natural system, (7) but is 
certain of its social and thus definitionally variable nomination. (9) 	
216 “Hence, there is a certain mutual benefit and mutual friendship for such masters and slaves as 
deserve to be by nature so related. When their relationship is not that way, however, but is based 
on law, and they have been subjected to force, the opposite holds.” (Aristotle 11) 	
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wealth217 – rather it is to ethically think through the total inconsistencies of the given 
social orchestra that governance might compose. For Aristotle, the orchestration of the 
natural form of the city allows for the highest promises of human potential.218 This city is 
explicitly understood as something composed of complex relations, incongruously 
populated and structured upon differently flawed individuals. With proper leadership, the 
heterogeneous human collectivity can be virtuously led to mutually beneficial ends.  
 
Leadership, Aristotle argues, is primarily needed where law is insufficient to deal with the 
inconsistencies between what governance has structured and what can be achieved as the 
greatest good219 – where neither law nor institution provide real direction. The PAH 
operates in such a junction of governmental failure, where the banks and state won’t 
solve the seemingly impossible situation they have governed people into. Virno, in 
describing the discursive nature of leadership, finds in Aristotle an antecedent to the 
concept of the general intellect. Political philosopher William Clare Roberts (2010) notes 
that while Virno refers to Aristotle’s thoughts on the intellect objectified, he is actually 
quoting from Aristotle’s larger explanation of mindful decision-making. (7) Virno220 
(2005) quotes Aristotle, referring to the general intellect as “the thinking that desires and 
the desire that thinks” (32) as a way of describing how action-oriented-thought innovates 
around what it desires to act upon. For Aristotle, this act of choosing what is the greatest 
good is explicitly akin to how a doctor defines a course of action for a sick patient whose 
body is still working but whose course must somehow be changed.221  																																																								
217 “Cases of too much individual accumulation, like that of Midas’, show that one can die of the 
hunger of greed.” (16–17) 	
218 See Aristotle. (4–5) 	
219 “As to the first problem we mentioned, it makes nothing else so evident as that the laws, 
when correctly established, should be in authority, and that the ruler, whether one or many, should 
have authority over only those matters on which the LAWS cannot pronounce with precision, 
because it is not easy to make universal declarations about everything.” (85) 	
220 Roberts (2010) locates Virno’s quotation of Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethic. 	
221 Aristotle (1998 18) also makes use of this metaphor to help distinguish between the wealth 
appropriate to an individual and the wealth appropriate to a community, suggesting that while an 
individual is concerned with their own health, the doctor is concerned with the overall health and 
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The PAH’s leadership stays with social intelligence in the way that a doctor makes an 
analysis;222 treatments for system-imminent problems must be addressed towards that 
which caused the sickness. The course of treatment can be judged by the virtuosity of the 
decisions it implied – by whether or not the patient lived, and according to the manner in 
which they lived. In cases of seemingly individual depression and hardship made 
manifest by the 2008 financial crisis, the PAH’s diagnosis was that individuals were 
facing a collective illness. The PAH prescribe joy through activism, protest, resistance 
and collective emotional labor. Roberto Esposito’s Immunitas (2011) makes a similar 
though different case for the centrality of medical reasoning within governance. Esposito 
traces how the concept of “inoculation” can be understood as central to the biopolitical 
maintenance of power – to meet crisis existing at the edge of law, contemporary 
governance finds innovative ways to inoculate itself with these outliers. Rather than 
engage in conflict with outlaw behavior, governance manages risk by incorporating what 
it can of whatever alterity in order to safely manage its own transformation. The US 
Government’s engagement with the Black Panther Party activities – taking over free 
lunch programs and sickle-cell anemia research projects while also violently eradicating 
the Party’s core is but one example of such inoculation. This study hopes for other ends 
for the PAH. Their capacity to socially innovate across race and class via the general 
intellect, as grounded in immediate social relations, stands as a cure against capitalized 																																																																																																																																																																					
healthy conditions of the community – and that while individuals can only handle so much 
wealth, the community can collectively manage it.  
 
 Aristotle (2004 103–105) breaks the discursive and cognitive process of decision making 
down into a tri-fold process that involves perception, intellect and desire. For him, perception is 
of secondary interest – he states that any animal can perceive. Intellect is an abstract capacity 
composed of two abilities; the ability to identify all sets of possible needs for actions and the 
awareness of possible courses of action. For example; possible sets of actions might relate to an 
understanding of all medicines, courses for actions might come from an appreciation of all the 
variabilities of disease within individually variable bodies. Aristotle identifies desire as the means 
by which a proper course of action is navigated – the doctor’s prognosis and course of action is 
based on what they feel to be the most realistic and desirable outcome. 	
222 “But having grasped only this, someone would be none the wiser; for example, you would 
not know what sort of treatments to use on your body if someone were to say that you should 
employ those that medicine requires, and in the way that a medical practitioner employs them.” 
(Aristotle 2004 103)	
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relations leading to premature social or actual death. It is in this capacity that the PAH 
demonstrates a political difference with Western governance models.  
 
1c Social currency and common sense 
The previous chapter identified Lévi-Strauss’s (1962) concepts of how societies maintain 
order through major “engineering” or minor “bricolaged” variation, contingent to their 
ongoing systemic needs. As discussed in the previous chapter, Hegelian ontology 
organizes whatever relational objects to revolutionize the totality of life towards an 
abstract ideal while maintaining the same governing order. Hegelian universals contribute 
to societal innovation when, across social difference, individual imagination is collected 
in the interests of an abstract and real state power. State and banking apparatuses appear 
to facilitate relations and subsume them by controlling access to money which post-
Fordism translates as social capital. From a governing perspective, as Lévi-Strauss’s 
manners suggest, managing social arrangements requires orchestrating activity at a 
variety of scales. 
 
Nevertheless, the multitude strains at both the limits and definitions of governing 
concepts; by protesting the self-interest of the class that profits from governing 
innovations or by just multitudinously misinterpreting the terms of governance. 
Seemingly below the terms engineered as governing order, the multitude’s bricolage of 
meaning and action can be seen as the common piecing together of life outside of 
engineered mastery. Spinoza’s work on initial common being in his Ethics adds, in subtle 
ways, to how the PAH’s innovations continue to find social currency through informal 
sociality rather than by overarching force of reason, law, money and other determinative 
logistics. This is the topic of this subsection.  
 
Following Virno’s discussion of the one of governmentality and the many of the 
multitude (2008 41); though the one coincides with the many, the many are not 
equivalent to it. As PAH member and anthropologist Maka Suarez (2014) makes clear,223 																																																								
223 The PAH grew significantly with the Spanish Mortgage Crisis, but it is pertinent to restate 
that the housing movement in Spain has a history and political agenda that precedes the PAH. 
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the PAH balances tensions224 between a critique of financial systems and the immediate 
need of its members for personal and public accommodation. To the extent that it can be 
said that the PAH works to unfix housing from capital, as multitude the PAH maintains a 
real ambivalence to governance and what it really seems to provide – that is, it provides 
both home and homelessness. Yet rather than working to identify solutions that the 
abstract economic market can bear, the PAH finds solutions through the currency of its 
own concrete social capacities in the variable but always composed actually existing 
ecology of social life. The PAH must somehow accommodate its non-market ends with 
the ongoing realities of state and bank. By the nature of any informal sector, and thus in 
the nature of the terrain within which the PAH defines its currency, it controls neither 
bank nor state. And as this chapter will demonstrate (in section 3), the Barcelona PAH has 
a no-violence policy for its confrontation with the state power – its real organizational 
power is not based in the multitude’s actual capacity for violence.  
 
The value and force that PAH innovations accrue is social, and has standing against 
formal power only to the extent that its actually near-criminal behavior is commonly and 
generally understandable. If innovation was equivalent with and translatable to both the 
social and to law, Hegelian dialectics would more successfully manage the world. But 
Hegelian universality seems to fail at translating the fruits of cultural, legal and economic 
activity across the world into a single basket of coordinated thought that would be the 
guaranteed order of the Hegelian ideal.225 According to Marx (1993), the general intellect 
functions as an “automaton consisting of numerous mechanical and intellectual organs, so 																																																																																																																																																																					
This is an important point because PAH’s notion of the home is not exhausted in its response to 
the mortgage bubble. Moreover, it is precisely at the political level that the PAH can benefit in the 
debate by employing the framework of Buen Vivir, particularly with an emphasis on the approach 
to building a home in harmony with diverse ecosystemic registers. (Suarez 2014 86) 	
224 Over the course of my research with the Barcelona PAH, they had already begun organizing 
eviction defenses to support apartment renters as well as homeowners. Moving directly against 
rentier income was hotly debated within the group, though it was agreed that it was fine for the 
group to move against large property owners and bank-held rental properties.	
 
225 Mbembe’s (2003) psycho-social critique of Hegelian dialectics – that they’re only accounting 
is that of deaths, finds a salient echo in the PAH’s counter-proposals concerning the meaning of 
depression and suicide in the time of economic crisis. 	
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that the workers themselves are cast merely as its conscious linkages.” (692) PAH 
members work with the PAH as people, common people around a table, not as wage 
laborers bonded to that table to which they must link in particular ways in order to make 
the machine function. Elsewhere they may work in such a mechanical manner to earn an 
income. But in relation to the PAH they work to remove their lives and especially their 
housing situation from the crushing rules of such accounting. This virtuous ethic of the 
PAH endears them to the broader informal social sphere who gives them support and is 
their social currency. If their activity were not endearing, they would lose the social 
currency they have and with which they make social change.  
 
Among other things, this fact distinguishes the PAH’s social practice from, for example, 
the general social practices of the “creative economy.”226 Post-Fordism’s normative 
creativity pushes subjects to “innovate” their social relations as an abstractable resource. 
Post-Fordism’s speculative logic asks its subjects to perceive the minutiae of sociality as 
having qualities that can be autonomously abstractable. So, it would be a mistake to read 
this chapter’s condensed descriptions of the PAH’s cognitive and affective labor as 
directly abstractable “innovations” that autonomously drive change. The core of PAH’s 
work is in its attention to and rejection of the bitter fruits of economization’s brutal 
dispossession that remain sensible through the informal social field and in the lives of 
people wherein the PAH finds fluidity. The PAH sees the violence that capitalism 
enforces, and says to its own social relations that life doesn’t have to be this way. So, in 
comparison to participants in the creative economy who also socially innovate but with 
the speculation of profit – under the strict logic of capital, the PAH project is not 
speculative. Its members have little illusion that they will financially profit from their 
social activity that commons sociality beside or beyond capital. The PAH’s window for 
innovation is constricted, members work with fixed but variable issues attendant to the 																																																								
226 Here we mean to point towards the expanded field that sits between social practice artwork 
and networked organizational strategies intended to mobilize participation in institutionally 
situated projects. By speculative ends, we point to the ambiguity inherent to the realm of abstract 
production fueled by cultural or real capital, and populated by either truly altruistic or entirely 
self-interested actors. The vast literature we reference here is descriptive (Holmes 2008, Sholette 
2012, Hickey 2012 Thompson 2015) and critical (Berry 2012, Kester 2013, Southwark Notes 
2016).	
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group’s given poeisis. Though a core group of skilled experienced activists, organizers, 
artists and graphic designers drives the PAH’s ongoing development, they do so in a 
manner that develops common means and ends and effectively disallows individual profit 
from collective effort.  
 
Therefore, a less explored aspect of Virno’s (2008) alliance of the “General Intellect and 
political Action” (68), or maybe just another aspect of the general fact of human capacity 
to think and organize together, may be the fact that intelligence works within already-
existing and almost determined fields. “Innovation” may be far more particular and 
specific than all this attention might suggest. That is, while Hegelian dialectics claim that 
universal concepts organize the world through well-reasoned action expressed through 
meaningful cultural production and enlightened politics, perhaps what is proper to the 
nature of the informal field is that by definition it already exists without having to be 
organized – and that much formal cultural production is power explaining itself to itself 
for its interests rather than to the multitude around it. It is important at this point to 
remember another aspect of the multitude (discussed in Chapter 1); that the multitude is 
that body which precedes and exceeds any form of governance. 
 
Thus, while Hegel identifies the final ends of the world in a refined and future 
universality, Spinoza’s Ethics (2001) recognizes the world as starting in a state of 
completion and differences that appear over time as just the spooling out, assemblage and 
disambiguation of different essences of that completeness. Spinoza described God (who 
is also nature and source of everything) as “being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance 
consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite 
essence.”(85) In Spinoza’s metaphysics, there are no predetermined ends to nature, just 
this perfection infinitely appearing over time. In this way, that which multitudinously 
exists and occurs in context in relation to that whatever which power and law expresses is 
already accounted for by the fact that something else preceded it in order for it to be so. 
In this way, the sociality of that which multitudinously exists is unaccountable in itself. 
 
A Spinozan understanding of an unknowable common origin suggests that difference 
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emerges as different faces of God/nature’s essential aspects – he names these aspects 
essences. The fact of a thing’s godly and timeless origin is independent from the fact of 
its actual appearance in the human world – “The essence of things produced by God does 
not involve existence.” (25) Through different sensitivities to the effects of lawly 
essences, the multitude contingently brings different relational faces into being.227 The 
cause of something actually existing is in something that contingently caused it to be: 
sociality can organize the momentary appearance of joy as organized logistics can bring a 
boat to harbor. Thus, with Ethics, one can conceptualize how the multitude discursively 
and actively organizes to bring things from virtual to actual existence in and over time. 
For Spinoza, knowledge is generated through study of what is sensed through the 
essential armatures of existence. “There will exist in the human mind an adequate idea of 
that which is common and proper to the human body: and to any external bodies by 
which the human body is generally affected.” (77) Awareness of the world is built by 
affectively bridging understandings of what sensing armatures gather between bodies to 
form “common notions” of what things are. The broader the common discourse, the 
wider common sense allows for things to appear or be as they seem they should be.  
 
This discursive process may be somewhat akin to Virno’s function of the general 
intellect. Any difference between Virno’s notion of the general intellect and Spinoza’s 
commoning of notions here is contingent to whether the definition of the intellect is 
informed by a Hegelian or a Spinozan understanding of knowledge. Hegelian-attendant 
governance rests on the force by which leaders grasp truths that can affect the world, a 
Spinozan view is aware that the world is already somehow ordered – and that governing 
truths function only as far as they are commonly or forcefully made functional across 
what orders difference. The PAH’s governmental notions function only as far as they 
maintain capacity to continually expand throughout the common terrain of life – its 
innovative generalization of the intellect is that its core activity must also give way to its 
furthest sensible margins; that its force is based upon the stranger’s awareness that the 
PAH’s activity is virtuous. This common understanding is the order it must have for it to 																																																								
227 “An individual thing, or a thing which is finite and which has a determinate existence, cannot 
exist nor be determined to action unless it be determined to existence and action by another 
cause…” (Spinoza 2001 26)	
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continue to informally operate.  
 
The following two subsections contain the research and participant-observation notes that 
aim to capture how the PAH can be seen to embody in form and practice such an 
innovative mode of political being.  
 
2 The PAH- composition of the body  
This second section (2) describes how people encounter and are reoriented within and by 
their relations within the PAH.  
 
The following statement appears in the PAH’s Green Book (2015) (a small pamphlet 
meant to be handed out at any PAH member’s first meeting) under the heading What is 
the PAH:  
We are all affected by mortgages, the housing policies of the real estate bubble, 
the mortgage scam and the bad practices of the banking sector, they are the root of 
today’s crisis that has condemned millions of people to unemployment and 
precarity. 
 
The government today is cutting our basic rights to sanitation and education in 
order to rescue those who are responsible for the crisis. However, while it is true 
that all of us are affected, within this manual the term "affected” refers to people 
who face the difficulty of not being able to pay their mortgage and face 
foreclosure, as well as those who face the serious violation of the right to housing 
known as eviction. (6–8) 
 
It often seems that one doesn’t easily recognize that one has become victim to systems 
largely beyond one’s control, and how common it is to become such a victim. Rather than 
recognizing one’s fate as an almost systemically preconditioned outcome and hardly 
one’s “own fault”, situations of debt and foreclosure often individually close in on those 
who suffer this fate. Often, the material and psychological effects of foreclosure 
announcements arrive before any sort of cognition of what is happening to the victim. To 
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become aware of crisis requires two things: a crisis and a consciousness of it. Systemic 
crisis arrives regardless of awareness. Moreover, there is no object named “crisis” but 
rather a series of related effects and orientations that ultimately come to be called “a 
crisis”. This section describes the process of individual perception, diagnostic 
recognition, and the understanding that the PAH provides in order for its members to 
renew their definition of what crisis is, rather than merely accept what governance would 
like crisis to be.  
 
2a Mere acceptance: how it felt in my body 
From the economic perspective, it is simple to name the conditions of dispossession that 
lead to the Spanish mortgage crisis. Besides being a market failure on paper, the financial 
crisis of 2007–2008 was real in that it had real reverberations in Spain.228 Variations 
within the economy, or within any infrastructure for that matter, affect people. At an 
abstract remove, one might ask how, but when macro-economies that formally manage 
social relations become unstable,229 this instability reverberates through social order.230  
 
José Coy, founder of the PAH chapter in the city of Murcia, writes about coming to 
recognize how the market had affected him: 
It took time for me to come to the conclusion that I wasn’t at fault for having 																																																								
228 For the relations between the 2008 crisis and the bursting of the Spanish bubble see Colau & 
Alemany (2014), and De Weerdt and Garcia (2016). 	
229 “The premise of neoliberal dogmatism is the reduction of social life to the mathematical 
implications of financial algorithms.” (Berardi 2012 31) 
 
For a particular account of how the Spanish government colluded with Spanish banks to 
financialize social reproduction through the increased financialization of housing, see García-
Lamarca & Kaika (2016). 	
230 Formal economic scales cut transversally across states, whose stability by law and practice is 
built from authority by fiat from above, to below. From the body of the state Hobbes writes, 
“Therefore before the names of Just, and Unjust can have place, there must be some coercive 
Power, to compel men equally to the performance of their Covenants, by the terror of some 
punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their Covenant.” (1922 110). 
 
 By its role as the enforcer of contracts, today the logic of the state atomizes the war of all 
against all into what the state can manage as individual failure. 	
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stayed unemployed and to arrive at this current feeling of indignation and 
rebellion. I led a normal life with a small, well paid, self-sustaining business 
within the textile sector. Globalization destroyed an activity that had been 
prominent throughout the Mediterranean region. When banks stopped financing 
the sector, it was the last straw. I spent three years unable to meet my mortgage 
payments... (2014 18–19) 
 
PAH co-founder Ada Colau, who this chapter will discusses throughout for the important 
role she has played as PAH spokesperson and also as political entrepreneur, and Adria 
Alemany, another of the four PAH co-founders write: 
Contrary to what one might think, people who come to their first PAH meeting 
are, more often than angry, morally dejected and resigned. Disoriented, neglected 
by the administration, threatened by banks and depressed, the foreclosure process 
acts as a shredder that destroys anything you put in front of it. Families feel guilty 
for the situation in which they find themselves and attribute it to personal failure. 
(2014 89–90)  
 
Within PAH meetings, depression and deprivation hover like ghosts that everyone knows 
will only infrequently appear. One can understand that depression is there – it exists as a 
thin film of qualitative proof, present as emotional outbursts that occur during meetings. 
Yet the affirmative effects231 of mutual aid232 practiced by the PAH as processes of 
solidarity and mutual care suffuse the whole project. In addition to more action-oriented 
meetings, The Barcelona PAH233 has a weekly calendared conversation for members and 
a counselor to deal with psychological needs. This meeting is known as the Grup Ajuda 																																																								
231 For popular press accounts addressing mutual aid’s psychological benefits within the Spanish 
context, see for example Botwin (2016) and Filguera (2014). 	
232 The concept of mutual aid is a basic element of social life and what is considered anarchist 
practice and theory. In this regard, it is useful here to remember the strong historic presence of 
Anarchism throughout Spain, and in Cataluña in particular. 	
233 Embedded within Valencia PAH meetings are volunteers from the group Psicólogas y 
Psicólogos sin Fronteras [Psychologists Without Borders]. The Madrid PAH has self-organized 
psychological studies within their own meetings, and has a group for psychological mutual aid 
that is scheduled to meet every other week.	
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Mútua [Mutual Aid Group], its presence attests to the Barcelona PAH’s awareness of the 
mental health issues inherent to their work.  
 
The American Psychology Association’s widely used definition (Mcintyre 2001 118) of 
depression states, “Depression is more than just sadness. People with depression may 
experience a lack of interest and pleasure in daily activities, significant weight loss or 
gain, insomnia or excessive sleeping, lack of energy, inability to concentrate, feelings of 
worthlessness or excessive guilt and recurrent thoughts of death or suicide.” (American 
Psychology Association, 2015) “Depression”, like any medical definition exists as a term 
to be accessed in order to analyze it in relationship to the patient’s symptoms. An official 
nomination allows for the doctor to treat a bad or sad mood as something more than 
normal.  
 
Yet the relationship between a definition in itself and its use as a diagnostic tool is 
problematic. In an article in the journal Human Psychopharmacology: Clinical and 
Experimental, psychologist Dr. John S. McIntyre (2001) blames the difficulty of making 
proper diagnoses of depression on a variety of factors including “the persistence of the 
biomedical rather than the biopsychosocial paradigm of illness and treatment educational 
issues...” (115) McIntyre goes on to textually analyze the APA guidelines, noting that in 
its very own words, the APA demonstrates a disconnect between the appearance of an 
actually existing illness and routes for its appropriate treatment.234 McIntyre concludes 
that only by integrating clinical and empirical wisdom into education about the use of 
guidelines might there be improved diagnosis and treatments for patient situations. (118) 
This is to suggest that beyond recognizable physical evidence (scars from suicide 
attempts) or less clear behavioral evidence (changes in long-term behavioral patterns), a 
caregiver has difficulty truly recognizing depression, and that treatments are far more 																																																								
234 “In the introduction of the (APA) guideline there is a ‘statement of intent’ noting that the 
guideline is not a standard of medical care. The statement also notes that ‘adherence to them [the 
guidelines] will not insure a successful outcome in every case, nor should they be construed as 
including all proper methods of care or excluding other acceptable methods of care…’ McIntyre 
(2001) finds such statement in the APA to be helpful in minimizing the potential for 
misinterpretation or misuse of the guideline. 	
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open than singular solutions might suggest. Mental health is a confluence of mental and 
social conditions, where depression sits between a possibility for its particular 
recognition, its perceived causes, and possible treatments. It is culturally and situationally 
dependent235 upon any variety of determinations.   
 
Furthermore, the task of analysis is compounded when the individual suffering 
depression or deprivation is the one who is tasked with recognizing and understanding 
that they need not be as they are, and that their situation could be different. This self-
awareness is not so easy. Yet people who come to the PAH have, to some extent, already 
sensed that their problem is a common one and not just their burden alone.236 The PAH, 
for its part, assumes a mental health aspect to their work. In relation to the overall interest 
of this thesis: the self-recognition PAH members demonstrate in sensing and analyzing 
their situation and the actions they take to address the causal conditions mirrors situations 
this study imagines in relation to the changing climate.  
 
At the weekly Monday night meeting that formally serves as the welcome for new PAH 
members, one can glimpse the raw emotions that the crisis of foreclosure draws from 
those who face it. An emerging activist commitment represented by those bodies that 
enter the Barcelona PAH office in order to differently address their situation can also 
attest to the fact of the social face of the psychosocial crisis.  
 
“My story is a little different,” says the first woman to explain her housing situation on 
this night of January 20 2015. Everyone’s case is a little different. Everyone seems to 
need to express the uniqueness of their situation.  
 																																																								
235 Such studies, endemic to psychology, that link social situations with high prevalence of 
depression make obvious the sociocultural elements determinant to depression. For studies 
demonstrating the prevalence of depression among those effected by the Spanish mortgage crisis, 
see for example Muñoz et. al. (2015), Marí-Dell’Olmo et. al. (2016), and Vásquez-Vera et. al. 
(2016). 	
236 The awareness of high incidents of suicide among those threatened by eviction has provided 
grounds for a chief judge in Spain’s Basque region to make changes to the region’s mortgage and 
eviction laws. See Barbero (2015).	
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“My case is particular,” says the fourth speaker before explaining her story. “Good 
evening, my name is Fatima. Last year, in February I had a problem with my job. So now 
I only work six hours a week. I couldn’t pay rent from March on. I have 5,000 Euro debt. 
I will be kicked out of my house on January 26th. That’s a week away, next Monday. 
What can the PAH do for me?” 
 
“We can’t pay your debt,” someone in the audience of 70 people jokingly responds. 
Entertained, many laugh.  
 
Fatima continues, “They pointed me to social services to help provide me a home. But 
they gave me a date in February.”  
 
Mark, a long-term PAH activist, says, “Did they show you an eviction notice?” 
 
“Yes.” 
 
“But in Barcelona, if people are going to be kicked out of their apartment, there are 
emergency flats for you. It’s very important.” Someone is explaining how things are 
supposed to work and of a particular governmental failure to follow the law. Fatima is not 
listening; she seems to doubt that anything can be done. 
 
“If you don’t listen, well, you’ll be going from one flat to the next asking for help… We 
know the situation. You have to act quickly; you have to save yourself, secure your 
situation. Go back to the judge.” 
 
Fatima repeats. “I want to secure myself. You know the situation. I have to act quickly. I 
have to save myself. I want to save myself.” 
 
Mark says, “There’s one week. Get social housing and you also need to stop the 
eviction.” 
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Fatima, finding reason not to act in her own self-interest suggests, “The building’s in bad 
condition though.” 
 
Another committed PAH activist name June tells Fatima, “I’ll go with you tomorrow to 
the court.” Fatima seems shell-shocked, almost unconscious of the fact that she may be 
losing her house within a week and unable to stop the process by herself. She does not 
seem to believe that there is anything to do and explains that she has to go to work and 
has other things to do besides stopping her eviction and imminent homelessness. Yet 
somehow, she has, along with eleven other people, gone to this PAH meeting for their 
first time.  
 
Perhaps Fatima heard about the PAH from friends. Perhaps she heard about it on the 
news. Perhaps she’d passed by one of the PAH's noisy protests they call escraches, where 
politicians are harassed to no end. Perhaps she saw one of their flyers on the street or one 
of several hundred flyers wheat-pasted to obscure windows of PAH-occupied or targeted 
banks.  Subsequent subheadings will discuss the way the PAH familiarizes its concepts 
and behaviors through the general population of the city. But what is important here is 
that stuff, cast-off from activist practice, has a mediatic effect and helps people find out 
about the group.  
 
In Mortgaged Lives, Colau and Alemany (2014) reflect on how the PAH came to be the 
lively workshop through which people might transform their material reality. The fact of 
the PAH’s success contrasts with V de Vivienda, a housing project that preceded the PAH. 
V de Vivienda was an artistic, activist, and NGO collaboration; Colau and former 
members of the Las Agencias237 collective participated along with others. Begun in 2007, 
V de Vivienda focused on the aspiration of home ownership, the actuality of its individual 
occurrence and the actual fact that housing is guaranteed within in the Spanish 
Constitution. As Alemany and Colau observed in 2014, “It’s not that V de Vivienda said 
anything new, but that it said it in another way, renewing the language and the codes used 																																																								
237 I will later discuss how, through the Enmedio Collective, these individuals designed graphics 
for the PAH’s escraches. 	
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by more traditional social movements. Without a doubt, one of the principal merits of the 
movement was its capacity to connect with public opinion through direct, communicative 
campaigns.” (84)238 But Colau and Alemany identify a weakness in V de Vivienda’s 
aspirational and communicative strategy saying, “In the case of V de Vivienda, the 
transformation of these young people into social activists was nearly a seamless 
transition. But were older people affected by the mortgage capable of going beyond their 
individual cases and getting involved in the political process? Could victims become 
activists?” (89) 
 
Unlike V de Vivienda, the PAH has managed to directly engage people affected by crisis, 
turning victims into activists. The facts of the crisis and the work that the PAH does to 
articulate itself as the group actually capable of responding to it attest to this. For 
example, by the following Monday (January 27th), Fatima has managed to postpone her 
eviction through legal work, by chasing down social services and with the active 
solidarity of other PAH members joining her at the door of her home on the day of her 
possible eviction. So, at the following Monday’s welcoming meeting, the facilitator asks, 
“How many people are coming to a PAH meeting for the first time?” to which seven 
people raise their hands (a few more victims would arrive by the crowded meeting’s end). 
The weekly facilitator goes through the routine of recounting the PAH’s story, “The PAH 
is a group that began to meet in 2009… We don’t want you to lose your house. The key is 
solidarity, that we support one another in our actions. When you enter for the first time, 
you learn that you are not alone, and that ‘Sí, se puede!’239 Today we stopped an eviction. 
Fatima, could you tell us about it.” 
 
Fatima stands up to applause. “It’s really because of the help of all of you, of June (who’d 																																																								
238 Counter-posed to the state’s promise was V de Vivienda’s eventual motto, “You’re not going 
to have a home in your whole fucking life,” which was written during Spain’s growing housing 
bubble. Spain’s economic policy forwarded home construction and home ownership and the 
neglect of rental property and created a situation such that in 2006, the average young home 
owner was paying 67 percent of their income towards housing costs with the average in 
Barcelona at 79.5 percent. (20 Minutos 2006).	
 
239 “Sí, se puede!” commonly translated as “Yes we can!” is a common activist rallying cry 
throughout the Spanish-speaking world.	
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volunteered to join her at court) who made it possible.” Fatima returns to her seat and the 
facilitator explains the three basic phases of fighting foreclosure and eviction (see Section 
3g. Grassroots Policies). 
 
2b Joining the PAH 
A simple routine inaugurates affected people into the group. They are invited to attend the 
Monday meetings, and after presenting themselves, they are asked to listen. At one such 
meeting in January, one meaning for this process is made explicit in the following 
exchange between a female meeting facilitator and a new arrival. The facilitator begins 
the gathering with a routine explanation of her experience with the PAH. “…I was upset, 
and so I got involved with the PAH. Here is a place where I can let loose my tears, begin 
to talk realistically about the banks, where we can cry. Here we can begin to talk person-
to-person because we all know what we are talking about. We started in 2009; in 2013, 
we started the popular initiatives to change the laws by gathering 1,500,000 signatures. 
All we do is fight against this law because it is unjust. The bank has so many empty 
houses… I am welcome here, I can get empowered and find encouragement here. The 
banks aren’t interested in my health, with my spirit.” The facilitator’s stirring invocation 
is met with applause and shouts; “Sí, se puede!” 
 
The new PAH arrival takes this energy in hand and begins to make a speech, talking 
about the banks and how we must work together to fight the system. At the beginning of 
her vocal rapture, she is told that through the meeting’s process, “we will get to how we 
organize...” The new member hushes up as the induction process’s order is explained; 
that on Mondays new people affected by the crisis are welcomed and oriented. That on 
Tuesdays there’s a coordination meeting, that on Wednesdays there’s an important 
meeting for people to discuss the psychological impacts of the crisis, that on Thursday 
there are groups whose members are victims of particular banks gathering to share bank 
negotiating tactics. The meeting continues as she takes her seat among the 70 or so other 
attendees.  
 
The Barcelona PAH does not ask its new members to over-commit to a functioning 
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internal process they do not yet know. As a group, they take on the banks; rhetorical 
innovation at this moment is superfluous– collective projects she isn’t yet aware of are 
already organizing to deal with the issues. 
 
During this meeting– where attendees appear to be of Spanish, Asian, and Latin 
American origin, another new victim, a woman named Claudia states that she is facing an 
eviction from her rental apartment on the very next day. The line between non-member 
and member of the PAH is negligible. Overnight, an action to defend her house is 
organized. To be a member of the PAH is to stand with the PAH and have the PAH stand 
for you against the banks and their allies in government and elsewhere. Note this 
interaction, witnessed during this same meeting, where a woman first discusses her 
potential eviction from a property she’d bought.  She has been cutting her food budget so 
that she can pay off her loan. Susan says, “Ah, there we have it, we are a group of people 
who can’t pay their loans. Tell the banks you’re with the PAH and you’re getting 
informed. You can do this...” 
 
Another woman, later on in this meeting, is discussing for the first time her difficulties 
with the Caixa Bank. “Those assholes” responds a PAH member “Tell them you’re 
related to the PAH and your looking to solve the problem. Tell them you want serious 
solutions.”  
 
These and other anecdotes talk about the relationship between the PAH and its notion of 
“membership.” Belonging is both a fait accompli and a work in progress. As this chapter 
will go on to demonstrate, the Barcelona PAH successively works to expand itself in 
relation to needs they find themselves capable of addressing. But in continued relation to 
the therapeutic nature of the group’s mutual aid, is the Grup Ajuda Mútua (mutual aid 
group in Catalan). Unlike other Barcelona PAH meetings, this one is closed door and 
without formal agenda. Meeting contents are fluid, driven by what attendees need to talk 
about: excluding conversations dealing with the bureaucracy of mortgages – there are 
other meetings for that. The facilitator, an art therapist, defines his therapeutic role as the 
one who provides focus, understands the meeting as a space to deeply explore 
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“repercussions at the level of the family, the individual and in work. In the group, we see 
how all this affects things at the level of health and emotions.”240 (Callejas & Monroy 
2014) 
 
2c Mutual aid and social constructionist psychology 
During the January 19th welcoming meeting, the coordinator begins by saying, “Thanks 
to the PAH, I’m going to explain to you how I learned not to be afraid of everything. 
With the PAH, you don’t rely on the PAH. We learn together what to do to solve our own 
problems.” How the PAH deals with debt’s affective trauma is woven through the entirety 
of the project as mutual aid.  
 
I had the opportunity to interview PAH activist and psychologist Irene Montero Gil241 
(January 10, 2015). Gil, together with other mental health workers/PAH members 
conducted unpublished research on trauma and transformation242 within the PAH. Though 
with the Madrid PAH, her thoughts reflect a common current of thought around trauma 
and therapy throughout Spain.  
 
Gil’s PAH research followed the Social Constructionist school of psychology. Their 
approach looks at how “psychological phenomenon are themselves socially constructed.” 
(Billig 1995 65). At its base, Social Constructionists question “the ways in which the very 																																																								
240 Out of respect for the closed-door policy, which is a true anomaly for the group, I chose not 
to attend the meeting. 	
241 Gil holds a Master’s Degree in educational psychology from the Universidad Autónomo de 
Madrid. At the time of this interview, she was an active member of the Madrid PAH. Now she 
serves as on the Executive Committee of Podemos, the largest of the political parties that came to 
prominence after the 2008 crisis. She is as congressperson for Madrid to the Spanish the Cortes 
Generales or the national parliament.  Within the legislature, she serves as Podemos’ speaker. 	
242 Along with Gil’s unpublished study is another one conducted by an embedded researchers in 
the Barcelona PAH that looks at individual empowerment in relation to the PAH, Casellas, 
Antónia & Sala (2017). 
 
 See Botija (2015) for a wider analysis of the relations social inequality and mental health 
in Madrid, which includes a chapter discussing the non-medical and non-clinical social setting of 
the PAH as effective treatment for mental health issues. 	
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nature of our knowledge-producing practices and institutions entrap us, and lead into 
simply reproducing unchanged what in fact we thought we were reconstructing.” (Parker 
& Shotter 1990 1) As such, Gil’s comments about the PAH demonstrate the ways in 
which she imagines its processes ontologically reorganize the sensibility of trauma and 
social relation in some manner equivalent to Constructivist goals.  
 
Gil explains that before engaging with the PAH, mortgage victims share their crisis with 
friends and family. This ad hoc sharing draws in a community in ways neither affirmative 
nor productive– though it does displace stress to friends and family.  To the extent that 
they are involved, state and aid organizations like CARITAS243 act as other outsourced 
and inappropriate stress-bearers of the debt– inappropriate because their interests are not 
consonant with those affected by the crisis. However, Gil explains, once a person joins 
the PAH, they learn how to accept their own responsibility for the debt situation while 
also recognizing the responsibility that others, including the banks and the state, have in 
creating and facilitating the situation that collaborated in their becoming victims. Central 
to this PAH facilitated re-orientation is an understanding that banks, with the state as 
accomplice, have cheated people. “People can’t believe that a bank would cheat so many 
people,” Gil says.  
 
For Gil, trauma is not simply erased through participation with the PAH, rather, trauma 
becomes something understandable and identifiable. Trauma can become a manageable 
form; it can become something like “a stone in a bag.” The bad feelings and the fact of 
debt becomes something comprehendible; it becomes just one fact of fate among other 
things that have happened over the course of many individuals’ lives. The PAH rapidly 
transforms244 people by providing new frames through which to process trauma and its 
causes. In the PAH, she says:  																																																								
243 CARITAS is the preeminent charity organization in Spain. It is associated with the Catholic 
Church.	
 
244 The speed by which the PAH is said to transform member’s lives varies. Some people say it 
takes five meetings. Others say what happens in five meetings can be accomplished in one 
protest, “when you go out to the street screaming…when you leave, you go, ‘whoa!’” (Psicólogas 
y Psicólogos sin Fronteras 2016)	
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I can cry, I can talk about it however I want. Facing evictions and going through 
evictions becomes a therapeutic process. I can scream, I can skip over and jump 
through a variety of emotions, I can overcome crisis. Hug, scream, laugh. Some 
people can’t cry – others just want to serve others who are there to defend their 
home. People out themselves for who they are and what they need in these 
situations. There are also affirmative changes in the eventual reflection in the 
aftermath of the eviction process. 
 
The PAH’s process demonstrates the “emotional intelligence of the collective.” Gil thinks 
that one’s experience in the PAH is “not like individually holding a stone.” It is a process 
of being commonly held and holding stones of debt together. Here Gil cites liberation 
theologian and psychologist Ignacio Martin Baro. Baro’s work found operative truths in 
the blurry lines between the individual and the social construction of reality in the context 
of El Salvador before he was famously murdered along with other activist priests. 
(Pavón-Cuéllar & Equihua 2013 643) Baro, according to Gil, understood that social 
process, not therapy, solves individual problems.  Accordingly, Gil and others do not see 
the PAH as an organization explicitly concerned with psychology or therapy. She sees it 
as an organization that is aimed at stopping bad laws and defending the human right to 
housing. The PAH is more “psychosocial than psychological. It’s not really a personal 
process.”  
 
Like others, Gil sees the PAH as neither identitarian nor ideological. Rather, she sees it as 
a group simply based on the human need for housing. In context, the political ways it 
articulates for the stone of debt to be carried is differ from previous Spanish political 
articulations in a historically particular way. Since the end of the Franco dictatorship, 
Spain’s politics have been divided between Conservatives (the Partido Popular) and 
Socialists (Partido Socialista Obrero Español). After the Generalissimo’s death in 1975, 
the transition to democracy is understood by many to have occurred as a negotiated 
detente between these two organized political factions at the expense of other social 
compositions.245 Rather than a thorough transformation of all of Spanish society, many 																																																								
245 This narrative is a common one among people I interviewed, and also appears in Spanish 
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see the so-called post-Franco Democratic Transition as the normalization of a divide 
between governing and governed. The transition was staged as the legal recognition that 
though politics might include many, they must work through either the Socialists or 
Conservative. According to Gil, less radical social movement utilize the ideological and 
identitarian tools of these parties; one innovation that allows the PAH to be understood 
within Spain as non-ideological (neither left nor right) is that it resists utilizing either 
party’s rhetorical and ideological devices. Rather than echoing tropes that align with 
extant formal governance, the PAH’s so-called informality is expressed through the fact 
that it demonstrates care for the general human that is left unattended by either party over 
the course of the crisis.  
 
According to Gil, by this general nature the PAH avoided becoming a node of routine 
political identity formation. “You can continue with your own identity, but carry the PAH 
beside you as a way to deal with the pain of debt.” 
 
2d The body of people  
The people affected by the Spanish Mortgage Crisis are simply people. This tautology 
functions because it appears as an operative truth of the PAH. They are people with needs 
common to people, who have been affected by a particular crisis. In what following 
sections (2d and 2e) we discuss the humanness of the PAH as ‘dignity,’ and how the 
notion is articulated through its groups of individuals. First, we briefly explain the 
subjective nature of the dignified person, to clarify conceptual ways of relating to them. 
Then we demonstrate this dignified body by explaining what dignity means to the PAH, 
and by explaining formal characteristics of the Barcelona PAH and how it organizes itself 
with dignity in mind.  
 
In this first instance, we refer to those affected by the crisis as people, in the word’s most 
common usage. They are not Virno’s (2004, 2008) ‘people’ who stand against the 
multitude through the Hobbesian intervention of sovereignty granted, rather, they’re 
people with needs, both social and biological. By recognizing that human social needs are 																																																																																																																																																																					
history books; see for example (Carr 1980).	
	 180	
as important and mobile as their biological needs, we recognize that despite their 
dispossession, these people are not Agamben’s (1998) homo sacer, for we do not 
encounter them through an abstract and managerial lens of the state that would simply 
exclude them. In the first instance, they are just individuals, who came together before we 
were able to classify them. And by recognizing the fact of the inseparability of the 
biological and social, they are also not the genealogical or autological individuals that 
Elizabeth Povinelli (2006) describes- they are neither selves whose identity has been 
endowed by familial and cultural inheritances (as genealogical) or via the more 
contemporary autological processes of social self-definition. Rather, they are just people. 
 
In the first instance, we encounter these particular people, affected by the always-varying 
world (whose variability could be called ‘a crisis’ or just a change in weather) as fellow 
humans: by this shared particularity alone we have something in common. “To live 
together in the world means essentially that a world of things is between those who have 
it in common” (Arendt 1998, 52.)  We encounter people, like those in the PAH, as those 
with whom we have the world in common. The Platform for People Affected by the 
Mortgage Crisis creates a table like the one Arendt describes. Agamben and Povinelli 
define their people by instruments, Agamben here through the lens of governance; and 
Povinelli through the modes of cultural transference. Rather, common people here 
multitudinously relate to each other as human do; and by actually relating to one another 
in a focused way, things happen.  
 
2e Dignity and the disobedience 
On January 30th, 2015, I attended a workshop announced on the Barcelona PAH website 
in the Catalan language as Desobediència Civil i Lei Mordassa [Civil Disobedience and 
the Gag Law]. The workshop was a civil disobedience training for a planned 11th of 
February occupation of a CaixaBank office (one of Spain’s largest banks). In particular, 
the occupation was also in dialog with the Lei Mordassa, the new bill making its way 
through the Spanish government meant to severely limit political speech246. The civil 																																																								
246 See for example, the Guardian, December 20th, 2014.  Spain’s New Security Law Sparks 
Protests Across Country.	
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disobedience itself was planned for Caixa offices on Ramblas de Cataluña. The 
CaixaBank had been bailed out by the Spanish Government in 2008 in order to stem the 
banking crisis; despite the influx of public cash, the PAH understands that Caixa and 
other banks do not recognize any social responsibility arising from the public bailout. 
Instead of sharing the forgiveness that the government gave them, they remain punitive 
towards individual debtors. Caixa in particular is notoriously difficult to negotiate with.  
 
The action and planned bank occupation was to be a part of an international day of action 
against Caixa Cataluña and Blackstone Group (a private equity and investment bank). 
The occupation would have two goals, to further pressure Caixa to settle or forgive 
mortgage debts and to focus attention on how they had sold off the mortgages of large 
rental properties to the US owned Blackstone. As bad mortgages have worked their way 
through the system since the beginning of the crisis, the PAH has begun working with an 
increasing number of rental properties in addition to troubled owner-occupied situations. 
Renters whose apartments had been sold by Caixa to Blackstone were promised that their 
rents would not rise. Nevertheless, Blackstone was increasing rents and making renewed 
threats of eviction to those in arrears. (Europa Press 2015, PAH 2015b)  
 
For the civil disobedience workshop, the PAH’s office floors were cleared of chairs. 
There was a participatory exercise happening when I arrived. Two groups of people 
facing each other, speaking loudly and gesticulating. A facilitator was standing on a chair 
in front of both groups. I should also note before I continue, that every PAH meeting has 
at least one facilitator. Facilitators volunteer from what amounts to a self-generating pool 
of PAH activists who’ve spent enough time in the group to understand and master the 
position’s expectations, processes and rhetorics. So, for example, the volunteering to 
facilitate Monday and Tuesday meetings occurs publicly at the previous week’s Tuesday 
Assembly. Following the model of autonomous affinity groups, decisions for groups 
other than these two meetings are made through the autonomous group’s own processes.  
 
So, at this meeting, the disobedience training facilitator was trying to institute an order to 
the conversation by suggesting that both groups listen to the speaker that she’d passed a 
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soda bottle to. Each chosen speaker playfully spoke into the bottle as if it were a 
microphone. Often, people would listen, though often enough it was also playfully loud 
and chatty. Based on previous civil disobedience trainings I’d attended, I’d expected to 
see half the group limp on the floor with arms linked while the other half played police. 
Instead what I encountered was a vivid collective articulation of the group’s current self-
image. It was also a conversation about dignity.  
 
That the PAH was essentially dignified was unquestionable. Embodying dignity is a 
central achievement of the PAH, “It dismantles the stigma associated with the threat of 
eviction for thousands of people who felt completely isolated and has turned what 
consumer society considered a personal failure (something to be ashamed of) into dignity 
and solidarity.” (Colau & Alemany 2014, 126) Within meetings, individuals refer to 
politicians, police and bankers as thieves, liars, cheats, assholes, sons of bitches. The 
PAH understands the banks' actions as theft, facilitated by governmental and professional 
corruption that allows them to pressure and cheat people into making bad decisions. The 
PAH literally uses the word cheating (“estafa”) as a synonym for the word “bank loan.” 
Spanish law is often described as being wrapped up with the banks, profit and capital. In 
discussion, it is often only a breath away that there is no profit with the banks, only theft. 
Regarding a mortgage case discussed at a Monday meeting, I heard a PAH member say, 
“No lawyer is going to solve this. Lawyers will laugh at you because the law doesn’t 
support you, that is what the PAH does. They would have people prostitute themselves in 
order to pay a rent or loan. They would have people choose hunger in order to pay back 
loans.”247  Conversely, The PAH’s advice to anyone facing eviction is that if one cannot 
pay, one should not pay. Food, medicine, these and other costs come before paying off the 
banks. Taking care of oneself and one’s family is dignified; prioritizing the banks and 
their strong arms by the law is to accept their practice of theft and corruption contingent 
to being made victim of them.    
 
The purpose and subject of debate at this disobedience training was to identify which 
tactics of civil disobedience might be considered violent and thus below the group’s 																																																								
247 June, PAH Assembly, January 27 2015.	
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dignity. “We are dignified. It is they that have no dignity. If it were up to them, they 
would kick us out of our houses and let us live in boxes on the side of Montjuïc” an older 
man explained. This was one response to the question of whether or not it’s violent to 
curse at the police. About fifty people were participating, smiling and joking and 
appreciating the responses each was giving to the facilitator’s set of question. “There’s a 
difference between calling a policeman a thief and a son of a bitch’” explains a middle-
aged woman. “The difference of course is that I don’t know if he’s a son of a bitch, that’s 
personal. But he’s acts like a thief when he robs me of my home.”  
 
A third person, a man dressed in beaten clothes says, “No, I agree, I wouldn’t call him a 
son of a bitch. But then again, if in a person-to-person argument, I might call him that in 
order to make a point.” 
 
“Is it violent to disturb a bank employee’s working area?” asks the facilitator. She is 
listing a variety of scenarios the members of the bank occupation might find themselves 
in during the action. In response to each question, groups form to her left or right, with 
the space in-between each group as a manifest spectrum of opinion.  
 
“We are more dignified than they. They are less dignified than us. They have dignity as 
individuals but not as bank employees. My point of view is that to stop someone from 
working is not violence. It doesn’t hurt anyone but the bank. Making a mess of the office 
isn’t hurting anyone,” says one woman.  
 
A male activist whose day job is as a computer engineer states, “Paper is a tool of 
eviction. Its super activist to use it, to empty employees’ desks of it and throw it all 
around.” Another woman who often does organizational work for the PAH says, “It stops 
things and makes it difficult to work.” A second woman disagrees, “Our actions are 
public. We have to behave.” An older man who joined the PAH to work towards the 
cancellation of his daughter’s debt says, “It might be violent, but saying it is violent is 
different from saying I’m not going to do it.”  
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Working through this training, those present expound upon the socially complex task of 
the bank occupation – the scenario they will individually find themselves in. The 
conversation negotiates manifest individual ethics, collective desires and tactics that 
individuals and the group have the capacity to contextually employ.  The goal is to 
produce a set of behavioral agreements through the training’s dialogical approach. 
Agreements– the training aims to come up with action guidelines. Action guidelines are 
time-based and flexible. The facilitator explains, “We are engaging in debates. It’s 
important to make a protocol of actions, but it’s important to go in to the action with the 
knowledge of what we’ve agreed upon means. When we employ specific acts in protest, 
it’s a form of negotiating. When we’re making actions, we also have press, police, and the 
public present. We don’t want to insult or injure people. Remember, they are employees. I 
don’t think I want to throw papers in their faces, but it’s an established way we do things, 
throwing papers and making a mess of the files. This is the line of negotiation we are 
discussing now.” 
 
An older male who I’d never seen before but had clearly had been involved with the PAH 
for some time said “We did many things including emptying garbage cans and scattering 
the trash around the floors of banks three years ago. We did everything– excuse my 
language, if we’d found shit, we’d have thrown it in the offices too. Sometimes you need 
to scream.” 
 
To this, the facilitator responds, “If you have a little power, you’re going to be 
criminalized. Gandhi said that violence is always unacceptable, but its use might be 
strategic. Our escraches weren’t violent, but they didn’t work. People didn’t speak well 
of us, so we don’t use them now.”  
 
A middle-aged woman, Susan, speaks up. “No, it wasn’t like that; it was a way to turn up 
the heat. The PAH can do escraches again. We can do escraches with Rajoy (Spain’s 
Prime Minister) for our legislative initiatives. We can do loud escraches or silent ones.”  
 
The facilitator responds, “Now we are bigger, we don’t need to think of such radical 
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actions. We need to decide in common what actions we are going to take. If we say no 
together, it means no.” Though she is the facilitator, she did not take authority and insist 
that her narrative dominate and become the agreement. Rather, she clarifies that those 
present for the training would act together based on the current composition of the 
Barcelona PAH, not its past identity. 
 
2f The PAH’s Logo as recognizable form 
Few things are as concretely identifiable to the PAH as its logo. With the logo, the PAH is 
nationally recognized. Marta Abad designed its, choosing fonts and color scheme. 
Though she initially designed it for PAH Barcelona, it is used throughout the 200 odd 
PAH chapters in Spain, and internationally. Abad made a stylebook for this purpose. As 
each PAH chapter is autonomously organized, each chapter needn’t adopt the logo. 
Nevertheless, most choose to use it with some adjustment – mostly just swapping out the 
name “Barcelona” for their city. Across difference, the logo remains a standing 
representative of the group. Because the PAH has staged a transversal space since its 
2009 founding, many sensibilities have flown through it, providing it relational grist for 
organizational transition and transformation. One notable transition has been that the 
PAH’s most charismatic spokesperson, Ada Colau has stepped down from her post to 
help co-found a political party.248 Therefore, few things remain as recognizable to the 
PAH than the formal design choices made by this designer.  
 
Abad is a professional whose other clients include a Barcelona-based contemporary 
dance festival, a family theatre and an art residency program. Her work for these arts 
organizations have the graphic sophistication that one would expect of such clientele; 
design collaborations with these groups have resulted in works with subtle color 
relations, intricate patterning, asymmetrical balance and intelligent font choice.  
 
I met Abad at an evening design salon attended by academics and professional designers. 
We began chatting in the company of someone she later described as one of Spain’s 																																																								
248 Colau co-founded Barcelona en Comú and is now serving as the city’s mayor. 	
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leading font historians. The expert described Abad’s use of Helvetica for the PAH logo as 
“ironic” in that such a radical group as the PAH is obviously not the normative 
institutional player that the font might suggest. Afterwards and outside his company, 
Abad respectfully disagreed, saying that she did not think its use was at all ironic. She 
sees the PAH as fulfilling the solid yet optimistic openness that this International Style 
font ultimately suggests to many.249 
 
Nevertheless, what I appreciate about the logo is its blandness in light of the PAH’s 
performance of political radicalism. The calm image has been reproduced innumerable 
times, laid out and photocopied on flyers to be sloppily wheat-pasted on bank walls. It 
has littered bank floor throughout the country after PAH activists have dumped both 
flyers and banker’s trash bins.  
 
Abad acknowledges the logo’s blandness, saying, “I don’t believe in anti-, I’m not anti-. I 
feel ok. I have a lot of work to do, so I don’t need to be bothered with so many things. I 
don’t need to say, ‘I’m a lesbian.’ I don’t need the drama. I don’t need to dress in a way 
that screams my identity. I’m here and I’m happy with myself, that’s it.”  
 
In discussing her primary color choices for the logo, she says, “I chose fluorescent green 
for the logo to be visible. I wanted green for hope. I didn’t want red, for violence, for 
‘stop’.  I didn’t want any violence in it, I wanted the color to be cheerful, to be visible, to 
have hope.” 
 
Abad was asked to design for the PAH by one of the group’s four founders, Lucia 
Delgado. Delgado and Abad grew up together near the seashore and again lived near each 
other in Barcelona at the time of the group’s founding. Abad got involved in the PAH to 
support her friend’s work and in appreciation of the group’s goals:  																																																								
249 “Helvetica is a time-tested, reliable choice for designers, it was released in the 1950s and 
today is used so much that people don’t even know what to call it. It has, in essence, become 
nameless.” (Haley et. al. 2012: 176) 
 
 “Standard and Helvetica played their part in some of the most durable corporate design, 
such as Paul Rand’s for IBM.” (Hollis 2006 253)	
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PAH logo designed by Marta Abad. 
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When I did the design, I considered how to help over a long period of time, 
without feeling exhausted. I wanted to design something that said, ‘you don’t 
need to put all your life here, you don’t need to feel obliged. I learned that they 
are a group of people who help a lot. I know they began in a small place, but that 
they were very skilled and experienced organizers. They run things very well, 
very smoothly with a good process. I learned how to run my own meetings 
because of them, now I say, ‘go to a PAH meeting to learn how to make 
meetings.’ PAH meetings are a time to share nice things, to gain balance and to 
chat. In the school of the PAH, I learned a lot of things. I learn that there are 
important things, relationships. Relationships with my mom and dad, with my 
friends. If I’m out of balance, it’s clear that these relationships aren’t healthy.  
 
When asked what sort of institution she thought the PAH ultimately was, she described it 
as a school. “They say that education makes you free. I appreciate the emotional learning 
of the PAH, the way they help each other. They try to help each other outside of money. 
It’s an education in creating and supporting healthy relationships. “ 
 
2g An Office and a guidebook  
In addition to doing the logo and stylebook, Abad designed the PAH's guidebook. Its 
2015 version is a small thing, date-book-sized and fifty pages when counting the book’s 
green front and back covers. Inside is a description of the group: 
The Platform for People Affected by Mortgages (PAH) was born in Barcelona in 
February 2009 with the intention of providing a citizen response for the situation 
of those affected… Almost 5 years later, we can say that today the PAH is a 
nonpartisan citizen’s movement, articulated in more than 190 nodes throughout 
the country, where persons who are directly affected by the crisis and those in 
solidarity with them can organize together to renounce and change this situation. 
The PAH acts in many terrains (emotional, political, mediatic, judicial, 
communicative, etcetera…) in order to make legal changes which provide 
responses to the infringement of the fundamental rights that those affected suffer 
from, and more broadly they provide solutions to actualize the right to housing for 
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the entire population. (PAH 2015 5) 
  
The book outlines the three phases of the eviction process and what the PAH suggests 
doing in each phase (detailed in section 3g). It is a useful book– informative, simple and 
beautiful. It expresses in a different form much of the knowledge one would hear at 
weekly meetings. It’s free, though during some meetings, members suggest making a 
donation in exchange. The title of the handbook is The PAH’s Green Book.  I asked Marta 
about the title. “We knew we needed a title, and I kept open the opportunity for a title to 
arrive. None came so we stayed with what I’d put in to fill the space, the Green Book. I 
liked it. Let’s keep it simple I thought. Let’s say what it is.”  
 
The Barcelona PAH’s storefront office is down the street from Plaza de España. It’s just a 
10-minute walk from the metro stop, you can take the green line, the blue line or the red 
line (lines 1, 3 or 8) to get there. One leaves the train, exits the station by way of the steps 
or the escalator and enters into the visually arresting Plaza. The Plaza de España was 
developed for the 1929 Barcelona International Exposition. Because the plaza is a place 
where so many roads intersect, one might not stay long but rather head straight away 
along one of the busy sidewalks towards the PAH office. Route depending, one passes a 
grand hotel, government offices or a trade-fair ground built within a converted bullring. 
The street-side economy flattens out into an area of cheaper restaurants, office supply 
stores, bars and small produce markets. The PAH office itself is off of the main road, on a 
parallel street whose varieties of architecture seems to attest to a boom to bust cycle of 
growth.  
 
The PAH office is on the west side of the street, and if the roll-up gate is down, one 
would see Abad’s PAH logo painted on its metal surface. When open, which is most 
evenings, the front wall is revealed to be all of glass. One might think it’d have a double 
swing door because from the outside the interior looks like a converted garage, though 
it’s not. It’s a single door on a hinge. The floor within is concrete. The place is not too 
bare, the ceiling has skylights so therefore the space has a warm effect. The walls are 
mostly bare brick or cinderblock but for marker and corkboards and the three posters with 
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procedural notices. These posters’ contents are also within the Green Book– they are 
posters of particular elements of the book’s content. Along the walls are stacks of chairs, 
lots of chairs. These chairs get moved around a lot because people are constantly coming 
in and out of the space for the meetings within. They use the chairs to sit upon. They are 
in stacks because the chairs need a place to rest after constantly being arranged and 
rearranged. There is a diversity of chair styles, of plastic, metal and wood.  
 
2h To change a law, that is all 
The PAH received national attention when they brought their Iniciativa Legislativa 
Popular por la Vivienda Digna (ILP) before the Spanish Parliament. The ILP stands for 
the Popular Legislative Initiative for Dignified Housing. Besides its dignity, we 
characterize the ILP as central to the PAH’s bodily composition because it formalizes the 
group’s action-oriented goals. With their efforts to pressure the Federal Government to 
pass it, three notable events came to pass. First, in effort to pressure legislators, the group 
began utilizing the escrache protest form, discussed later on in section 3l. Confrontation; 
suffice to say now that they are a specific style of protest that earned them much press 
attention. Second, in organizing for the ILP, Ada Colau addressed the parliament and with 
her eloquent speaking, became a national figure. Third, the failure of the Parliament to 
pass this immensely popular ILP contextually reconfirmed to many that the Spanish 
political system is broken, that it does not represent the interests of the people. (Cruz 
2012) 
 
The ILP legislative initiative stalled in April 2013. (Castro, Irene & Noelia Román 2013) 
But due to the insurgent Catalan independence movement, the Barcelona PAH decided to 
present a similar initiative to the Cataluña Parliament named the ILP Habitatge. (El 
Diario, July 10, 2014). The logic for their decision was two-fold; it would maintain 
pressure on politicians to take a stance on the ILP, and in the case of Cataluña’s actual 
independence the initiative would have force of law. Gathering signatures for the ILP 
requires individuals to commit time to the project. During PAH meetings, the signature-
gathering activists tally each week’s signatures. During a Monday Welcoming Assembly 
when people are incorporating the group, the female facilitator says, “All the PAH does 
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ultimately is to fight against this law, because it is unjust.” 
 
She is referring to the Spanish laws that govern bankruptcy. These laws define 
bankruptcy in a manner unique from the rest of Europe and the West. In Spain, banks can 
repossess and resell a foreclosed property while nevertheless continuing to demand that 
the mortgage holder’s (and/or co-signer) full debt be repaid. The facilitator continues, 
“The banks have empty houses all over Spain. In Cataluña there are 70 PAHs, they’re in 
almost every city. In each group, you’re welcome in our group, to get empowered, 
inspired. The banks are not interested in your health, with your spirit. They just want your 
money.”  
 
The ILP Habitatge, similar to the national ILP, places five demands upon the Catalan 
Parliament. The first demand is to provide what they call “a second opportunity.” This is 
actually a demand that the government change its bankruptcy policy into a non-punitive 
one, so that a debtor is not burdened with a lifetime of debt regardless of who ends up 
with the property. The second demand is that renters be given public aid if they are at risk 
of eviction. The third is to stop all evictions throughout Cataluña, and that banks should 
make all efforts to settle debt disagreements. The fourth demand is to ensure a Cataluña-
wide right to housing by turning large real estate developments and holdings into public 
housing. And finally, the fifth demand is to guaranteed basic income, including a 
guarantee for basic utility services.  
 
The following day (January 13, 2015), like every Tuesday, is the PAH’s General 
Assembly. It is in this meeting where questions that affect the entirety of the Barcelona 
PAH are discussed and agreements are reached. During this first Tuesday meeting of the 
New Year, with a Christmas tree still in the office, a thirty-something man discusses the 
ILP. Because of political circumstances that I will discuss in 3m. The Party as Citizen’s 
Platform section, he describes how political parties are once again paying attention to the 
ILP. “The parties say they support the PAH, but it doesn’t mean anything. If we push 
forward with the local ILP Habitatge, it will be easy to mark them and hold them 
accountable at the municipal level. We can hold them accountable…. It’s become difficult 
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for the PAH. We don’t want the parties to assume the PAH. They’re not talking about the 
PAH now. If we stay quiet, they don’t want to fight the banks for us. It’s a historic 
moment. If they fight the banks with us, it’s a compromise of the parties. It is not the 
PAH who compromise, but the other way around.” Many in the group, about 70 people 
sitting in an elongated circle on chairs arranged two to four rows deep, hold their hands 
up and wiggle their fingers to demonstrate agreement.  
 
Over the course of this meeting, a red-haired woman who’s announced that her housing 
situation is now settled (“I got my house! Thank you so much. I won’t become homeless, 
I won’t be thrown out by the bank!”), rallies those present to volunteer to gather more 
signatures in support of the ILP Habitatge. Mark adds. “If the law changes, everything 
changes.” This echoes something Juan had said yesterday, “If the laws change, the PAH 
ceases to exist.” 
 
In response to Mark’s comments, Raul (a man who appears to be in his late 40’s) speaks 
up. He regularly volunteers to gather signatures. He’s upset that it’s always the same 
group that travels to the La Maquinista shopping center on Saturdays to gather signatures. 
His outburst is sudden and notable because despite the emotionality of the meeting 
(they’re dealing with possible evictions, crimes of the state and banking sector) the tenor 
has been calm. People had recently volunteered to join him but didn’t follow through. He 
wants people to fulfill their commitments; after all, they’ve signed their name on a list 
that is posted on the wall. 
 
Mark responds, “Its difficult. I give you encouragement and peace! We can’t scare people 
into doing this. We have thousands of meetings, evictions. Our lives are precarious in 
both our work and doubly as activists. It is very difficult. But we keep on walking.” 
 
3 Expansion, confrontation 
The section (3) describes how the constituted body of the PAH negotiates the fluid 
common relations and formal oppositions it engages and encounters in preserving its 
dignified self-identity and moving towards its goals. In that the PAH’s primary mode of 
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activity is informal politics, they maintain through powerfully performed social 
antagonism a distinction between the people and the politicians. This section honors this 
distinction by looking at how the PAH organizes relations within the common social 
terrain of Barcelona, and how the PAH demands its self-dignity in the face of the banks 
and state who would deny them of it.  
 
3a The beginning of the PAH 
Lucia Delgado is one of the PAH’s four co-founders. Previously, she’d had little more 
than a passing experience with organizing.  Her most memorable encounter with activism 
previous to the PAH was at an immigrant rights conversation in the Raval neighborhood– 
there she and other attendees nodded off to the boredom of the meeting’s theoretical 
abstraction– everyone knew the meeting wouldn’t result in action. Other activist groups 
dwell too much in things not so concrete, Delgado distinguishes the PAH from other in 
how it centralize a praxis towards one eventual goal– ending laws that punish debtors and 
renters.  
 
During our conversation of January 27, 2015 Delgado explained how the PAH’s 
organizational body initially struggled to find a consistent meeting space. Eventually they 
found a steady place in the Barrio Gothic, the old Roman part of the Barcelona. Delgado 
sees a consistent meeting space as key to the group’s initial success. Consistency of 
location allowed for meetings to run in trial-and-error fashion. At the beginning, they’d 
paper the city with posters aimed at attracting people affected by the emerging housing 
crisis. From the beginning to today the PAH draws a diverse slice of Barcelona’s 
demographics.250 The PAH’s first eviction defenses were for houses owned by working 
class Ecuadorian251 immigrants. “It made sense that these were the first people who came 																																																								
250 For a demographic breakdown of Barcelona PAH participants, see Macias (2016), which 
demonstrates that only a little more than half of PAH participants are of Spanish ancestry, the 
second most dominant group being Ecuadorians, than Peruvians. Combined as one group, people 
from countries in South Asia make up the fourth largest group after Columbians. 	
251 See Saurez 2014 for interviews with and discussions of early PAH immigrant members’ 
experiences. 	
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to the PAH, because they really needed us.” While European citizens had family to fall 
back upon, these people had no one but the organization, Delgado explained. As such, 
that this emergent social movement’s composition would fall outside the traditional 
left/right narrative of Spanish politics is at least partially based upon the common though 
unique circumstances of the recent immigrants– their political allegiances had not been 
solidified elsewhere.  
 
When Delgado first understood that Spain’s eviction law allowed for eviction after one 
month’s arrears, and for the bank to demand the full return of the original loan even after 
taking the home, she couldn’t believe it. She was shocked to discover just how ill-
informed she was about Spanish politics. “I didn’t even know how to spell desahucio 
[eviction]– I didn’t know where the letter ‘h’ was. I had no idea what a daccion en 
pago252 was.” She remembers the depth of shame and guilt that early PAH members felt, 
and how impossible it seemed to relieve meetings’ environment of the weight of those 
feelings. Yet unwinding this systemic shame and guilt became an early and ultimate goal 
of the group.253 “Our first meetings were four-hour-long sessions of non-stop crying.” 
But through the intense emotional process, they learned to “trust the assembly,” to let the 
momentarily constituted group decide upon actions either concrete (shall we do an 
eviction blockade?) or abstract (how can we best support the person suffering in front of 
me today, and next week?). 
 
3b Bringing the outside in  
After the welcome, the routine first minutes of this Tuesday, mid-January meeting are 
reserved for report-backs and announcements from visitors. For example, I found the 
length of time given for a discussion with the visitor from Leonard Peltier International 																																																								
252 A daccion en pago is a legal term that refers to the cancellation of an unpaid debt after the 
bank takes possession of the property. 	
253 “It is the problem that we victims of the crisis face, when we hit rock bottom and realize that 
it is not possible to take care of the debts; to overcome the shame, the stigma and fear associated 
with the process, and to dare to talk about the situation we are facing, even in the immediate 
environment. One of the most important achievements of the PAH was to visualize an individual 
problem, contained within an intimate and private space, and make it a social issue…” (Colau & 
Alemany 2014 20)	
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Solidarity Network surprisingly long.  
 
Then the PAH organizer named Carlos gave a report back. During my January 2015 stay, 
he was one of the more visible activist-oriented PAH members; meeting facilitators 
sought him out for advice, other PAH members would direct me to him when they 
couldn’t respond to my questions. During my visit, Carlos had left and returned from a 
housing activist meet-up in Rome. He described how the rendezvous was aimed at 
conceptualizing a grassroots, pan-European anti-eviction network. He described the 
neighborhood-level organization in Rome that hosted the event. “They have 30 occupied 
homes, there’s a house specifically for survivors of domestic and economic violence, if 
you don’t have money or support, you can go there… They generate their own economy.”  
 
An hour before each Monday welcome meeting is the weekly 5PM student meeting. This 
is scheduled specifically to orient researchers and journalists within the PAH project. The 
meeting provides an intimate forum for researchers to directly question whichever PAH 
member has taken on the responsibility of attending. I sat in the circle with MA and PhD 
researchers from Spain, a French MA journalism student and a Brazilian reporter on 
assignment in Spain.  
 
The PAH member hosting the first student meeting I attended was curious about the 
overall thrust of my research and informed me when I said I’d hope to get to know the 
PAH over the course of several weeks, that I should feel free to attend any meeting I’d 
like. He mentioned others who’d embedded themselves for fixed periods: a New Yorker, 
a Japanese filmmaker who’d been with them for a year. He pointed me towards Carlos in 
case I needed help with access. 
 
He could have also mentioned the several other non-Spanish researchers embedded with 
the PAH that I’d come to know. Over the course of their studies, they’d become 
integrated into the organization and also worked as activist/researchers. Perhaps these 
researchers had first entered the PAH through this student meeting. The point is that these 
meetings are not meant to isolate students and others from the PAH but rather to provide 
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them with an attentive setting to facilitate a clear entrée into the organization. Ultimately, 
academic researchers become one small constituent group involved with the PAH.  
 
As the Green Book says, the PAH is not only for people who are facing eviction from 
rental or owned property. People find their way into the group through activist interests 
and a “do-gooder” spirit. There was, for example Julia, a Spanish law school graduate 
who was between jobs and wanted to do something meaningful with her time. Based on 
her legal skills, she was asked to present the PAH to a visiting group that was interested 
in the legal issues. She also volunteered to help out on a video shoot.  
 
This video shoot, which we will soon go in to greater detail, serves as an example of how 
researchers and activists seem to find responsibility within the PAH. Attending my first 
assembly, I was asked along with other new researchers, to present myself. I did. Vanessa, 
the French journalism student also introduced herself, and asked if anyone would mind if 
she filmed the meeting. She was told that filming would be no problem. Later, when 
somebody asked if the media collective could film a short about a family facing eviction, 
attendees realized that the usual media collective was not present and would be difficult 
to contact. People turned to Vanessa to see if she would volunteer. She agreed to do so 
and began organizing with the person who’d made the request.  
 
3c The casual accumulation of media 
Let us not forget the paperwork that is produced by the PAH, the posters wheat-pasted not 
only on the windows of banks but also on telephone junction boxes, walls and shop 
windows. Walking down certain streets, the wheat-pasted posters can serve as an archive 
or history lesson on recent Spanish mass-movements. Of course, there are similar routes 
through the web, social media and other online platforms; through which people of all 
classes and smartphone plans have access to a wide breadth and depth of information 
about the PAH and other activist organizations. By the many casual effects of their 
activities, the PAH generates media and meditated things that serve to outwardly 
communicate its concepts. This seeds the grounds for a common appreciation of the 
group.  
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In his book Organization of the Organizationless, philosopher and media theorist Rodrigo 
Nunes (2014) discusses the capacity for activist networks to produce so much material at 
their centers and also coincidentally at their margins– where memes and Facebook 
clicktivism contributes to a movement’s wider sensibility. He specifically names the PAH 
as being within a category of groups that because of their core wager (in the PAH’s case 
its goal to change an unjust relationship between law and life) are able to mobilize 
support for their overall goals if not for each particular initiative.254 Nunes suggests that 
projects like the PAH “care for the whole” of their mediatic ecosystem – which includes 
their organized core and the more horizontal margin of fans, ‘likes’ and comments which 
they need in order to maintain a meaningful socio-political profile beyond the activist 
milieu. (43) 
 
In their paper on the PAH’s self-imaging communication strategies, embedded researcher 
Eduard Sala and co-writer Artiz Tutor (2016) build upon the analysis of the PAH’s 
internal Communication Commission. By their analysis, a key strategy for the PAH’s 
general communicativity across the common terrain is identified with how its members 
pose for online pictures. They note that while normative images of ‘disobedient’ activity 
presents images of police violence and victims in misery, PAH imagery aims to 
communicate something else. (99–100) For example, for social media representations of 
bank occupations, the PAH posts images of members joyfully occupying the banks that 
have so greatly brutalized them: 
Against the drama of evictions, the PAH organizes rage and converts it into a call 
for rebellion against the financial policy that uses debt as a way to control the 
affected – the debt tightens around you and hides any vision of the future, it holds 																																																								
254 “It is through an awareness of a diverse ecology of agents and interactions and the political 
potentials offered by the conjuncture that interventions can be devised. These require neither 
exclusivity nor adherence to a programme or group identity, but can nonetheless mobilize, 
structure and coordinate the collective behavior of parts of the network-system according to a 
certain strategic wager with relatively well-defined ends in sight. This is what those initiatives 
have done that managed to break the deadlocks in which some of the network-systems in question 
found themselves after the period of occupations, such as the Plataforma de Afectados por la 
Hipoteca and 15MpaRato in Spain, or the Rolling Jubilee in the United States…” (Nunes 2014 
43)	
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back and sequesters the energies and prevents families from moving forward. To 
see oneself as affected allows one to move the struggle to the concrete ground of 
the body – of the bodies, of the multitude – without being lost in the world of 
ideas. The centrality of the body concretizes the struggle, visibilises the 
perpetrator, points out those responsible and offers material and immediate 
solutions – direct action, without judicial waiting, against the banks that evict 
them. The performative practice of embodying the alternative, establishes the 
positioning from which to protest, which adds legitimacy – because it is an open 
and honest posture, arising from suffering… (94) 
 
For Sala and Tutor, these embodied images are the antithesis of the selfie’s 
individualizing narrative. (94) The PAH pays attention to the meanings of images 
portraying individual suffering at the hands of the bank, and to portrayals of individual 
and common overcoming of this suffering within the halls of power. It is Sala and Tutor’s 
thesis that the PAH’s basically critical imagery facilitates the simple communicative 
translatability of PAH core messages to be further mediatized through memes and other 
forms of clicktivism beyond the PAH’s immediate grasp.   
 
3d Making production 
The PAH occasionally produces online videos to publicize eviction cases that merit 
particular attention. I observed one such production, made to help an extended family 
fighting their potential eviction. At the suggestion of an activist lawyer, the PAH decided 
to film a short clip with the help of Vanessa, Susan and Julia. The media collective 
usually directs and shoots these clips, but in their absence Susan volunteered. Vanessa 
would work her video camera.  
 
Susan often facilitates meetings; she’s got a strong presence. Her manner and energy is 
like that of a talk show host: she’s well dressed, blond and is able to concisely summarize 
situations, proposals and concepts with clear and energetic articulation.  This manner 
serves well in meetings; she gets to the point. She brings these mannerisms to her 
directorial debut. 
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The intergenerational family that is to be the clip’s subject is already sitting in the PAH 
office when I arrive on the evening of January 15th. Their conflict with the bank is a 
family affair because the son had fallen into arrears and mutual aid through family 
support apparently runs strong in this working-class family. It also had become a de jure 
intergenerational affair when the grandparents undersigned the bank loan; the bank had 
begun bothering them, too, for repayment.  
 
As director, Susan’s role was to coach each family member before the camera so that they 
could tell their story in succinct sound bites. She would call each member one-at-a-time 
to sit in front of Vanessa’s camera. She called them in a sensible order, first the signer of 
the loan, then the wife, then the signer’s siblings. She then called out previous 
generations until more than 8 people had spoken. Susan would let each person have a go 
at stating his or her bit but then inevitably intervene. She would stand between the camera 
and the family member, sometimes crouching face-to-face, putting her hands on their 
knees or shoulders. She would coach them on their narratives.  
 
For example, the following is a descriptive exchange between Maria, the wife of the 
debtor, and Susan. Maria is explaining the scenario before Vanessa’s rolling camera,  
“The police came and threatened to evict my three young children and me.”  
 
Susan interjects, “It’s important to say that they came through the door. … Say something 
like, ‘On the 21st of July, they threw open our door’. ” 
 
Maria repeats it once and then again at Susan’s prompting for dictation and emotional 
clarity.  
 
Maria continues on with her story. Susan instructs Maria to name their banker and say, 
“Marino Baro cheated us.” Maria repeats it, then Susan massages Maria’s shoulders. “Say 
it again, Marino Baro cheated us!” putting emphasis on “cheated us”. 
Susan runs to the PAH’s entrance to check on something unrelated while asking Maria to 
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practice repeating the line again, “On the 21st of July, the police came.”  
 
Maria repeats this again, and Susan asks Vanessa if the camera is running. Vanessa 
confirms that it is.  
 
Susan tells Maria to say, “I feel cheated.”  
 
After several takes, Susan excuses her and Maria, exhausted, happily shouts “Sí se 
puede!” 
 
Susan takes the time to give make-up and clothing advice to each family member before 
they’re seated in front of the camera. Julia helps out. When the grandfather comes up to 
speak, he does so wearing a pair of sunglasses. Susan asks him to take them off. He does, 
but then explains that he’s blind in one eye and that without glasses he’d look strange. He 
puts the glasses back on. Susan checks with Vanessa to make sure the sunglasses look all 
right in the camera. Vanessa says its ok, and he keeps them on.  
 
The older man jokes on camera. He playfully curses out the landlord, “That son of a bitch 
Marino Baro is going to throw me out on the street.” Susan provides the man with words 
to describe the situation. He disagrees, “I’m from the villages… I wouldn’t say it that 
way.  
 
“Papí!” his daughter interjects, suggesting he follow Susan’s script.  
He does.  
 
It’s stressful; its hard interpersonal work, but the work is accomplished with a few laughs. 
I can’t assume that this is representative of the normal process of making Barcelona PAH 
videos – the practiced media collective wasn’t on hand. This was the first time Susan 
directs, and because the process was so exhausting, she said it would also be her last 
time. In reviewing other PAH videos online though, I recognize in her direction a form 
she was following. These videos also weave together short and direct first-person 
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statements to make an overall narrative.  
 
What is telling from this video shoot is the fact that a horizontal organization disciplines 
individual voice via collective technique. In relation to the overall goal of meeting 
housing needs, affected people ultimately trust that the cost of their participation is low 
enough and that ultimately the effort is worthwhile. The cost is having to temporarily 
submit one’s subjective individual voice to staging techniques; it’s a relatively cheap 
investment for an effort whose return could be a stabilized housing situation and the end 
of a punitive debt. 
 
3e Grassroots policies 
The PAH has two projects intended to confront vertical governmental structures, while 
also reverberating through the wider informal social and mediatic terrains. Through 
reverberations, the general social terrain become familiar with the ethical claims the PAH 
make against vertical governance; and by so acting, the PAH continues to articulate the 
extent of its own informal horizon. Discussions of both projects follow. 
 
The first project (discussed in 3g.) develops a people’s competency of absolutely 
meaningful social practice, and solidifies the activist ethic of the PAH. This competency 
of practice, the Obra Social [Social Work] insists on and provides for the social assurance 
that anyone who is with the PAH will not become homeless. The Obra Social is the 
group’s measure of last resort. Its horizon is self-imminent, claiming the right to housing 
by deed, building on the PAH’s organizational capacities to fulfill promises by legal and 
extra-legal measures. In other words, the Obra Social doesn’t ask anything from the state 
to fulfill this promise. As such, like other PAH functions, it only requires the 
organizational capacities of affected people and those in solidarity with them.  Activists 
call upon and utilize popular support in claiming the right to house each other in squatted 
situations. By seeking nothing from the state their actions brush up against its punitive 
legal structures. Radical in its efforts, its efforts preserve the ethical promise of the PAH.  
 
The second project (discussed in 3h. and beyond) expands out through the horizontal 
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social terrain to normalize and make common sense of the PAH’s primary policy 
directive– the transformation of Spanish bankruptcy laws via legislative initiatives, 
which, if passed would end the PAH’s raison d'etre. Unlike the Obra Social, which 
operates in what is at best a legal grey area (squatting), the ILP work began entirely 
within legal terrain. Yet because of its effectiveness, the Spanish government began 
crafting laws in order to hamper its activity.  
 
3f Grassroots policy, social work  
Obra Social means social work. The PAH’s use of the name is like a pun. It is by the 
Obra Social working group that the PAH fulfills its promise that no one with the PAH 
will go homeless; the PAH ensures, through squatting, that everyone with the PAH will 
be housed. In the description of their activity lays the pun. At the heart of the PAH’s 
current analysis of the banking crisis is the fact that while Spain’s banks were bailed out 
in 2012 with public funds, people continue to be dehoused. While banks received the 
benefits of the State’s services, it is only through the work of the PAH’s Obra Social that 
the social benefits received by the banks are socialized.  
 
Collectively, the PAH helps its affected members as they go through the basic phases of 
the eviction process. From the PAH’s 2015 Green Book; the PAH promises to provide 
people threatened with eviction: “1) training and tools to defend yourself, developed by 
many people including movement lawyers. 2) mutual support; you will never be alone.” 
(23)  
 
To fulfill its first promise, the PAH helps its members through what they’ve outlined as 
the three basic phases of the eviction process: 
 
The first phase begins when one is first unable or foresees an inability to pay for housing. 
Here negotiations with the banks, or landlord in the case of rental property, are still very 
open. If affected people come to the PAH during this phase, they are counseled to seek a 
debt relief plan from the bank, a return of the house and a cancellation of the debt, or 
some other sort of agreement that moves the affected resident into social housing: 
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meaning that the bank formally repossess the home and the owner becomes a renter of 
the property at an affordable rent, or the owner is moved to social housing. (32) 
 
The second phase begins with the arrival of a final 10-day eviction notice regarding 
unpaid debt. At this point, legal machinery begins and the struggle moves through legal 
and legally prescribed proceedings. During this period, the PAH suggests that its useful to 
find the service of a lawyer, because by doing so member can “gain time”, and 
demonstrate to the judge that they are doing everything to resolve the situation through 
legal routes. Other steps in this phase include continued negotiation with the bank. (34–
38) 
 
Throughout all three stages, the Green Book recommends that its members utilize the 
resources of the government. This buys time, affords some services and acts to insist 
upon the state’s legally prescribed ethical responsibility within the process. 
 
The third phase occurs when all previous legal routes have been exhausted, when 
previous postponements have come to an end, and eviction appears imminent. Here the 
PAH suggests direct appeals to the bank for the release of the debt, and to a judge on 
grounds with previous standings before the court; for example, sickness, low income and 
single parenthood. (39–44) 
 
“If the date (of eviction) arrives and there is no indication of a satisfactory solution, we 
can resist an eviction with a concentration in the street, as a way of postponing it. In one 
way or another, you should know that we have been able to stop most anything.” (45)  
The final interior page of the Green Book is a photograph of an occupied building with a 
large hanging banner that reads, “Social Work (of) The PAH.” Before this, the Green 
Book states, “If we can’t stop the eviction, we can begin to participate in the Obra Social 
of the PAH. Remember that in the PAH, nobody is left to the street (homeless).” And on a 
second banner in the photograph of the same occupied house, “We rescue people, not 
banks.” (47)  
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I observed the Summer 2013 housewarming party, organized by the Obra Social group, 
for the occupied four-story building pictured in the Green Book. I’d received a text from a 
friend that something (she didn’t know what) was happening related to the PAH. She 
directed me to a plaza in the centrally located immigrant and working-class neighborhood 
of Raval. From above in the buildings, the banners were unfurled to the buzz of toy horns 
as balloons were released in the plaza. Champagne glasses befitting a celebration were 
passed around. The diverse PAH membership was visually unified by its members 
wearing their green logo-emblazoned PAH t-shirts. It was a loud and celebratory event 
that made the news.  
 
This occupation was organized by the Obra Social working group. Four racially diverse, 
single mother-led families were rehoused through this PAH action. (El Lokal 2013) Until 
it was squatted, this tenement had been owned by the government-rescued Valencia Bank. 
That Valencia and its holding company, the CaixaBank continue to evict and make 
homeless people while being beneficiaries of the bailout and holders of many vacant 
properties provided the specific logic to occupy this property.  
 
The Obra Social working group meets every other Wednesday. I attended the January 21st 
meeting. Though not entirely, the core of this group appear to be younger activist types. 
In addition to organizing PAH squats (which happens occasionally, but not too often), 
they give advice to those threatened with imminent eviction on negotiation tactics, on 
how to squat and on squatter’s rights. Attendees sit in a small circle; the facilitators ask 
everyone present to speak up and explain why they are at the meeting. Several introduce 
themselves as activists interested in helping the Obra Social. Others speak up about their 
needs. 
 
Through tears, a young woman describes her situation. She has family problems and 
doesn’t live at home, though luckily her boyfriend helps out. Currently, she is illegally 
occupying a building that is not well maintained, the ceiling is collapsing. Nevertheless, 
she’s worried about being kicked out. A male PAH member asks if she’s employed, she 
sheepishly explains her tenuous work situation. The PAH member explains that he 
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doesn’t care whether or not she’s working, but that he’s asked only to better understand 
her situation. He tells her that she’s with the PAH now, and that a solution will be found. 
She stops crying as he says that she should trust the process, that the eviction process 
won’t move quickly and that she should trust the PAH’s process. He says that the PAH “is 
tough. We want to fight the banks.” She repeats, “I want to fight the banks.” At the end of 
the meeting, she asks if there’s anything she can do besides attending general PAH and 
Obra Social meetings? “Yes” she’s told after a little thought, “You can help with the ILP.” 
 
3g Common sense and abstract laws 
On the face of it, you wouldn’t think that pursuing a legislative initiative would be one of 
the more radicalizing elements of the PAH’s work. Yet while the activities of the Obra 
Social are actively radical in their ignoring of state-authorized property relations, the ILP 
has demonstrated its power to radicalize people by clarifying political positions and 
solidarities. By perusing the Popular Legislative Initiative (ILP) that several things 
happened; the PAH gained national attention and popularity, its participation numbers 
skyrocketed, PAH co-founder and spokesperson Ada Colau became a national figure, the 
PAH introduced a new protest form to Europe, it brought the Spain’s bankruptcy laws 
before the European Human Rights Commission and won, it further clarified the division 
between the governing classes and the people. Below, I discuss the space for the ILP in 
relationship the wider field of horizontal relations that the PAH exists within.  
 
With the ILP’s signature gathering and publicity, the PAH informally expands through its 
horizontal limits. Here “expands through” refers to how by meetings and chance 
encounters, people evaluate PAH concepts – such as its dignity, its tactics, its ethic, its 
understanding of the crisis – so that any possible knowledge becomes a common archive, 
a general intellect, of and for making the PAH legible. When the PAH informally (by 
postering) or formally (through any number of public activities) interfaces with the 
common public, they inform and function through common notions – extending into 
broader society that makes sense of their actions. The PAH are successful to the extent 
that their work seems broadly sensible – the PAH’s popularity is based on how they 
maintain an ethic that is commonly seen as meaningful in the eyes of a common that 
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recognizes their activities as proper responses from victims to a crisis they did not cause. 
This is not to suggest that this is the only way for a group to be successful, though it does 
seem to explain how the PAH can act in the law’s grey area and remain popular. Their 
activities are generally understandable. Popular support and informal allowance of their 
activity is the translation for general good will. Most of the rest of Section 3 looks at how 
the PAH continues to work through the informal until their limits are revealed against the 
underlying architectures of governance that remains in opposition to their activity.  
 
On January 17th, I observed a signature-gathering event in the neighborhood of 
Barceloneta, a traditionally working-class waterfront community that is now in transition. 
Signature gathering is not hard work, it just requires sitting and chatting with people 
about the Cataluña ILP. Barceloneta is situated next to the inner harbor that has been 
revamped for pleasure boats and private yachts. The neighborhood also borders a long 
sandy Mediterranean beach that is accessible by the city’s public metro system. 
Barceloneta has been feeling the strong squeeze of gentrification where flats are being 
turned into tourist accommodations and spare rooms are being monetized through 
“sharing economy” websites like Airbnb. In 2014, two naked tourists wandered through 
the neighborhood for three hours as long-term neighbor residents watched aghast. This 
moment galvanized a sense felt by residents that the scale had been tipped much too far 
in the direction of the tourist economy255. 
 																																																								
255 In 2014, two naked Italian tourists wandered through the neighborhood for three hours as 
long-term neighborhood residents watched aghast. This was the galvanizing moment where 
residents felt that the scale had been tipped too far in the direction of the tourist economy. 
"Imagine that you're in a tiny house, with three children, unemployed with no money for 
vacations and you have to put up with the screams and fiesta of tourists next door. It's 
unbearable." (Kassam 2014a) 
 
 According to the Guardian report about the protests that this event sparked, “One protest 
this week saw locals take to the streets armed with a home-made map, detailing the location of 
apartments on rent for tourists. The protesters then sought out the owners of these tourist lets, 
confronting them and urging them to close their businesses for the good of the neighborhood. 
While municipal officials say there are 72 licensed tourist rentals in La Barceloneta, a quick 
search of online rental portals like Airbnb show more than 600 tourists lets available in the area.” 
(Kassam 2014a) 	
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This signature-gathering event was planned to coincide with a public design charrette for 
the Siglo XX Social Centre.256 The charrette, held in the open-air public square in the 
center of the neighborhood, began with music and speeches. The 50 or so attending 
people then (mostly older Spanish men and women along with a mix of younger multi-
ethnic community members) were broken down into two groups. The groups looked at 
floor plans for the proposed revamping in order to suggest ideas and uses for the Siglo 
XX building. Many of these residents have been up in arms about the deep 
touristification of their living space, so it is interesting that though they are shirking under 
the weight of one notion of culture (tourist-oriented culture) many residents imagine the 
space could fulfill other cultural needs.  
 
An older man stands up. “My name is Martin, but I think you all know me. Our 
neighborhood is being overrun by tourists…we need to recuperate the traditional food 
from here, to communicate it. We need a space for theatre, poetry and a digital 
communication that is ours.” This is a context of important minor differences, where the 
leisure culture for sale through the neoliberal market place bumps up against traditional 
anti-fascist and anarchist cultures of the proud neighborhood. There may be an awareness 
that while neoliberalism has resolved immediate class tensions around labor relations by 
removing boss/employee relationships (through the rearranging of the port and fishing 
industries and making much of their manual labor redundant), the larger questions of 
social reproduction remain unresolved. This charrette is but one way to process these 
unresolved tensions. The freedom of the tourists to loudly overrun the place is built upon 
the real or psychological displacement of the neighborhood residents themselves – the 
neighborhood seems to the tourists to appear empty of any social form; it appears as a 
place to be at rather than to be in.  
 
Within this environment, the PAH sets up its table to gather signatures for their Popular 
Legislative Initiative which effectively puts an end to housing speculation. A person 
walks up to the PAH table which is situated on the edge but well within the charrette area. 																																																								
256 The Siglo XX was a historic anarchist and working class club in the neighborhood that had 
been nationalized and turned into a neighborhood center and then recently shuttered.	
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“What is this doing here?” they ask the middle-aged PAH members gathering signatures 
at the table. 
 
“It’s for a popular initiative to bring to the parliament so that they stop evictions and 
don’t kick people into the streets.” 
 
“Ok.”…and the PAH gathers another signature.  
 
In nine months, between June 2012 and February 2013, the PAH collected 1,402,845 
signatures in support of the ILP initiative to change the Spanish Bankruptcy law. Spain’s 
Parliament requires only 500,000 signatures. When brought before Parliament, the 
initiative polled nationwide at 85% support (20 Minutes, 2013), but the ruling party, the 
Partido Popular (PP), refused to consider it.  
 
The signatures were gathered from throughout Spain. Contingent to this moment, the 
PAH transitioned into becoming an organization with a national presence. New PAHs 
began sprouting up around the country. On February 5, 2013, PAH co-founder Ada Colau 
addressed the Parliament in support of the PAH’s initiative. (LA Vanguardia 2013) On 
April 18th, 2013 the Government passed an empty bankruptcy reform law that did not 
include any of the ILP’s recommendations. (Reuters 2013)  
 
Sensing that they would be face an uphill battle– Colau’s parliamentary address discussed 
whether the Parliament would consider the Initiative, and was not meant as a discussion 
of the Initiative’s merits – the PAH had already launched their escrache campaign by the 
end of February. (PAH 2013) The state chose not to consider the ILP, even though the 
PAH had followed all rules and gathered so many signatures. Thus, the escraches were a 
method of protest aimed at identifying and pressuring singular Parliament members to 
vote for the Initiative. Here is the moment when grassroots, horizontal movements are 
forced to recognize the vertical nature of power and apply distinct techniques to address 
that power differential.  
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3h Against the state 
When people encounter others with whom they can’t relate to but must, they invent or 
utilize methods that allow for communication. This might simply be an encounter 
between co-workers who speak different languages, or a qualitative disjuncture where the 
difference as constituted appears seemingly insurmountable. In the case of the PAH, the 
encounter between their horizontal plane and the vertical plane of the state, as represented 
by the Spain’s governmental failure to even discuss the contents of their petition drive, is 
an exchange where the state refuses the horizontality of a general intellect. The State see 
that it has nothing in common PAH, so communication seems insurmountable.  
 
In the following subsection, I describe two types of encounter between the horizontal of 
the people and the vertical of governance. In one encounter the PAH laterally redirects 
vertical state machinations. In the second, people effort to directly halt state machinic 
functions. Continuing with the distinction between the people and the government, I write 
about these encounters as though they occur between Newtonian constants – between two 
distinct and unstoppable forces that meet on a plane of equivalence. Others might choose 
here to identify meaningful communication at the micropolitical and interpersonal level 
that occurs nevertheless. But to highlight the PAH’s nature, it serves to trace an encounter 
between two unyielding forces. Surprisingly, these examples demonstrate that it seems 
far simpler to halt state activity than it is to redirect it– and so we begin with what is easy. 
I discuss it as the piecemeal blockade of a singular home eviction. The attempted 
redirection of the state machine through the ILP and escraches proves a more complex 
operation and is discussed second.  
 
3i Against the state: halting the state machine 
Though the PAH takes every effort to try and avoid police-enforced evictions, they do 
occasionally happen. To avoid eviction if you are a homeowner, one joins a PAH bank 
group, joining the group named for the bank from where the loan originates. Groups meet 
regularly to share information about each bank’s loan officers, their negotiating tactics 
and overall strategies. They support each other during negotiations and to organize 
targeted media campaigns and direct actions particular to bank policies and how they 
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treat their disputes. Through the fine-grained pooling of knowledge of particular bank 
practices, the PAH has been able to halt many eviction processes through informed 
negotiation and threat of targeted protest before they reach the stage where members 
stand against the police at the house entryway. When actually blockading evictions, the 
notion of dignity emerges as a core concept again. In confrontations, the Barcelona PAH 
maintains a no-violence code that means that while they may block an entrance to an 
apartment, they do not fight back and don’t explicitly resist arrest.  
 
During the January 28th Tuesday Meeting, the frequent facilitator Mark has been 
discussing the recent experiences the PAH organization in the nearby city of Sabadell. 
“Sabadell is meeting with the cops so that they don’t treat us (the PAH) as animals. We 
have to lower the tension between the PAH and the Police.” They are discussing a recent 
eviction defense in Sabadell where the police dealt with the eviction blockade with 
excessive force.  One older woman passionately decries the police action and asks to 
have it noted that she was at the defense and was roughed up. “This can happen with the 
local PAHs, but we are in Barcelona, not Sabadell.”  
 
Later, Lucia explains to me, that over time, the Barcelona PAH has built a relationship 
with the police; the Barcelona police know PAH activists won’t attack them, that “we are 
orderly and won’t threaten the police’s safety.” She mentions that of course there are 
individual police officers who are still rough and violent, but that sort of behavior is no 
longer the norm.  
 
This fact may or may not lessen any unspoken fear attendant to putting one’s body into an 
eviction blockade. I planned on attending several eviction defenses while in Barcelona, 
which I imagined would ultimately involve joining others to sit down in front of 
someone’s doorway to risk arrest. Nevertheless, because of last minute legal wrangling, 
not one people/police confrontation occurred during my 2015 Barcelona and Madrid 
research; the PAH’s processes to stop forced evictions are effective. Many evictions 
blockades were called off the night before or while standing in solidarity with the victim 
in front of their house. So what I did join were blockades that became eventually 
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canceled evictions; with PAH members joining the threatened victim, phones in hand 
communicating with off-site lawyers and other authorities and in dialog with other 
attending PAH members at the street-level entrance to the home and apartment.  
 
3j Confrontation: eviction blockades  
While in Spain in 2015, I left my accommodations early to attend three eviction defenses. 
I will describe one of them that I attended in Barcelona.   
 
I attended the January 27th eviction defense. It was announced at the Monday Welcome 
Meeting, because the eviction was to occur the following day. The woman being evicted 
had been renting the flat from a large real estate firm. “My lawyer told me on Friday that 
I’d be kicked out on Tuesday.” According to Barcelona regulations, city social services 
are supposed to provide evicted people with temporary housing. Unfortunately, the city 
wasn’t following through.  
 
At the meeting beforehand, Mark listens to her story and says, “It’s not a foreclosure 
eviction, but her building is owned by a large real estate firm, it’s a big building. I think 
we should support her, stand at her door and protect her.” The action is quickly organized; 
we are to meet at the address and expect to be there any time between 8AM and 3PM. 
Seventy-odd people at the meeting consense to the plan; because these sorts of decisions 
are routine, this all happens very quickly.  
 
Susan chimes in, “We should immediately demand a stay of eviction from the court, 
based on the size of the real estate firm.” The attendees applaud as Mark repeats what 
Susan has finished with– “We should stand at her door and protest.”   
 
I arrive at the house the next day at 10.15 a.m. The neighborhood is dense and urban, 
almost urbane even though the inexpensive or shuttered shops hint at other economic 
realities beyond urban and architectural design. I slip on my green PAH t-shirt and join 
the group already in front of the building. The 17 people present on the street are mostly 
familiar faces, including meeting facilitators and frequent assembly speakers; Susan, 
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Mark, Juan, Carlos, Rebecca and others.  
 
One person whose face I don’t recognize approaches me and we began to chat. She 
informs me that we’ll know what the court has decided by 11AM. I’m surprised that at 
11.05, a court representative arrives by car, and cell phone negotiations occur with the 
renter– with the court representative and PAH consultation beside her, and her lawyer at 
the court on the other side. The court representative leaves. At 11.24, someone calls a 
meeting for the now larger crowd of maybe 25 people. The eviction has been postponed 
for a month. At 12.04, I leave just after the mass of people say goodbye to each other and 
congratulate the renter.  
 
The eviction has been postponed; it may be necessary to mount this sort of defense again. 
And if this eviction is canceled altogether or some other happy resolution is found, there 
are ultimately hundreds more evictions that will occur for the PAH to work with. At 
around 11.35, Mark and Susan had left to scout out the truth of the rumor of another 
planned eviction happening elsewhere in the neighborhood on that day. If there is an 
eviction in the works today, they’ll contact people via WhatsApp.  
 
I was reminded that though this eviction defense was both easy and victorious, it could 
have gone the other way. The woman I chatted with, a thirty-something hairdresser from 
Peru tells me, “I worry about how this eviction process might affect her kids. They’ve 
seen this situation on the television news where police come with nightsticks and it gets 
violent with the PAH who are blocking the staircase and being dragged off. You never 
know how each defense is going to go.” 
 
This one went smoothly. Around the time that I arrived, the renter and some of the PAH 
walk out of the building’s front door carrying a tray of cups, hot water, milk and instant 
coffee to be served in the building’s external foyer. While a few PAH members never 
leave this area adjacent to the door, most of us stand in small groups along the sidewalk, 
chatting, occasionally chanting, collecting signatures for the ILP and discussing the 
situation with neighbors and passers-by. Other than for coffee, we gather in front of the 
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door twice; once for the victory announcement, and once beforehand to pose for a 
television camera that had appeared. At these moments, it makes sense to gather together 
and chant. It also becomes clear to me that we’d also be taking this formation if the police 
arrived to enforce the eviction.  
 
Neighbors and other passers-by are supportive. At certain moments of the morning, two 
people are collecting ILP signatures. “Neighbors, did you know there’s an eviction 
today?” “We need to support our neighbors.” The most critical comments I hear, from a 
suit-clad twenty-something, is “Well, I don’t know how much she earns, but, how could 
they do this to a mother?” He sticks around and asks, “How did she end up getting 
support from you (the PAH)?” to which he’s told how she showed up at yesterday’s 
meeting.  
 
The renter herself is Spanish. She’s wearing a PAH t-shirt below a cardigan and a large 
peace-sign necklace. She has eyeglasses and long hair that she wears down. She seems 
physically fragile, but this is offset by what I see as an emerging confidence. In hand, 
she’s got a clipboard and folder that reads, “I’m the cat lady you’ve been hearing about.” 
Her teenage son arrives near the end of the event and they seem to stand proudly together. 
 
Throughout the event, we stand and chant. “This eviction will be an occupation.” “We are 
going to stop this eviction.” “Neighbors, wake up, (there’s) an eviction at your door.” It’s 
cold and I have to shuffle my feet to keep my toes warm. Overall the spirit is light. At 
times, some of the members jump up and down chanting, “I’m from the PAH, from the 
PAH, from the PAH!” (which rolls off the tongue easier in Spanish than in English.) One 
PAH member, a man from Ecuador, wears a green sequined hat that looks like it was 
intended for Saint Patrick’s Day parade. Another man has a horn he occasionally blows. A 
woman suggests that someone come up with a flamenco beat to which we could dance. 
Then she claps out the appropriate rhythm, partially, I assume, to keep her hands warm. 
One member eats an apple and his friends joke about collectivizing the apple so that he 
shares it.  
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Evictions are halted with a dual strategy of confrontation and mediation with the state 
(through courts and lawyers, and police-PAH interaction) and the mobilization of popular 
support (in initiatives and in PAH street-level activities). Despite successes at halting and 
stopping particular evictions, the general capacity for the banks, property owners and the 
state to insist on their right to evict remains.  
 
3k Confrontation: escraches 
The two ILPs that the Barcelona PAH have gathered signatures for (the 2013 ILP for the 
Spanish Parliament and the ILP Habitatge for the Cataluña Assembly) succinctly 
illuminates the boundary between what the PAH can effectively organize through 
common-sense notions of what is right, and what it can’t. The first ILP, aimed at the 
Spain’s National Parliament saw the PAH’s implementation of escraches that attempted 
to work on both sides of the line drawn between grassroots and governance. The second 
ILP, aimed to bring the political conversation to the Cataluña Parliament, and 
demonstrates the depth of this chasm.  
 
We begin with a discussion of the National ILP and how the PAH scaled up its activities 
to convince individual elected officials to support the PAH initiative. In 2012 with 
collaboration with other social movements,257 the PAH launched the ILP signatory 
process. By early February 2013, they’d recognized that the conservative Partido Popular 
(the PP), headed by Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, wasn’t going to support its three main 
points. So, on February 4th, they announced their escrache campaign on their central 
website with the title; “The PAH’s new campaign: Escraches. Putting first and last name 
to those responsible for the financial genocide.” (PAH 2013b)  
 
The escrache-style protest originates in Argentina, “with the objective of socializing the 
condemnation and the making visible the unpunished crimes of the past dictatorships.” 
(Balbi 2013 17) Rumor has it that the suggestion that the PAH utilize the escrache came 
from an artist and educator who lives between Barcelona and Argentina. It is worth 																																																								
257 Both ILPs were co-authored by a human rights and social welfare think tank, the 
Observatorio DESC who play a shadow role in supporting the PAH. Other social justice groups 
have co-sponsored both ILP’s role-out.	
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mentioning too, is that it was also through the art context that I initially heard of 
escraches. In the distance that the escrache has traveled, one can imagine that the 
escrache was a South American cultural import to Spain.  
 
“The PAH’s is not the first reappropriation of this tool.” (Balbi 2013 5) In her essay about 
how escraches make apparent the machinations of injustice that remain intact across 
generations, Magdalena Balbi describes the ontological essence of the escrache in how it 
positions its voice towards power. Escraches “redirect attention towards the logistic of 
state terrorism, whether that is terror’s operators (oppressors, accomplices), its footprint 
in everyday spaces (here live the committers of genocide, here were the torture 
chambers), or the demand for justice (whether judgment and punishment, or social 
condemnation).” (25)  
 
Balbi describes how the escrache came to be as an object relieved from its authorial 
context through the work of the H.I.J.O.S. (the acronym means ‘children’ in Spanish). 
The H.I.J.O.S. were a group whose relatives were ‘disappeared’ during Argentina’s dirty 
war. She describes how the escrache evolved with H.I.J.O.S. re-working the 
representational strategies of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo. The Mothers became 
internationally recognized as a group that silently stood together in the Plaza de Mayo in 
solidarity against the Argentinean dictatorship that had disappeared their children.  Balbi 
writes, “The escrache is no longer only the activity of H.I.J.O.S., it has become an 
autonomous practice. It has no author, it finds meaning in diverse situations and it 
propagates itself through alternative means of the production of sociability.” (Balbi 2013 
18) 
 
After the governing Partido Popular (PP) politicians who drove the defeat of the ILP did 
not take advantage of the PAH’s offer to arrange meetings with the victims of the 
mortgage crisis, the group aimed to identify and publicly shame them as people who 
could change a horribly unpopular law but choose not to.258 The escraches involved 																																																								
258 Barcelona-based Enmedio Art Collective was enlisted to design a downloadable escrache 
“D.I.Y. Kit” (Balbi 2013 20) that highlighted the fact of the governance’s capacity for and 
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many methods of theatrical protest, but at their core was the popular ILP and the 
politicians who refused to change a law so onerous the European Court of Justice ruled 
that it was out of line with European standards. (Belaza 2013) Protests were unleashed to 
haunt and shame individual politicians at home, at work, and on the go. Escraches, in the 
form developed by the PAH, are rolling and spontaneous protest aimed to socially isolate 
targeted individuals from the social realm by surrounding them in public with noise and 
angry bodies. I did not witness any escrache as the campaign was halted before my 
focused research period. But there are videos of them online, including spontaneous 
escraches emerging as Conservative parliamentarians board airplanes and are identified 
within the airplane cabin.  
 
The response to the escraches was enormous. According to Lucia Delgado, Ada Colau 
was doing national television broadcasts daily to explain the PAH’s position. She wasn’t 
only being asked to explain the ILP; she was being challenged about the ethics of the 
escrache within Spain’s constitutional monarchy. Lucia explained the media’s hostility to 
the escraches as proof of its being controlled by wealthy interests. The visibility of the 
PAH increased, and the number of local chapters bloomed. The PAH was awarded by the 
European Parliament a citizen’s prize that was accepted by Ada Colau. Meanwhile, 
Spain’s PP compared the PAH to terrorists and Nazis for the escrache tactic (Daley 
2013).   
 
In the end, the PAH’s ILP did not pass. There were adjustments to the mortgage law, but 
none significant enough to lessen the way individuals associated with the PAH negatively 
experienced the housing crisis.  
 																																																																																																																																																																					
unwillingness to make change. The Enmedio Collective is a project of some former members of 
the artivist Las Agencias group that were also involved in the V de Vivienda campaign. The main 
item within the kit were large red and green circles. The green circle said, Sí Se Puede [Yes we 
can], the red circle Pero No Quieren [But they don’t want to]. The red and green were already in 
use by the PAH for the logo and t-shirt that Marta Abad designed, as was the slogan Sí Se Puede. 
The round red and green shapes refer to how Spain’s parliamentarian’s votes are reported upon, 
with graphics of red or green buttons recording a yes or no vote in the parliament. Enmedio says 
“…rather than trying to invent something new, we decided to do just the opposite: to reinforce the 
existing graphic identity.” (2013)	
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3l The party as citizen platform  
In July 2014, the Barcelona PAH announced the ILP Habitatge, aimed at clarifying the 
Catalan Parliament’s position around the Catalan right to housing, humane living 
conditions and bankruptcy laws. (França 2014) In the month before the effort, Ada Colau 
and others had begun a process outside the PAH to explore the possibility of forming a 
party, Barcelona en Comú, which was then called Guanyem. They were hoping to run in 
Barcelona’s May 2015 municipal elections. (França & Puente 2014.) At that point 
Barcelona en Comú understood itself as a party that had no interest in governing beyond 
the municipal level. Barcelona en Comú’s259 founding followed on the heels of Podemos’ 
(another insurgent left party) success in the May 2014 European Parliament elections. 
(Murcia 2014) Podemos itself was only founded in January of that year. (Mendez 2015) 
Podemos and Barcelona en Comú and the PAH are seen as strands of the Indignados 
movement coming out of the Spanish Plaza movements of 2011 that in turn are seen as 
parallel with the Arab Spring and the Occupy Movement. (Murcia 2014) In other words, 
there are international events running parallel with these developments. 
 
A final political fact important to the understanding of the PAH’s launch of the ILP 
Habitatge was the renewed energy of the Catalan Independence movement. The 
Independence movement organized a non-binding public referendum in November 2014 
(Kassam 2014b) and the possibility of a Catalan Parliament vote in the near future. 
(Geoghegan 2015)260   
 
So, the ILP Habitatge represents a politically contingent push for the PAH’s demands, 
and is an effort for it to remain relevant within the flux of history. That Ada Colau is both 																																																								
259 Barcelona en Comú was originally called Guanyem until it changed its name soon after its 
founding in 2014.	
 
260 As this thesis is being completed, the Catalan independence movement is in disarray after the 
contentious October 1st referendum. Colau, now Barcelona mayor, is ambivalent on this matter. It 
would seem that her support for the right to vote on the matter was an effort to affirmatively side-
step the issue, as she has said she would not vote for independence. 
 
 The ILP Habitatge was passed by the Catalan Parliament in 2015, and if Cataluña were to 
become independent, it would be law.	
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the former PAH spokesperson and the central political actor within Barcelona en Comú, 
the PAH has been cast in the light of the new politic. Yet at the time of research, the PAH 
refused to play the role of Ada Colau’s foot soldiers.  
 
This was clearly stated in an interview with a Brazilian reporter that I witnessed while 
attending the January 19th, 2015 student orientation meeting. The reporter was on 
assignment in Spain to write about the new European insurgent left parties (including 
Podemos and Greece’s Syriza). He asked about the relationship between the PAH and the 
then-named Colau’s party. Juan, the PAH member answered, “There is none. Ada Colau 
started here. Individual PAH members might support her, but not the PAH. The PAH is 
non-partisan, even though we are not apolitical.” 
 
Juan explained to the reporter that Ada is no longer the PAH’s spokesperson though she 
still occasionally attends meetings. He says that he’ll vote for her as an individual, but not 
as a PAH member. He thinks she’ll govern Barcelona better than the current mayor. He 
does admit that Ada developed her “political charisma” through her work within the 
PAH, and in that way, there is an ongoing connection between the two groups. Utilizing 
Barcelona en Comú’s talking points, when Juan is asked about the “new political parties” 
he says it’s not a political party but rather a “citizen’s platform.” 
 
I witnessed a large PAH Tuesday General Assembly on January 12 where both the ILP 
and the PAH’s relationship to Barcelona en Comú was discussed. The conversation began 
with a discussion of the coming weekend’s events, with June facilitating. They were 
discussing ILP signature gathering events, including a screening of a PAH documentary 
at a community event in leftist Sants neighborhood. “We need volunteers to do the set up 
and projection. We need to approach neighborhood presentations as an opportunity to 
nosh on food and chat. In Sants, you’re going to collect a lot of signatures.”  
 
Mark chimes in, “The PAH needs to state our demands for this upcoming election. We 
know the elections are coming up with the new political parties. They say the new 
political parties speak for the PAH. PAH Vallecas (another PAH group near Barcelona) 
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says we need to make propositions to the parties. We spoke about making demands by 
occupying rental and owned properties. A Cataluña level PAH conversation is working on 
a public meeting to explain the PAH’s demands, because the PAH is not itself a party.” 
 
Patti says, “What we want is this; if the Partido Popular wants to meet with us. We’ll say 
hi and hit them in the face with our ILP Habitatge. But whatever. All the parties now say 
they support the PAH, but it doesn’t mean anything. If we do this, if we meet with them, 
it’ll be easy to mark them as liars and hypocrites.” 
 
An older woman asks, “Have the six points on the ILP Habitatge been translated online 
from Catalan to Castilian (standard) Spanish?”  
 
With many small conversations occurring, there is commotion. A sense of political 
potential hangs in the room, along with distrust of institutional political processes. While 
a Barcelona en Comú victory might help the PAH, the Barcelona PAH has already been 
negatively impacted by the elections. It has impacted the group’s recent organizational 
capacity, with many experienced activists in addition to Colau devoting attention to 
Barcelona en Comú rather than the PAH.  
 
Mark says, “It’s become difficult for the PAH. We don’t want the parties to assume the 
PAH. They are not talking about the PAH if we stay quiet, they won’t fight the banks just 
because we are an historic movement. If we get the parties to incorporate our needs in 
their platforms, it would strengthen the movement. It’d be a compromise of the parties 
towards the PAH, not the other way around.” To this statement many people show 
agreement by raising their hands and wiggling their fingers. “It’s important to either talk 
to no party or to all parties.” 
 
A woman wearing blue says, “On the municipal level, in the end, its local enough and 
perhaps possible to maintain accountability. But another doubt I have, based on my 
experience with parties, is what they say at public meetings and then how they 
compromise behind closed doors. The parties never have to ask how they want to 
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participate in our meetings. They simply assume the right to set the agenda. We have to 
ask ourselves what our minimum is in order to participate in any way within this 
institutional process.” 
 
Ada Colau, who’d been sitting in the room, speaks up. She seems to be speaking as a 
PAH member as much as a political candidate.  
 
“The parties appropriate you. My experience is that they’ve respected us (the PAH) from 
back in 2009. We’ve been demanding things of them, and I’ve never had any problem 
doing this. It gives force to the PAH. In many countries throughout history, movements 
have collectively made demands to governments on issues such as racial equality and the 
environment, and as a result, change has occurred. We should ask if they’ll make the 
change we demand in public so that they put their support for us on the table. This has 
public impact. The election is very important.” 
 
A woman sitting next to me says below her breath as a threat to those parties that might 
not help, “Escraches.” 
 
Another, “We need to have this debate.” At best, many think that whichever politician is 
in power, the PAH must hold their feet to the fire in order for any meaningful change to 
occur. “I don’t know what else can happen.” 
 
A woman throws up her arms and says, “The political parties are going to use us, I don’t 
have anything else to say. This is my opinion.” 
 
3m Cultural work for the informal sphere 
Ada Colau made no more statements during the meeting. Colau’s move from the PAH’s 
grassroots politics to mechanical party politics make sense in the light of the PAH’s 
effective horizon. My field research was concluded just as Colau’s party won the 
mayorship of Barcelona. Soon the ILP Habitatge would pass through the Catalan 
parliament but the PAH and Barcelona en Comú would find that its laws were 
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unenforceable, as expected, without passing through the National Parliament as the 
Catalan independence remained unclear. Thus, for some a long march through the 
institutions would begin and Barcelona en Comú and its allied municipal platforms 
would run for national office. A governing story could begin from here. While the 
national ILP addresses the one body that can definitively change Spanish law (the 
National Parliament), the Habitatge is directed towards the Catalan Parliament that does 
not have the legitimacy to enforce the agreement – though having passed it, they further 
normalize the PAH’s interests throughout Cataluña. Whether or not Colau as mayor and 
party leader, will be able to use the vertical mechanics of political power to change the 
situation of those affected by mortgages is yet to be seen.  
 
I had the opportunity to attend a January 30th, 2015 conversation of autonomous artists, 
writers and critics at the office of the Enmedio Collective. It was neither a PAH nor 
Barcelona en Comú get-together. It was a meeting for autonomous cultural workers, the 
purpose of which was to discuss the “role of radical critique today.” Here, “today” was 
understood not as some general contemporary, but rather the current political and cultural 
ferment of the city, country and its institutions. The conversation was staged to discuss 
the role criticism plays “1) on the symbolic level, 2) with respect to the materiality of 
existence 3) on the organizational level. In conclusion, we will address how a critical 
approach may proactively intervene in this current situation.” (Jordana 2015) 
 
Those gathered at the meeting were writers, artists and academics who’d found 
themselves having to explain to their peers why they weren’t involved in Barcelona en 
Comú or Podemos whose energy was, at the time, explosive. Those present understood 
that despite possible opportunities, the new parties placed grassroots movements at risk. 
The first risk they identified was the drawdown of grassroots labor power. The second 
risk was the loss of cultural capital that had recently so energizing the grassroots. Other 
risks include the possibilities for a general disenchantment with activism and a possible 
powerful right-wing counter-offensive from below.  
 
For those present, Ada Colau’s motives were beyond reproach, though the larger party 
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system she engages with was held with the same suspicion demonstrated at the PAH 
meeting. Rather than working in the interest of the new politics, these creatives were 
interested in continuing to support the informal sector. In this context, the informal sector 
was identified in two ways that were not explicitly differentiated – it was understood as 
the organizational project of and by people in need – for example of people in need of 
housing or food. “There is a war, a war of actual hunger, going on below the surface of 
everything that is going on at the markets, with people who are in actual need” said 
another meeting attendee.  But it was also understood slightly differently – as shorthand 
for people with general need, including those involved in the conversation.  
 
Those present understood themselves as possible relational agents whose cultural work 
could shape multitudinous sociality. Jara Rocha, the woman who invited me to this 
private conversation said, “How do we hold in suspension the individual in relation to the 
collective in our work? Suspend in two ways – putting relations in pause so there is 
solidarity without individual erasure, but also supporting the appearance of important 
things that highlight what must be related to? What forms have we replicated to 
affirmation of these social dispositifs, and what forms do we as cultural workers utilize to 
build bridges across different ways of relating?” In this time of change, Jara was positing 
that critical culture’s role was to sit beside those who would be left out of whatever 
transition and keep open their capacity to survive in the margins, but also to continue of 
further social innovation that would meaningfully address the most marginal of people’s 
concerns.  
 
Ada Colau has gambled that a move from a common multitudinous body to the legal 
structures of the city and state would pay off for the marginal.  She figures she can affect 
the changes she’d helped make appear as common-sense governance within the social 
body, but that has been resisted by the formal institutions of the state. Though she still 
attended PAH meetings at the time of research, by then she had left her grassroots 
practice. Her actions were understood as an operation of a different order. 
 
Her “political charisma” was developed within the PAH – helping co-articulate its 
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interest across the social terrain. Now, upon Barcelona en Comú’s victory, she and all the 
residents of Barcelona would be able to see how that charisma might operate through 
another, much more symbolic, abstract and machine-like machine. Barcelona is officially 
governed by a council of 41 city councilors, through whom a mayor (elected by 21 
councilors) forms a governing body of 5 lieutenant-mayors and 17 city councilors and an 
additional 5 unelected councilors. And then, they must work through departments, 
salaried employees, budgets, contracts, private contractors in order to effect regulations, 
financing, budgeting and much more to both make change and provide stability.  
 
Rocha’s comments regarding the multitude that remains other to governance stand in 
critical reflection to the common sense notion that Colau’s political victory would 
translate into the immediate fulfillment of the margin’s needs. Rocha’s knows otherwise, 
and her comments further demonstrate an awareness that the multitude’s relationality is 
always an ongoing project that is coordinated and scaffolded in intimate relation with 
other ongoing projects.  
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Chapter	4	
An	ontology	of	law-likely	culture			The	transposition	of	the	PAH’s	ongoing	social	encounters	into	this	study	transfers	the	group’s	ongoing	sociality	into	fixed	cultural	thought,	ordered	to	help	shape	policy	suggestions.	Policy,	by	its	nature,	strives	to	relate	to	the	already	systemic.	What	is	proper	to	the	systemic	is	not	the	particularity	of	the	objects	it	connects,	but	the	general	facts	that	the	system	enforces	toward	particular	results.	For	this	study,	the	cultural	is	understood	as	formalized	ways	and	means	of	relating.	In	its	objectification,	the	cultural	becomes	different	than	the	social.	The	cultural	are	objects	or	subjects	of	systems	that	themselves	are	cultural	in	the	sense	that	they	have	some	sort	of	formal	consistency.	To	use	Silvia	Wynter’s	term,	when	the	social	becomes	cultural,	it	becomes	more	“law-likely”.	While	the	social	(as	defined	by	this	study)	remains	multitudinously	unaccountable	and	particular	in	its	moments	and	places,	culture’s	systemic	nature	begs	for	accountability.	The	social	and	cultural	along	with	the	biological	and	ecological	play	roles	in	both	the	niche261	and	regulatory	structures	that	structure	life’s	living.		The	PAH’s	social	forms	serve	within	this	study	as	a	cultural	model	for	socially	relational	practices	in	the	time	of	climate	change	to	the	extent	that	they	demonstrate	ways	that	multitudinous	sociality	encounters	and	reworks	its	own	social	relations	to	governance	and	governmental	failure.		This	chapter	aims	to	articulate	the	actual	ways	of	systematicity	that	organize	the	multitude	in	relation	to	culture	and																																																									
261	“Niche	construction	theory,	on	the	other	hand,	focuses	on	the	ways	systems	actively	shape	or	construct	their	environment.	In	this	view,	the	niche	is	not	something	that	exists	out	there	in	nature	waiting	to	be	discovered	or	filled	by	an	organism.	Furthermore,	constructed	niches	often	persist	longer	than	any	of	their	individual	inhabitants,	which	allow	these	niches	to	store	important	hereditary	and	regulatory	information.	Niche	construction	theory	thus	includes	the	notion	of	expanded	and	multiple	inheritance	systems	(from	genomic	to	ecological,	social	and	cultural).	This	latter	aspect	has	made	the	concept	of	niche	construction	especially	attractive	for	theories	of	cultural	evolution	as	it	facilitates	a	more	complex	notion	of	inheritance	and	a	closer	link	between	evolutionary	dynamics	and	learning.”	(Laubichler	&	Renn	2015	566)		
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governance	in	the	world.	The	PAH	in	itself	demonstrates	the	multitudinous	capacity	for	social	means	“outside	law”	to	address	and	reformulate	law	and	demonstrates	an	actual	moment	where	the	tautological	capacity	of	the	multitude	to	govern	itself	with	governance	becomes	more	than	tautological.		Rather	it	becomes	a	surprising	innovation.	Copernicus’s	epochal	breaching	of	the	Heaven/Earth	divide	was	only	to	be	made	possible	during	the	Renaissance,	first,	in	generic	terms,	by	the	revalorizing/reinvention	of	Latin-Christian	medieval	Europe’s	homo	
religiosus	Adamic	fallen	Man	as	homo	politicus,	a	figure	now	self-governed	by	its/his	reason,	articulated	as	reasons	of	state…	And	he	[God],	as	Copernicus	was	to	centrally	argue,	as	“the	best	and	most	systematic	artisan	of	all,”	would	have	had	to	have	created	the	universe’s	“world	machine”	according	to	rules	that	made	it	law-likely	knowable	by	the	human	reason	of	those	creatures	for	whose	sake	he	had	done	so.		(Sylvia	Wynter	2015	15-16)		To	have	“law-likely”	affects	suggests	that	affects	are	nearly	certain	to	occur	through	relations	organized	around	them.	Wynter	describes	how	after	the	Copernican	breach,	Eurocentric	conceptualizations	for	organizing	life	were	to	be	divined	from	moral,	ethical	and	scientific	structures	justified	by	their	certifiable	universality.	As	Hobbes	demonstrates,	social	facts	can	be	seen	to	coincide	with	natural	facts	whose	ruling	orders,	like	gravity,	can	be	argued	on	the	grounds	of	their	universal	nature.	What	can	be	conceptualized	as	ethics,	morality	and	human	and	worldly	ontologies	exceed	any	Eurocentric	conceptualizations	of	how,	and	for	what,	life	is	ordered.	What	Wynter’s	term	“law-likely”	allows	for	is	a	de-mystification,	beside	terms	like	“lawless”	and	“like-law”,	of	the	relative	systematicity	of	any	organized	dispositif.	That	the	multitude	and	its	representative	in	this	study,	the	PAH,	relate	to	law	and	governance	is	the	law	of	law.	But	human	law	de-mystified	is	variable	to	its	core.		This	chapter	explains	how	governing	systems	function	through	natural-scientific,	theological,	legal,	cultural	and	social	ways,	so	as	to	recognize	in	what	ways	and	how	multitudinous	activity	occurs	in	relation	to	governance.	A	cross-disciplinary	
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approach	is	employed,	utilizing	literature	from	evolutionary	biology,	cognitive	science,	ecological	and	political	history,	anthropology,	theology	and	art	history.	Following	Silvia	Wynter’s	suggestion,	the	culture	for	which	this	study	intends	to	make	policy	is	suspended	in	varying	binds	in	nature,	through	culture	and	in	conceptualizations	of	the	nature/culture	divide.			Philosopher	of	the	brain	Catherine	Malabou	(2017)	makes	clear	the	extent	to	which	changes	in	governing	law	can	deeply	alter	human	practice	across	time.	“Human	practices	alter	or	affect	brain-body	chemistry,	and,	in	return,	brain-body	chemistry	alters	or	affects	human	practices.	Brain	epigenetic	power	acts	as	a	medium	between	its	deep	past	and	the	environment.”	Malabou	describe	how	brains	with	their	human	and	cultural	needs	construct	habits	and	then	habitats	with	real	historical	impact	to	forward	particular	lines	of	cognitive	and	logistical	development.	“We	can	distinguish	here	between	autotropic	and	allotropic	psychotropic,	that	is,	addictive	substances	and	practices	acting	on	the	self,	and	addictive	practices	acting	on	the	other	political	addictive	practices.	Among	the	former	are	‘coffee,	sugar,	chocolate,	and	tobacco’,	which	first	began	circulating	in	Europe	in	the	seventeenth	and	eighteenth	centuries.”	(47)	Coffee	may	just	be	coffee,	or,	in	a	system,	coffee	can	be	much	more.	Malabou	suggests	that	coffee	structures	different	ways	of	working	not	only	for	coffee	growers	and	producers,	but	also	its	consumers,	whose	increased	concentration	plays	out	in	the	terrestrial	ecologies	that	collaborate	in	its	production.	If	the	PAH’s	practice	can	be	understood	as	making	a	habitual	break	in	capitalist	relations,	the	systemic	interests	of	this	chapter	must	come	to	terms	with	how	relational	objects	–	the	things	of	culture,	like	the	“idea	of	the	PAH”	(and	not	the	PAH	itself)	–	transfers	particular	meaning	within	countervailing	or	other-interested	systems.	To	understand	this	is	to	build	a	conceptual	relation	between	anthropological-cultural	and	art-cultural	thought.			This	chapter	serves	to	explain	systemic	ways	of	being	in	relation	to	any	thing’s	being	in	itself;	which	is	both	tautological	and	antithetical.	It	is	tautological	because	objects	only	relate	in	themselves	systemically,	it	is	antithetical	because	the	nature	of	an	
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object	is	to	be	confined	to	its	own	being.	The	first	section	goes	some	way	towards	untangling	this	Chthulucenic	knot,	in	which	nature	and	culture	lay	on	top	of	one-another,	to	form	general	human	bio-social	processes	(that	are	not	exclusively	for	humans),	and	to	discussing	how	climate	change	affects	all	of	this.	The	second	section	lays	out	the	interested	nature	of	human	determinations	of	lawly	governance,	and	justifications	of	force	through	climactic	and	governmental	ends.	It	also	establishes	a	qualitative	notion	for	judgment	in	the	interests	of	the	multitude.	The	third	section	looks	more	deeply	at	the	social	and	cultural	besides	the	law-making	biopolitical	to	suggest	how	systems	come	to	dominate	multitudinous	potential	through	cultural	forms.	Through	this	comes	the	study’s	definition	of	policy.	This	section	speculates	on	the	operations	of	less-lawly	sociality	at	the	margins	of	law,	where	manifest	governmental	failure	allows	the	multitudinous	capacities	of	self-governance	to	more	clearly	emerge.		
 
1	Science	The	blue	marble:	planet	earth	viewed	from	space	can	be	seen	as	the	outer	limit	of	earthly	systems.	Or,	at	one	more	step’s	remove,	the	blue	marble	of	the	earth	can	be	conceptualized	as	an	objective	fact	rather	than	a	living	system	–	in	the	same	way	as	when	resting	on	a	coffee	table,	a	pebble	or	plant	appears	to	be	nothing	other	than	impenetrably	whole.	While	any	planet	can	be	recognized	as	an	indivisible	fact	for	itself,	within	the	planetary	one	can	also	identify	the	countless	places	and	niches	it	contains	for	things	and	systems	integrated	within.	Interested	in	how	terrestrial	life	participates	in	its	own	non-directional	evolution	that	occurs	as	the	Chthulucenic	collaboration	between	species	and	environment,	evolutionary	biologists	and	historians	of	science	Manfred	Laubichler	and	Jürgen	Renn	(2015)	state	that	from	a	certain	perspective,	ecologies	and	organisms	are	indistinguishable.	Without	objective	knowledge	of	them,	ecologies	and	organisms	can	appear,	if	apparent	at	all,	as	points	within	affiliated	flows.	Scientific	distinctions	made	of	planetary	things	must	be	understood	as	“process	specific	and	also	pragmatic.”	(568)	Distinctions	are	
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always	only	made	on	behalf	of	interested	parties.263	Interested;	in	the	way	that	if	one	purposefully	points	to	a	rock,	one	has	a	reason	to	do	so.			In	identifying	how	life’s	innovations	can	be	meaningfully	accounted	for	within	the	total	environment,	the	pair	nominate	the	ecological	niche264	as	the	site	where	particular	relations	between	culture	and	nature	are	staged	for	any	organism	to	encounter,	to	make	due	with	and	to	make	changes	of	scale	and	order.	For	humans,	they	conceptualize	the	niche	as	the	point	for	particular	life’s	exchanges	with	the	many-scaled	ecological	and	human	regulatory/maintenance	systems	to	which	it	must	relate.	The	niche’s	biosocial	nature	is	to	be	the	particular	and	particularly	constructed	place	where	individuals	make	their	homes.	Socially	and	culturally,	Renn	and	Laubichler	build	upon	scaffolded	niche	theory	developed	by	evolutionary	biologist	John	Odling-Smee.	Odling-Smee’s	(1988)	ontological	niche	thesis	builds	from	the	fact	that	fully	formed	organisms	and	not	just	their	genomes	participate	in	the	process	of	evolution.	It	is	not	just	DNA	that	changes;	fully	cultural	and	fully	social	human	beings	change	in	time	and	space	(that	is,	evolve).	It	is	through	the	transformations	of	human	habits	and	environments	that	also	structure	and	provide	for	the	habitual	cultural	forms	that	continue	social	life	through	particular	ways.	Odling-Smee’s	work	suggests	the	naturalness	of	whatever	creature	to	make	a	home	in	the	world	and	in	so	doing	transform	and	be	transformed	by	the	many	relations	their	niche	affords.																																																									
263	To	be	clear	and	yet	not	to	specifically	undermine,	their	acknowledgement	represents	the	theology	of	Western	science,	which	ultimately	suggests	a	secular,	globally	purposeless	world.				
264	“Niche	construction	theory…	focuses	on	the	ways	systems	actively	shape	or	construct	their	environment.	In	this	view,	the	niche	is	not	something	that	exists	out	there	in	nature	waiting	to	be	discovered	or	filled	by	an	organism.	Furthermore,	constructed	niches	often	persist	longer	than	any	of	their	individual	inhabitants,	which	allow	these	niches	to	store	important	hereditary	and	regulatory	information.	Niche	construction	theory	thus	includes	the	notion	of	expanded	and	multiple	inheritance	systems	(from	genomic	to	ecological,	social	and	cultural).	This	latter	aspect	has	made	the	concept	of	niche	construction	especially	attractive	for	theories	of	cultural	evolution	as	it	facilitates	a	more	complex	notion	of	inheritance	and	a	closer	link	between	evolutionary	dynamics	and	learning.”	(566.)		
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		As	architectures,	niches	are	stores	of	times’	accumulations;	the	facts	of	what	they	accumulate	help	account	for	the	effects	of	particular	inheritances	as	they	provide	place	and	manner	for	individualized	process	and	localized	learning	–	thus,	for	being	in	particular.	Niches	accumulate	both	objective	things	but	also	abstract	ways	of	doing	things.	The	niche	is	the	site	where	by	the	facts	of	life	and	death,	where	the	accounting	for	“the	evolution	of	innovations	within	complex	systems	across	scales”	(566)	must	occur	–	as	abstract	innovation	with	no	worldly	manifestation	has	no	being	at	all.	The	niche	provides	regulatory	systems	with	cultural,265	biological	and	organic	matter	to	organize	and	to	be	organizational	for	–	systems	are	termed	“ecological”	to	the	extent	that	they	represent	contextually	situated	total	systems	of	exchange.	The	niche	is	the	site	where	the	fiction	of	the	nature/culture	divide	is	made	real	through	the	force	of	natural	and	narrated	human	law.	Real	or	conceptually	real,	the	contextual	situation	of	the	niche	can	be	engineered	by	how	it	relates	to	varieties	of	scale;	scales	are	variable	and	accessed	as	regulatory	networks	(567).			By	Laubichler	and	Renn,	exchange	systems	are	termed	“regulatory	networks”,	through	them	organisms	sociologically,	technically,	culturally	and	biologically	relate	with	things	within	and	external	to	their	niches.266	These	exchanges	can	be	material,	psychological,	abstract:	they	are	culturally	made	and	mediated	in	the	ways	that	one	qualifies	a	relationship.	Though	the	terrestrial	world	is	almost	totally	ecological	–	that	is,	almost	without	unsystematized	material,	from	the	point	of	view	of	whatever																																																									
265	Laubichler	and	Renn	(567)	identify	both	the	social	and	the	cultural	as	subsets	of	the	confluence	of	the	generally	“behavioural”	and	“structural.”			
266 “We,	as	others	before…	have	identified	the	integration	of	regulatory	network	and	niche	construction	perspectives	as	one	challenge	for	extending	evolutionary	theory	and	suggest	that	this	requires	a	model	that	brings	together	regulatory	and	niche	elements	within	one	network	of	interacting	causal	factors.	While	others	have	done	this	for	some	specific	cases	and	within	the	conceptual	structure	of	either	evolutionary	genetics	(Linksvayer	et	al.,	2012)	or	cultural	evolution	(Laland	et	al.,	2008;	Andersson	et	al.,	2014)	our	proposed	perspective	aims	to	bring	evolutionary	processes	at	all	levels	into	one	conceptual	framework.”	(568).			
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niche,	the	relational	regulatory	systems	can	be	entirely	variable.	Niches	expand	or	contract,	live	or	die	by	the	regulation	models	they	attend	to	(cf.	Lévi-Strauss).	The	changing	of	whatever	system	brings	certain	elements	within	focus	and	makes	certain	things	other	to	that	system;	that	is,	concepts	become	conceptually	externalized	and	“not	in	the	interests”	of	whoever.	Regulatory	networks,	such	as	capitalism	or	calorie	counting,	change	the	focus	of	what	can	be	internalized	or	externalized	to	the	interests	of	the	systems.267	Calorie	counting	internalizes	a	focus	on	weight	and	externalizes	fatty	foods.	Capitalism	internalizes	financial	profits	and	externalizes	environmental	costs.	Regardless	of	their	externality,	fat	and	environmental	costs	continue	to	variably	exist.		Karola	Stotz’s	(2010)	focuses	niche	theory	on	cognitive	science’s	extended	mind	thesis268	that	posits	that	all	living	organisms	are	defined	by	both	“what	is	inside	your	head”	(what	the	brain	is	and	what	it	thinks	about)	and	to	what	the	mind	is	connected	by	way	of	the	body’s	capacities	(483).	The	extended	mind	thesis	suggests	that	people	are	psychically	and	thus	really	and	systemically	connected	with	physical,	cultural,	social	and	biosocial	connections.	The	extended	mind	thesis	provides	a	frame	for	understanding	how	that	whatever	that	helps	people	connect	in	the	world	becomes	part	of	the	armature	that	makes	their	world	intimately	sensible	(cf.	Spinoza).	By	the	definitional	indeterminacy	that	Laubichler	and	Renn	give	to	the	scale	of	any	one	niche,	evolutionary	biology	under	discussion	here	uses	niche	theory	to	explain	how	life	can	be	positioned	within	both	particular	and	universal,	abstract	and	real	niches;	and	how	the	body	and	mind	might	connect	to	the	conceptually	particular	and	universal	which	variably	provide	for	and	regulate	life.			
Whatever	object	connects	the	multitude	to	the	world;	they	orient	connectivity	but																																																									
267 “The	niche	for	an	internal	network	at	one	scale	can	be	part	of	the	internal	network	at	another	scale.	Therefore,	from	the	system’s	perspective	there	are	no	absolute	boundaries	between	an	internal	network	and	its	environment.”	(568).			
268 See	Clark	&	Chalmers	(1998).		
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do	not	define	it.	Definition	ultimately	remains	independent	of	the	capacity	of	whoever	relates,	even	through	acculturated	and	lawly	determinations.	Provision	and	regulation	are	understood	as	always-particular	encounters	with	things	to	which	one	can	related	through	other	systems.	Particular	relational	encounters	can	have	many	different	ends:	but	to	the	extent	that	a	peach	on	a	table	is	desirable,	it	has	some	regulatory	effects	–	in	the	sense	that	one	must	eat	it	with	the	mouth	not	the	elbow,	and	that	the	process	of	getting	more	peaches	suggests	certain	behavioral	patterns	to	be	repeated,	or	not.			In	Laubichler	and	Renn’s	considerations	of	the	indeterminacy	of	the	niche’s	scale,	the	line	between	innovation	and	transformation	is	never	quite	clear.269	Through	time	spent	with	the	PAH,	this	study	understands	that	the	innovative	particular	and	social	can	become	general	and	cultural	through	a	general	transformation	of	common	sense.	To	appreciate	the	systematicity	of	life	on	the	blue	marble	is	to	understand	that	both	systems	that	organize	life,	and	life	itself,	are	always	in	flux.	Because	humans	have	constructed	their	being	on	earth	as	historical,	there	is	also	a	political	dimension	in	the	epistemological	difference	between	recognizing	transformation	as	either	mere	modulation	or	as	systemic	transformation.	As	a	result,	change	in	the	human	world	happens	for	reasons	that	cannot	be	captured	by	simply	referring	to	change	as	constant;	the	institutionality	of	systems	makes	change	‘political’.	Climate	change	is	political	partially	because	it	suggests	that	some	people’s	lives	must	change	at	the	expense	of	others’,	even	though	variation	is	natural.	Some	of	these	politics	are	more	thoroughly	developed	in	this	chapter’s	second	section	with	the	concept	of	the	Katechon	and	the	spectacle.	What	matters	here	is	the	simple	fact	that	life	and	its	niches	are	exposed	to	the	wider	world	regardless	of	how	the	niche	poses	itself	and	narrates	its	relations	to	new	developments.			This	is	because	the	particularities	of	climate	have	always	already	been	scaffolded	in																																																									
269 This	sort	of	global	translationality	of	particulars	is	common	to	systems	theory	beyond	biology,	see	for	example	Luhmann	(1977).		
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relation	to	the	systematicity	of	life;	when	a	climate	can	no	longer	sustain	what	is	scaffolded	within	it,	life’s	organization	will	change.	When	the	water	runs	out,	something	must	eventually	happen.	Renn	and	Laubichler	(2014)	describe	how	human	knowledge	is	developed	as	an	affect	and	object	of	humanity	in	specific	relation	to	particular	climactic	qualities.	For	example,	they	highlight	variable	ecological	conditions	that	favor,	in	particular	cases,	the	development	of	cooperative	foraging	and	elsewhere	collaborative	hunting	habits	(8)	and	elsewhere	sedentary	cultivation	(11).		With	an	understanding	that	climates	change	beside	other	things,	one	does	well	to	consider	the	possibility	that	in	their	time	these	socio-cultural	developments	may	also	have	been	painful	political	adjustments	to	those	who	experienced	them	most	keenly.			Needs	contingent	to	a	species’	biology	are	relatively	rigid;	it	is	law-like	that	blood	must	circulate	through	the	body	–	if	not,	death	follows.	Likewise,	it	seems	to	be	a	law	of	our	nature	that	oxygen	must	be	inhaled.	It	seems	law-like	that	if	appropriate	water,	food	and	shelter	are	not	secured,	creatures	meet	their	ends.	Science	has	made	gains	at	tending	the	margins	of	such	rules,	still	the	need	to	eat	and	drink	is	a	rule.	Yet,	beyond	and	with	these	rules,	Laubichler	and	Renn	highlight	that	the	niche	and	its	attendant	cross-scaled	relations	allow	for	a	temporary	decoupling	from	‘nature’.	That	is,	by	setting	up	life’s	relations	in	particular	ways,	life	seems	to	cheat	against	its	own	biology	and	the	world’s	pre-existing	ecologies.	Decoupling	builds	resource	cushions	into	living	systems	that	bring	more	to	bear	in	life	than	what	a	gene	or	phenotype	might	express;	inheritances,	archives	and	warehouses,	learned	and	structured	behavior	and	more.	Niches	allow	for	particular	continuations	of	species	over	time	(568–569).	Importantly,	the	niche	demonstrates	the	home	where	the	biological	and	social	eminently	mix	to	afford	living	in	and	beyond	the	moment.	As	Wynter	(2015)	and	Ferreira	da	Silva	(2015)	point	out,	besides	the	rigidity	of	genetics	and	biology,	a	variety	of	existential	strategies	can	be	organized	through	social	and	cultural	arrangements.	Even	death	itself	can	be	socio-culturally	qualified	through	questions	like,	‘what	constitutes	the	good	life?’,	and	‘what	is	a	good	way	to	die?’			
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	Furthering	Odling-Smee’s	formulations	on	the	niche’s	juncture	as	mind,	language	and	culture,	Kim	Sterelny	(2012)	ventures	to	hypothesize	how	human	language	co-evolved	with	humanity	rather	than	being	genetically	coded	by	some	cranium-based	universal	grammar.	Rather	than	born	in	a	fixed	relationship	between	brain,	tongue	and	the	ear,	Sterelny	posits	that	grammar	developed	from	gestural	sign	language	based	upon	the	miming	of	daily	human	activities.	Mirroring	Wynter’s	and	Malabou’s	thoughts	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter,	cognitive	scientist	Chris	Sinha	(2015)	pointedly	states	that,	“Rather	than	seeing	cultural	evolution	as	‘taking	off’	from	a	terminal	point	of	biological	evolution,	we	should	rather	see	evolutionary	biological	processes	as	having	been	‘captured’	by	an	emergent	cultural	process,	with	ontogenetic	processes	(especially	those	involving	representation,	symbolization	and	communication)	as	a	crucial	catalyst	and	product	of	the	co-evolution	of	culture	and	biology.”	(1)	With	John	Searle’s	notion	of	concrete	abstract	facts270,	Sinha	firmly	recognizes	the	grounds	that	human	cultural	arrangements	provide	for	further	bio-social	development.			The	fine,	narratival	difference	between	the	cultural	and	the	social	merits	attention;	in	this	study’s	definition,	the	social	is	more	forgiving	than	the	cultural.	In	general,	and	in	relation	to	the	multitude,	the	cultural	is	far	more	law-likely	than	the	social.	The	more	law-likely	something	is,	the	greater	the	punishment	there	is	for	disobedience.	As	Chapter	2	outlined,	and	as	the	second	section	of	this	chapter	discusses,	the	cultural	in	what	fine	art	models	or	what	anthropology	defines,	appears	in	Western	thought	as	rigidly	regulated	(with	the	anthropological	providing	definitional	structures	for	how	people	are	or	need	not	be)	or	softly	managerial	(by																																																									
270 For	his	part,	Searle	describes	how	language,	cultural	processes,	and	objects	buoy	social	facts	things	that	may	have	no	identifiable	physical	correlate	but	nevertheless	operate	as	collective	references.	“There	are	things	that	exist	only	because	we	believe	them	to	exist.	I	am	thinking	of	things	like	money,	property,	government,	and	marriages	…	[such]	Institutional	facts	are	so	called	because	they	depend	upon	human	institutions	for	their	existence.”	(1995	1).				
	 234	
fine	arts	productions	to	which	the	multitude	must	somehow	relate).	The	social	as	described	in	Chapter	3’s	focus	on	the	PAH;	here	it	is	understood	as	the	register	of	actually	interpersonal	exchanges	folded	within	and/or	over	or	against	and	upon	culture’s	formalized	relationality.	The	social	is	the	register	of	the	multitude	at	its	most	multitudinous.	Both	biological	necessity	and	cultural	manner	have	real	worldly	effects:	to	politically	untangle	them	from	what	is	internally	driven	habit,	individual	ambition,	desire	and	activity	from	externally	regulated	enforcement	is	to	untangle	the	fact	that	all	organisms	are	fated	to	die	in	some	way,	but	that	the	death	that	was	experienced	was	not	the	one	that	was	desired	or	meant	to	be.	Political	activity	aims	in	this	world	aims	to	particularly	organize	life	in	advance	of	common	death,	regardless.			Given	within	the	social	and	cultural	is	the	capacity	for	all	humans	to	have	some	way	of	controlling	how	they	die…	if	only	in	the	emotional	register	each	breathes	their	last	breath.	In	the	time	of	the	climactic	unraveling	of	what	once	seemed	solid,	this	question	steps	forward	in	relation	to	what	sort	of	existential	meanings	are	socio-culturally	organized	in	spite	of	or	against	the	law-likeliness	of	either	particular	or	general	structural	collapse.		This	question,	further	detailed	in	this	chapter’s	third	section,	relates	to	a	recognition	of	the	multitude’s	blind	ability	to	socially	act	or	dream	regardless	of	what	appears	as	law,	or	as	structural	and	biological	need.	One	recognizes,	then,	that	biology	and	culture	are	intermingled,	in	the	most	formal	of	ways,	and	that	sociality	finds	ways	against	laws	of	nature.			For	Theodor	Adorno,	the	interaction	between	the	cultural	and	the	social	occurred	in	the	following	way	through	art(1970/1997):	The	shaft	that	art	directs	at	society	is	itself	social;	it	is	counter	pressure	to	the	force	exerted	by	the	body	social;	like	inner-aesthetic	progress,	which	is	progress	in	productive	and,	above	all,	technical	forces,	this	counter	pressure	is	bound	up	with	progress	of	extra-aesthetic	productive	forces.	There	are	historical	moments	in	which	forces	of	production	emancipated	in	art	represent	a	real	emancipation	that	is	impeded	by	the	relations	of	
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production.	Artworks	organized	by	the	subject	are	capable	tant	bien	que	
mal	of	what	a	society	not	organized	by	a	subject	does	not	allow;	city	planning	necessarily	lags	far	behind	the	planning	of	a	major,	purposeless,	artwork.		(42)	
 
1a	The	entanglements	of	the	bio-social	It	should	be	clear,	following	this	brief	discussion	of	biology,	culture,	language	and	meaning,	that	in	light	of	several	things	of	interest	to	this	study	(including	the	PAH’s	anti-capitalist	interests,	the	post-Fordist	valuation	of	the	cultural	sphere	and	capitalism’s	ability	to	dispossess	or	vitalize	particular	lives)	that	humans’	capacity	for	abstraction	is	historically	distinguishable	from	capitalism	and	finance.	Abstraction	is	not	an	innovation	invented	by	banking	or	finance.	Human	thought	and	thought’s	translation	across	space	by	acts	of	language,	imagination	and	representation	occur	without	so	much	regard	to	financial	infrastructure.	As	mentioned	in	Chapter	1	and	Chapter	2,	abstraction	is	the	result	of	intense	focus	and	also	facilitates	cross-community	communication.	The	ancient	regulatory/systemic,	archeological	and	architectural	remains	of	societies	are	the	results	of	abstract	activities	that	do	not	remain	but	nevertheless	can	be	inferred	from	what	is	left.	As	Renn	&	Laubichler	(2014)	explain:	Knowledge	is,	as	mentioned	above,	encoded	experience.	Based	on	experience,	it	is,	at	the	same	time,	the	capacity	of	an	individual,	a	group	or	a	society	to	solve	problems	and	to	anticipate	appropriate	actions.	In	short,	knowledge	is	a	problem-solving	potential.	But	it	is	not	just	a	mental	structure.	It	also	involves	material	and	social	dimensions	that	play	a	crucial	role	in	determining	what	actions	are	possible	and	legitimate	in	a	given	historical	situation.	Knowledge	may	be	shared	within	a	group	or	a	society.	Material	artifacts	such	as	instruments	or	texts	may	be	used	in	learning	processes	organized	by	societal	institutions,	allowing	individuals	to	appropriate	the	shared	knowledge.	(4).		The	relative	law-likeliness	of	knowledge	or	art	does	not	imply	an	inherent	
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‘truthness’.	The	truth	of	any	object	is	relative	and	subjective.	The	multitude	relates	to	contingency,	contingently.	Otherwise,	there	would	be	no	multitude,	only	useless	law	and	one	normative	behavior.	Definitions	sit	independently	from	whatever	phenomenon	they	seek	to	describe.	In	relation	to	certain	Marxist	and	other	radical	ontologies,	Dipesh	Chakrabarty	(2009)	is	troubled	by	how	the	concept	of	the	Anthropocene	may	make	Hegelian	or	Marxist	universal	human	projects	seem	performatively	necessary	with	the	notion	of	the	climate	crisis.	Chakrabarty	problematizes	the	conceptual	utility	of	Enlightenment	tools	to	think	through	responses	to	the	changing	climate,	observing	how	readymade	frameworks279	that	claim	to	develop	radical	developments	face	variability	from	directions	that	exceed	traditional	Western	accounting	and	Enlightenment	reason.280	Kant	and	Hegel	did	not	consider	the	climate	as	the	unstable	variable	it	actually	is.	Chakrabarty	states,	“the	industrial	way	of	life	has	acted	much	like	the	rabbit	hole	in	Alice’s	story;	we	have	slid	into	a	state	of	things	that	forces	on	us	a	recognition	of	some	of	the	parametric	(that	is,	boundary)	conditions	for	the	existence	of	institutions	central	to	our	idea	of	modernity	and	the	meanings	we	derive	from	them.”	(217)	In	terms	of	the	parametric,	Chakrabarty	looks	towards	similar	ecological	conditions	as	Laubichler	and	Renn	have	identified,	with	regards	the	ways	in	which	particularly	stable	climactic	conditions	allowed	for	the	foundational	practice	of	contemporary	humanity	(e.g.	agriculture	or	state	practice).	He	recognizes	how	temperatures	and	geologies	were	rarely	considered	because	they	seem	so	solid,	and	that	their	apparent	stability	allowed	for	particular	socio-cultural	arrangements	to	develop	over	very	long	periods	of	time.	By	their	means,	scope	and	scale	these	relations	are	
																																																								
279 “As	the	crisis	gathered	momentum	in	the	last	few	years,	I	realized	that	all	my	readings	in	theories	of	globalization,	Marxist	analysis	of	capital,	subaltern	studies,	and	postcolonial	criticism	over	the	last	twenty-five	years,	while	enormously	useful	in	studying	globalization,	had	not	really	prepared	me	for	making	sense	of	this	planetary	conjuncture	within	which	humanity	finds	itself	today.”	(2009	199).			
280 “[T]he	current	crisis	has	brought	into	view	certain	other	conditions	for	the	existence	of	life	in	the	human	form	that	have	no	intrinsic	connection	to	the	logics	of	capitalist,	nationalist,	or	socialist	identities.”	(217).			
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simply	“independent	of	capitalism	or	socialism.”	(218)	He	points	out	that	so	many	of	the	violent	conditions	caused	by	climate	change;	ocean	acidification,	temperature	rise,	the	destruction	of	food	chains,	will	happen	regardless	of	anyone’s	political	position.	Their	affects	will	be	felt	by	people	and	creatures	whose	political	position	will	never	be	heard,	even	if	their	voices	are	human.			In	this	way,	the	less	law-like	capacities	of	individual	consciousness,	sociality,	culture,	and	biology	run	multitudinous	around	those	more	law-like	capacities	of	the	geological,	climatological,	biological,	cultural	and	social.	To	think	through	the	multitudinous	possibilities	of	human	relationality,	this	study	returns	to	writing	on	art	and	anthropology	among	other	things,	as	they	stand	to	be	generally	propositional	to	the	capacities	of	human	sociality.	Heather	Davis	and	Etienne	Turpin’s	Art	in	the	Anthropocene	(2015)	begins	with	a	question	about	art,	and	how	it	can	respond	to	the	world	“going	to	pieces”	(9).	Their	introduction	discusses	how	thinking	in	strictly	economic	terms	limits	human	capacities	to	actually	acknowledge	the	depth	of	human/non-human	entanglement	in	the	world:	In	a	move	to	think	through	the	entangled	relations	that	might	better	describe	our	present	moment,	Haraway	proposes	the	Chthulucene,	“after	the	diverse	earth-wide	tentacular	powers	and	forces	and	collecting	things	with	names	like	Naga,	Gaia,	Tangaro	(burst	from	water-full	Papa),	Terra,	Haniyasu-hime,	Spider	Woman,	Pachamama,	Oya,	Gorgo,	Raven,	A’akuluujjusi,	and	many,	many	more”…	Although	the	names	Eurocene,	Technocene,	Capitalocene	and	Plantationocene	are	necessary	political	interventions	to	draw	attention	to	the	origins	of	our	current	planetary	situation,	do	we	really	want	the	epoch	to	be	named	as	such	for	the	next	10,000	years?	Isn’t	there	a	necessity	to	think	with	geology	and	biology,	with	the	power	of	imagining	all	that	might	take	place,	rather	than	condemning	our	descendants	to	live	in	a	world	perpetually	marked	by	the	events	of	a	few	hundred	years?	As	Bruno	Latour	suggests	in	this	volume,	perhaps	the	best	way	to	fight	capitalism	is	not	to	grant	it	this	kind	of	enduring	power,	but	to	instead	take	a	deflationary	approach.	As	Latour	
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remarks,	“Let’s	limit	the	number	of	things	that	you	can	attribute	to	capitalism	and	let’s	distribute	them	and	see	what’s	actually	happening.”	(9)		A	flexibility	afforded	by	general	human	sociality	that	is	channeled	through	more	structured	cultural	arrangements	remains	a	given	at	the	window	of	the	anthropocenic	undoing	of	long-stable	slow	relationality	between	the	ecological	earth	and	its	inhabitants.	This	study’s	impetus	to	critique	and	step	away	from	capitalism	is	based	on	an	awareness	of	the	environmental	and	psychological	costs	of	the	economic,	military,	political,	philosophical	and	theological	systems	attendant	to	Euro-American	governance.	Capitalism	demands	inhumane	interpersonal	relationships	from	and	between	people.	Sustaining	these	behaviors	and	extending	their	debts	continues	more	of	the	same,	but	with	more	violent	means	to	bring	nature	and	the	multitude	to	heel.	Wanting	certain	Western	capitalist	ontologies	to	diminish	in	favor	of	others	is	not	the	same	as	a	desire	to	watch	things	crumble,	or	to	produce	something	conceptually	different	for	difference’s	sake.	Rather,	by	looking	towards	other	ways	with	retrospection	and	experimentation,	one	gains	a	greater	appreciation	of	what	relationality	can	achieve	when	freed	from	the	strictures	of	capitalist	accountancy	and	law.			Existent	cultural	knowledge	at	the	margins	and	other	to	Western	thought	provides	hints	as	to	how	the	human	multitude	has	collaboratively	governed	itself	seemingly	to	afford	the	stability	of	the	Holocene.	In	Davis	and	Turpin’s	book,	Mohawk	artist	and	Environmental	Studies	scholar	Laura	Hall	describes	how	she	understands	the	contingencies	of	her	people’s	creativity;	according	to	Hall,	“Indigenous	aesthetics	are	rooted	in	culture	and	community,	with	the	enmeshed	responsibilities	of	living	well	in	the	ecologies	of	our	ancestors.”	(282).	Métis	artist	Zoe	Todd	(2015)	discusses	Indigenous	Studies	scholar	Vanessa	Watts	in	a	manner	that	complements	Hall,	stating	that	“Place-Thought	is	based	upon	the	premise	that	land	is	alive	and	thinking,	and	that	humans	and	non-humans	derive	agency	through	the	extensions	of	these	thoughts.”	(245-246).	In	her	own	works,	Watts	(2013)	has	described	how	Western	
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legal	practices	gained	power	by	shaming	indigenous	actors	in	treaties,	making	them	feel	foolish	for	considering	the	voices	of	non-human	actors	within	indigenous	legal	agreements.281			A	general	conception	of	the	global	multitude	considers	the	entire	anthropology	of	governmental	forms	in	relation	to	which	that	multitude	may	have	or	might	possibly	govern	itself.	This	consideration	of	possible	anthropologies	is	not	evoked	for	revisionist	purposes;	we	cannot	simply	rewind	the	ecological	destruction	capitalism	has	caused	by	“playing	primitive”.	We	cannot	recreate	other	ways	of	being	in	the	world	as	though	life	were	a	work	of	performance	art.	The	multitude	sets	itself	in	
whatever	relation	to	things	that	themselves	are	formed	in	larger	historical,	archeological	and	environmental	accumulations.	Nevertheless,	by	looking	to	the	work	of	indigenous	scholars	such	as	Hall,	Todd,	and	Watts,	one	can	imagine	different	ways	for	human	self-governance	to	become	contingent	on	other	relations,	and	through	different	object-oriented	routes.	For	example,	Hall	highlights	how	being	in	conscious	relation	with	beings	that	are	other-than-human	organizes	different	ethical	horizons.			This	study	has	embraced	Spinoza’s	worldly	ontology,	but	it	also	recognizes	a	need	to	be	attendant	to	the	real	effects	that	Hegelian	thought	has	organized.	This	section	has	further	enriched	this	ontological	vision	by	demonstrating	how	sciences	conceptualize	ontological	and	epistemological	bindings	of	nature	and	culture	in	abstract	procedures	to	describe	how	the	capacities	for	life	are	scaffolded	together	upon	layers	of	littoral	history.	It	has	also	glimpsed	at	how	other	cultures	have	conceptualized	these	nature/culture	relations.	The	following	sections	further	investigate	how	law	and	law-likely	cultural	structures	built	upon	and	transversally																																																									
281 Introducing	her	article,	Watts	(2013	20)	succinctly	summarizes,	“that	agency	has	erroneously	become	exclusive	to	humans,	thereby	removing	non-human	agency	from	what	constitutes	a	society.	This	is	accomplished	in	part	by	mythologizing	Indigenous	origin	stories	and	separating	out	communication,	treaty-making,	and	historical	agreements	that	human	beings	held	with	the	animal	world,	the	sky	world,	the	spirit	world,	etc.”			
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connected	to	real	and	virtual	objects	and	things	to	collaborate	in	the	organization	of	life;	as	governing	regimes	bound	by	capitalist	economy,	bolstered	by	law	and	violent	force.	Law	and	law-likely	regimes	occupy	the	gap	between	the	epistemological	and	the	actual	that	is	also	occupied	with	multitudinous	activity;	because	what	is	said	to	be	is	often	not	what	must	be	nor	what	actually	happens,	even	if	it	appears	or	is	forced	to	be	otherwise.	Cultural	and	social	life	exceeds	itself,	especially	in	the	expressive	instant	–	the	material	organized	through	scaffolded	relations	makes	possible	expressions	that	appear	to	escape	whatever	logic.	(cf.	Bataille	1989,	Guattari	1995)	In	many	ways,	all	life	and	its	living	continues	to	exceed	itself,	despite	the	awareness	of	the	difficulties	that	the	changing	climate	brings,	and	despite	fears	of	death.	
 
2	Life,	law,	governance	and	death		 The	living	organism,	in	a	situation	determined	by	the	play	of	energy	on	the	surface	of	the	globe,	ordinarily	receives	more	energy	than	is	necessary	for	maintaining	life;	the	excess	energy	(wealth)	can	be	used	for	the	growth	of	a	system	(e.g.	an	organism);	if	the	system	can	no	longer	grow,	or	if	the	excess	cannot	be	completely	absorbed	in	its	growth,	it	must	necessarily	be	lost	without	profit;	it	must	be	spent,	willingly	or	not,	gloriously	or	catastrophically.	(Bataille	1949/	1989	21)			Each	human,	with	hunger	nourished	and	thirst	quenched,	possesses	more	energy	than	is	necessary	to	contain	life.	Life	exceeds	itself.	The	daily	nourishment	globally	consumed	as	food	pushes	back	the	apocalyptic	clock	that	ticks	for	the	conceptual	possibility	of	mass	starvation.	Many	objects	in	the	world	provide	real,	relational	or	ideational	nourishment	for	life,	meeting	the	interests	if	not	the	particularities	of	biological	and	social	need.	Humans	gain	a	temporary	immunity	from	death	by	engaging	in	systems	that	both	constrain	their	horizons	by	seeming	to	meet	need	within	limited	frames,	while	also	maintaining	the	possibility	that	those	horizons	may	expand	with	the	possibility	for	more	sustainance.	Within	niches,	the	objects	
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that	directly	or	indirectly	provide	for	human	need	are	the	objects	around	which	humans	individually	and	collectively	pass	their	time,	and	perhaps	also	think	through	the	reorienting	of	their	future	activities.			Human	and	non-human	life	has	what	can	be	called	a	vitality	to	it,	though	life	is	bound	by	laws	of	physics,	chemistry,	biology,	nature	and	its	own	inter-	and	intra-species	organizationality.	The	bursting	forth	of	life	in	springtime	is	a	wonder	to	behold.	Beyond	the	absolute	bare	minimum	of	existence	at	death’s	door,	each	life	overflows	with	potential	and	effort	–	a	fact	that	confronts	the	concept	of	human	animal	life	posited	in	varying	ways	by	Aristotle,	Hobbes	and	Hegel.	All	three	of	these	philosophers	draw	distinctions	between	simple	human	beings	and	those	beings	closest	to	the	interests	of	law	and	order.	Aristotle	describes	a	human	species	as	enriched	by	a	distinctly	human	spirit	whose	capacity	for	expression	is	the	task	of	those	that	fate	has	cast	in	the	role	of	society’s	rulers.	Hobbes’	sovereign	right	demonstrates	the	ethic	of	law	that	tumbles	down	from	sword	and	scepter	to	ensure	a	nation	and	nature’s	orderly	progression.	Hegel’s	philosophy	gives	to	all	men	the	capacity	for	betterment,	defined	through	a	culture	attendant	to	Western	law	and	order	that	reaches	into	all	men’s	souls.			All	three	conceptualizations	posit	a	way	for	the	human	being	to	stand	independently	from	being	human	–	in	ways	that	manifest	over	time	as	civilizational,	national	and	cultural	expression.	These	structures	are	constructed	on	the	backs	of	others	within	and	beyond	their	societies	who,	by	the	force	of	relationality	(through	marriage,	debt,	property	right,	threat	of	or	actual	use	of	force,	law	and	also	through	the	simple	fact	that	people	relate),	come	to	appear	less	than	the	interested	individuals	who	organize	or	benefit	from	these	ideal	forms	and	orders.	In	the	philosophical	West,	but	also	elsewhere,	people	are	biopolitically	inculcated	–through	law	and	order,	culture	and	tradition,	need	and	the	ways	of	working	in	society	and	at	home	–	into	processes	that	separate	them	from	their	individual	capacities	and	worldly	possibilities,	and	at	the	same	time	connected	to	the	apparently	greater	potential	of	whatever	human	
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organizationality.285	
 
2a	Law	and	myth	Upon	Aristotelian,	Hobbesian,	Hegelian	and	other	epistemological	terrains,	the	nature/culture	division	in	particular	is	buttressed	in	order	to	facilitate	the	scaffolding	of	Western	organizationality.286	In	the	light	of	those	seated	most	clearly	by	these	human	laws,	all	others	to	varying	degrees	can	be	conceptualized	as	beside	or	beyond	(cultural	or	actual)	law.	These	others	who	racially,	culturally,	sexually,	economically,	specially,	geographically	(etc.)	are	beside	or	beyond:	their	lives	have	been	qualified	according	to	Western	philosophy	as	“simple”,	“animal”	or	“bare”.	Agamben	(1998)	summarizes	one	way	in	which	others	are	conceptualized	as	simple	and	natural,	and	as	such	confined:	“simple	natural	life	is	excluded	from	the	polis	in	the	strict	sense,	and	remains	confined	–	as	merely	reproductive	life	–	to	the	sphere	of	the	oikos,	‘home’.”	(9).	Following	Aristotle’s	terminology,	Agamben	identifies	the	division	of	simple	(zoe)	from	meaningful	(bios)	life	as	the	beginning	of	sovereign,	juridico-institutional	and	biopolitical	logics	(11).	This	is	the	making	of	a	specifically	human	law	of	things,	the	identification	of	an	apparent	space	for	a	political	ontology	to	utilize	so-called	natural	forces	organized	thusly	for	“human	interests”	beside,	but	not	removed	from,	the	laws	and	effects	of	such	natural	forces.	Anthropocentrically	determined	laws	work	by	modeling	how	humanity	should	be	–	against	the	multitudinous	ways	that	humans	are	and	do	actually	relate.	The	laws’	enforcements	are	the	same	but	also	qualifiedly	different	from	how	nature	already	enforces	itself:	exposure,	isolation,	hunger,	thirst,	violence	and	the	threat	of	death	can	be	enacted	by	either	nature	or	by	people	in	nature.287																																																										
285 This	space	between	individual	potential	and	collective	capacity	is	what	Marx	(2009)	defines	as	the	space	of	alienation	and	estrangement.	For	Hegel	(1977)	this	gap	dynamic	is	expressed	as	the	dialectic	between	individual	interest	and	masterly	law.			
286 Let	there	be	a	footnote	to	acknowledge	that	other	myths	have	organized	other	systems	differently	throughout	human	history.			
287	The	experience	of	force	defines	similarity	between	the	violence	of	a	mortgage	crisis	and	a	flood.	
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	Referencing	the	infamous	Nazi	jurist	and	noted	legal	scholar	Carl	Schmitt,	Agamben	identifies	sovereign	law	as	always	contextually	established,	as	determined	by	a	sovereign	actor288	whose	founding	activity	is	outside	the	law.289	At	the	heart	of	law	is	the	lawless	act	undertaken	by	a	conquering	power	that	determines	subsequent	legal	orders	of	things	against	whatever	pre-existing	order.290	Law,	for	Schmitt	(2006),	begins	with	very	particular	founding	mythologies	about	land	–	in	his	telling	–	from	cultures	grounded	in	Eurasian	farming	techniques.	Indeed	this	myth	establishes	an	ontology	linking	nature	and	the	forces	of	law	and	governance.		First,	the	fertile	earth	contains	within	herself,	within	the	womb	of	her	fecundity,	an	inner	measure,	because	human	toil	and	trouble,	human	planting	and	cultivation	of	the	fruitful	earth	is	rewarded	justly	by	her	with	growth	and	harvest.	Every	farmer	knows	the	inner	measure	of	this	justice.		Second,	soil	that	is	cleared	and	worked	by	human	hands	manifests	firm	lines,	whereby	definite	divisions	become	apparent.	Through	the	demarcation	of	fields,	pastures,	and	forests,	these	lines	are	engraved	and	embedded.	(42)	
																																																																																																																																																																							
288 Agamben	(1998)	states,	“For	what	is	at	issue	in	the	sovereign	exception	is,	according	to	Schmitt,	the	very	condition	of	possibility	of	juridical	rule	and,	along	with	it,	the	very	meaning	of	State	authority.”	(18)			
289 This	also	goes	for	what	can	be	named	“natural	laws”	–	in	that	the	events	of	nature	occur	in	advance	of	their	recognition	and	naming	by	interested	parties.				
290	Agamben	(1998	17)	quotes	Schmitt:	“There	is	no	rule	that	is	applicable	to	chaos.	Order	must	be	established	for	juridical	order	to	make	sense.	A	regular	situation	must	be	created,	and	sovereign	is	he	who	definitely	decides	if	this	situation	is	actually	effective.	All	law	is	‘situational	law.’”				
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	Schmitt’s	Nomos	of	the	Earth	is	a	partisan	history	of	Eurocentric	international	law	that	sets	the	terms	for	the	post-World	War	II	American	global	order.	Schmitt	is	brutally	clear	that	law	is	based	on	the	justifications	and	divisions	of	the	spoils	of	conquest,	as	extended	over	time.291	He	is	also	clear	about	his	mythological	allegiances292	to	the	political	meanings	of	Roman	Christendom.	(57–62)	These	meanings	provide	governmental	justification	for	much	of	the	results	of	competing	European	legal	claims	spilling	out	over	the	annals	of	human	history.	An	embrace	of	myth	such	as	Schmitt’s	represents	a	law-likely	establishment	of	common	sense,	of	the	socialization	of	the	cultural	for	particular	governmental	ends.	In	order	to	explain	the	law,	Schmitt	naturalizes	the	birth	of	governance,	as	conceived	on	Christian	land	for	specific	human	use:	“the	earth	is	bound	to	law	in	three	ways.	She	contains	law	within	herself,	as	a	reward	of	labor;	she	manifests	law	upon	herself,	as	fixed	boundaries;	and	she	sustains	law	above	herself,	as	a	sign	of	public	order.	Law	is	bound	to	the	earth	and	related	to	the	earth.”	(42)			All	variation	that	stands	in	and	as	questions	against	this	(or	any)	law	are	multitude.	In	the	event	of	animal	or	bare	life,	the	multitude’s	being	is	superfluous	to	his	patriarchal	and	given	(by	his	own	judgment)	legal	order.	The	ethic	of	law	and	the	brutality	it	distributes	as	clearly	delineated	common	sense,	enforceable	by	state	and	interested	private	actors	is	what	is	of	interest	for	the	cultural	policy	of	the																																																									
291 “In	every	case,	land-appropriation,	both	internally	and	externally,	is	the	primary	legal	title	that	underlies	all	subsequent	law.”	(Schmitt	2006	46)			
292 In	the	introduction	to	Nomos,	Schmitt	gives	thanks	to	geographer	and	geo-strategist	Halford	John	Mackinder	–likely	because	of	Mackinder’s	joining	together	of	a	global	political	view	with	a	materialist	view	of	the	way	in	which	the	territorial	distribution	of	fertile	land	drives	history.	In	his	brief	introductory	comment,	Schmitt	(2006	7–38)	thanks	Mackinder’s	reasoning,	then	makes	his	mythological	exception:	“I	am	much	indebted	to	geographers,	most	of	all	to	Mackinder.	Nevertheless,	a	juridical	way	of	thinking	is	far	different	from	geography.	Jurists	have	not	learned	their	science	of	matter	and	soil,	reality	and	territoriality	from	geographers.	The	concept	of	sea	appropriation	has	the	stamp	of	a	jurist	not	a	geopolitician…	The	ties	to	mythological	sources	of	jurisprudential	thinking	are	much	deeper	than	those	to	geography.”			
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multitudes.	Despite	Schmitt’s	clear	and	ethical	admissions,	it	must	be	remembered	that	the	author	of	these	statements	made	legal	cover	for	the	Nazi	regime.	All	law	is	backed	up	by	some	brutality.	This	study	has	no	specific	interest	in	Schmitt’s	legal	thought	other	than	how	it	might	transparently	reveal	Western	law’s	affects.		Law	is	the	binding	of	interested	human	judgment	(governance	that	he	names	as	myth)	besides	forceful	geo-bio-social	entanglements	(in	this	instance	state,	police,	property,	work	and	distribution	networks).	Law	is	written	upon	some	activity	that	happened	in	advance	of	law	(Schmitt	names	this	an	act	of	theft	or	appropriation).	Laws	are	the	enforceable	mythologizations	of	some	body’s	sovereign	sense	of	things.	Law	is	cultural.		As	culture	has	law-likely	affects,	this	study	understands	that	a	cultural	policy	of	the	multitude	collaborates	in	the	production	of	law-likely	objects	in	relation	to	which	the	multitude	may	govern	itself.	Recognizing	Schmitt,	Agamben	(1998)	identifies	the	power	of	making	law	from	its	grounding	in	lawlessness	as	the	“sovereign	exception”.	“In	this	sense,	the	sovereign	exception	is	the	fundamental	localization	(Ortung),	which	does	not	limit	itself	to	distinguishing	what	is	inside	from	what	is	outside	but	instead	traces	a	threshold	(the	state	of	exception)	between	the	two…”	The	power	of	law	is	its	enforceability,	or	its	continued	and	interested	enforcement	based	upon	distinctions	it	makes	between	its	own	activity	(whether	actually	lawful	or	not)	and	all	others	who	must,	against	some	threat	of	force	remain	on	its	good	side.	Law’s	nature	is	both	rigid	(as	law)	and	permeable	(as	founded	upon	no	law)	in	relation	to	the	fluidity	of	life;	as	law	it	extends	itself	seamlessly	over	or	into	whatever	variable	situation.	This	is	law’s	own	unaccountable	sociality.	It	lawfully	lawless	operation	is	what	allows	it	to	stand,	“on	the	basis	of	which	outside	and	inside,	the	normal	situation	and	chaos,	enter	into	those	complex	topological	relations	that	make	the	validity	of	the	juridical	order	possible.”	(9)	Here,	it	is	useful	to	be	reminded	of	Fanon’s	existential	self-alienation	under	Western	law,	and	acknowledge	that	there	will	be	populations	outside	of	whatever	law	or	culture.	The	validation	of	law’s	juridical	order	is	not	merely	in	court,	but	also	within	the	intimate	realm	of	social	life	and	thought	where	it	may	or	may	not	provide	definitional	logics	that	organize	daily	
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sociality	as	common	sense	that	harkens	back	to	law’s	originary	appropriations	and	theft.			Against	bare	life293	speculation,	Black	Studies	scholar	Alexander	Weheliye	(2014)	proposes	an	understanding	of	being	that	refuses	definitions	of	a	life	impoverished	in	relation	to	that	which	is	sovereign.			 The	particular	assemblage	of	humanity	under	purview	here	is	habeas	viscus,	which,	in	contrast	to	bare	life,	insists	on	the	importance	of	miniscule	movements,	glimmers	of	hope,	scraps	of	food,	the	interrupted	dreams	of	freedom	found	in	those	spaces	deemed	devoid	of	full	human	life	(Guantanamo	Bay,	internment	camps,	maximum	security	prisons,	Indian	reservations,	concentration	camps,	slave	plantations,	or	colonial	outposts,	for	instance).	Beyond	the	dominion	of	the	law,	biopolitics,	and	bare	life	they	represent	alternative	critical,	political,	and	poetic	assemblages	that	are	often	hushed	in	these	debates.	(16)		For	Agamben,	a	danger	of	conceptualizing	power	with	concepts	like	bare	life	is	that	under	such	law	the	sovereign	power	finds	ways	to	organize	the	multitudinous	world	to	the	exclusion	of	multitudinous	interests.294	Different	in	voice	and	tone	than	the	territories	given	to	law	and	bare	life	law	that	Agamben	describes	in	Homo	Sacer,	the	realm	he	describes	in	the	Coming	Community	(1993)	appears	enchanted	by	metaphysical	thought	that	weaves	possibilities	for	transformation.	As	discussed	in																																																									
293 “Nevertheless,	until	a	completely	new	politics	–	that	is,	a	politics	no	longer	founded	on	the	exception	of	bare	life	–	is	at	hand,	every	theory	and	every	praxis	will	remain	imprisoned	and	immobile,	and	the	‘beautiful	day’	of	life	will	be	given	citizenship	only	either	through	blood	and	death	or	in	the	perfect	senselessness	to	which	the	society	of	the	spectacle	condemns	it.”	(Agamben	1998	13)			
294 “It	can	even	be	said	that	the	production	of	a	biopolitical	body	is	the	original	activity	of	sovereign	power.”	(Agamben	1998	11)			
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Chapter	1,	whatever	stands	regardless	of	how	law	relationally	connects	whatever	thoughts	to	singular	universal	nominations.	For	Agamben,	the	good	of	words	are	that	they	innately	reveal	paths	to	all	knowledge,	rather	than	to	final	thought	or	to	data	points.	Words,	by	their	nature	bridge	the	particularities	of	utterance	with	the	universal	potential	for	translation	and	understanding.	Thus,	Debord’s	“spectacular	phantasmagoria”(79)	speaks	to	the	law-likely	risk	that	a	word	“be	separated	from	what	it	reveals	and	acquire	an	autonomous	consistency.	Revealed	and	manifested	(and	hence	common	and	shareable)	being	is	separated	from	the	thing	revealed	and	stands	between	it	and	humans.”	(81).	The	phantasmagoria	is	that	whatever’s	meaning	has	been	affectively	impoverished	by	the	law-likely	demands	of	capitalist	relation,	occluding	actual	relationality	in	favor	of	the	spectacle’s	profit.			
Whatever	things	appear	as	singular,	not	Chthulucenic.	Bridging	law,	language,	and	its	enforcement	by	state	and	interested	private	actors;	this	is	how	law-likely	culture,	today	attendant	to	capitalism,	organizes	and	scaffolds	nature	within	the	seemingly	human	realm.	The	nature/culture	divide	that	law	describes	is	straddled	by	both	law	and	the	other,	but	in	different	ways.	The	other	conforms	to	law	or	fails	and	remains	in	the	eyes	of	the	law	as	animal	or	as	simply	human,	expendable.	Whereas	the	law	straddles	the	world	that	is	both	human	and	nature	and	makes	of	it	what	it	will.	The	ultimate	achievement	of	the	spectacle	is	that	it	can	“now	manipulate	collective	perception	and	take	control	of	social	memory	and	social	communication,	transforming	them	into	a	single	spectacular	commodity	where	everything	can	be	called	into	question	except	the	spectacle	itself,	which,	as	such,	says	nothing	but,	‘What	appears	is	good,	what	is	good	appears’."	(80)	In	that	way,	though	the	multitude	always	only	exists	in	governmental	relation	to	itself	through	the	objects	it	creates,	this	contemporary	state	stands	as	an	inverse	of	the	ideal	of	the	multitude	managing	its	affairs.	This	is	because	of	how,	through	post-Fordism,	lawly	and	law-likely	finance,	regulation,	and	the	spectacle	of	cultural	and	social	being	(backed	up	by	the	police	and	the	military)	objectively	stand	to	dispossess	the	human	sociality	that	would	be	the	multitude	in	actual	governmental	self-relation.	Rather	than	being	for	itself,	social	relations	contingent	to	capital	oblige	governing	myth	in	the	production	
	 248	
of	something	spectacularly,	if	only	slightly,	different.		
 
 2b	Governance	and	end	times	In	the	time	of	dominant	capitalism,	the	fallacy	of	Malthusian	thought	is	exposed	by	the	scales	for	life	that	human	organizationality	has	constructed.	Human	organizationality	is	able	to	accommodate	its	own	life.	Nevertheless,	through	the	nature	of	ecology,	economy,	political	economy,	history	etc.,	much	of	human	organizationality	is	precariously	positioned	in	collaboration	with	law	and	the	world	to	hold	life	in	particular	ways,	to	restrictively	afford	for	certain	outcomes.	This	is	the	“rabbit	hole”	that	Chakrabarty	identifies.	A	commonly	expressed	outcome	of	human	arrangements	as	we	know	them	is	profit	(for	the	few);	another	is	for	the	multitude’s	continued	subjugation	and	treatment	as	expendable.	In	this	way,	the	multitude	is	outside	of	law	but	subject	to	it.	In	terms	of	actual	systematicity	and	political	ecology,	the	rapid	and	violent	collapse	of	earthly	systems	would	likely	be	catastrophic,	especially	for	the	poor.312	Regardless	of	law,	life	right	now	depends	on	what	is	ordered	right	now.	As	the	Paris	Climate	Agreement	(and	its	governing	critics	in	the	United	States)	demonstrates,	capitalism	and	the	current	order	find	governmental	justification	for	their	lawful	continuance	within	this	bind.	To	expand	upon	this	point,	as	well	as	the	previous	chapter’s	discussion	via	Aristotle	of	the	differences	between	leadership	and	governance,	it	is	instructive	to	look	now	to	the	nature	of	the	difference	between	law	and	governance	according	to	the	following	comments	made	by	philosopher	Roberto	Esposito	(2011):	The	monarch	is	both	the	whole	and	the	part,	the	body	and	its	head,	his	body	and	all	the	bodies	that	are	part	of	it	in	the	form	of	limbs,	like	the	frontispiece	image	of	the	first	English	edition	of	Leviathan:	a	macrobody	formed	by	the	interconnection	of	many	bodies	fitted	together	like	plated	armor.	A	body	made	immortal	by	the	sum,	or	product,	of	infinite	mortality;	an	order	made	to	endure	by	the	sacrifice	of	all	those	who	are	at	the	same	time	both	its	subjects	and	subjugated	by	it.	(71)																																																									
312	See,	for	example,	Brown	(2007),	IPCC	(2014).		
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	That	which	subjugates	the	multitudinous	body	is	law	governed	over	by	a	head	in	its	exceptionality	and	exclusivity	to	others.	Nevertheless,	bound	to	the	nature	of	the	world,	the	head	is	just	a	part	of	the	body.	On	the	theological	nature	of	such	governmental	relations,	Esposito	writes,	“This	is	how	political	theology	accomplishes	and	perfects	the	ancient	function	of	the	katechon:	by	including	the	principle	of	exclusion	or	by	normalizing	the	exception.”	(71)	The	katechon	–	the	force	that	holds	back	the	apocalypse313	–	is	a	useful	way	to	think	through	the	governmental	justifications	for	its	own	existence,	and	in	the	time	of	climate	change.	Governance	here	is	the	space	between	laws	and	their	application,	and	is	necessary	so	that	the	system	doesn’t	bring	its	own	downfall.		It	is	a	historic	conceptualization,	and	thus	Schmitt	(2006)	points	towards	the	historic	claims	made	by	early	theologians	and	rulers	that	the	European	order	is	katechonic,	by	highlighting	how	the	European	legal	system	was	conceptualized	for	the	maintenance	of	Christian	governmental	promises314	and	a	particular	social	stability	rather	than	for	the	production	of	grounds	for	its	own	end-times.			Consistent	with	this	concept	of	the	European	Christian	tradition’s	anointed	nature	of	rightly	governance	is	the	notion	of	secular	governance;	that	while	leaders	might	work	under	or	towards	godly	order,	they	serve	in	a	worldly	manner.	This	dualism	is	of	a	piece	with	the	nature/culture	division,	the	distinctions	between	zoe	and	bios																																																									
313 “[T]he	katechon	restrains	evil	by	containing	it,	by	keeping	it,	by	holding	it	within	itself.	It	confronts	evil,	but	from	within,	by	hosting	it	and	welcoming	it,	to	the	point	of	binding	its	own	necessity	to	the	presence	of	evil.”	(Esposito	2011	63)			
314 Schmitt	(2006	59)	begins	his	chapter	on	governing	concepts	in	relation	to	the	Katechon	thusly:	“The	unity	of	this	respublica	Christiana	had	its	adequate	succession	of	order	in	imperium	[empire]	and	sacerdotium	[priesthood];	its	visible	agents,	in	emperor	and	pope.	The	attachment	to	Rome	signified	a	continuation	of	ancient	orientations	adopted	by	the	Christian	faith.	The	history	of	the	Middle	Ages	is	thus	the	history	of	a	struggle	for,	not	against	Rome.	The	constitution	of	the	army	of	the	march	to	Rome	was	that	of	the	German	monarchy.	The	continuity	that	bound	medieval	international	law	to	the	Roman	Empire	was	found	not	in	norms	and	general	ideas,	but	in	the	concrete	orientation	to	Rome.”				
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that	allow	for	both	common	unqualified	life	and	a	proper	way	of	being	that	need	not	be	common	property.	The	political	functionality	of	this	mode	of	governance	is	that	it	obfuscates	actual	mundane	behaviors,	mundane	and	gross	interests,	behind	a	veil	of	anthro-theological	thought	that	is	openly	revealed	as	both	meaningless	and	very	important.315				Secularity	provides	a	contemporary	concept	for	governance	–	that	is,	Christianity	generalizes	a	book	of	laws	by	which	all	people,	rather	than	just	a	chosen	people316	should	be	governed.	Governed,	and	also	judged.	Besides	allowing	for	the	revelation	of	concepts	for	governmental	(rather	than	theological)	idealism,	secularity	makes	political	certain	forms	of	human	behavior	while	allowing	other	forms	to	just	appear	as	debates	around	common	sense.	Regardless	of	the	fact	that	these	differences	are	being	drawn	over	one	body.	Within	secularity	and	the	spectacle,	the	fact	of	death	is	transformed	from	a	mystery	to	be	cared	for,	to	become	just	another	fact	of	life.317	Aiming	to	conceptualize	something	different,	Agamben	(2005)	describes	distinctions	between	law	of	the	Roman	era	and	since,	and	prelaw	that	came	before,	as	the	“prejuridical	sphere	in	which	magic,	religion,	and	law	are	absolutely																																																									
315 Agamben	reminds	readers	that	the	Schmittian	thesis	on	political	theology	is	"the	most	meaningful	concepts	of	the	modern	doctrine	of	the	State	are	secularized	theological	concepts."	(118)			
316 This	is	first	in	reference	to	the	Jewish	Torah	becoming	a	text	common	to	all	peoples	of	the	Christian	world.	Then	it	is	in	reference	to	constitutions	and	written	legal	codes	for	general	populations	and	modern	states.		
 
317 On	the	loss	of	the	grip	that	death	once	had	over	life,	Foucault	(2003	248)	writes,	“Now	that	power	is	decreasingly	the	power	to	the	right	to	take	life,	and	increasingly	the	right	to	intervene	to	make	live,	or	once	power	begins	to	intervene	mainly	at	this	level	in	order	to	improve	life	by	eliminating	accidents,	the	random	element	and	deficiencies,	death	becomes,	insofar	as	it	is	the	end	of	life,	the	term,	the	limit,	or	the	end	of	power	too…	And	to	that	extent,	it	is	only	natural	that	death	should	now	be	privatized,	and	should	become	the	most	private	thing	of	all.”				 See	also,	Plessner	(1958).			
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indiscernible	from	one	another”	(114).	In	relation	to	this	distinction	between	law	and	prelaw	and	the	head	and	the	body,	it	is	tempting	to	think	that	prelaw	describes	the	terrain	of	the	multitude	in	self-governance,	where	common	human	relationality	to	both	natural	and	human-natural	law	acts	in	self-governance	rather	than	by,	with	and	through	governmental	order.	It	is	also	tempting	to	see	this	state	of	prelaw	as	sharing	some	qualities	with	both	the	biblical	times	of	the	Second	Coming	or	the	time	of	the	universal	Spirit.318		It	is	tempting	to	see	prelaw	as	the	inversion	of	the	spectacle,	or	as	the	proper	state	for	the	multitude	in	ecological	relation	to	its	own	being	as	self-governance.	Yet,	one	of	several	reasons	for	hesitation	before	this	thought	concerns	the	inversion’s	consistency	with	the	philosophical	ends	of	dialectical	social	imaginaries.	Moreover,	Agamben’s	description	of	this	state	law	is	in	relation	to	messianic	and	apocalyptic	fears	of	Western	history;	in	relation	to	final	and	mysterious	ends.	Roman	law	and	governing	structures	that	develop	and	are	continued	after	the	fall	of	Rome	are	conceptualized	as	the	katechon,	holding	back	whatever	forces	that	came	before	and	will	come	after.	“The	katechon	is	therefore	the	force	–	the	Roman	Empire	as	well	as	every	constituted	authority	–	that	clashes	with	and	hides	katargesis	[end	times],	the	state	of	tangential	lawlessness	that	characterizes	the	messianic,	and	in	this	sense	delays	unveiling	the	‘mystery	of	lawlessness.’	The	unveiling	of	this	mystery	entails	bringing	to	light	the	inoperativity	of	the	law	and	the	substantial	illegitimacy	of	each	and	every	power	in	messianic	time.”	(111)	In	messianic	times,	the	self-interests	of	each	being	are	revealed,	and	either	left	aside	so	that	the	lion	can	lay	down	with	the	lamb,	or	allowed	to	take	on	a	force	of	their	own.	Within	Judeo-Christian	traditions,	end-times	and	the	apocalypse	fall,	eschatologically,	into	the	territory	of	the	Final	Judgment	–	a	familiar	affective	territory	for	climate	change	fears.		Yet	the	apocalypse	is	only	the	last	chapter	of	a	book.	Existence	in	the	so-called	mystery	of	lawlessness	is	a	constant	throughout	history	for	anyone	standing	beside																																																									
318 In	the	Hegelian	sense.			
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and	beyond	any	government’s	good	graces.	Since	the	beginning	of	time,	people	(the	multitude)	have	existed	under	the	thumb	of	governance	and	outside	of	law’s	protection.	The	ecological	and	eco-social	trauma	of	the	Columbian	experience	represents,	for	example,	500	years	of	two	continents’	populations	outliving	their	supposed	demise.	Insofar	as	humanity	and	others	live	in	ways	that	precede	and	exceed	this	severely	limited	frame	of	judgment,	humanity	is	not	to	be	simply	judged	through	a	reversal	of	Eurocentric	and	Judeo-Christian	order.	The	order	of	human	behavior	and	sociality	in	the	world	is	more	complex	than	simple	dialectic	moves	between	the	ideal	and	the	fallen.		
 
2c	Force,	judgment	and	particular	judgment	Whoever,	like	Weheliye,	encounters	a	life	with	their	agency	always	already	surrendered	to	the	state	or	that	exists	irretrievably	beyond	the	laws	of	men,	has	existed	outside	of	the	law.	Nevertheless,	life	is	written	throughout	with	thought	and	expression	that	steels	against	any	apparent	state	of	affairs	towards	what	comes	next	–	in	latent	relation	to	incalculable	pasts	and	multitudinously	imaginable	future	historicals.319	Everyone	and	everything’s	life	is	just	in	relation	to	its	ends	and	to	its	continuing	existence	–	even	though	both	means	and	ends	are	subject	to	judgment,	which	comes	from	every	direction.	In	the	praxis	of	life	wherever	lived	is	a	relationship	to	the	wider	world	that	is	also	embedded	in	variable	relations,	rather	than	simply	fixed	final	ends	and	judgments.	There	is	never	any	reason	to	die	in	this	or	that	way,	no	requirement	for	total	acquiescence	to	what	might	be	fate,	or	to	contractual	and	legal	relation.	And	there	is	no	requirement	to	feel	this	way	or	that	about	how	things	are	or	how	they	went.	Judgment	is	ultimately	free.	Memories,	dreams	and	silent	projections	upon	other	ways	of	being	in	relation	can	hardly	be	criminalized,	and	only	in	the	most	brutal	of	regimes	are	furtive	glances	punishable																																																									
319 Here	it	is	useful	to	concretely	acknowledge	the	nature	of	both	linear	and	circular	time,	and	the	distinct	roles	that	these	two	conceptions	of	the	passing	of	materiality	over	temporality	relate	to	the	nature	of	the	conceptualization	of	human	being.	See,	for	example	Plessner	(1958).					
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offences.	The	clinical	indistinction	between	simple	exhaustion	and	clinical	depression320	suggests	that	there	exists	temporal	recesses	for	critique	and	planning	between	exhaustion	and	medical	diagnosis.321	Simply	put,	scenarios	driven	by	climate	change	that	appear	end-time-like	are	not.	Mass-extinction	in	no	way	suggests	the	need	for	the	law-likely	affects	attached	to	stories	in	old	books,	or	for	that	matter	in	new	ones.322		With	regards	the	multitudinous	response	to	the	law	and	law-likely	forces	of	natural	and	human-natural	governances,	it	is	useful	to	remember	that	a	difference	between	ecosystemic	law	and	the	multitude	is	the	multitudinous	affordance	of	social	and	psychological	flexibility	outside	of	apparent	nature.	Ecosystemic	law	acts	as	it	does,	while	the	multitude	relates	in	degrees	of	variation.	While	governing	force	may	act	by	its	capacities	or	desires	to	harm	the	multitude,	the	multitude	also	avoids,	observes	and	is	just	effected	differently	by	force.	In	the	world’s	order	and	disorder,	however,	the	human	multitude	has	been	and	will	be	definitionally	flexible	in	relation	to	itself	and	in	nature.323	The	multitude	collaborates	to	create	other	cultural	ways.	If,	as	
																																																								
320 See	Surova,	Galina	&	Ulke,	Christine	&	Hegerl,	Ulrich	(2017)	for	a	discussion	of	the	proximity	between	exhaustion	and	depression.		
321 See	Harney	&	Moten	(2013).		
 
322 This	comment	refers	to	the	Old	and	New	Testaments	of	the	Bible.			
323 Ecological	Philosopher	Gregory	Bateson	(1987)	argues	that	any	advanced	society	must	have	an	inbuilt	conceptual	flexibility	so	that	it	does	not	consume	irreplaceable	resources	that	should	only	be	used	in	order	to	adapt	to	unpredictable	change	(500).				 Art	Historian	T.	J.	Demos	(2009)	follows	Bateson’s	point,	in	favor	of	artistic	responses	to	climate	change.	In	relation	to	Bateson's	theorization	of	ecology	as	the	intertwined	relations	of	planetary	biology,	technology,	sociology	and	politics,	Demos	argues	that	Bateson’s	theorization	was	“capable	of	opening	up	a	range	of	artistic	practices	dedicated	to	the	complex	interlinking	of	biological,	technological,	social	and	political	ecologies	that	construct	an	‘environment’	that	can	no	longer	be	considered	simply	as	‘natural’,	and	where	any	‘output’,	according	to	the	operations	of	cybernetic	feedback,	was	simultaneously	understood	to	affect	the	working	of	the	system.”	(21)	In	this	sense,	Historical	thought	is	in	itself	natural	and	has	ecological	impact.			
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Agamben	says,	the	concept	of	sovereign	order	can	also	be	conceptualized	as	the	birth	of	biopolitics,	then	biopolitics	can	be	multitudinously	re-interpreted	(here,	foolishly)	as	the	interested	management	of	terrestrial	life	by	and	in	the	interests	of	the	sun	that	rules	in	exclusion	to	all	life,	as	the	sun	dominates	but	is	disinterested	in	its	earthly	relations:	A	constant	fact	of	behavioral	governance	is	that	human	life	always	exists	in	relation	to	any	variety	of	powerful	“universal”	forces:	the	sun,	chemistry,	capitalism.	The	biopolitical	relation	can	be	queered	to	extend	life’s	meaningful	relations	in	ways	that	support	other	ways	of	judging	the	human-biological	system324	–	life	is	a	regulated	activity	even	within	itself.325	The	diversity	of	theologies	over	the	course	of	human	history	immediately	demonstrates	how	the	above	example	is	more	than	just	heliocentric	play.		Leaving	sovereign	interests	behind	–	across	the	multitude’s	quotidian	lives,	affective	relations	understood	by	the	effects	of	hunger,	or	embodied	following	a	nasty	encounter	with	the	police,	can	be	described	as	relating	to	the	regulatory	effects	of	individual	and	common	sense.	Though	there	are	justifiable	reasons	for	ignoring	common	sense,	it	is	variable	common	sense	to	avoid	both	hunger	and	a	police	officer’s	swinging	baton.		The	ease	by	which	common	sense	judgments	afford	human																																																									
324 Concurring	with	this	analysis,	Foucauldian	scholar	Maria	Muhle	(2014)	states:	“On	the	other	hand,	the	specificity	of	the	biopolitical	techniques	lies	in	the	positive	and	not	repressive	relation	to	life	and	in	the	fact	that	such	techniques	are	intrinsic	and	not	exterior	to	its	object.	Biopolitical	techniques	increase,	protect,	and	regulate	life	–	in	short,	they	“make	live.”	And	they	do	so	by	infiltrating	the	processes	of	life	(instead	of	suppressing	or	submitting	them)	in	order	to	govern	or	to	rule	them	from	the	inside.”	(79)	Surely	the	sun	has	a	positive	governing	effect	on	life,	and	is	generally	unrivalled	in	terms	of	its	power	over	the	earth.			
325 This	is	in	particular	a	reference	to	Agamben’s	(1999)	essay,	Absolute	Immanence,	which	works	through	Deleuze’s	definition	of	life	which	is	“desire's	self-constitution		as	desiringly	blessed.”	(237)	Via	Deleuze,	Agamben	defines	life	through	singularities	that	push	from	the	beginnings	of	a	Spinozan	existence,	embracing	being’s	ability	in	itself	(as	a	singularity	that	is	aware	of	itself)	to	contain	the	possibilities	for	life.	This	study	is	in	agreement	with	Agamben	and	Delueze’s	sentiment	here	only	to	the	extent	that	life	is	understood	as	a	relational	project,	that	takes	relationality	and	being	with	something	as	a	way	of	defining	desire.			
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avoidance	of	the	most	brutal	terrestrial	violence	(thirst,	hunger,	being	run	over	by	moving	traffic)	sublimates	responses	to	the	root	causalities	of	violence	over	time.	For	example,	if	it	is	common	sense	to	avoid	oncoming	cars,	there	may	be	no	sense	in	banning	automobile	traffic	on	the	grounds	that	someone	might	walk	out	into	traffic	and	be	killed.	Humans	avoid	threats	while,	variably,	keeping	them	in	mind.	The	same	goes	for	moving	towards	pleasant,	nice	and	good	things.326	That	natural	and	human-natural	governance	is	made	apparent	by	the	nature	of	their	forces	and	effects,	rather	than	beside	the	multitude’s	seemingly	vitalistic	capacity	to	survive	however,	is	its	judgmental	ability	to	order	what	and	in	what	modes	of	governance	it	can	or	must	accept.	In	its	own	time,	the	individual	and	collective	multitude	orders	the	facts	of	life	and	judges	what	facts	and	things	it	privileges	as	how	it	would	like	to	be	governed.	In	its	own	time,	in	relation	to	governmental	failure,	the	multitude	recognizes	that	its	affection	is	systemic	and	that	it	works	socially,	in	ways	exemplified	by	the	PAH,	to	reorder	facts	of	life	and	governance	–	regardless	of	what	the	dominant	culture	and	extant	formal	governance	suggests.		Consequential	to	the	facts	of	organizing	life	everywhere	in	the	time	of	climate	change,	Foucault’s	essay	Life,	Experience	and	Science	(1998),	helps	provide	a	critical	frame	to	these	deliberations.	The	essay	is	a	forward	for	Foucault’s	teacher	Georges	Canguilhem’s	(1978)	The	Normal	and	the	Pathological.		For	both	thinkers,	there	are	always	cultural	components	attendant	to	the	sciences’	judgments.	Within	The	
Normal,	Canguilhem	writes,	“Normative,	in	the	fullest	sense	of	the	word,	is	that	which	establishes	norms...”	(1978	70–71)	His	work	describes	how	historians	of	science	narrate	the	varying,	multi-directional,	and	dead-end	histories	of	biological	sciences	whose	approaches	nevertheless	appeared	in	their	time	as	normal.	Foucault	insists	that	it	is	not	“possible	to	constitute	a	science	of	the	living	without	taking	into	account,	as	something	essential	to	its	object,	the	possibility	of	disease,	death,	
																																																								
326 It	is	common	sense	to	respond	positively	to	desirous	things,	though	there	are	also	reasons	to	also	not	prioritize	all	good	things	all	the	time.	The	notion	of	nice	things	can	be	understood	as	relating	to	the	effect	of	desire	as	discussed	in	Spinoza’s	Ethics.		
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monstrosity,	anomaly,	and	error.”	(Foucault	1998	474)	All	people	die;	what	is	important	about	normativity	is	its	relation	to	varied	rather	than	fixed	concepts.	Rather	than	developing	over	one	fixed	line,	life	invariably	relates	in	changing	environments	through	changing	conceptions.	This	fact	relates	to	the	variability	of	what	is	internalized	or	externalized	by	the	katechon	or	by	the	niche	to	manage	its	relations	to	gain	immunity	in	time.327	For	Canguilhem	and	Foucault	the	practices	of	living	in	one	era	are	framed	by	multitudinous	frameworks	that	in	other	eras	seem	monstrous	or	foolish	and	in	relation	to	some	undesirable	manner	of	death.	Relational	thought	intended	to	orient	positive	practice	reveals	itself	as	responsive	to	processes	that	do	come	to	ends	regardless,	as	life	continues	anyhow	–	until	it	doesn’t.	For	Foucault,	the	histories	of	reparative	thoughts	must	continually	define	interested	being	which	includes	the	ends	of	life.	Though	this	study	is	disinterested	in	succinct	end-time	considerations,	Foucault’s	thoughts	demonstrate	how	end-time	considerations	are	both	particular	and	multitudinous	as	a	constant	and	moving	target	across	time.			Climate	change	appears	within	the	context	for	the	consideration	of	operative	margins	for	both	common	and	multitudinous	practice	and	being.	This	consideration	asks	upon	what	grounds	is	multitudinous	life	desirable	and	not	just	possible.	The	multitude	is	a	given,	its	presence	is	never	in	question;	and	its	marginal	relation	to	natural	or	more	variable	human	law	is	what	matters	here.	Common	sense	has	it	that	forces	entangled	within	capitalist	management	will	provide	ground	for	human	being	for	some	time	while	dealing	horror	to	the	planet	and	the	multitude.	For	Foucault,	the	evaluations	of	life	share	concerns	with	the	ends	of	the	Enlightenment	and	the	questions	that	attend	these	ends.	The	evaluations	of	life	also	deal	with	the	power	invested	in	judgment.	For	this	study,	talking	about	life’s	means	and	ends	is	not	a	project	done	on	high,	but	rather	a	common	and	multitudinous	project	proper,	as	posited	by	Weheliye.328	Foucault	follows	Canguilhem’s	process	of	evaluating	the																																																									
327 This also relates to the nature/culture divide.		
328 In	language	similar	to	Wynter’s	(Wynters	&	McKittrick	2015)	where	“Man2”	represents	
	 257	
success	of	science’s	rational	employment	of	thought	to	forward	humanity’s	objective	position	in	the	world.	Foucault	recognizes	that	his	teacher	is	tasked	to	judge	humanity’s	many	practices	of	living	with	its	capacities	to	technically	govern	and	improve	these	processes.	And	yet,	rather	than	laying	some	definition	of	ideal	life	against	some	definition	of	normal	life	to	see	how	rational	thought	has	fared	over	time,	Foucault	describes	an	epistemology	upon	which	to	totally	judge	the	effects	of	human	governmentality’s	leadership	can	be	totally	judged:	“life	–	and	this	is	its	radical	feature	–	is	that	which	is	capable	of	error.”(Foucault	1998	476)		As	it	moves	towards	its	conclusions,	this	study	arrives	at	a	term	of	judgment	for	a	cultural	policy	of	the	multitude.		A	capacity	for	error	is	a	qualitative	analytic	through	which	cultural	work	attendant	to	the	margins	of	the	multitude	in	the	time	of	climate	change	should	be	judged.	It	is	qualitative	because	the	terms	of	what	multitudinous	errors	can	be	allowed	are	up	for	multitudinous	debate.	The	PAH	demonstrates	how	the	marginally	social	can	find	systemic	forgiveness	where	other	governing	forces	cannot.	Having	forgiveness	(for	debt,	etc.)	is	one	way	that	society	permits	capacity	for	error.	Human	capacities	for	error	and	forgiveness	are	understood	as	having	ethical	and	economic	implications	for	sociality	within	the	multitudes	into	the	variable	structures	of	cultural	and	law-like	life.	It	is	also	a	useful	frame	for	evaluating	human	governmental	force	in	relation	to	climate	change.		By	following	the	PAH,	this	study’s	synthetic	privileging	of	social	movements	already	posits	a	judgment.	On	a	political	level,	this	study	supports	a	sociality	that	works	through	common	notions	to	effect	law-likely	effects	of	the	cultural	–	in	relationship	to	governance	in	common	rather	than	isolated	as	the	governing	force.	Common	notions,	proper	to	the	multitude	can	socially	define	needs	in	relation	to	what	is																																																																																																																																																																						the	Western	ideal	of	personhood,	Weheliye	(2014	82)	asks,	“What	does	hunger	outside	the	world	of	Man	feel	like?	Is	it	a	different	hunger,	or	just	the	same	as	the	famines	created	by	racializing	assemblages	that	render	the	human	isomorphic	with	Man?	How	do	we	describe	the	sweetness	that	reclines	in	the	hunger	for	survival?”					
	 258	
actually	governable.	Rather	than	seeing	life	as	immanent	to	itself,	following	Agamben	(1999),	this	study	understands	that	by	the	nature	of	our	world,	life	is	in	no	way	bound	in	a	needy	relation	to	any	singular	thing,	isolated	besides	that	to	which	it	must	variably	relate	ecologically,	biologically	and	sociologically.	Relations	are	not	only	written	in	contract	between	being	and	its	own	possibility,	or	between	citizen	and	president,	king	or	slave.	Relational	needs	are	bound	in	habits	and	exchanges	between	neighbors,	friends	and	partisans,	between	the	humans	and	their	food	and	the	rivers	that	flush	out	to	the	sea.	Relations	exist	as	contracts	for	futures,	as	secrets	told	to	comrades,	in	visions	of	ancestors	or	of	children	seven	generations	to	come.	Capacitating	relational	systems	with	psychological	and	actual	space	of	possibility	and	forgiveness	for	error	forwards	life	in	meaningful	ways,	even	through	death.			This	second	section	has	established	the	distinctions	between	law,	government,	and			judgment.	In	so	doing	it	has	also	begun	to	flesh	out	key	elements	of	the	cultural	policy	it	will	clarify	in	the	next	chapter.	What	is	left	to	establish	in	this	chapter	is	a	basic	sketch	explaining	how	cultural	objects	work	within	laws,	judgment	and	governance	to	make	life	biopolitical.	It	will	be	a	basic	sketch,	because	its	concerns’	demand	more	complex	treatment	than	is	possible	within	a	subchapter	of	a	chapter.	The	organization	of	this	final	section	is	ultimately	defined	by	the	logic	of	biopolitics	attendant	ultimately	to	capitalism.		This	is	because	the	concept	of	biopolitics	elegantly,	basically,	folds	into	itself	the	concept	of	the	collective	organization	of	life	(which	can	be	imagined	as	the	multitude)	through	its	understanding	that	the	variable	necessities	of	life	stand	in	relation	to	whatever	the	sovereign	nominates	as	necessary.		
 
3	Cultural	work		
3a	Externalizing	nature	Over	and	beyond	the	multitudinously	particular	politics	this	study	supports	is	a	broader	law-likely	ontology	ascribed	cross-culturally	to	cultures-in-general.	Definitionally,	here	and	throughout	this	study,	cultural	thought	can	be	applied	to	
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anything	that	humans	share;	that	is,	all	things	that	stand	between	people	can	be	said	to	have	a	cultural	face	–	it	is	their	cultural	face	that	makes	them	conceivable.	The	goal	of	this	final	section	is	to	come	to	grasp	how	“standing	between”	functions	in	relation	to	the	biopolitics	of	capital	and	the	possibility	of	other	ways	of	multitudinous	being	in	relation	to	self-governance.	It	has	been	established	that	culture	is,	or	embodies,	law	or	law-likely	behavioral	functions	of	human	relationality.	This	section	seeks	therefore	to	investigate	a	more	specific	question	further:	Drawing	from	the	presumption	that	the	world	is	already	shared,	how	can	radically	different	outcomes	be	culturally	determined	through	the	materials	of	the	world	that	always	already	exist	somewhere	within	the	worldly	ecology?	This	question	is	motivated	by	the	need	in	this	time	of	climate	change	for	clear	differences	to	be	pulled	from	the	same	worldly	things	that	are	already	bound	by	and	within	that	which	Chthulucenic	earthly	history	has	already	provided.	What	is	of	interest	here	is	a	general	ontology	of	cultural	things	that	is	broader	than,	though	explanatory	of,	Western	ontologies	that,	as	explained	below,	are	grounded	upon	a	particular	organization	of	the	nature/culture	division.			In	spite	of	their	emergence	from	particular	locations	–	because	of	capitalism’s	world-historical	nature,329	demonstrated	by	the	violent	impact	of	its	particular	systematization	of	nature’s	abstractions	–	capitalism’s	relations	to	nature	demand	special	focus.	Excluded	from	the	knot	of	this	specific	philosophical	inquiry,	but	not	ignored	by	it,	are	the	non-abstract	violences	that	diverse	forms	of	capitalism	organize	against	those	who	otherwise	organize.330	There	is	a	proximity	between	capitalism’s	systematicity	and	Hegelian	dialectical	developments,	whose	
																																																								
329 The	term	“world	historical”	refers	here	to	the	World-Systems	school	of	history	founded	by	Ferdinand	Braudel	with	which	Giavonni	Arrighi,	Jason	W.	Moore	and	others	are	affiliated.	For	more	on	the	periodization	of	capitalism’s	world	historicity	as	an	emergent	and	systemic	fact	of	nature,	see	Moore	(2017).			
330 This	study	thinks	here,	for	example,	about	murderous	extra-legal	land	seizures	that	operate	adjacent	to	and	are	ultimately	informative	for	and	beneficiaries	of	Capitalist	practice.		
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universalizing	teleologies	of	culture	and	politics	seem	to	obscure	capacities	of	immediately	meaningful	work	–	behind	abstract	images	of	something	different	(either	profit	or	loss	within	capitalism,	or	a	higher	order	with	Hegel).	Capitalism	and	its	cultural	forms	produce	a	difference	where	things	may	particularly	exist	in	the	world	and	also	within	its	logic	of	financialized	abstraction.	Simply	put,	an	abandoned	building	may	be	legally	unusable	because	of	abstract	financial	relations	though	the	building	itself	is	perfectly	fit	for	use.	The	ways	in	which	things	actually	operate	relates	to	what	they	do	and	how	they	are	caught	up	in	systemicity.	How	this	difference	plays	out	can	be	witnessed,	for	example,	in	the	PAH’s	utilization	of	the	escrache.	While	escraches	arrived	in	Spain	through	a	variety	of	ways,	one	way	is	through	the	international	circuit	of	fine	art,	which	can	be	seen	as	a	fruit	of	Hegelian	thought	and	bourgeois	culture.	Nevertheless,	in	the	hands	of	the	PAH,	the	escrache’s	practice	of	identifying	political	actors	to	shame	them	for	common	ends	remains	intact.	This	fact	is	contingent	not	only	to	the	escrache	itself	but	also	to	the	whole	of	the	PAH’s	relational	framework,	which	has	remained	grounded	in	localized	and	counter-capitalist	politics.			A	similar	thing	can	be	said	for	that	soda	bottle	that	stood	in	as	a	microphone	during	a	PAH	direct	action	training	as	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter.	The	soda	bottle	arrives	in	the	PAH	office	as	a	product	of	capitalist	exchange.	Yet	in	the	PAH	member’s	performing	hands,	only	the	most	cynical	would	read	the	bottle’s	capitalist	inception	as	determinative	of	its	role.	One	could	cynically	see	it	as	a	brilliant	instance	of	product	placement	–	multitudinously,	this	interpretation	should	not	be	dismissed,	because	the	multitude	will	think	as	it	does	whether	or	not	the	interpretation	is	actually	meaningful.	Or,	as	this	study	does,	one	could	appreciate	the	soda	bottle’s	transition	into	whatever	material,	whose	forms	shared	the	quality	of	microphone-ness	that	momentarily	mattered.	Like	a	microphone,	it	fit	in	hand,	and	that	was	enough.	The	whatever	nature	of	objects	described	by	Agamben	seems	to	express	itself	here.		Conceptualizing	the	nature	of	cultural	things	must	exceed	definitions	of	culture’s	
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variable	law-likely	natures.	That	objects	might	most	directly	express	meanings	attendant	to	capitalism	has	been	discussed	in	relation	to	Agamben	and	the	spectacle,	where	the	spectacle	colors	the	nature	of	the	universal	that	appears	through	it.	The	PAH	demonstrates	that	particular	objects	can	be	read	in	systemically	different	ways,	that	objects	can	produce	different	outcomes	than	just	being	for	speculative	profit.	People	universally	relate	in	complex	ways.331	Throughout	anthropological	thought,	descriptive	ontologies	are	written	and	enacted	over	fault	lines	between	active	agents	who	hope	to	determine	outcomes	through	the	rest	of	the	world.	The	active	agents	have	particular	affinities	in	the	cultural;	to	them	the	rest	of	the	world	is	often	identified	as	the	natural.	Philosopher	Olivier	Surel	(2014)	points	to	a	task	anthropologist	Eduardo	Viveiros	de	Castro	sets	for	himself	of	“comparative	ontographies”	(18)	when	thinking	about	the	universal	as	a	relational	path	between	the	cultural	and	the	natural	that	organizes	how	people	see	the	world,	and	how	they	see	it	moving	through	things.	Surel	suggests	that	there	are	at	least	two	overarching	ways	to	think	through	how	culture	universally	relates	through	nature.332	One	way	suggests	that	different	cultures	access	a	singular	nature	differently,	and	that	by	compositing	all	these	perspectives	together,	humans	can	have	a	more	total	sense	of	nature	and	the	world.	Viveiros	de	Castro	identifies	this	as	multiculturalism,	which	brings	different	frames	to	a	singular	but	common	nature.	Another	total	way	of	
																																																								
331 Wynter	(2014	66)	describes	a	77,000-year-old	piece	of	artwork	found	in	an	archeological	cave	excavation	in	what	is	now	South	Africa.	She	highlights	through	the	words	of	the	archeologists	that	by	its	abstract	nature	it	demonstrates	“the	[very]	ability	to	create	
and	communicate	using	such	symbols”	that	demonstrates	it	as	“	‘an	unambiguous	marker’	of	‘modern	humans’”.	
 
332 Referencing	Viveiros	de	Castro,	Surel	(2014)	remarks	that	this	first	model	can	be	understood	through	the	Spinozist	conception	of	nature:	“It	is	to	be	noted	that	Viveiros	associates	naturalism	with	the	posit	of	an	‘objective	universality	of	bodies	and	substance’.	But	what	‘substance’	stands	for	is	not	entirely	clear.	Viveiros’	naturalist,	if	not	a	straw	man,	is	a	rather	curious	beast,	who	defends	a	naïve	version	of	Spinoza's	rational-ism	(a	version	where	the	concept	of	Nature	is	bluntly	equated	with	that	of	Substance,	stripped	bare	of	the	fine-grained	distinctions	of	the	Ethics),	along	with	a	foggy	synthesis	of	the	different	programs	found	under	the	heading	of	‘physicalism’,	or	the	general	theory	for	which	everything	supervenes	on	a	more	fundamental	physical	level.”	(18)			
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describing	the	universe	that	culture	reveals	is	that	the	universe	is	different	depending	on	what	particular	cultures	and	specieal	beings	access	it	–in	Viveiros	de	Castro’s333	concept	of	multi-naturalism	a	singular	category	of	nature	is	inconceivable.334			There	is	no	reason	to	resolve	this	definitional	argument	for	the	sake	of	the	multitudes.	Rather,	this	study	is	satisfied	to	say	that	people	have	multitudinous	opinions	about	the	nature	of	culture’s	construction	of	and	approach	towards	universality.		What	seems	clear	is	that	culture	organizes	ways	of	being	in	the	world.	Here,	this	study	turns	to	anthropologist	Pierre	Clastres	and	his	work	among	the	Amazonian	Guarani	to	expand	upon	the	meaning	of	this	claim.	Clastres	articulates	Guarani’s	understanding	of	culture	thusly:	Culture	apprehends	power	as	the	very	resurgence	of	nature.	In	fact,	it	is	as	though	these	societies	formed	their	political	spheres	in	terms	of	an	intuition	which	for	them	would	take	the	place	of	a	rule:	namely,	that	power	is	essentially	coercion;	that	the	unifying	activity	of	the	political	function	would	be	performed	not	on	the	basis	of	the	structure	of	society	and	in	conformity	with	it,	but	on	the	basis	of	an	incontrollable	and	antagonistic	beyond,	that	in	essence	power	is	no	more	than	the	furtive	manifestation	of	nature	in	its	power.	(Clastres	1977	34–35)			It	is	useful	to	look	at	Clastres'	language	here.	“Culture	apprehends	power	as	the	very	resurgence	of	nature.”	To	apprehend	is	to	know	and	to	hold.	Culture	does	not	dismiss	power	and	pass	it	by;	rather,	culture	uses	power’s	affordances.	Culture	utilizes																																																									
333 Viveiros	De	Castro		(1992,	2012,	2014)				334	Surprisingly,	Surel	(2014	12)	finds	an	affinity	(though	not	an	equivalence)	between	Multinaturalism	and	the	Hegelian	worldview.	This	is	based	on	the	Hegelian	distinction	between	body	and	spirit,	in	how	within	both	the	Multinatural	Amerindian	perspective	and	Hegelian	dialectics,	an	object	can	actually	represent	or	be	something	other	than	as	it	appears.	He	also	identifies	within	Viveiros	de	Castro’s	work	where	the	anthropologist	found	a	similar	connection	between	Hegelian	thought	and	Multinaturalism.			
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nature	(the	biological,	geological,	physical	and	chemical	and	social	processes	of	worldly	systems)	to	invert	nature	and	utilize	it	within	the	actively	human	sphere.	Clastres’	Guarani	have	an	ambivalence	towards	power	that	reflects	their	awareness	of	nature’s	dual	nature	–	in	its	wild	and	original	form	beyond	the	human	and	as	knowledge/power	in	the	hands	of	people.	Nature	is	a	wildly	powerful	force	that	culture	can	utilize	through	particular	ethics	and	techniques	and	objects.	To	approach	the	universal	is	to	use	culture	to	apprehend	power	through	ways	that	enculturate	it,	make	it	amenable	to	particular	human	works,	particularly	and	towards	general	directions.		
 
3b	Power	and	the	arrangement	of	life	over	history	This	study	is	under	no	illusion	that	it	is	possible	to	write	a	universal	description	for	how	culture	can	at	all	times	interact	in	order	to	universally	produce	singular	outcomes.	What	Clastres’	description	offers	is	a	meaningful	way	to	return	to	the	nature/culture	divide	that	identifies	the	impact	of	that	line	as	a	cultural	object	in	itself.	The	work	of	historian	and	eco-philosopher	Jason	W.	Moore	(2015)	is	instructive,	when	it	comes	to	considering	the	how	power	is	organized	in	capitalism	as	objects.	In	Capitalism	in	the	Web	of	Life,	Moore	presents	the	eco-historical	way	in	which	particular	arrangements	were	made	to	organize	capitalism	towards	a	general	scale	as	it	gradually	emerged	as	a	governing	concept	out	of	the	Late	Middle	Ages	of	Europe.			Briefly,	other	theorists	focus	on	different	compositions	of	the	transition;	Wynter	(2015,	2003)	highlights	this	transition	in	European	governmental	logics	by	following	power’s	through-line	as	it	drives	across	theological	and	then	secular	logics;	where	capitalism	collaborates	first	with	rationalism	before	emerging	as	the	dominant	mode	of	thought.	One	thing	Agamben	(2011)	traces	is	how	different	understandings	of	the	angelic,	as	stand-ins	for	good	news	about	different	ways	to	consider	situations,	differs	across	the	Abrahamic	religions,	and	how	the	Christian	angelic	singularly	allows	for	conceptualizations	of	governance	to	transition	towards	one	that	provides	secular	capitalism	with	the	answers.	Foucault	(2007	365–366)	
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summarizes	the	slow	but	inexorable	introduction	of	profit,	rather	than	ecclesiastic	and	eschatological	concern,	as	the	most	reliable	method	for	state	management	of	power	and	governing	capacities	–	finding	general	stability,	value	and	profit	in	managing	increasing	populations.	Moore	demonstrates	the	particular	ways	that	those	who	would	become	capitalism’s	agents	organized	its	systematicity	in	relation	to	collapsing	medieval	order.351	It	is	useful	to	trace	his	history	in	some	detail	in	advance	of	an	explanation,	so	to	demonstrate	what,	in	cultural	terms,	is	understood	by	what	is	explained.				Life	in	Medieval	Europe	was	generally	set	between	peasant	and	lordly	relations	under	a	weak	regent	and	distant	though	present	Pope.	Moore	(2003)	describes	the	formational	grounds	of	modern	Europe	as	resulting	from	its	resolution	of	the	Feudal	Crisis	of	Medieval	Europe.	The	Feudal	Crisis	is	the	name	given	to	the	political	crisis	of	the	ruling	class	in	relation	to	the	experience	of	a	European	population	as	a	whole.	It	generalizes	the	lived	experience	of	people	in	time	(from	approximately	1100	to	1300)	organizing	their	individual	and	collective	lives	within	the	feudal	system–	and	in	relation	to	climactic,	geographical,	sociological,	political,	and	cultural	ecologies	(etc.).	The	crisis	is	historically	characterized	by	decreasing	land	productivity,	increasing	populations,	famine	and	disease.	For	the	ruling	classes	of	local	landlords	and	weak	national	regents,	this	meant	steadily	declining	taxes	and	less	profits	from	sales.		Environmentally,	by	1300,	trade	had	increased	bacterial	and	viral	transmission	through	previously	isolated	regions	–	a	cooling	climate	seemed	to	compound	these	trends,	resulting	in	famines	of	historic	proportions	in	1315–1317	and,	in	1348,	through	an	outbreak	of	the	Black	Death.	“Feudalism’s	fate	may	already	have	been																																																									
351 Describing	the	cyclical	nature	of	capitalism	with	its	system-imminent	crisis,	Moore	(2015	10)	writes	in	his	introduction,	“That	pattern	is	one	in	which	new	technologies	and	new	organizations	of	power	and	production	emerged	after	great	systemic	crises,	and	resolved	the	older	crises	by	putting	nature	to	work	in	powerful	new	ways.”			
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sealed	prior	to	1348.	Less	certain,	however,	was	the	nature	of	the	social	system	that	would	succeed	it.”	(112)	In	the	flux	of	history,	between	plans	and	what	cannot	be	planned	or	planned	for,	Moore	narrativizes	the	growing	dominance	of	capitalism	in	specific	accounts	of	transformation	in	land	and	labor	patterns.	At	the	beginning	of	Moore’s	list:				 1)	The	agricultural	revolution	of	the	Low	Countries	(c.	1400–1600)	–	motivated	by	the	crisis	of	sinking	peat	bogs	resulting	from	medieval	reclamation	–	which	allowed	three-quarters	of	Holland’s	labor	force	to	work	outside	of	agriculture.	2)	The	mining	and	metallurgical	revolution	of	Central	Europe,	thoroughly	transforming	the	political	ecology	of	forests	across	the	region.	(2014	134)		While	this	transition	would	eventually	emerge	as	beneficial	to	capitalist	interests,	the	immediate	causal	effects	attendant	to	questions	of	labor	seemed	relatively	independent	from	the	interests	of	a	governing	merchant	class’	that	would	emerge	more	strongly	at	the	resolution	of	the	crisis.352	Peasant	revolts	spread	after	the	Black	Death,	and	as	Moore	summarizes,	“The	class	power	of	Western	European	peasantry	had	developed	to	such	an	extent	that	the	reestablishment	of	serfdom	became	exceedingly	unlikely”	(ibid.).353	Feudal	order	was	such	that	landlords	found	themselves	unable	to	compel	peasants	to	produce	beyond	their	own	sustenance																																																									
352 As	Brenner	(2001)	points	out,	medieval	land	reclamation	in	Holland	was	carried	out	by	the	relatively	autonomous	Dutch	peasantry	over	the	course	of	several	hundred	years.	And	as	Holmes	and	Quataert	(1986)	note,	mining	in	Central	Europe’s	early	modern	history	was	primarily	a	labor	carried	out	to	supplement	household	income	rather	than	as	employment	directly	resulting	from	dispossession.			
353 On	first	blush,	one	thing	of	interest	in	this	historical	narrative	is	how	large-scale	resistance	movements	historically	organized	in	relation	to	and	beyond	local	conditions	around	universal	figures	such	as	a	king,	carried	on	the	backs	of	multitudes	carried	upon	against	local	seigneurial	powers.	It	also	interesting	how	this	account	falls	in	line	with	orthodox	Marxist	narratives	regarding	the	European	development	from	serfdom	to	proletarianization	and,	for	Moore’s	interest,	towards	communism.			
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needs	as	the	peasantry.	In	this	power	gap,	monarchical	authority,	then	a	historically	weak	force,	began	to	dominate	over	local	seigneurial	power	as	the	monarch	“tended	to	centralize	popular	reactions	to	seigneurial	extortion	or	repression.”	This	massification	of	peasant	power	for	itself	and	in	revolt	against	local	leadership	favored	an	abstract	orientation	to	distant	monarchy	that	helped	sparked	“major	collective	movements.”	(Moore	2003	113)		Subsequent	proletarianization	was	orchestrated	as	a	response	from	regulatory	power	to	peasant	revolt.	(Moore	2016	3)	With	their	newfound	authority,	monarchies	found	themselves	able	to	reorganize	restive	populations	in	a	way	their	lordly	relations	could	not.	The	goal	of	proletarianization	from	above,	according	to	Moore,	was	to	limit	the	peasant	autonomy	that	bothered	the	ruling	classes.		Peasants	were	successively	kicked	off	their	land	and	made	aimless	and	vagabond.354	Proletariatization’s	“‘central	function’	was	‘the	internal	maintenance	and	external	defense	of	private	property	regime’	–	and	may	we	add	the	expanded,	globalizing,	
reproduction	of	that	regime?”	(ibid.)	Factory	work	would	become	a	way	to	profitably	occupy	this	freed	labor.			In	other	words,	in	its	initiation,	concepts	central	to	capitalism	and	colonialism	were	system-immanent,	and	inoculative	to	the	ongoing	problems	faced	by	propertied	interests.	Moore	reveals	the	contradictory	developments	within	European	working-class	consciousness	in	relation	to	the	global	subjugation	of	the	non-European	multitude.355	Accounting	for	Europe’s	expanding	ecological	footprint,	he	details	how	relatively	early	in	its	history	of	colonizing,	it	began	to	severely	impact	lands	distant	from	its	shores.	His	account	resumes	as	follows:		 3)	The	first	signs	of	the	modern	sugar-slave	nexus	in	Madeira,	whose	rapid																																																									
354 See	Federici	(2004)	on	this	period	of	great	vagabondage.			 			
355 Here	this	study	looks	specifically	towards	Arrighi	&	Silver	(2001),	Chakrabarty	(2007).		
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rise	and	decline	(1452–1520s)	was	necessitated	by	rapid	deforestation.		4)	Madeira’s	crisis	was	followed	quickly	by	the	sugar	frontier’s	movement	to	São	Tomé	(1540s–1590s)	and	the	first	modern,	large-scale	plantation	system,	which	allowed	one-third	of	the	island	to	be	deforested.		5)	Northeastern	Brazil	displaced	São	Tomé	at	the	commanding	heights	of	the	world	sugar	economy	after	1570,	from	which	issued	the	first	great	wave	of	clearing	Brazil’s	Atlantic	rainforest.	(Moore	2014	17)			Capitalist	organizationality	began	expanding	beyond	its	borders	partially	in	an	effort	to	manage	problems	within	Europe.	For	Moore	(2003),	the	relative	strength	and	autonomy	of	the	emerging	Western	European	proletariat,	due	at	least	partially	to	what	can	be	recognized	as	self-determined	actions,	is	one	reason	that	governing	structures	desired	external	colonization.	Moore’s	central	claim	regarding	the	nature/culture	division	is	that	while	the	division	of	culture	in	nature	precedes	capitalism,	capitalism’s	ethic	is	to	imagine	that	it	exists	wholly	outside	and	independently	of	nature.	In	this	way,	it	creates	a	spatial	imagination	that	internalizes	the	world	as	the	seamlessly	unified	“us”	or	“we	the	people”	and	externalizes	everyone	and	everything	else	as	other	problems	–	contentious	internal	class	conflicts	can	appear	resolved	when	externalized	as	collaborative	violence	beyond	Europe	as	a	European	project.356	Through	general	consumptive	habits,	even	the	most	dispossessed	of	Europe	and	North	America	can	materially	relate	to	the	others	of	the	world	as	raw	material	and	sources	of	cheap	goods.			With	Catherine	Malabou’s	forwarding	of	the	socio-political	nature	of	addiction	and	its	worldly	impact,	this	chapter	circles	back	to	its	introduction.	Social	order	and	environmental	conditions	facilitate	the	organization	of	life	in	its	place	to	run	cheap	capitalist	production	up	and	down	life’s	niches.	This	abbreviated	eco-history	of	capitalist	development	demonstrates	how	organizational	efforts	sit	biopolitically																																																									
356 See,	for	example	Césaire	(1950/2001),	Fanon	(1963/2004).		
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upon	existing	cultural	relations	and	tendencies	to	determine	margins	of	general	behavior	despite	anyone’s	conceptual	capacity	to	act	beyond	those	margins.	Moore	ultimately	describes	the	set	of	regulatory	concepts	that	capitalism	develops	for	itself	to	augur	profit	and	maintain	power	over	relations,	through	its	development	of	the	“‘four	cheaps’	of	labor	power,	food,	energy,	and	raw	materials.”	(20)	The	“four	cheaps”	are	the	natural	resources	that	capitalism	suggests	it	can	freely	rely	upon	for	profit,	in	varying	degrees,	as	coming	from	external	and	bountiful	nature.	Out	of	what	culture	can	determine	as	bountiful	or	worthless	or	essentially	present	–	slavery,	women’s	work,	wild	land,	coal,	the	property	of	others	–	law	develops	paths	for	capitalism’s	profit	by	some	sort	of	conceptual	expropriation.	Moore	identifies	how	capitalist	abstraction	over	time	consistently	enforces	its	particular	divisional	nature	based	on	what	it	insists	be	valued	as	human,	and	what	is	to	be	naturalized	as	“natural”	within	its	general	construction	of	reality.	Moore	describes	how	capitalist	processes	work	to	culturally	erase	(environmental,	social)	costs	and	overstate	other	(often	European,	often	male)	natural	costs	in	order	to	direct	surplus	energy,	profit	and	libidinal	flow	for	its	interest	holders.		
  
3c	Policying	objects	as	systemic	nature	With	the	concept	of	Multinaturalism,	one	can	imagine	the	powerful	logic	of	profit	surging	through	capital’s	subjects	and	objects,	determining	over-arching	intentional	outcomes	through	its	powerful	nature.	Moore’s	description	of	how	capitalism	functions	not	as	a	dividing	line	between	nature	and	culture	but	as	an	abstracting	force	from	nature	is	such	that	this	logic	seems	to	draw	itself.		Stakemeier	and	Vishmidt	(2016)	further	clarify	how	through	capitalism,	the	relations	between	the	multitude	and	objects	of	the	world	are	externally	governed	by	this	for	profit	logic.	Profit	can	be	both	central	and	yet	sometimes	peripheral	to	contemporary	life’s	continued	development.	Capitalism	enforces	its	own	abstractions	by	organizing	within	the	already	existing	field	of	social	relations	the	need	for	its	own	reproduction.363	As	an	objective	effect	of	abstraction,	capitalism	makes	presents	a																																																									
363 Stakemeier	and	Vishmidt	describe	capitalism	as	“	‘automatic’,	because	it	increases	itself,	
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variety	of	possibilities,	and	makes	itself	available	as	a	means	of	fulfilling	these	possibilities,	all	the	while	obscuring	the	social	and	environmental	grounds	that	determine	needs,	ideations	and	capacities.	The	engines	of	autonomous	capital	are	poised	to	produce	capitalist	effects	within	the	social	body.	“Marx	calls	capital	a	‘subject’	because	it	is	self-position,	and	also	because	it	produces	the	(social,	material)	conditions	which	are	at	the	same	time	its	presuppositions.”	(41)		Stakemeier	writes	a	pre-history	of	the	cultural	concept	of	autonomy	(13–17)	that	defines	it	in	two	ways:	one	that	rests	autonomy	in	the	distinctions	between	manual	and	intellectual	labor,364	and	one	that	rests	autonomy	as	independence	from	particular	force.	On	independence	from	force,	she	references	the	characterization	of	“courtly	art”	in	the	late	Middle	Ages	as	secular365;	secularity	based	on	painterly	and	topical	interests	–	separation	from	location,	history	and	the	symbolic	in	order	to	pursue	artistic	principles	related	to	visibility.	Stakemeier	then	notes	the	socio-political	entrance	of	the	concept	of	autonomy	within	philosophy	through	Kant’s	recognition	of	the	governing	utility	of	reason	and	individual	aesthetic	judgment.	Hegel	in	his	treatise	on	law	says	that	autonomy	“is	nothing	other	than	[self]	interest,	activity	of	the	subjectivity	in	general.	Autonomy	is	this	(formal)	self-determining,”	(16)	and	is	the	manner	through	which	the	“absolute	spirit”	of	the	world	is	made	real																																																																																																																																																																						realizes	itself	as	a	condition	of	its	continued	existence,	without	the	intervention	of	any	other	agency	extraneous	to	it:	once	a	capitalist	mode	of	production	is	established,	capital	survives	by	constantly	positing	the	conditions	it	needs	to	reproduce	and	survive	as	the	conditions	for	that	society	to	reproduce	survive	(wage-labour,	property,	and	the	commodity).”	(41)			
364 This	distinction	can	find	historic	legitimization	in	Aristotle’s	distinction	between	work	and	labor,	and	it	is	also	famously	employed	by	Arendt	(1998).	Stakemeier	references	Marx	&	Engel’s	German	Ideology	to	set	up	the	logic	of	such	categorization	and	the	impact	of	such	distinction:	“The	exclusive	concentration	of	artistic	talent	in	individuals	and	the	suppression	of	it	in	the	greater	masses	is	the	result	of	the	division	of	labor.”	(8)			
365 This	obviously	overlaps	with	developments	described	above	and	in	relation	to	the	developments	of	capitalism.	It	also	mirrors	the	Peter	Bürger’s	conceptualization	of	artistic	of	autonomy	as	discussed	in	Chapter	2.				
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via	individual	enlightenment	as	a	general	social	process.			On	the	social	level,	cultural	logics	(as	policied	culture)	become	capitalist	instruments	when	the	seemingly	independent	“autonomous”	capacities	of	individual	social	determinations,	regarding	what	is	interesting	in	work,	move	through	capitalized	imaginaries.	Capital	imaginaries	suggest	that	meaningful	social	work	and	independent	determinations	can	be	meaningfully	determined	within	capitalist	order.		Capitalism’s	Leviathan	head	is	nothing	other	than	the	sovereign	determination	that	moneyed	self-interest	will	persevere	regardless	of	its	body’s	composition.	This	head	drives	policy	through	its	influence	on	any	cultural	appearance	that	may	attend	to	it.	The	appearance	of	the	so-called	autonomous	sphere	of	social	and	cultural	life	within	society	is	affectively	made	exclusive	from	nature	through	logistics,	marketing,	entertainment	industries,	labor	relations	etc.	From	the	outside,	this	autonomous	sphere	of	the	social	and	cultural	life	of	capitalism	is	made	apparent	by	border	walls,	guns,	regulations,	impassable	deserts	and	oceans,	entry	fees,	debt,	the	police,	etc.		Nevertheless,	what	can	be	called	judgement	or	lack	thereof	is	a	capacity	proper	to	the	human	multitude	rather	than	the	sovereign	or	citizen	blessed	with	the	capacity	to	autonomously	have	their	self-interests	commonly	expressed	for	them	through	governance	and	law.	This	is	because	in	time,	people	think,	feel	and	act	how	they	can	in	relation	to	whatever.	Ecological	conditions,	human	experience	and	innovation	suggest	particular	modes	for	human	sociality	whether	or	not	capitalism	tries	to	squeeze	profit	from	them.		Humans,	unqualified,	are	those	simple	and	bare	humans	who	have	always	and	will	have	always	existed	beside	or	outside	law	and	persist	to	the	extent	that	they	do	without	the	mathematical	relations	of	capital.	They	see	what	its	logistics	bring	them	and	what	they	do	not	bring,	or	they	don’t	see	this	at	all.	The	unqualified	person	has	the	capacity	to	take	pause,	and	find	some	space	between	themselves	and	the	situation.		This	is	a	different	sort	of	autonomy,	qualified	by	intellectual	awareness	
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rather	than	institutional	capacity.	“Autonomy	is	the	point	at	which	the	subject	thinks	herself		‘complete’	before	she	encounters	objectivity	and	realizes	that	she	is	not,	and	that	she	has	to	universalize	the	reflection	of	the	objective	in	the	subjective	in	order	to	surpass	autonomy	and	thus	sublate	individuality	in	the	universal.”	(44).	Vishmidt	understands	this	as	a	general	formula	of	the	subject	eventually	thinking	through	and	making	something	(abstracting)	of	their	situation	in	an	effort	to	affirmatively	remake	themselves,	by	some	alternative	relation	to	whatever	system.	(44)			The	understanding	here	is	that	art	is	a	speculative	project	in	the	full	sense	of	the	word.	It	is	financially	but	also	philosophically	and	strategically	speculative.	Vishmidt	says,	“Ideologically	speaking…	art	is	both	a	protest	against	the	brutality	of	the	world	and	a	confirmation	that	this	brutality	has	limits,	preserving	hope,	akin	to	the	role	of	relation:	redemptive	in	its	negation.”(36)	Alienation	produces	the	object	of	inalienation;	crisis	generates	responses	that	may	or	may	not	be	incorporated	into	a	system	as	its	immunative	inverse	so	that	the	system	holds.	This	is	the	distinction	between	the	being	of	the	PAH	that	is	created	in	the	context	of	crisis	and	the	idea	of	the	PAH	employed	here.	The	descriptive	terrain	of	biopolitics	tries	to	conceptually	capture	manners	that	capitalism	generally	organizes	to	draw	profit	from	beyond	its	own	limits.	Cultural	forms	can	be	successively	organized	in	relation	to	capitalism	and	its	regulatory	modes,	promoting	the	ultimate	autonomy	of	profit	over	time	–	that	is,	while	different	cultural	projects	occur,	those	that	last	over	time	are	often	those	that	become	profitable.	But	art	and	critical	thinking	in	the	most	general	sense	are	the	fruits	and	bitter	fruits	of	such	ecologies.	As	real	and	virtual	objects	in	the	world	they	help	materially	bear	out	effects	of	the	projects	that	caused	their	expression,	and	they	socially	persist	beside	capital	to	its	critical	deficit.	Incorporated	into	the	system,	as	happens,	they	provide	more	terrain	for	the	spectacle.	As	bitter	fruits	of	ongoing	relations,	such	as	living	and	thinking	through	the	tumult	of	the	Chthulucene,	they	can	overflow	and	run	against	normative	systematicity.	Their	excess	stands	as	such.			Classical	communist	political	theory	saw	the	role	of	the	working	class,	of	
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autonomous	labor,	as	the	inheritors	of	history.	The	steady	increase	of	collaboration	between	worker	movements	within	“First	World”	governance	East	and	West	was	a	hallmark	of	the	normalization	of	antagonistic	politics	well	into	the	1970s.	Contemporary	Communization	theory	can	be	seen	as	hanging	onto	the	theoretical	perspective	that	the	biopolitics	of	capitalist	social	order	have	effectively	managed	the	bitter	fruits	of	class	relations	by	either	internalizing	or	externalizing	dissent,	to	the	extent	that	systems	of	both	order	and	dissent	must	be	overcome.366	Historicizing	this	process	of	capitalism	overcoming	its	own	shadows,	communization	theorist	Jasper	Bernes	(2011)	identifies	the	fragmentation	of	working	class	identity,	achieved	by	its	affective	modulation	and	dispersion	in	the	fragmenting	labor	pools	differentiated	as	productive	and	reproductive	work.	In	the	quest	for	more	profit	and	self-consistency,	Bernes	also	sees	a	future	composed	of	capital’s	increase	and	greater	dispossession.	In	Berne’s	account,	capitalism	has	expanded	its	biopolitical	presence	upon	the	terrain	of	social	reproduction	to	the	extent	that	“it	renders	incoherent	all	attempts	to	imagine,	as	past	revolutions	did,	an	egalitarian	set	of	social	relations	laid	atop	the	existing	means	of	production.	It	is	the	end	of	a	communist	politics	that	is	merely	redistributive.	If	we	want	communism,	then	we	will	have	no	choice	but	to	take	our	radicalism	to	the	root,	to	uproot	capital	not	merely	as	social	form	but	as	material	sediment,	not	merely	as	relations	of	production	but	as	productive	forces.”	(163)			As	this	study	claims	that	all	people,	however	qualified,	have	the	capacity	from	any	position	to	gain	a	reflective	foothold	against	something	that	is	holding	them	down,	it	also	claims	that	anything	–	not	just	“art”,	has	the	capacity	to	inspire	“protest	against	the	brutality	of	the	world.”	That	is,	if	art	can	be	whatever	object	that	relationally	helps	develop	critical	relations	and	maintain	other	ways	of	being	in	the	world,	any																																																									
366 Writing	in	Communization	and	its	Discontents,	Jasper	Bernes	(2011)	describes	contemporary	class	composition	in	its	self-abolition	(its	own	deconstruction),	where	the	most	meaningful	forms	of	protest	are	actually	against	“the	institutions	charged	with	reproducing	the	class	relation	(labor	unions,	social	welfare	offices)”	(160).	This	study	hopes	that	it	has	demonstrated	both	here	and	in	the	previous	chapter	that	contemporary	art	is	one	formal	institution	of	social	reproduction	of	class	in	addition	to	those	listed	by	Bernes.			
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object	can	result	in	whatever.	Any	object,	not	just	art,	can	help	confirm	that	brutality	has	limits,	and	might	preserve	hope	in	some	manner.	Hope	is	not	a	concern	of	Communization	Theory,	and	this	study’s	claim	for	“hope”	via	any	object	is	not	intended	to	be	understood	as	optimistic	–	it	is	intended	to	reflect	the	sensible	shattering	of	contemporary	institutions’	capacity	to	deal	with	things	in	the	light	of	a	changing	climate	where	people	without	qualifications	(the	individuals	of	the	multitude)	desire	something	else.	Capitalism	cannot	account	for	the	stability	of	the	earthly	systems	to	the	extent	that	it	really	regulates	it	(the	earth).367	The	fact	that	capitalism	can’t	stabilize	the	climate	demonstrates	how	economic	theories	and	affirmative	biopolitics	face	incredibly	steep	challenges	in	actually	accounting	for	all	of	life	and	all	of	the	planets’	relations.368			Between	this	study’s	claim	that	“all	people	and	all	objects”	can	find	some	ground	to	stand	on,	and	Bernes’	recognition	of	the	total	capture	of	being	in	Western	politics,	the	multitude	is	in	varying	relation	to	affective	and	material	relation	of	the	contingency	named	crisis.	It	is	for	a	cultural	policy	of	the	multitude	to	attend	to	positions	articulated	at	the	center	of	capitalism’s	reproductive	crisis	(as	Bernes	and	others	Communization	theorists	would	have	it,	among	the	“growing	pool	of	proletarianized	technical	and	clerical	workers”	(162)	that	include	precaritized,	de-classed	labor)	and	those	who	have	always	been	structurally	at	its	margins	where	Western	cultural	forms	hardly	function.	To	understand	“art”	stripped	of	its	contemporary,	contingent	institutions	(its	formal	representational	structures,	its																																																									
367 See	for	example	Leonardi’s	(2017)	analysis	of	the	inability	of	Carbon	Markets	to	address	the	issue	of	climate	change	while	generating	profits	for	the	biggest	carbon	polluters.	Conversely,	he	suggests	that	capitalism	under	other	forms	of	governance	beyond	profit	can	serve	as	a	useful	regulatory	form.				
368 Leonardi	(2012)	argues	that	an	eventual	management	of	climate	can	only	be	achieved	through	regulations	that	reconstruct	the	ontology	of	“goods”	beyond	profit.		“Rather,	it	is	the	fact	that	those	rules	cannot	be	exclusively	–	or	even	primarily	–	ascribed	to	state	authority	or	market	invisible	hand.	Commons	are	‘goods;	which	cannot	be	categorized	as	either	‘public’	or	‘private’.”	(345)			
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theoretical,	structural	and	its	formal	reproductive	structures)	is	to	understand	the	potential	held	within	any	object	to	universally	relate	in	a	singular	or	multitudinous	manner	and	to	have	no	real,	particular	meaning	at	all.	To	this	end,	the	study’s	conclusions	try	not	to	objectify	the	organizational	structure	of	the	PAH	as	the	answer	to	the	Chthulucenic	crisis	–	forms	and	organizational	structures	find	their	way	into	the	normalization	of	capitalist	biopolitics.	Rather,	the	PAH’s	multitudinous	and	embodied	social	manners	are	objectified	as	general	orientational	perspectives	demonstrating	the	fluidity	of	relations.	Culture	extends	particular	social	ways	over	time	while	the	social	adjusts	cultural	forms	to	the	extent	it	is	capable.	These	variable	perspectives	are	what	can	be	multitudinously	conceptualized	in	relation	to	cultural	form.	The	final	line	of	inquiry	in	this	chapter	assesses	how	cultural	thought	might	politically	approach	the	liminal	space	between	a	culture	policied	by	capitalism	and	one	that	finds	itself	attendant	to	another	order	by	cultural	perspectives	on	power.	This	assessment	can	only	just	begin	to	grasp	what	will	remain	sensible	in	the	mix	through	the	collapse	of	structured	meaning	with	the	tumultuous	transformation	of	ecological	and	political	relations.		
 
3d	Policy	in	the	liminal	space	of	critique	and	collapse	Communization	theorists	like	Bernes	and	Endnotes	(2011)	look	towards	radical	activity	to	tear	down	institutions	of	social	reproduction375	within	capitalist	societies,	so	as	to	disallow	the	composition	of	new	relations	from	which	to	extract	profit.	This	is	a	cultural	proposal	for	individual	meaning-production,	one	that	Communization	theorists	term	self-abolition.376	This	study	understands	self-abolition	as	the	construction	of	a	social	relation	in	freefall,	with	any	process	of	social	reformulation																																																									
375 Endnotes	(2011	26)	writes	that	they	are	interested	in	the	destruction	“of	the	capitalist	class	relation,	and	the	complex	of	social	forms	which	are	implicated	in	this	reproduction	–	value-form,	capital,	gender	distinction,	state	form,	legal	form,	etc.	In	particular,	such	an	overcoming	must	necessarily	be	the	direct	self-abolition	of	the	working	class,	since	anything	short	of	this	leaves	capital	with	its	obliging	partner,	ready	to	continue	the	dance	of	accumulation.”			
376 “Yet	it	is	still	the	working	class	which	must	abolish	itself.”	(Endnotes	2011	27)		
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occurring	afterwards,	when	capitalism’s	capacity	to	determine	relations	has	been	destroyed.377	Self-abolition	abandons	affirmative	political	projects	at	the	level	of	cultural	organization.	Self-abolition	leaves	capitalism	without	an	“obliging	partner,”	without	a	cultural	composition	that	capitalism	can	organize	for	the	partner’s	eventual	exploitation.			In	his	essay	“No	Selves	to	Abolish”,	Aarons	(2016)	comments	on	the	concept	of	self-abolition	in	relation	to	Frank	B.	Wilderson	III	and	Mbembe’s	Afropessimism.	Aarons	understands	self-abolition	as	a	concept	aimed	at	exceeding	the	confines	of	identity,	which	he	understands	as	racialized	subjectification	imposed	upon	people	by	the	state.	Downsides	to	identity-based	discourses	around	blackness	exist	even	in	relation	to	progressive	state-based	diversity-interested	governance.	He	surveys	the	theory	of	identity	within	Afropessimism,	which	critiques	identity	politics	for	forcing	black	people	to	prove	themselves	deserving	by	analogizing	“itself	with	White	civil	society.”(4)	In	militant	protests	against	the	policing	of	bare	life,	Aarons	finds	an	inchoate	tension	on	the	street	between	the	insurrection	and	the	need	for	ongoing	communal	management,	expressing	it	as	a	conflict	between	autonomy	and	self-abolition.378	Aarons	recognizes	self-abolition	as	a	process	of	performance;	self-abolition	played	out	upon	the	actually	existing	social	terrain	would	be	an	“unthinkable	vanishing	point	in	socio-historical	conjuncture.”	(6)																																																										377	“In	particular,	such	an	overcoming	must	necessarily	be	the	direct	self-abolition	of	the	working	class,	since	anything	short	of	this	leaves	capital	with	its	obliging	partner,	ready	to	continue	the	dance	of	accumulation.	Communization	signifies	the	process	of	this	direct	self-abolition,	and	it	is	in	the	directness	of	this	self-abolition	that	communization	can	be	said	to	signify	a	certain	‘immediacy’.”	(Endnotes,	2011	26)			
378 Aarons	(2016	7)	frames	the	ongoing	resolution	of	the	tension	between	Self-Abolition	and	a	quest	in	some	form	for	autonomy	of	black	bodies	in	this	way:	“the	meeting	point	between	Blackness’s	war	on	enslavedness	and	those	who	might	envision	themselves	as	its	‘allies’	is	not	in	a	paradigmatic	commonality	to	affirm	between	us;	it	lies,	rather,	in	what	we	wish	to	negate	in	ourselves	that	might	free	the	way	for	us	all	to	find	something	more	powerful	than	the	selves	presently	available	to	us	and	denied	to	them.”		
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From	the	position	of	the	unqualified	black	rather	than	from	the	declassed	person	about	whom	Bernes	writes,	this	tension	is	grounded	upon	an	ontological	and	skin-based	ability	to	lawfully	count	under	the	terms	of	the	current	order.	Aarons	summarising	Wilderson	(2014)	on	the	non-position	of	Black	people	states	that	“social	death	is	a	condition,	void,	not	of	land,	but	of	a	capacity	to	secure	relational	status	through	transindivudual	objects	–	be	those	objects	elaborated	by	land,	labour,	or	love.”	(9)	When	acting	outside	of	but	in	dialogue	with	law,	blackness	can	only	mediate	its	pain	through	pleas	to	be	understood	as	human		Wilderson’s	2014	essay	The	Black	Liberation	Army	and	the	Paradox	of	Political	
Engagement	qualifies	the	political	engagement	of	Black	Liberation	Army	member	Assata	Shakur’s	1973	“To	My	People”	communiqué	while	in	prison.	The	“paradox	of	political	engagement”	alluded	to	in	title	of	the	essay	is	based	on	the	fact	that	as	black	subjects,	Shakur	and	Wilderson	find	no	leverage	in	the	political	discourse	of	the	European	settler	societies	where	they	live.379	Here,	they	are	bare	and	animal	and	provided	no	way	to	mediate	their	suffering	without	elevating	the	society	that	subjects	them	to	such	violence	through	diversity-interested	governance.	The	paradox	in	political	engagement	is	their	sense	that	regardless	of	how	they	are	subjectified,	they	know	they	should	not	have	to	suffer	in	the	ways	they	do.	Wilderson	claims,	in	manners	akin	to	Agamben’s	description	of	those	bare	lives	beside	law,	that	black	people	can	be	subject	to	an	unfathomable	and	unrecognized	social	violence	even	though	they	are	foundational	to	such	societies.	When	the	underclass	revolts,	civil	society	and	the	state	affectively	express	their	"fear	of	a	black	planet".	(25)	This	fear	is	of	a	scenario	where	society’s	norms	are	overturned	in	some	apocalyptic	nonsense,	and	where	lawful	citizenry	is	subjected	to	the	same	conditions	that	it	has	afforded	the	underclass;	under	conditions	of	life	where	death	is	the	only	sanctuary.	Alone	besides	the	state,	black	suffering	lacks	ontological	meaning	under	the	state’s																																																									
379 This	same	inability	to	matter	which	occurs,	even	under	Socialist	and	Marxist	relations	following	Communization	Theorists	but	also	Arrighi	&	Silver	(2001),	Chakrabarty	(2009),	Moore	(2015).			
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terms.	Theoretically,	as	humans	unqualified	to	appear,	they	have	no	leverage	to	be	counted,	lack	“the	capacity	to	transpose	time	into	event,	and	the	capacity	to	transpose	space	into	place.”	(11)		Between	this	study’s	claim	that	“all	people	and	all	objects”	can	find	some	ground	to	stand	on,	and	Wilderson’s	claim	that	Black	suffering	is	unmediatable	by	a	disinterested	Human	culture380	is	his	caveat	that	“I	should	make	it	clear	that	this	does	not	mean	that	the	Black	has	no	inner	life	and	that	psychoanalysis	is	of	no	use	to	us	in	thinking	about	that	inner	life.	It	just	means	that	such	a	journey	involves…	a	symptomatic	analysis	of	the	text”	(33).	With	a	quote	from	Shakur’s	communiqué,	Wilderson	explains	that	despite	lacking	the	grounds	for	any	meaningful	political	project,	politics	stand	as	a	request	for	a	common	sanctuary	made	through	hardly	unmediated	human	connectivity.	“Black	brothers,	Black	sisters,	i	want	you	to	know	that	i	love	you	and	i	hope	that	somewhere	in	your	hearts	you	have	love	for	me.	My	name	is	Assata	Shakur…”	(5)	Without	an	ability	to	articulate	actionable	political	projects	but	nevertheless	driven	by	a	need	to	act,	Wilderson	makes	central	a	politics	of	uncertainty.		As	political	uncertainty,	it	is	a	cultural	and	determined	willingness	to	give	in	time	and	space	and	in	struggle	and	regardless	of	outcome,	to	possibility	for	sustained	political	comfort	–	whether	or	not	there	is	a	conceivable	resolution	of	the	situation.	This	form	of	love	is	a	request	to	hang	on	to	whatever	as	the	place	that	might	be	filled,	generally,	with	love.	Rather	than	whatever	culture	policied	by	capitalism,	Wilderson	seems	to	propose	a	culture	policied	by	an	uncertain	determination	to	build	conditionally	meaningful	alliances	in	and	against	time.		Between	this	study’s	claim	that	“all	people	and	all	objects”	can	find	some	ground	to	stand	on,	and	Bernes	and	Wilderson’s	doubts,	stands	Stakemeier	and	Vishmidt	(2016)	who	might	agree	with	the	general	nature	of	the	“all	people”	claim.	For	them,	
																																																								
380 “The	Slave’s	relationship	to	violence	is	not	contingent,	it	is	gratuitous	–	it	bleeds	out	beyond	the	grasp	of	narration,	from	the	Symbolic	to	the	Real,	where	therapy	and	politics	have	no	purchase.”	(7)		
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the	liminal	space	that	this	final	section	has	been	following	can	sit	within	the	autonomy	they	prescribe	to	art	–	which	they	bracket	as	intellectual	work.	(80)	They	conceptualize	autonomy	as	either	following	the	distinctions	between	manual	and	intellectual	labor	(political	autonomy),	or	resting	on	notional	independence	from	any	particular	force	(juridical	autonomy)	externalized	as	other.	Towards	their	conclusion,	investigation	settles	on	a	definition	of	autonomy	that	centers	around	a	weak	political	autonomy	based	an	artwork	that	“presents	an	understating	of	work	as	an	activity	which	is	measureless,	or	which	can	be	measured	only	in	terms	of	its	merging	of	production	and	reproduction,	of	maintenance	and	creation,	and	which	produces	an	over-arching	subject.”	(78)	This	very	measurelessness	is	the	reason	why	this	study	attends	to	sociality.		The	overarching	sociality	that	production	and	reproduction,	maintenance	and	innovation	produce	is	potentially	a	politically	aware	“solidarity-collectivist	form	of	human	relations”	(78).	It	is	aware	because	it	is	caught	up	in	the	system	yet	able	to	determine	its	own	thoughts.	As	a	general	subject	involved	with	reproductive	labor,	sociality’s	relative	autonomy	is	constructed	between	the	law	and	law-likely	order	of	things	that	compose	and	particularly	recompose	life.	That	is,	Stakemeier	and	Vishmidt	recognize,	by	other	terms,	the	space	for	life	that	eco-social	systematicity	provides	between	nature	and	culture	(the	niche),	which	allows	for	a	margin	of	space	from	nature’s	wider	variation.	Within	this	space	they	focus	on	the	unrecognized	and	neverending	reproductive	labor	that	manages	to	maintain	it.	Unrecognized	despite	the	centrality	of	its	multiple	routines	that	everywhere	stand	at	the	core	of	holding	general	sociality	together	in	its	particular	ways,	stands	the	capacity	for	the	development	of	a	critical	perspective	on	the	social	labor	it	does.	Stakemeier	and	Vishmidt	posit	that	critical	work	here	reflects	and	intervenes	into	law-likely	cultural	forms,	and	has	the	capacity	to	modulate	the	general	systematicity	with	which	reproductive	labor	pairs.	The	authors	refer	to	this	critical	production	as	an	“antisocial	thesis”.	Like	art	in	general,	the	“antisocial	thesis”	is	speculative;	here	it	speculates	on	culture’s	systematicity,	and	aims	to	undermine	“the	social	figure	
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identified	as	the	natural	bearer	of	the	future.”	(79)381			The	autonomy	that	Stakemeier	and	Vishmidt	give	to	art	is	like	that	which	Arendt	(1998)	ascribes	to	the	category	of	work.	Arendt	identifies	work’s	weightless	ability	to	intervene	in	methods	of	labor	and	social	reproduction,	as	work	is	tasked	with	designing	machines	and	ways	for	living	–	whether	those	machines	are	legal,	artistic,	architectural,	process-based	or	industrial.	In	Arendt	(1998),	the	bearer	of	the	future	is	embodied	in	the	image	of	the	child.382	But	in	Stakemeier	and	Vishmidt’s	“antisocial	thesis”	and	the	interests	of	this	study,	this	“understanding	of	reproduction	cannot	be	one	that	mirrors	the	naturalization	of	human	procreation”	(Stakemeier	&	Vishmidt	2016	79).	In	other	words,	Stakemeier,	Vishmidt	and	this	study	recognize	no	external	compulsion	to	reproduce	on	a	societal	level.	Rather,	in	the	interest	of	further	cultural	work	freed	from	the	unconscious	compulsion	to	produce	whatever	capitalist	relation,	what	is	of	interest	here	is	how	their	proposal	asks	whatever	artwork	to	be	policied	by	all	other	natural,	social	and	cultural	relations	that	might	run	through	life’s	reproductions	and	allow	for	the	critical	expression	of	how	capitalism	(or	whatever)	makes	life	unbearable.	The	artwork	they	highlight	aims	to	break	the	cycle	of	capitalist	reproduction	by	highlighting	systemic	failures	within	the	cycle	of	whatever	system.	The	explicitness	of	exchange	within	systematicity383	is	what	distinguishes	their	proposal	from	Bernes	and	Wilderson	–	though	as	multitude,	all	are	equal.	To	produce	objects	that	are	critical	of	the	assumed	bearers	of	the	future	means	putting	a	skeptical	halt	on	assumptions	of	the	future	in	order	to	anchor	necessary	adjustment	towards	other	regulatory	horizons;																																																									
381 Mansoor	(2013)	comes	to	similar	conclusions	more	concisely.			
382 Arendt,	to	qualify	this	hope	embodied	in	the	child	(1998	246)	quotes	from	the	New	Testament	at	the	birth	of	the	Messiah,	Jesus.	“It	is	this	faith	in	and	hope	for	the	world	that	found	perhaps	its	most	glorious	and	most	succinct	expression	in	the	few	words	with	which	the	Gospels	announced	their	‘glad	tidings’:	‘A	child	has	been	born	unto	us’.”	(247)		
383 This	explicitness	of	systemicity	demonstrates	in	other	ways	what	Hansen	(2015)	claims	regarding	the	ongoing	cultural-ness	of	whatever	activist	project	despite	whatever	insurrectionary	goals	it	holds.				
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other	in	relation	to	those	demanded	by	capitalism’s	regulatory	objects.			Stakemeier	and	Vishmidt’s	ambivalence	towards	the	reproduction	of	capitalism,	while	appreciating	the	systemicity	that	art	and	life	is	enmeshed	within,	helps	define	this	study’s	ambivalence	towards	most	particular	teleologies.	A	basic	precept	of	the	cultural	policy	of	the	multitude	is	that	cultural	forms	that	stand	for	capitalist	governance	needn’t	be	reproduced.		This	cultural	policy	is	attendant	to	the	global	ecology	in	its	particular	systemic	appearances	rather	than	its	universal	governance.	A	capacity	for	error384	is	the	experimentation	with	and	within	meaningful	margins	through	systemicity	to	strengthen	what	culturally	increases	those	forgivable	margins	and	what	in	the	system	is	unforgivable.385	The	final	chapter	of	this	study	will	think	through	these	points.	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																									
384 “[A]rt	is	at	the	same	time	itself	exposed	to	its	inherent	measurelessness”	(Stakemeier	&	Vishmidt	2016	87)	and	in	and	beyond	the	margins	it	has	to	work	with,	errors	are	made.	Critical	work	at	its	best	is	able	to	identify	what	is	vital	within	and	beyond	the	margins	and	make	appropriate	political	judgment.		Judgment	in	itself	is	free,	and	political	judgment	has	consequences.				
385 In	respect	to	the	multitude,	besides	looking	towards	Enlightenment	judgment	and	ends	such	as	Hegel’s,	one	might	also	look	at	Native	American	law,	which	according	to	Hall	(2015)	looks	towards	the	universal.	“Indigenous	aesthetics	are	rooted	in	culture	and	community,	with	the	enmeshed	responsibilities	of	living	well	in	the	ecologies	of	our	ancestors.”	(282)	For	Hall,	this	responsibility	necessitates	a	historiography,	a	critical	play	with	the	universals	of	the	past.	“(T)he	pressures	of	colonization	have	demanded	that	we	interrogate	false	and	simplistic	interpretations	of	tradition,	while	renewing	those	voices	of	the	most	specifically	targeted	by	the	colonial	system.”	(284–285)				
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Chapter 5  
Conclusions  
The multitude appears in variable relation to that which would want to harness life for its 
own ends by crossing law with life. This chapter aims to do just that; cross life with a 
proposal for the production of law-likely cultural work. For, as stated in this study’s 
introduction; while in the interests of the multitude, this study is written for cultural 
workers. This cultural work joins other cultural forces of living in relation to the 
multitude’s positioning between the governing forces of climate change and the 
squeezing of life by capital. Formally qualified, cultural workers temporarily remove 
themselves from the multitude and become something other than the endless variety of 
things: they join other actors proposing something other than that things simply are. This 
chapter ends with a list of policy directives and statements for their consideration. What 
matters most with the multitude’s sociality is how it encounters crisis and makes sense of 
it for its own terms, rather than for governance; this study looks towards the different 
orientations to governance that PAH members take in response to dispossession, as 
described in Chapter 3. Climate change is an issue because of how cultural formations 
attendant to capitalism’s organization of particular human ways of being acts to 
dispossess general human organizationality from its historic capacities to more easily 
adjust to the natural world. Culture can further scaffold capacities for the multitude to 
socially make up that space of adjustment.  
 
The study is framed by the Chthulucenic knot of relationality and the tautology of the 
multitude governing itself in relation to governance that is constructed from concepts the 
multitude itself produces. Chapters 1 and 2 demonstrate ways that culture has been 
conceptualized as forms that generally manage human organizationality. Chapter 1 
demonstrates, with examples drawn from art and anthropology, how critical cultural 
thought directs meaningful activity towards the conceptual development of disciplines– 
sometimes at the expense of focus on the poeisis of social necessity within particular 
contexts, among other things. Chapter 2 demonstrates what disciplinary thought 
nevertheless provides to the multitudes while also explaining the actual stakes of climate 
change. Through a discussion of the Dark Mountain Project, the chapter demonstrates 
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how challenges to human organizationality by anthropocenic climate change can 
reverberate through ongoing tendencies within politically cultural expressions that only 
further their law-likely manners rather than forcing them to respond to the general nature 
of the climactic threat. Theoretically, Chapter 3 introduces the juncture of governmental 
failure and meaningful leadership as the zone where the multitude can commonly reorient 
its own social relation to governance. Chapter 3 demonstrates the PAH’s embodied 
approach that thinks, and eventually acts, through the reorganization of social relations 
attendant to law and its law-likely institutions. The fourth suggests how culture and 
natural law work through the multitudinous ontologies of life– an ontology here that 
relates to the body of the multitude that may be definitionally composed of one or many 
actors. Chapter 4 demonstrates how cultural arrangements extend particular ways of 
relating over time, and discusses how when these ontologies no longer function, culture 
and the social have ways to address and recompose the multitude in relation. 
 
This concluding chapter concisely rearticulates a set of definitions, thoughts and 
formulations derived from these previous chapters to explain the framework this cultural 
policy ultimately suggests. This chapter first reiterates several concepts often associated 
with either ecology or governance left at the study’s conceptual margins to help focus on 
the matter at hand. Then, it sketches an anthropology of the multitude’s relationship to 
itself and to the laws of climate change. Following that, is a discussion of the relationship 
posed between the social and cultural that is attendant to such an anthropology, which is 
specifically orientated to the nature/culture relation. Through a specific reiteration of how 
the nature/culture divide is enforced by cultural thought attendant to capitalism, a terrain 
for the framework for cultural work in the time of climate change is proposed. This 
terrain is the space of the policy’s enactment- the policy here suggests specific ways for 
cultural production to meaningfully relate to climactic change and the ways of being 
human that a culture attendant to capitalism is disinterested in.  
 
1 What is extraneous to this study 
To clarify the study’s margins and interests, it is useful to first reiterate what this study 
has left to its side. While human activity is multitudinous, a cultural policy enacted in 
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relation to climate change and the contemporary multitude is not. This study focuses on 
how the multitude relates to contemporary governmental dispositifs in relation to climate 
change. Thus, throughout the preceding chapters, concepts have been explicitly 
marginalized in order to keep the multitude’s capacity for self-governance in relation to 
this dispositif in sight. In favor of the multitude’s multitudinous capacity to govern itself 
socially, this study has sidelined formal solutions that are often highlighted in relation to 
managing climate change. That is, the first chapter states that while this study is generally 
interested in the development of alternative technologies and strategies to acquire and 
manage resources– such as green technology, food sharing, improved soil management, 
architectural solutions, etc.…. they are not the immediate focus of the work. While their 
utilization might advance the general goals of the project, this study is interested in 
developing the social grounds where their development and application makes common 
sense; and where their application is for the benefit of the common rather than for a 
governmental that is often indiscernible from its own private interest. 
 
Chapter 2 recognizes the disciplinary and management techniques of governing bodies 
and concepts with global reach– and identifies their anchors in (Euro-American) state and 
(upper) class-oriented (macro) politics. It discusses structures of global governance such 
as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the international human 
rights frameworks. In the chapter it is stated that occasionally, governmental bodies make 
rulings, policy and organize force in ways that is of benefit, or least diminishes the 
violence, to the multitude. In such cases, this study suggests that despite the manner of 
their compositional power, the fact that these governances can be of use to multitudinous 
ends should not be disregarded. Nevertheless, because of their lawly composition such 
government forms fall out of this study’s purview.  
 
Chapter 4 articulates the ways of common cultural praxis, and brings attention to why a 
focus on the specific violence that governmental forces bring to bear falls out from this 
study’s focus. Looking at the ideological and biopolitical force of Western-style 
governance over the multitude, the chapter consciously chooses not to focus on what 
military, police and economic dispossession allow for as law and law-likely enforcement. 
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That is, while this study does not ignore what the state-sponsored or state-normalized 
violence allows for, it does not deeply engage with the materiality of human-on-human 
violence. Rather, it equates war, unjust policing, poverty and eviction with ‘naturally 
occurring’ starvation, disease, flooding and lack of shelter– and names them all 
governmental force. This is not to naturalize them, to the contrary, it equates them all as 
governmental, demonstrating the particular way that force in general relates to human 
ways. Scholarship makes clear the social natures of (for example) disease397 and food 
distribution policy398. And this study recognizes, too, that colonization, domination and 
dispossession are processes that purposefully pair book and sword. It’s just that state 
violence opens up a territory diametrically opposed to the sociality of the multitude that 
this cultural policy hopes to bring into force; in that way, attention to general violence 
remains loudly at the study’s margins.  
 
2 Anthropologies and others 
2a The Multitude and its anthropology  
In relation to what has been left out, a refrain of the study has been the insistence on the 
fact that the multitude precedes and exceeds governance– that at every turn the multitude 
does things different than what governance, nature, culture and law expects. It also must 
be clarified that with this study’s particular focus on cultural production in relation to the 
politics of climate change for the multitude, towards these ends a multitude of things and 
relations have been excluded. The multitude exceeds the politics that this study is 
interested in. While all things are political, all things also exceed politics. The multitude 
can relate to law as if it were a bullet, a curiosity, a poison, a thing of beauty, a useful tool 
for specific ends, something sublime, or something hardly noticed. The same goes for all 
things in the world– while the ends of this study look towards culture to scaffold differing 
earthly relations for the multitude in the time of climate change, it does not ask culture to 
produce (for example) beauty, fun, or endless pleasure. Chapters 1 and 3 highlight how 																																																								
397 See for example, Harris & Siplon (2007), Shepard (2015) on the social nature of the AIDS 
crisis. 	
398 See for example Lappe 1998 for a general overview of the social nature of hunger and food 
scarcity.	
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the common processing of desired affects and their just causes is central to how the 
multitude comes to embody its own sociality, so they are clearly in the general interests 
of the study. They should be, as the multitude finds these and other affects generally and 
particularly meaningful. The room for error that is central to this study’s ontology is 
constructed with these and other affects in mind. Yet for themselves, these affects exceed 
all multitudinous ends; any singular affect’s unbound production through the technical 
and philosophical tools of culture is not of primary interests of this project.  
 
A multitude exceeds, but also exists upon, the biopolitics and politics of governance– via 
governances of the self, home, family, town, agriculture, water, state, nation and world. 
The multitude exceeds these forms in its being one and many by never having to account 
for individual activity other than by affirming the possibility of it having happened or 
existing. The multitude may be in whatever niche for life there is, it also spins out from 
that niche in ignorance of what it leaves behind or with a decisive plan for something 
else. The multitude is in itself biologically, but grows and changes, gets weaker or 
stronger. It leaves itself in one way through death, another way during sleep, and another 
way during surgery. The multitude is, in itself and elsewhere, with its sociality— or not. 
Human beings are biological and social creatures; with the biology through which life 
happens, functioning beside the sociality that necessarily embeds being in a network of 
exchanges needed for the actual complexities of existence. The multitude’s life is innately 
relational. The sociality of the multitude affords relations to be culturally structured from 
below or above or through equality: in that meaningful social reproduction is 
unaccountable by capitalism, it is nevertheless multitudinously tasked with organizing a 
future for capitalism (or other systems to which it is differently unaccounted) that it has 
little stake in. As discussed in the previous chapter, the unaccountability of sociality 
provides it with multitudinous freedom to move in other futures, within limits set by 
accounting structures such as whether or not those other futures are ultimately afforded 
through other means.  Common sociality, built upon quotidian and particular exchanges 
within the multitude can destabilize or stabilize relations culturally structured from 
above; ultimately appearing as common care, common disobedience and revolt, or simply 
as warmth, sass, shade, or withdrawal. These exchanges are mostly unaccountable 
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because they are barely noticed until it’s too late. Beyond freedom in the moment, the 
multitude determines the future to the extent that it finds an organizationality in 
difference to the law-likely effects of pre-existing governance by re-organizing common 
sense. Towards these unaccountable and socially reproductive ends, the multitude for 
itself can be described as feminist, anti-racist and queer. But towards other ends, it is also 
otherwise.  
 
Besides this general definition of the multitude and towards the specific ends of this 
study– towards ‘a cultural policy of the multitude in the time of climate change: with an 
understanding that the multitudes have no policy’, the multitude bends and turns in 
whatever ways in relation to this policy that seeks to collaborate with it in the scaffolding 
or diminution of particular ways of being. That is, to the extent that the policy is written 
to organize cultural production rather than the multitude, the objects this policy organizes 
through cultural work aim to drive cultural lines within the multitude upon which for it to 
bend and turn beside and through and in relation to. As will be explained below in 
Section 3, these lines’ ends are in difference to the one that capitalism drives through the 
multitude. In the time of climate change, the ends that capitalism draws across the 
multitude drive the it into further dispossession and, along with all other planetary life, 
relentlessly towards death.  
 
The anthropology that capitalism continues to drive to direct its response to climate 
change is the same one that continues organizing singular profit through multitudinous 
variability. That is, the anthropology of capitalism normalizes the biological costs of life 
in the favor of the material, financial and social enrichment of a few against the many of 
the multitude. But an anthropology of the multitude accepts the variability of climate, 
relations and life as a fact of its being. An anthropology of the multitude accepts that 
existential human need is variable over and in relation to itself and the world. In the time 
of climate change, to meet those needs, it pays to focus on a greater capacity for general 
flexibility towards those things that define need. This flexibility is achieved by a culture 
that is more intimate with the nature it fictionally sets beyond itself. The PAH’s ongoing 
dialog with its own situation demonstrates what this study means by intimacy, as it 
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demonstrates a creativity in ways to define and fulfill need. Rather than money and debt, 
for example, it needs escraches and accountability.  Accepting this singular fact of the 
multitude, that its needs varies greatly in context and across difference is one way to 
think differently about the questions that have universal answers– as Ferriera da Silva 
asks her readers to do.  
 
That any singular object can inspire universal difference is important to this study’s 
interrogation of how widely distributed cultural forms can maintain meaning across 
context, and is at the heart of whatever universality.  The concept of whatever helps think 
through how the same worldly matter can lead to different results over history. By 
suggesting that singular things can be both multitudinous and universal is to suggest that 
whatever allows things to be different from beginning to end but still have a universal 
function. This function might be that, regardless, whatever cultural thing is somehow 
universally relatable. Within the Chthulucenic world, autonomously directed cultural 
activity must assume that different things that result from its actions are not errors but 
just different answers to the same question. Responses are multitudinous to universally 
relatable activity. This is apparent in the same way that oxygen is universally necessary 
for humans to breath, but breathed at different rates for different activities towards 
different ends.  
 
The variability of whatever thing in itself is echoed by the manners this cultural policy 
recognizes in the self-orientating moves of the PAH (see Section 4a), when it organizes 
itself in variable relation to itself and governance. While hoping to organize common 
experience, necessary cultural work should assume that whoever encounters its forms 
comes from different origins towards different trajectories. In the time of climate change 
against the singularity of accounted death, the multitude shares common material towards 
ends that simply are not finalized by naming the cause of death; a cause of death that 
nevertheless matters. Rather, the multitude in life and death surpasses the means that 
whatever object has allowed for, in multitudinous ways of being human, 
anthropologically. 
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As established in the last chapter, a cultural policy of the multitude provides room, to 
whatever extent, for error. The space for error allows for things that are less and more 
than mistakes, though not for governmental error. The room for error is for the multitude, 
which can be one or many; it is not for governance, that through the crisis of climate 
change demonstrates its limited capacity to properly govern. When governance is not 
held accountable for its higher order errors, it might hope to obscure itself through false 
equivalencies with the allowable errors of the multitude– governmental error kills and 
causes foreseeable suffering, multitudinous error is most often just foolish, and is 
ultimately forgivable. When governance errs, crisis capitalism steps in (cf. Klein 2008) 
and further fractures the commons, thus providing less room for common error. Climate 
change demonstrates that when governmental error occurs people die in untimely ways; 
when government is not held accountable, people continue to suffer. Here, governing and 
universal ideals of equality and justice continue to matter in ways that stand in 
meaningful tension with particular sociality that can be drawn to unjust, unequal and 
overarchingly violent relation.  
  
Error has room through ecological and cultural means- these means provide social 
allowance for the space between law and life’s actual living. Other thought attendant to 
climate change creates food security and systemic redundancy as material and technical 
room for error- this study concerns itself with social capacities. Sociality can experiment 
with conceptualizations of needs and their fulfillment in order to reorganize what are 
interests, and what is possible. In the face of systemic collapse, providing room for error 
can be ecologically translated into finding, organizing and allowing common margins 
within living systems in and through death. Providing room for error even in systemic 
collapse appears as allowance for social differentiation, variation, mutation, 
experimentation and play- with play understood as the varying space between co-
dependent things. When sociality from below can play, vary, mutate, continue and 
differentiate within and with its governing margins, this is the formalization of a space for 
error: this is meaningful variation of the multitude. On these terms, critical judgment 
must continue to be applied towards law and law-likely governing structures. 
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2b A policy of the other 
Culture structures room for error with an awareness of under what terms and in whose 
interests law and law-likely governmental forms should be judged. Specific relation 
between the multitude and capitalist governance are discussed in Section 3a; the variable 
ways the multitude relates to governance is discussed in Sections 4a; and the way that 
culture positions itself in relation between governance and the multitude is 
conceptualized in section 4b. This section suggests overarching conceptualizations for 
how cultural workers can evaluate interests contingent to the managerial forms that they 
produce. In relation to those who forward interests are others whose relationality 
necessarily provides actors with an allowance for error– by being somehow necessary 
through providing care, reproductive labor or being in some other relation that matters. 
Meanwhile governance collaborates with capitalism when it legally nominates the 
singular individual as the only and irreducible point for either ownership, accountability 
or activity. An anthropology of the multitudes runs in difference to this singular 
nominationality, it is in the space around and beyond singularity where actual 
multitudinous being has room for error. Cultural work must be aware of this. 
 
The tension between wanting to identify singular cultural forms that reshape the 
multitude and what are the multitude of things that frame this relationship can also be 
seen as the fictional knot of what is of supposedly ‘autonomous’ production. While 
certain discourses would suggest that autonomy is the special purview of art, the 
preceding demonstrates the common relations that structure autonomy– what is 
uncommon in autonomy is that its intended politics actually meaningfully play out as 
intended. Autonomy is both operative and fictional; being is relational and in practice the 
multitude’s one and many rely on the other as relationally necessary, even if they don’t 
acknowledge it. Cultural work in relation to the multitude must consider how other social 
interests collaborate in organizing meaningful spaces of livability. While the multitude is 
unaccountable, the temporal concerns of governance suggest a capacity to think about 
and be aware of the need to consider these others at the margin of meaningful 
appearance. This study thinks of two kinds of other: the intimate and distant. 
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1) The multitude is intimate with this first ‘other’. As discussed with Irigaray in Chapter 
2, in whatever human project exists a non-negational dialectic that can be understood as 
the essential but non-essentialized relation of female and male. By non-essentialized, this 
relation refers to neither sex nor gender but to the acknowledgement of relational 
collaborations necessary for the making and sustaining of particular life. In other words, 
the other here is not only human; it is also what is called nature. By Irigaray’s telling, at 
the heart of any project stands an unknown and essentially unaccountable effort that 
nevertheless should be acknowledged in some way for its more-than-equal contribution 
to whatever that is. This intimate other suggests relations of necessary care and necessary 
performance that neither suggest who performs and who cares, nor does it predetermine 
towards what ends sustaining care is provided– all that intimacy suggests is that central to 
any identifiable thing are other constructs that exceed the formalized nature of what is 
being sustained. With an awareness of the intimate other which sustains momentary 
being, comes a sense that precarious being399 is contingent to variable relations that seem 
to independently vary.  
 
2) Second, within the general anthropology of the multitude are others that are in some 
way intimate but are also objectively far and distant. The first other is intimate, the 
second other is the most distantly conceivable possible other that may relate, and thus 
matter. They matter because by their distance it may become recognizable that their 
relation through otherness can be consequential. By consciously organizing on what 
terms to relate to something that can be seen as so foreign, this process organizes the 
space where thing inbetween becomes more familiar. Chapter 3, section 3c describes how 
despite the PAH’s near-criminal behavior, their common sociality maintains a general and 
popular support that crosses law-likely class and race-based difference. They manage to 
cross cultural lines through the common and general nature of their social work, 
appealing not to law but to a common sense that doesn’t end where familiarity does. The 
mediatic face of common sense is materially grounded in common experiences of 
common social conditions; with relationality worked through the common mediatic litter 																																																								
399 For more on this understanding of precarity see Butler (2004), Lorey (2015). 	
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and detritus400 that being produces. The PAH cares for “the whole” of their interests by 
making sure to produce action and images that translates to their most distant 
commonality. In so doing, despite their lawly criminal nature, the social fabric of their 
commonness reaches to the furthest possible other, and in so doing creating a social force 
that is able to counter law with common sense. So, in that the multitude can be either 
singular or multiple, acknowledging the necessity of this distant other is also central to 
the nature of the anthropology of the multitude.  
 
3 Nature and culture 
3a Thinking for culture 
While the multitude suggests unaccountable relationality between the intimate and the 
other and between the singular and the collective, capitalism is perfectly clear about its 
relations with the other. The discussion of Jason W. Moore’s work in Chapter 4 clarifies 
that while many societies propose relationships between nature and culture, capitalism 
works by proposing that culture is external too and removed from nature. That is, while 
the anthropology of the multitude embraces an ultimately unknowable intimacy between 
the actor and the other, capitalism’s other is just an externality to be written off in an 
accounting book. The ends of life within capitalism are profit, all loss is externalized. 
Whatever nature is posed not as a necessary partner in the ongoing co-production of 
livable relations but as a cheap source for the ongoing reproduction of capitalism’s own 
model of profit extraction and reproduction. Nature is seen as only capable of silently 
giving, silently suffering or violently responding: capitalism recognizes this silence and 
violence as the nature of nature that justifies the fact of its externalization. With nature’s 
imagined externality, it doesn’t matter what happens to it. In the same way, the poor and 
dispossessed are understood as rightfully suffering in silence or violence with their 
nature. The dispossessed, as animals, as the poor and other; their bare life is imagined by 
capital as being nothing other than external noise to the system of extraction and ends of 
profit for the few. It results, nevertheless, in the continued dispossession of the many.  
 																																																								
400 The terms “litter” and “detritus” relate to how images and news, social media and memory 
joins the rich compost of common life, and relates to what is scaffolded in the niche over time.	
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Here, this study proposes a terrain to visualize where the cultural policy of the multitude 
is enacted. In total, this terrain is multitudinous life and its being over time– where the 
multitude of all life relates socially, biologically and culturally. Upon this terrain, the 
human project generally draws the useful fiction of nature and culture to govern its own 
activities within itself and in relation to the wider world. It is less a line and more a zone, 
unmarked field, sphere of interest, or just a fiction. This fiction narratively organizes 
particular niche building activities for the particular and general multitude- allowing for 
the accumulation of practices, knowledges and relations across lifetimes and generations. 
The niche allows for a buffer against privation, it provides room for particular error and 
possibility, orienting itself for future activity. The niche is particular like when it is 
analogous to a home, and it is general in that it is like an economy that regulates in its 
own interests in ecological exchange across the variety of scales that it connects. In that 
the niche can encompass all these things, it is a Chthulucenic mix of relations.401  
 
What capitalism does in difference to this divide is to draw another line in contrapposto 
to this nature-culture divide– upon this other line capitalism extracts from nature in order 
to drive its ends in profit. Everything else is excluded as being something other and as 
having different or competing interests. Unlike the nature/culture divide, this conceptual 
line is a real line of profit. Many translate their own relationality across or through 
capital’s nature/culture divide for their intimate needs and to orient their worldly 
relations. The multitude appears in relation to any law, and its relationality is often 
dependent upon lines of capitalist extraction.  But capitalism claims to erase the need for 
being intimate with the reality of the world beyond. It suggests that it is able to account 
for all that needs to be attended to by suggesting that means only matter toward ledger-
book ends in profit.  
 
Within contemporary capitalism, life’s intimate needs are variable not for life’s own 
general multitudinous nature but for profitable ends through varieties of need– profit 
dangerously constrains, obscures or amplifies actual needs for systemic variability with 																																																								
401 All creatures construct their niches, so in some ways one can talk about the nature/culture 
divide of the bee colony through the work of, for example, Laubichler and Renn’s (2015) 
discussions of eusocial insect colonies.	
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its own interests in variation that drives profit. This space between a fictional 
nature/culture divide that is intimate with both the human world and wider nature and the 
line that capitalism draws across the world for profit is the zone of the meaningful 
politics of this cultural policy.  
 
The Barcelona PAH’s experience sets a good example. Barcelona, its geology, geography, 
cultural histories, architectures, ways of being, laws, relations and its inhabitants fill the 
plain of multitudinous existence. The nature/culture line is real because the city exists in 
relation to the landscape but fictional because the lines of nature extend into the city and 
the city itself extends out into the countryside. Yet capitalist governance has drawn a line 
of dispossession across the city by extracting profit and the right to housing from those 
affected by banking issues. Through dispossession at the hands of capital, victims are left 
to silently suffer as external to its systemic and abstract interests. Nevertheless, a line of 
nature and culture that is more intimate with the actualities of relating within the city 
suggests that things could be otherwise, that housing and a social will to bring people to 
housing can exist: the homes are empty (or can be repurposed or built) and the social 
knowledge to keep or get people in them exists (or can be generated). Depression caused 
by being on the wrong end of capitalism’s politics can be transformed into the will to 
organize towards other ends. Depression and other ways of being affected can be sensibly 
transformed into another way of processing politics, in the space that strives for intimacy 
with both its issues and the capacity to somehow address them– being between the issue 
and the space to address it is where cultural work actually crosses the fictional line 
between nature and culture.  
 
The PAH’s understanding that trauma can be transformed to activism demonstrates some 
of the space between capitalist dispossession from nature and a more genuinely fictive 
line between nature and culture. Depression, or other disempowered sensibilities, appear 
when dispossession suggests there are no other options, though the fictive nature/culture 
line demonstrates possibilities for other ongoing and variable narratives that can relate in 
other ways of being in the world. The fictive line can be fantastical, though notions prove 
their truth-value in actually being commonly effective, though towards any end. Moving 
	 295	
against the line of capital’s extractive ends towards multitudinous ways and ends, to 
whatever extent, is the space in which this policy takes form. Any movement here, as the 
PAH’s activity demonstrates, is scaffolded upon active cultural work.  
 
A cultural policy of the multitudes needs cultural workers to enact this policy. This study 
assumes that there are self-selecting and interested actors who share its general goals. 
Formally speaking, as specific actors, these cultural workers leave the multitude in the 
instance of their labor, when pushing contours of cultural activity through the multitude. 
In that culture here is defined as having law or law-likely effects, culture is always in 
relation to something institutional- culture works by, through, for and against whatever 
institutional dispositif. The cultural distinguishes itself from the social by its longer 
temporality and more formal nature. More on the particular variability of the multitude in 
relation to culture will be discussed in Section 4– of importance here is simply that 
cultural work promotes and provides its own meanings through being formally or 
informally institutional. That is, between the multitude and individual cultural things are 
instituting dispositifs that enforce relational meanings with the multitude– as policy or in 
law-likeliness. Cultural things get policied by the multitude (that is, subject to 
multitudinous meaning-networks) rather than governance when common sense suggests 
what is so is so. That is, as discussed in the previous chapter, whatever object’s actual and 
immediate translationality can be affected through whatever system that provides for its 
meaning, including common sociality.  
 
A work of art that seems to illuminate a political transformation may, years later, be 
buoyed only by its market value that is built upon an entirely disinterested system. 
Conversely, the fetish objects of cargo cults demonstrate how isolated cultures can read 
the quotidian detritus of Western society in dramatically different ways towards 
multitudinous ends. In many but not all ways, the nature of the institution from where 
cultural forms are generated matter less than through what system objects are translated, 
for it is through translation that the thing becomes policied. Here, things can be judged by 
how they enforce violence on others, distant and intimate. It is in how things work to 
policy their contingent meanings with the general multitudinous anthropology that comes 
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to matter. Towards this matter then, a cultural policy of the multitudes in the time of 
climate change sits beside or beyond capitalist interests. It is for others, rather than for 
capital that policies this culture.  
 
3b For the multitude, the mirror of being in the world  
While cultural work suggests that it can consciously straddle the nature and culture divide 
to organize routines over time that are more intimate with the realities of both sides, the 
multitude responds as it does. It tautologically organizes what in the cultural is 
governmental, but the multitude must be understood as operating independently of 
culture. The multitude embodies a space of being, external but in relation to culture’s 
governance. The multitude can be one or many because it is ungovernable and 
uncultured, though this does not mean that it is without governance or culture. Cultural 
forms as governing forms are tasked with consciously organizing relations to the other as 
multitude. The multitude and cultural forms mirror each other– but differently, for the 
multitude acts in actual relation while culture works in formal relation. Fluidly, cultural 
work forcefully shapes forms that the viscous multitude responds through and to. It is 
through the multitude’s intimate or least law-likely social responses that it most directly 
embodies its own self-governance in time. The tautology suggests a balance in every 
form, but also forwards the conundrum of how within fixed systems, imaginal autonomy 
can make changes.   
 
4 Rhetorics and manners 
The multitude responds or works in advance of natural/governmental/political force. This 
cultural policy facilitates the multitude’s social work of commoning notions around what 
subjectifies or dispossesses it, in order to transform situations. The PAH, as a model for 
such work, demonstrates sociality re-orienting its relations to governing force. It bridges, 
scaffolds, counteracts, re-orients or deconstructs relational capacities of governance. 
Outside of the multitudes’ social work, cultural work can provide frames and models of 
thinking through the variability of social relation with governing concepts. These cultural 
frames suggest ways in which intimate being commonly relates to governing forces that 
help or impede their being and becoming in and over time. 
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Bound in the knot between being and becoming, the embodied multitude relates to 
governances through itself and cultural forms intimately and generally. It is bound in the 
knot of the operative fiction between nature and culture, which is the human being in 
nature over time striving to differently relate to things in order to maintain some way 
within its worldly home. In that the multitude is tautologically singular and multiple, this 
binding operates as much through cultural projection across difference as it does in 
intimate and immediate sociality. 
 
Therefore, this study identifies two frames for culture to think about the multitude’s 
relationality. The first frame (section 4a) reiterates the social manners of intimate 
responses to violent governmental action. The second frame (4b) demonstrates general 
cultural approaches to how the social relates to governance. These are named rhetorical 
cultural frames. 
 
4a Manners by which the multitude embodies itself in crisis 
(Based on the organization for Chapter 3, Section 2 and 3) 
 
1. The multitude works to recognize within itself the space between its own 
understanding of the worldly violence it has experienced and what and how culture and 
law have provided for it to feel and articulate its feeling. 
 
2. The multitude socially organizes common notions within itself and others through the 
shared experience of violence as crisis; and relationally articulates these notions as 
common ways of being and becoming together in the world– beside or against or in other 
relation to the violence it has been experiencing.  
 
3. The multitude socially works through these common notions with less intimate and 
more distant others in order to generalize and adjust its self-articulations to relate among 
the general commons, as common sense.  
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4. The multitude makes cultural law of its common sense, or organizes common action 
against laws that subjectify it.  
 
4b Rhetorics, or ways of addressing institutions of governance 
(Based on the discussion in Chapter 4, Section 3) 
 
The cultural thought in this section provides rhetorical forms intended as scaffolding 
structures for the multitude’s relational manners. In the way that dispositifs around art 
and culture formalize ways to relates, these rhetorics provide the multitude with common 
articulations for power relations that expediently scaffold multitudinous awareness 
towards transformations of governing relations. At the margins of this discussion is how 
cultural forms provide ongoing room for livability; of interest are the culture thoughts 
that provides succinct rhetorical thought to organize common ways to relationally work 
through governmental error. It is cultural forms’ formality that allows them to appear 
autonomous– as their formal nature provides them with the integrity to stand in 
independence from the relations which their existence depends upon. These forms are 
first named in the discussions of Chapter 4, Section 3; each form specifically identifies 
conflictory relations within how capitalist culture organizes multitudinous life.  
 
To deepen an understanding of the rhetorical approaches, the following section briefly 
sketches them with the additional work of critical theorists. This is to more concisely 
demonstrate how the cultural can work to scaffold particular relationality beside the 
multitude within the larger ongoing cultural/natural environment. While here critical 
theorists focus primarily on the objects of art, their reasoning can be applied beyond it. It 
is the relational nature of cultural forms in general that opens up particular creative ways 
of being to the wider world. 
 
A) Culture can work to destabilize, destroy or close-off multitudinous relations to 
governing forms in the ways described in the work of Autonomist Marxist theory as 
discussed in the previous chapter.  
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In Gavin Grindon’s (2011) essay, Surrealism, Dada and the Refusal of Work Grindon 
follows parallels between Berlin Dadaist activity and the Berlin’s Spartacists during the 
insurrection of 1919. Within Berlin, Communist-aligned Spartacists were revolting 
against the Socialist Party that had been for decades collaborating with German national 
interests. The Socialists were clinging to power in effort to re-instate a governing 
normalcy on more conservative terms. For Grindon, the artistic avant garde works 
politically when it throws its lot in with the immediate and contingent processes of 
emergent subjectification that the Spartacists were driving. In this context, Dada 
organized a funerary parade to symbolically hold open the unsettled liminal moment– 
performatively amplifying the immediate sensual affects of insurrection against demands 
to settle for institutional Socialist politics. 
 
Central to Grindon’s narrative is Berlin Dada’s ongoing refusal to make traditional 
artwork. Following Marx, Grindon suggests that with their refusal to work under 
traditional terms, these professional artists (and also striking workers) demonstrate the 
autonomous power of labor against the institutions that would order their particular ways 
of working otherwise. Here, within the sociality of the street, artists employed as  
“specialists in revolt” (84) make art that moves “outside or against capitalist relations.” 
(86) Grindon references Mario Tronti (1972) and Steve Wright’s (2002) understanding 
that class is actively composed ahead of and in antagonism to relations with capital, and 
that composing class antagonism is active and always particular, sensuous and 
performative. Its non-cultured culture is its state of exception in advance of whatever law 
it aims to establish. Within Marxist logic, Grindon (2011) explains that class composition 
has two heads; it can be technically composed by the demands of capital402 or politically 
(and in the discourse of this study, more multitudinously) through organization from 
below– in subversion, by refusal to work, and through worker self-organizations. (85) 
 
Grindon rests the political ontology of this artistic refusal in a cultural dispositif 
organized through Kantian-informed notions on the value of disinterested play against the 																																																								
402 Technical composition organizes labor in relation to the managerial structures to service 
capitalist interests.	
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discipline of (artist) work time. (82–83) In the immediacy of this revolt, the Kantian logic 
may have provided structure the visibility of its artistic actors; beyond the moment’s 
historicity and Grindon’s ordering of it within art history, this study is unclear how the 
activity exactly relates to Kant or other philosophical thought. What remains are 
independent narratives and representations.  
 
B) Culture can work to specifically frame places where the multitude can reinforce or 
innovate within ongoing institutional frames, in ways suggested by the previous chapter’s 
discussion of Stakemeier and Vishmidt.  
 
Informed by Modern Art’s Institutional Critique, Marc J. Leger’s (2012) Brave New 
Avant Garde does “not propose an escape from institutions but works towards the 
egalitarian transformation of institutions.” (3) Leger builds upon Brian Holmes’s 
recognition of the productive network of activist-artists that loosely collaborate between 
social movements and particular art institutions against the capitalist order of things. 403 
Leger recognizes these cultural formations as supportive of artistic work that leverages 
precaritization and the fracturing of a cultural field across the precarious commons, as 
social practice artwork. This sphere explicitly stages an autonomy afforded by its 
network and allows for radical currents to be made visible across the broader cultural 
context. 
 
Therefore Leger situates a critical art practices between institutions, the state of present 
(contingent) social relations and a universal ideal. For Leger, that ideal is a communism 
he defines as the non-coercive truth organizing affirmative and equal transformation of 
all people and social relations.404  He sees universal thought providing critical wind to 
individuals working to maintain tensions between themselves as independent actors and 																																																								
403 “In an essay on the critique of institutions and the desire of radicalized artists to work outside 
the limits of established disciplinary structures, Brian Holmes argues that the most productive 
areas of contemporary critical art practice – discourse-based context art and institutional critique 
– have undergone a significant phase change, a shift toward extra-disciplinary, transversal 
assemblages that link actors from the art world to projects oriented toward political contestation.” 
(Leger 2012) 	
404 See Leger 2013 12–16.	
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the institutions where they act within (67); unattended, this tension would allow 
institutions to biopolitically subjectify its participants. Leger sees much social practice 
artwork to be ultimately supportive of neoliberal biopolitics, and symptomatic of non-
critical and anti-essentialist “utopian ideology of the left.” (Leger 2013 7-8) Against such 
affirmations of bland sociality, he supports artworks that are socially critical yet 
ultimately affirmative of the networked aspirations of what these progressive institutions 
desire to compose.  
 
Dark Mountain is also critical of the biopolitics – of how contemporary capitalism 
prioritizes humanity over other forms of nature. Kingsnorth (2010) critiques normative 
green activism; “It is not about ecocentrism. It is not about re-forging a connection 
between over-civilized people and the world outside their windows. It is not about living 
close to the land or valuing the world for the sake of the world.” (58) With such universal 
damnation for civilization, Kingsnorth accesses universal logic through anti-human. The 
formally cultural nature of his journal, as discussed in Chapter 2, is central to the 
Modernist project and works between institutions to promote critical thought through 
means not so different from Leger’s. Though they express different analysis, both Leger 
and Kingsnorth utilize similar institutional structures for critique. Through their 
institutionality in relation to an abstract ideal, they provide the multitude with variable 
logics for further relational poeisis. 
 
C) Culture can work to specifically frame space for the multitude to make new 
connections beyond pre-existing institutional frames; as suggested in the previous 
chapter’s discussion of Afropessimism.  
 
In her (2012) essay Poetics, Commitment: Ayreen Anastas’s M*Bethlehem and Pasolini 
Pa Palestine, Art Historian Jaleh Mansoor points to a question Hannah Arendt (1979) 
raises in her essay The Decline of the Nation State and the End of the Rights of Man. 
Mansoor finds Arendt beginning with a simple question regarding the ongoing issue of 
dispossessed and stateless people: “how is it that he or she who could embody the rights 
of man as such, the stateless one, or the refugee, signals a legitimating crisis at the heart 
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of the concept of rights?” (73) Mansoor looks at Palestine and its virtually stateless 
inhabitants that formally exist only as a legal adjunct to Israel. Palestine’s utter 
contingency dispossesses it of an ability to set its own terms of existence – this situation 
having direct parallels to the situation of climate migrants. She quotes Adorno’s (1977) 
essay “Commitment” in relation to artworks whose effects obscure political tension 
without responding to the totality of their issues, saying they run the risk of “merely 
assimilat[ing] themselves to the brute existence against which they protest, in forms so 
ephemeral… that from the first days they belong in the seminars in which they end.” (78) 
The multitude is the becoming of other besides law; its praxis is not exhausted through 
submission to governance. Staying with the trouble of situations like Palestine’s 
demonstrates an intimacy with multitudinous capacities beyond pleas for relief from 
powers that cannot, will not, or just do not know how to actually end what they have 
begun. 
 
Mansoor affirms an artwork by Ayreen Anastas that works through its Palestinian activist 
and poetic commitments,405 and refuses to surrender to the immediate gratification of 
political trade-offs. Mansoor discusses Anastas’s Pasolini Pa Palestine, demonstrating 
how she creates a system where knowledges and representation are made to bear the 
materiality of their own limits – word and film present themselves as a singular object 
that ultimately can provide neither comprehensible knowledge or consumable form. The 
work escapes institutionalized meaning and avoids formal capture while still being 
aesthetically captivating, here the concretely poetic object of art falls like a stone that 
begs to be caught.  
 
Mansoor affirms work made within political struggle that does not drive abstract laws 
through the multitude’s purely relational capacities. Rather, she points to cultural work 																																																								
405 Mansoor (65–68) ascribes to poetry a power to move people, and to do it in a manner that is 
not simply political in the sense described here. She traces a debate about poetry between poet 
Juliana Spahr and poet-theorist Joshua Clover. Spahr frames the instrumentality of political 
poetry as a debate between Adorno who Spahr sees as instrumentalizing politics within academia, 
against Brecht whose street poetry represents the living word and movement of the street. Clover 
begs to differ, asserting that while poetry does move people, it does not necessarily always move 
them in the way that activists would like, and that might be a good thing.	
	 303	
whose formal concepts and materiality elevates the multitude’s capacities to socially 
relate to anything through and over law and law-likely culture and nature.  By crossing 
simple laws of governance and allowing for the normal flows of relational sociality based 
on the mere fact that things might relate, individual humans seem to exceed themselves 
and their perceived, actual and imaginational horizons. Cultural work can provide frames 
to expand the multitude’s relational horizon towards a variety of ends. 
 
By applying these rhetorical approaches in relation to the possible embodied manners of 
the multitudes suggested above, the multitude moves from capitalist towards more 
multitudinous ends in this time of climate change.  
 
5 Reiteration, closing statements  
A cultural policy of the multitude in the time of climate change understands that the 
multitude has no cultural policy, because when the multitude’s social capacities become 
policy, they become law or law-likely and are no longer properly multitudinous. When 
there is law, the multitude will exceed it in some way. Thus, formally speaking, the 
cultural policy for multitudinous self-governance in the time of climate change is not 
written for the multitude but rather for those who would venture to collectively organize 
cultural frames, models and processes through which the multitude might relate towards 
particular but multitudinous ends.  
 
Like a person composing themself before a mirror, the multitude governs itself 
tautologically, as culture mirrors the multitude as a form of itself in self-governance. An 
anthropology of a truly global multitude utilizes the culturally institutional, scaffolded, 
organized human-natural and natural structures through which the multitude relates to 
and lives through towards multitudinous, rather than a singular, end. This is because the 
multitude does not agree on its means, how it will end, or what its endings mean. While 
subject to governmental law which it always exceeds, the global multitude recognizes no 
institutions and laws governing its total relational capacity other than those of its own 
sociality. 
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What is most proper to the multitude is its unaccountable sociality, which allows for its 
seamless transition from the one to the many and to many ones, without ever loosing 
consistency. It is the multitude’s embodied and unaccountable translationality that allows 
it to definitionally exceed itself. In the multitudinous world there is never any question of 
who acts– the multitude acts, in relation. There is never any question that results and 
responses to its action will create difference, but also that things will remain as they are 
and also be transformed. Accounting for what stays the same and what changes is 
situationally particular. The multitude’s sociality provides the ontological terrain for the 
cultural ways of the multitude, regardless of climate change. Cultural work and the works 
of culture are the policied sociality of the multitude, where the multitude’s habits and 
practices are given autonomous form by someone’s common sense, and made enforceable 
in order to scaffold other particular ways of being multitudinous: in law or outside of it.  
 
An anthropology of the multitudes in general is different from a cultural policy of the 
multitudes in the time of climate change because rather than trying to describe the general 
manners of generally being, policy attempts to organize particular ways of generally 
living in a specific time.  
 
The Chthulucene brings into high contrast the culture policied by capitalism that 
continues to disallow and disable the material and ideational ways for multitudinous 
being and multitudinous ends. The culture attendant to capitalism that simply externalizes 
nature therefore forcibly limits the variability of the multitude by increasing the 
multitude’s exposure to the violence and dispossession that nature’s exclusion affords. 
The indeterminacy of multitudinous being and multitudinous ends mirrors the general 
indeterminate boundary between nature and culture that drives many human ontologies; 
the problem with capitalist culture is that it excludes nature from culture and vice-versa 
with righteous demands for proof of profit at whatever end. Within capitalism, the only 
variability that ultimately matters is profit. Chthulucenic climate change is meaningful 
because it reveals the total and brutal horizon of capitalism’s limited means and ends, a 
cultural policy of the multitude functions, to the extent that it can, to limit the multitude’s 
exposure to this violence. It does so in manners besides capitalist abstraction; rather, a 
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cultural policy scaffolds human social meaning and ends at the margins, against, under, 
beyond or in variable relation to capitalist ends.   
 
Climate change paired with the social orderings attendant to capitalism disproportionately 
places violence upon those poorer than, darker than, other gendered than whoever drives 
such profit-interested laws. Climate change paired with capitalism has the ability, as 
studies have said, to drive near-term human extinction events, or just cause massive 
upheaval. With the intimate possibility for death regardless of whatever sociality, this 
study clings to conceptualizations of multitudinous ends. It is the multitude's experience 
of climate change that matters. If life ends by the singular violence of capital, the 
multitude regardless has ends that exceed this death.  
 
In actually intimate experiencing of governmental force, the multitude embodies the 
violence capitalism expresses. Within itself, the multitude embodies a variety of 
relational perspective to reorganize its own common-sense relations to such expressions. 
By working through whatever common notions in ongoing cultural relation, the multitude 
socially organizes its means and ends attendant to whatever regulatory forces it identifies 
as meaningful self-governance. Cultural workers can amplify the multitude’s embodied 
relational manners by providing cultural and rhetorical frames to expediently maneuver 
other relational ways to governing force. Cultural work makes emotional, socio-cultural, 
and environmental room for error in common practice and at life’s margins by culturally 
framing other relations to governance. An allowance for error is the ethical task that 
proper governing forms allow at the margins of life. Governmental force that leads to 
unforgivable violence is bad governance, not forgivable error.  
 
As such, a cultural policy of the multitude: 
 
1) Recognizes that the multitude precedes and exceeds and also necessarily exists in 
relation to governmental forms.  The multitude either lightly carries or is terribly 
burdened by governance.  Through its independent sociality, the multitude becomes both 
one and many in relation to, and in excess of, such governing forms.  
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2) The multitude varies in variable relation to all forms of governance; which are both 
natural and human-natural (i.e. cultural) forms of law and law-likely enforcements of 
behavior. Multitudinous sociality becomes culture when its ways become as policied 
forms of law and law-likely behaviour attendant to whoever’s interests, and articulated as 
somehow common sense. Culture allows for particular ways of social being over time.  
 
3) The problem of culture attendant to capitalism in the time of climate change is how, 
regardless, it enforces ways of proper being, that recognizes violence as external to its 
own profitable systemicity. Climate change suggests that the need for multitudinous 
variation through sociality, law and law-likely culture will increase. The problem of 
culture attendant to capitalism is that its proper ways of being human exact violence upon 
the world by disallowing other's ways of variation. 
 
4) Sociality informed by this policy works to undermine, replace, stand beside or beyond 
the violent line of capitalist cultural law, and acts to move the margins for life towards 
ways and ends that contain possible margins for error. (Section 3A contains a schematic 
visualization of this point.) 
 
5) Culture informed by this policy necessarily relates to the other that co-produces 
marginal spaces for error, at the heart and margins of its policy practice (see section 2B 
above). Error is understood as forgivable in its foolishness. Unforgivable errors occur 
when governance does not follow through with universal ideals aimed at caring for life. 
 
6) A cultural policy of the multitudes in the time of climate change is energetically 
policied by an anti-capitalism that is informed by feminist and queer thought. 
 
7) The multitude intimately experiences the violence of nature and culture’s governing 
forces as governing force. The multitude responds to governing force in social and other 
ways, multitudinously. Through its own sociality, the multitude reorganizes its relations 
with governing force. The study uses the PAH to model the manners in which the 
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multitude embodies and reorients its own governing relations in response to violence. 
Section 4A’s framework rearticulates how the multitude socially reorients its own being 
and becoming. 
 
8) The being and becoming of the multitude exists in the knot bound at the fictional line 
of nature and culture, where sociality nominates cultural ways of utilizing natural cultural 
relations to govern itself in relation to the rest of the world. 
 
9) In relation to how the multitude reorients its social relations to governance, culture can 
provide frames to scaffold multitudinous relationality to governance. Section 4B provides 
a set of rhetorical frames constructed with contemporary critical thought aimed to 
culturally sets relations to governing force in pure antagonism, in critical relation, or in 
open connectivity. Particular sociality will relate to cultural frames as it will, 
multitudinously. These rhetorical forms relate to the variable ways the multitude works 
through its own common notions (as self-governance) by being ways and means for the 
multitude to think through its relations to nature’s powers as culture (as governance). 
 
10) These and other cultural forms are universal not because they suggest singular truths, 
but simply because they may by universally relatable by a human multitude with 
differing beginnings and ends. They are means for whatever relation. 
 
11) Throughout history, the multitude has operated towards multitudinous 
anthropological ends, living in whatever particular relationships between nature and 
culture. This relationality is properly informed by and in dialog with the most distant 
knowable other that it must somehow meaningfully relates. This is partially so that 
margins remain for the other, not for profit. 
 
12) There is no way ‘back’ to previous ways of being multitudinous. Multitudinous ends 
always, rather, suggest particular ways of being in common relation to all that it might be 
contingent to in the moment and beyond. These ways suggest multitudinous rather than 
singular ends; regardless of whether or not extinction level events occur. In whatever 
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manner, ways of being are organized to meaningfully exist in some form, today or 
tomorrow. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 309	
Cited bibliography 
 
20 Minutos (2006, 29 December) Los jóvenes españoles destinan el 64% de su sueldo a 
comprar un piso. Retrieved from: www.20minutos.es/noticia/183904/0/jovenes/compra/piso 
 
20 Minutos (2013, 8 February) Una iniciativa legislativa popular recoge casi un millón y 
medio de firmas por la dación en pago. Retrieved from: 
http://www.20minutos.es/noticia/1725145/0/dacion-pago/desahucio-hipotecas/iniciativa-
legislativa-popular/#xtor=AD-15&xts=467263 
 
Adorno, Theodor (1977) “Commitment,” Aesthetics and Politics: The Key Texts of the 
Debate within German Marxism. London: Verso. 
 
Adorno, Theodor (1997) Aesthetic Theory. London: Continuum. 
 
Agamben, Giorgio (1993) The Coming Community. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
 
Agamben, Giorgio (1994) The Man Without Content. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press. 
 
Agamben, Giorgio (1998) Homo Sacer. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Agamben, Giorgio (1999) Potentialities. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Agamben, Giorgio (2005) The Time That Remains. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Agamben, Giorgio (2011) “Angels” (trans. by Lorenzo Chiesa), Angelaki, 16:3, pp.117–
123. 
 
	 310	
Alerta Digital (2013, 11 February) El 34 por ciento de los suicidios que se producen en 
España son por los desahucios. Retrieved from: www.alertadigital.com/2013/02/11/el-34-
por-ciento-de-los- suicidios-que-se- producen-en-espana-son-por-los-desahucios/ 
   
Agarwal, Anil & Narain, Sunita (1991) Global Warming in an Unequal World: A Case of 
Environmental Colonialism. New Delhi: Centre for Science and Environment. 
 
Arendt, Hannah (1979) “The Decline of the Nation State and the End of the Rights of 
Man,” Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
 
Arendt, Hannah (1998) The Human Condition. London: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Aristotle (1986) Da Anima. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Aristotle (1998) Politics. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing. 
 
Aristotle (2004) Nichomean Ethic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Aarons, K. (2016, 29 February) No Selves to Abolish: Afropessimism, Anti-Politics and 
the End of the World. Retrieved from: http://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/no-
selves-to-abolish-afropessimism-anti-politics-and-end-world  
 
Arrighi, Giovanni & Silver, Beverly (2001) “Workers North and South,” Socialist 
Register, 2001, S. pp. 53–76. 
 
Asad, Talal (1973) Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter. London: Ithaca Press. 
 
Baird, Kate Shea (2015, 17 December) Rebel Cities: The Citizen Platforms in Power. 
Retrieved from: https://www.redpepper.org.uk/rebel-cities-the-citizen-platforms-in-
power/ 
 
	 311	
Balbi, Magdelena I (2013) Hacer Visible Y Hacer Audible. El Escrache de HIJOS y la 
PAH (un Poco) Mas Alla del Activismo Artistico. MA, Museum of Contemporary Art 
Barcelona (MACBA) Independent Studies Program. 
 
Balibar, Étienne (2008) Spinoza and Politics. London: Verso.  
 
Barbero, Iker (2015) “When rights need to be (re)claimed: Austerity measures, neoliberal 
housing policies and anti-eviction activism in Spain,” Critical Social Policy 35 (2), pp. 
270–280. 
 
Basso, Luca (2012) Marc and Singularity. Leiden: Brill. 
 
Bataille, Georges (1989) The Accursed Share. New York: Zone Books. 
 
Bateson, Gregory (1987) Ecology of Mind. Northvale, New Jersey: Jason Aronson.   
 
Belaza, Mónica Ceberio (2013, 14 March) European Court rules Spanish mortgage law is 
abusive. Retrieved from: 
elpais.com/elpais/2013/03/14/inenglish/1363264199_406548.html  
 
Bell, Matthew (Ed.) (2016) The Essential Goethe. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Bennett, Tony (1988) “The Exhibitionary Complex,” New Formations, Number 4, Spring 
1988 73-102 
 
Berardi, Franco “Bifo” (2012) The Uprising, On Poetry and Finance. Los Angeles: 
Semiotext(e).  
 
Beuret, Nicholas (2017) “Counting Carbon: Calculative Activism and Slippery 
Infrastructure,” Antipode Vol. 49, Issue 5, pp. 1164–1185. 
 
	 312	
Bernes, Jasper (2011) “The Double Barricade and the Glass Floor,” Noys, Benjamin 
(Ed.) Communization and its Disconents. Brooklyn: Autonomedia.  
 
Biehl, Janet & Staudenmaier, Peter (1995) Ecofascism: Lessons from the German 
Experience. San Francisco: AK Press. 
 
Billig, Michael (1995) “Rhetorical Psychology, Ideological Thinking and Imagining 
Nationhood,” Johnston, Hank & Klanderman, Bert (Eds.) Social Movements, Protest, and 
Contention. London: Routledge. 
 
Block, Fred & Somers, Margaret (2014) The Power of Market Fundamentalism: Karl 
Polanyi's Critique. Boston: Harvard University Press. 
 
Bloom, Brett (2015) Petro-Subjectivity. Fort Wayne: Breakdown Break Down Press.  
 
Boas, Franz (1914) “Mythology and folk-tales of the North American Indians,” Journal 
of American Folklore, Vol. 27, No. 106, pp. 374–410. 
 
Botija, María Reneses (2015) Malestares y Patologías Menores en una consulta de salud 
mental: Biomedicina y subjetividad en tiempos de crisis. Doctoral Thesis in the Faculty 
of Medicine, Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, Spain. 
 
Botwin, Anita (2016, 10 August) Los Grupos de Apoyo Mutuo en salud mental: un 
cambio de chip brutal. Retrieved from: http://www.eldiario.es/retrones/Grupos-Apoyo-
Mutuo-mental-cambio_6_567353277.html 
 
Bourriaud, Nicolas (2009) Relational Aesthetics. Paris: Les presses du réel.  
 
Boyd, Andrew & Mitchell, Dave Oswald (Eds.) (2012) Beautiful Trouble. London: Or 
Books. 
 
	 313	
Brenner, Robert P. (2001) “The Low Countries in the Transition to Capitalism,” Journal 
of Agrarian Change, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 169–241. 
 
Brown, Oli (2007) “Climate change and forced migration: Observations, projections and 
implications,” Human Development Report 2007/2008, Geneva: United Nations 
Development Program.  
 
Buuck, David (2014) “We Are All Sound: Poetics and Public Space in the Occupy 
Oakland Movement,” Journal of Aesthetics & Protest, Issue 9.  
 
Butler, Judith (2004) Precarious Life. London: Verso. 
 
Bürger, Peter (1984) Theory of the Avant Garde. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press.  
 
Callejas, Teresa and Paula Monroy (2014, 7 May) Santi González: el artista 
comprometido. Retrieved from: https://barnasticos.wordpress.com/2014/05/07/el-artista-
que-ayuda-titulo-temporal 
 
Canguilhem, Georges (1978) On the Normal and the Pathological. Boston: Fawcett. 
 
Carlsson, Chris (2008) Nowtopia. Oakland: AK Press. 
 
Carr, Raymond (1980) Modern Spain 1875–1980. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Casellas, Antónia & Eduard Sala (2017) “Home Eviction, Grassroots Organization and 
Citizen Emposerment in Spain,” In Brickel, K., Fernandez, M. & Vasudevan, A (Eds.) 
Geographies of Froced Eviction: Dispossession, Violence, Insecurity. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 167–190. 
 
Castro, Irene & Román, Noelia (2013, 18 April) La PAH toma la decisión simbólica de 
	 314	
retirar la ILP por la dación en pago. Retrieved from: www.eldiario.es/sociedad/PAH-
retira-ILP-daciondesahucios_0_123187836.html 
 
Cesaire, Aimé (2001) Discourse on Colonialism. New York: Monthly Review Press.  
 
Chakrabarty, Dipesh (2007) Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial thought and historical 
difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Chakrabarty, Dipesh (2009) “The Climate of History: Four Theses,” Critical Inquiry 35 
(2), pp. 197–222. 
 
Cho, Eunah (2014) ‘Cover art’ Dark Mountain Journal, Issue 6, In the book’s front 
matter.  
 
Clark, Andy & Chalmers, David (1998, January) The Extended Mind, Analysis, Vol. 58, 
No. 1, pp. 7–19. 
 
Clastres, Pierre (1977) Society Against the State. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Clover, Joshua (2016) Riot. Strike. Riot. London: Verso.  
 
Coffin, Arthur B (date unkown) “Robinson Jeffer’s Life and Career,” Modern American 
Poetry. Retrieved from: http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/poets/g_l/jeffers/life.htm 
 
Colau, Ada and Adria Alemany (2014) Mortgaged Lives. London: Journal of Aesthetics 
& Protest Press. 
 
Coole, Diana & Frost, Samantha (2010) New Materialsm: Ontology, Agency and Politics. 
Durham: Duke University Press. 
 
Cowen, Deborah (2014) The Deadly Life of Logistics. Minneapolis: University of 
	 315	
Minnesota Press. 
 
Coy, José (2014) “Yes we can! Introduction,” Mortgaged Lives. London: Journal of 
Aesthetics & Protest Press, pp. 17–20. 
 
Cruz, Violeta (2012, 3 November) Una ley hipotecaria más justa y compasiva. Retrieved 
from: politica.elpais.com/politica/2012/11/03/actualidad/1351973868_892971.html 
 
Czech, Brian (2013) Supply Shock: Economic Growth at the Crossroads and the Steady 
State Solution. Gabriola: New Society Publisher. 
 
D’Alisa, Giacomo, Dmaria, Federico & Kallis, Giorgos (2014) Degrowth, A Vocabulary 
for a New Era. London: Routledge. 
 
da Silva, Denise Ferreira (2015) “Before Man: Sylvia Wynter’s Rewriting of the Modern 
Episteme,” McKittrick, Katherine (Ed.) On Being Human in Praxis. London: Duke 
University Press. 
 
Daley, Suzanne (2013, 20 December) Leading the Charge Against Spain's Mortgage 
Crisis. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com/2013/12/21/world/europe/leading-the-
chargeagainst- spains-mortgage-crisis.html 
 
Daly, Herman E. 1972. ‘In defense of a steady-state economy’. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics54: 945-954. doi: 10.2307/1239248 
 
Darian-Smith, Eve (2016) “Who Owns the World? Landscapes of Sovereignty, Property, 
Dispossession,” Journal of the Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, Issue 1. 
 
Dark Mountain (Eds.) (2014) “Picking up the Threads,” Dark Mountain Journal, Issue 5.  
 
Davis, Heather & Turpin, Etienne (2015) “Art & Death: Lives Between the Fifth 
	 316	
Assessment & the Sixth Extinction,” In Davis, Heather & Turpin, Etienne (Eds.) Art in 
the Anthropocene. London: Open Humanities Press.  
 
Davis, Mike (1990) City of Quartz. London: Verso.   
 
De La Cadena, Marisol (2010) “Indigenous Cosmopolitics in the Andes,” Cultural 
Anthropology, Vol. 25 (2), pp. 334–370.  
 
De Weerdt, J. & Garcia, Marisol (2016) “Housing crisis: The platform of mortgage 
victims (PAH) movement in Barcelona and innovations in governance,” Journal of 
Housing and Built Environment, 31 (3), pp. 471–493. 
 
Dean, Jodi (2012) The Communist Horizon. London: Verso. 
 
Debord, Guy (2012) Society of the Spectacle. Eastbourne: Soul Bay Press. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles (1988) Spinoza: Practical Philosophy.  San Francisco: City Lights 
Books. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles (1991) “The Fold,” Yale French Studies, No. 80. pp. 227–247. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles & Felix Guattari (1994) What is Philosophy? New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
 
Demos, T. J. (2008) “Means without End: Ayreen Anastas and Rene Gabri’s Camp 
Campaign,” October, 126, pp. 69–90.  
 
Demos, T. J. (2009) “The Politics of Sustainability: Art and Ecology,” Manacorda, 
Francesco & Yedgar, Ariella (Eds.) Radical Nature: Art and Architecture for a Changing 
Planet, 1969–2009. Barbican Art Gallery: London. 
 
	 317	
Demos, T.J. (2017) Against the Anthropocene. Berlin: Sternberg. 
 
Depression (2015) American Psychology Association. Retrieved from: 
apa.org/topics/depress/index.aspx  
 
Diederichsen, Diedrich (2013) “On the Writings of Thomas Hirshhorn,” Artforum 
International, 52, (3), pp. 233–234. 
 
Diederichsen, Diedrich & Franke, Anselm, (Eds.) (2013) The whole earth: California and 
the disappearance of the outside. Berlin: Sternberg.  
 
Draper, Malcolm & Maré, Gerhard (2003) “The Garden of England's Gaming Zookeeper 
and Zululand,” Journal of Southern African Studies, 29 (2), pp. 551–569. 
 
Du Cann, Charlotte (2016, 27 December) 2016: The Reveal. Retrieved from: http://dark-
mountain.net/blog/2016-the-reveal/    
 
El Lokal (2013, 10 July) Recuperación de un edificio por la Obra Social de la PAH en la 
Plaça Padró. Retrieved from: www.ellokal.org/recuperacion-de-un- edificio-por-la-obra-
socialde-la-pah-en-la-placa-padro  
 
Endnotes (2011) “What are we to do?” Noys, Benjamin (Ed.) Communization and its 
Discontents. Brooklyn: Autonomedia.  
 
Enmedio (2013) Yes We Can / But They Don't Want To. Retrieved from: 
www.enmedio.info/en/yes-we-can-but-they-dont-want-to-the-making-ofthe-escraches-
graphic-campaign-2  
 
Esposito, Roberto (2011) Immunitas. Cambridge UK: Polity Press.  
 
Europa Press (2015, 11 February) La PAH protesta contra la venta de hipotecas de 
	 318	
Catalunya Caixa a Blackstone. Retrieved from: www.europapress.es/economia/finanzas-
00340/noticiaeconomia-pah-protesta-contra-venta-hipotecas-catalunyacaixablackstone-
20150211195930.html 
 
European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policy. (2008) Monster Institutions. Retrieved 
from: http://eipcp.net/transversal/0508. 
 
Fabian, Johannes (2014) Time and the Other. New York: Columbia University Press.  
 
Fairbanks, Robert (2011) “The politics of urban informality in Philadelphia’s Recovery 
House Movement,” Urban Studies, 48 (12), pp. 2555–2570. 
 
Fanon, Frantz (2004) Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press.  
 
Fanon, Frantz (2008) Black Skin, White Masks. London: Pluto Press.  
 
Federici, Silvia (2004) Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and Primitive 
Accumulation. New York: Autonomedia. 
 
Feigenbaum, Anna & McCurdy, Patrick & Frenzel, Fabian (2013) Protest Camps. 
London: Zed Books. 
 
Field, C.B., Barros, V.R., Dokken, D.J., Mach, K.J., Mastrandrea, M.D., Bilir, T.E., 
Chatterjee, M., Ebi, K.L., Estrada, Y.O., Genova, R.C., Girma, B., Kissel, E.S., Levy, 
A.N., MacCracken, S., Mastrandrea, P.R. & White, L.L. (Eds.). Climate Change. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Filguera, Eva (2014, 2 November) Cuando el apoyo mutuo te puede salvar la vida. 
Retrieved from: https://www.diagonalperiodico.net/global/24344-tabu-desahucios-y-
suicidios.html 
 
	 319	
Florida, Richard (2004) The Rise of the Creative Class. New York: Basic Books. 
 Fonseca,	Diego	(2016,	30	March)	El	número	de	suicidios	duplica	al	de	los	muertos	por	accidentes	de	tráfico.	Retrieved	from:	http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2016/03/29/actualidad/1459249694_040134.html	
 
Foster, John Bellamy (1999) “Marx’s Theory of Metabolic Rift: Classical Foundations for 
Environmental Sociology,” American Journal of Sociology, 105 (2), pp. 366–405. 
 
Foucault, Michel (1990) History of Sexuality, Vol. I. New York: Vintage Books. 
 
Foucault, Michel (1991) “Governmentality,” Burchal, Graham & Gordon, Colin, & 
Miller, Peter (Eds.) The Foucault Effect. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Foucault, Michel (1998) “Life, Experience and Science,” Aesthetics, Method and 
Epistemology. New York: The New Press.  
 
Foucault, Michel (2003) Society Must Be Defended. Lectures at the College de France, 
1975–76. New York: Picador. 
 
Foucault, Michel (2006) The Order of Things. London: Routledge. 
 
Foucault, Michel (2007) Security, Territory, Population. Houndmills, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
França, João (2014, 10 July) La PAH impulsa una nova ILP pel dret a l'habitatge i contra 
la pobresa energètica a nivell català. Retrieved from: 
www.eldiario.es/catalunyaplural/PAH-impulsa-ILPhabitatge-
energetica_0_279972280.html  
 
	 320	
França, João & Arturo Puente (2014, 15 June) Guanyem Barcelona echa a andar con un 
llamamiento a la confluencia ciudadana para las municipales. Retrieved from: 
http://www.eldiario.es/catalunya/guanyem_barcelonaadacolau-candidatura-municipales-
barcelona_0_270873244.html 
 
Freeman, Jo (1970) The Tyranny of Structurelessness. Retrieved from: 
https://www.jofreeman.com/joreen/tyranny.htm 
 
Friborg, Flemming (2015, 22 October) Warm Flesh, Cold Marble: Canova,Thorvaldsen, 
and Their Critiques. Retrieved from: http://caareviews.org/reviews/2486  
 
García-Lamarca, Melissa & Kaika, Maria (2016) “Mortgaged lives; the biopolitics of 
debt and housing financialisation,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 
2016, 41, pp. 313–327. 
 
Geertz, Clifford (1973) Interpretation of Culture. New York: Basic Books.  
 
Geoghegan, Bernard Dionysius (2011) “From Information Theory to French Theory: 
Jakobson, Lévi-Strauss, and the Cybernetic Apparatus,” Critical Inquiry, 38, pp. 96–126. 
 
Geoghegan, Peter (2015, 26 January) Catalans Eye New Independence “Referendum”. 
Retrieved from: www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/01/catalans-eyeindependence-
referendum-150120113249701.html  
 
Giddens, Anthony (1999) Runaway World. London: Profile.  
 
Gjesdal, Kristin (2006) “Hegel and Herder on Art, History, and Reason,” Philosophy and 
Literature, 30 (1), pp. 17–32. 
 
Glowczewski, Barbara (2015) Resisting the Disaster: Between Exhaustion and Creation. 
Retrieved from: http://spheres-journal.org/resisting-the-disaster-between-exhaustion-and-
	 321	
creation 
 
Goldsmith, Zac (2015, 28 Febraury) Zac Goldsmith: How my dad saved Britain. 
Retrieved from: https://www.spectator.co.uk/2015/02/zac-goldsmith-how-my-dad-saved-
britain  
 
Graeber, David (2014) Debt: the first 5,000 years. Brooklyn: Melville House.  
 
Graeber, David (2001) Towards and anthropological theory of value. New York: 
Palgrave. 
 
Gratton, P. (2013) “Spinoza and the Biopolitical Rotts of Modernity,” Angelaki, 18 (3), 
pp. 91–102. 
 
Greer, John Michael (2017, 17 January) 2016: Toward the Deep Future. Retrieved from: 
http://dark-mountain.net/blog/2016-toward-the-deep-future/ 
 
Gray, John (2009, 14 September) Walking on Lava. Retrieved from: 
https://www.newstatesman.com/books/2009/09/civilisation-planet-authors 
 
Grindon, Gavin (2011) “Surrealism, Dada and the Refusal of Work: Autonomy, Activism 
and Social Participation in the Radical Avant-Garde,” The Oxford  Art Journal, 34 (1), 
pp. 79–96. 
 
The Guardian (2014, 20 December) Spain’s new security law sparks protests across 
country. Retrieved from: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/20/spainprotests- 
security-law-parliament  
 
Guattari, Felix (1995) Chaosmosis: an Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press. 
 
	 322	
Guattari, Felix (2014) The Three Ecologies. London: Bloomsbury.   
 
Gupta, Vinay (2011) Death and the Human Condition. Dark Mountain Journal, Issue 2, 
pp. 74–79. 
 
Hall, Laura (2015) “My Mother’s Garden: Aesthetics, Indigenous Renewal and 
Creativity,” Davis, Heather & Etienne Turpin (Eds.) (2015) Art in the Anthropocene. 
London: Open Humanities Press.  
 
Haley, Allan et al. (2012) Typography Referenced. Beverly MA: Rockport Publishers. 
 
Hansen, Bue Rübner (2015) Surplus Population, Social Reproduction, and the Problem of 
Class Formation. Retreived from: https://www.viewpointmag.com/2015/10/31/surplus-
population-social-reproduction-and-the-problem-of-class-formation  
 
Haraway, Donna (2016) “Staying with the Trouble Anthropocene, Capitalocene, 
Chthulucene,” Moore, Jason W (Ed.) Anthropocene or Capitalocene? Oakland: PM 
Press.  
 
Haraway, Donna (2015) “Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Plantationocene, Chthulucene: 
Making Kin,” Environmental Humanities, 6, pp.159–165. 
 
Hardt, Michael & Negri, Antonio (2000) Empire. London: Harvard University Press. 
 
Hardt, Michael & Negri, Antonio. (2004) Multitude: War and Democracy in the age of 
Empire. New York: Penguin Books. 
 
Harney, Stefano & Fred Moten (2013) The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning & Black 
Study. Wivenhoe: Minor Compositions.  
 
Harris, Paul G. & Siplon, Patricia D. (2007) The Global Politcs of AIDS. Boulder: Lynne 
	 323	
Rienner Publishers.   
 
Harvey, David (2000) Spaces of Hope. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
 
Harvey, David (2013) Rebel Cities. London: Verso. 
 
Hegel, Georg W. F. (1977) The Phenomenology of Spirit. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
 
Hegel, Georg W. F. (1988) Aesthetics Volume 1. Oxford: Clarendon.  
 
Hickey, Amber (2012) Guidebook of Alternative Nows Guidebook of Alternative Nows. 
Los Angeles: Journal of Aesthetics & Protest Press. 
 
Hine, Dougald (2014a) “Introduction to the 2014 edition,” Hine, Dougald and 
Kingsnorth, Paul (Eds.) Uncivilization, The Dark Mountain Manifesto. Croydon: Dark 
Mountain Project. 
 
Hine, Dougald (2010, 30 December) What I learned, 2003–2010. Retrieved from: 
http://otherexcuses.blogspot.de/2010/12/what-i-learned-2003-10.html   
Hine, Dougald (2007, 8 July) Buy the Anarchists a Tank! Retrieved from: 
http://otherexcuses.blogspot.de/2007/07/buy-anarchists-tank.html  
 
Hine, Dougald, Hunt, Nick, Kingsnorth, Paul & Odasso, A.J. (2014) “Picking Up the 
Threads,” Dark Mountain Journal, Issue 5, pp. 1–3.  
 
Hobbes, Thomas (1929), Leviathan. London: Oxford University Press.  
 
Hollis, Richard (2006) Swiss Graphic Design. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Holmes, Douglas R. and Quataert, Jean H. (1986) “An Approach to Modern Labor: 
Worker Peasantries in Historic Saxony and the Friuli Region over Three Centuries,” 
	 324	
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 28 (2), pp. 191–216. 
 
Hörl, Erich (2013) “A Thousand Ecologies: the Process of Cyberneticization and General 
Ecology,” Diederichsen, Diedrich & Franke, Anselm (Eds.) The whole earth: California 
and the disappearance of the outside. Berlin: Sternberg.  
 
IPCC, 2014: Summary for policymakers. Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, 
and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group 
II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Jacobs, Jane (2011) The Death and Life of Great American Cities. New York: Modern 
Library. 
 
Jeffers, Robinson (1935) “Rearmament,” Quoted in Kingsnorth, Paul & Dougald Hine 
(2014) Uncivilization. The Dark Mountain Manifesto. Croydon: Dark Mountain Project. 
 
Irigaray, Luce (1996) I Love To You. London: Routledge.  
 
Jordana, Ester (2015, 29 January) Email to Jara Rocha. 
 
Kant, Immanuel (2009) An Answer to the question, What is Enlightenment? London: 
Penguin. 
 
Kant, Immanuel (2007) Critique of Judgement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Kassam, Ashifa (2014a, 21 August) Naked Italians spark protests against antics of 
drunken tourists in Barcelona. Retrieved from: 
www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/21/nakeditalians-protests-drunken-tourists-
barcelona 
 
	 325	
Kassam, Ashifa (2014b, 10 November) Catalan leader to step up independence push as 
80% vote to split from Spain. Retrieved from: 
www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/10/catalansvow-push-independence-80-favour-
split  
 
Kester, Grant (2013) The Device Laid Bare: On Some Limitations in Current Art 
Criticism. Retrieved from: http://www.e-flux.com/journal/50/59990/the-device-laid-bare-
on-some-limitations-in-current-art-criticism  
 
Kester, Grant (2015) Editorial. Retrieved from: http://field- journal.ocm/issue-2/kester-2  
 
Kingsnorth, Paul (2007, March) Teddy Goldsmith: godfather of green. Retrieved from: 
http://www.theecologist.org/News/news_analysis/309113/teddy_goldsmith_godfather_of
_green.html  
 
Kingsnorth, Paul (2010, 29 April) Why I stopped beleiving in environmentalism and 
started the Dark Mountain Project. Retrieved from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/apr/29/environmentalism-dark-
mountain-project  
 
Kingsnorth, Paul (2010b) “Confessions of a recovering environmentalist,” The Dark 
Mountain Project, Issue 1, pp. 47–60. 
 
Kingsnorth, Paul (2016, 13 December) 2016: year of the serpent. Retrieved from: 
http://dark-mountain.net/blog/2016-year-of-the-serpent/  
 
Kingsnorth, Paul (2017, 18 March) The lie of the land: does environmentalism have a 
future in the age of Trump? Retrieved from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2017/mar/18/the-new-lie-of-the-land- what-future-
for-environmentalism-in-the-age-of-trump  
 
	 326	
Kingsnorth, Paul & Hine, Dougald (2010a) “It’s the end of the world as we know it (and 
we feel fine). Dark Mountain Journal,” Issue 1, pp. 1–4. 
 
Kingsnorth, Paul & Hine, Dougald (2010b, 13 May) The environmental movement needs 
to stop pretending. Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cif-
green/2010/may/13/environment-dark-mountain  
 
Kingsnorth, Paul & Hine, Dougald (2011) “Control, and Other Illusions,” Dark Mountain 
Journal, Issue 2.  
 
Kingsnorth, Paul & Hine, Dougald (2014) Uncivilization, The Dark Mountain Manifesto. 
Croydon: Dark Mountain Project. 
 
Kingsnorth, Paul, Hunt, Nick & Wheeler, Steve (Eds.) (2014) Dark Mountain Journal, 
Issue 6. 
 
Kingsnorth, Paul, Tompkins, Doug & Tompkins, Kris (2012) “The Death of Birth,” Dark 
Mountain Journal, Issue 3, pp. 141–160. 
 
Klein, Naomi (2000) No Logo. Toronto: A. A Knopf. 
 
Klein, Naomi (2008) The shock doctrine: The rise of disaster capitalism. London: 
 Penguin Books. 
 
Kracauer, Siegfried (1995) The Mass Ornament. London: Harvard University Press.  
 
Land, Nick (2012) The Dark Enlightenment. Retrieved from: 
http://www.thedarkenlightenment.com/the-dark-enlightenment-by-nick-land/   
 
Laruelle, François (2002) Future Christ. London: Continuum.  
 
	 327	
Laruelle, François (2012) Struggle and utopia at the end times of philosophy. 
Minneapolis: Univocal. 
 
Lappe, Francis Moore et. al (1998) World Hunger, 12 Myths. Oakland: Food First. 
 
Latour, Bruno (1993) We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press.  
 
Latour, Bruno (2013) Facing Gaia: A new inquiry into Natural Religion. A series of six 
lectures, The Gifford Lectures. Retrieved from: http://Www.Bruno-
Latour.Fr/Sites/Default/Files/Downloads/Gifford-Six-Lectures_1.Pdf  
 
Laubichler, Manfred Renn, Jürgen (2015) “Extended Evolution: A Conceptual 
Framework for Integrating Regulatory Networks and Niche Construction,” Journal of 
Experimental Zoology, 324,(B), pp. 565–577. 
 
Léger, Marc J. (2012) Brave New Avant Garde. Winchester UK: Zero Books.  
 
Léger, Marc J. (2013) Neoliberal Undead. Winchester UK: Zero Books.  
 
Léger, Marc J. (2016) Strike Art, Reviewed by Marc James Léger. Retrieved from: 
http://marxandphilosophy.org.uk/reviewofbooks/reviews/2016/2284    
 
Leonardi, Emanuele (2017) “Carbon trading dogma: Theoretical assumptions and 
practical implications of global carbon markets,” Ephemera, 17 (1), pp. 61–87. 
 
Lévi-Strass, Claude (1962) The Savage Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Lewis, Justin & Miller, Toby (2008) Critical Cultural Policy Studies: A Reader.  London: 
Blackwell. 
 
Lippert, Ingmar (2004) An Introduction to the Criticism on Sustainable Development. 
	 328	
Brandenburg University of Technology Cottbus Faculty IV – Environmental Sciences and 
Process Engineering Environmental and Resource Management B.Sc.-Programme 
2102780. 
 
Lorey, Isabell (2015) State of Insecurity, Government of the Precarious. London: Verso.  
 
Lowrie, Ian (2016, 8 January) On Algorithmic Communism. Retrieved from: 
https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/on-algorithmic-communism/  
 
Luhmann, Niklas. (1977) “Differentiation of society,” Canadian Journal of Sociology, 2 
(1), pp. 29–54. 
 
Macherey, Pierre (2011) Hegel or Spinoza. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.  
 
Malabou, Catherine (2017) “The Brain of History, or, The mentality of the 
Anthropocene,” South Atlantic Quarterly, 116 (1), pp. 39–53. 
 
Macias, Carlos et. al (2016) Ecclusió Redidecial Al Món Local. Barcelona: Observatori 
DESC. 
 
Mansoor, Jaleh (2012) “Poetics, Commitment: Ayreen Anastas’s M*Bethlehem and 
Pasolini Pa Palestine,” Journal of Aesthetics & Protest, Issue 8.  
 
Mansoor, Jaleh (2013) Notes on the Militant Fold. Retrieved from: 
http://theclaudiusapp.com/5-mansoor.html   
 
Marí-Dell’Olmo, Marc et. al. (2016) “Housing Policies and Health Inequalities,” 
International Journal of Health Services, 47 (2) pp. 207–232. 
 
Marx, Karl (1993) Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy. 
London: Penguin Books. 
	 329	
 
Marx, Karl (2009) Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Retrieved from: 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/preface.htm   
 
Marx, Karl & Engels, Friedrich (1998) The German ideology. Amherst New York: 
Prometheus Books.  
 
Marx, Karl & Engels, Friedrich (2007) The Communist Manifesto. Minneapolis: 
Filiquarian. 
 
Mason, Paul (2012, 30 April) Does Occupy signal the death of contemporary art? 
Retrieved from: http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-17872666  
 
Mbembe, Achille (2003) “Necropolitics,” Public Culture, 15 (1), pp. 11–40. 
 
McIntyre, John S. (2011) “Depression and Practice Guidelines,” Human 
Psychopharmacology: Clinical and Experimental, 16, pp. 115–118.  
 
McKee, Yates (2016) Strike Art. London: Verso. 
 
McKee, Yates & McClagan, Meg (2012) Sensible Politics. New York: Zone.  
 
McLuhan, Marshall, & Quintin Fiore (1996) The Medium is the Massage. Berkeley: 
Ginko Press.  
 
Mead, Margaret (1960) “A new preface by Margaret Mead,” Ruth Benedict. Patterns of 
Culture. New York: Mentor Books.  
 
Mendez, Lucía (2015, 19 January) Del Teatro del Barrio a Alternativa De Gobierno. 
Retrieved from: 
http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2015/01/18/54bab6c8268e3ea04a8b4580.html  
	 330	
 
Mirzoeff, Nicholas (2014a) Visualizing the Anthropocene. Public Culture 26:2 213-232 
 
Mirzoeff, Nicholas (2014b) How to See the World. London: Pelican. 
 
Monbiot, George (2002, 30 April) Black Shirts in Green Trousers. Retrieved from: 
http://www.monbiot.com/2002/04/30/black-shirts-in-green- trousers  
 
Monbiot, George (2011, 5 May) The green problem: how do we fight without losing what 
we’re fighting for? Retrieved from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/georgemonbiot/2011/may/05/green-problem-
environmentalism  
 
Monbiot, George (2016, 3 August) The climate crisis is already here – but no one’s telling 
us. Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/aug/03/climate-
crisis-media-relegates-greatest-challenge-hurtle-us-collapse-planet  
 
Monbiot, George & Kingsnorth, Paul (2009, 17 August) Is there any point in fighting to 
stave off industrial apocalypse? Retrieved from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/aug/17/environment-
climate-change  
 
Monsieur Dupont (2003) Nihilist Communism. Retrieved from: 
https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/monsieur-dupont-nihilist-communism  
 
Moore, Jason W. (2003) “Nature and the Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism,” 
Review, XXVI (2), pp. 97–172. 
 
Moore, Jason W. (2015) Capitalism In the Web of Life. London: Verso. 
 
Moore, Jason W. (2016) Anthropocene or Capitalocene? Nature, History, and the Crisis of 
Capitalism. In Moore, Jason W. (Ed.) Anthropocene or Capitalocene? Oakland: PM 
	 331	
Press. 
 
Moore, Jason W. (2017) “The Capitalocene, Part I: on the nature and origins of our 
ecological crisis,” The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 44 (3).  
 
Morfini, Vittorio (2018) “Memory, Chance and Conflict: Machiavelli in the Theologico-
Political Treatise,” Korela, A. Kiarina & Vardoulakis, Dimitris, (Eds.) Spinoza’s 
Authority Volume II. London: Bloomsbury.   
 
Muhle, Maria (2014) “A Genealogy of Biopolitics: The Notion of Life in Canguilhem 
and Foucault,” Lemm, Vanessa & Miguel Vatter (Eds.) The Government of Life. New 
York: Fordham University Press.  
 
Muñoz, Julia Bolivar et. al. (2015) “La salud de las personas adultas afectadas por un 
proceso de desahucio,” Gaceta Sanitaria, 30 (1), pp. 4–10.  
 
Murcia, Guillem (2014, 18 June) The rise of Podemos. Retrieved from: 
http://socialistworker.org/2014/06/18/the-rise-of-podemos 
  
Negarestani, Reza (2011) “Contingency and Complicity,” Mackay, Robin (Ed.) The 
Medium of Contingency. London: Urbanomic. 
 
Negarestani, Reza (2008) Cyclonopedia: Complicity with anonymous materials. 
Melbourne: Re.press. 
 
Normandin, Sebastian & Valles, Sean A (2015) “How a network of conservationists and 
population control activists created the contemporary US anti-immigration movement,” 
Endeavour, 39 (2), pp. 95–105 
 
Nicholls, R. J. et al. (2007) In Parry M. L. et al. (Eds.) Climate Change 2007: Impacts, 
Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment 
	 332	
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. pp. 315–356.  
 
Noys, Benjamin (Ed.) (2011) Communization and its discontents. Wivenhoe: Minor 
Compositions.  
 
Noys, Benjamin (2014) Malign Velocities. Winchester: Zero Books. 
 
Nunes, Rodrigo (2014) Organisation of the Organisationless. London: Mute. 
 
Observatorio DESC (2015) Emergència habitacional a Cataluña Impacte de la crisi 
hipotecària en el dret a la salut i els drets dels infants. Barcelona. 
 
Observatorio Metropolitano (2013) Hipótesis Democracia. Madrid: Traficantes De 
Sueños.  
 
Odling-Smee, John (1988) “Niche constructing phenotypes,” Plotkin, H. C. (Ed.) The 
role of behavior in evolution. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Out of the Woods (2017, 31 March) Lies of the land: against and beyond Paul 
Kingsnorth’s völkisch environmentalism. Retrieved from: 	https://libcom.org/blog/lies-
land-against-beyond-paul-kingsnorth%E2%80%99s-v%C3%B6lkisch-environmentalism-
31032017 
 
O’Brien, Dave (2014) Cultural Policy: Management, Value and Modernity in the 
Creative Industries. London: Routledge.  
 
O’Grady, Sean (2016, 16 June) How Britain came to the brink of leaving the European 
Union. Retrieved from: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/how-britain-
came-to-the-brink-of-leaving-the-european-union-a7085486.html  
 
PAH (2013.a) Campaña de escrache #Fase1 “Hay vidas en juego”: Carta abierta a los 
	 333	
diputados. Retrieved from: afectadosporlahipoteca.com/2013/02/28/fase-1-de-lacampana-
hay-vidas-en-juego-carta-abierta-a-los-diputados/ 
 
PAH (2013.b) Nueva campaña de la PAH: escraches. Pongámosle nombre y apellido a los 
responsables del #genocidioFinanciero. Retrieved from: 
afectadosporlahipoteca.com/2013/02/04/final-ilp-campanyaescraches. 
 
PAH (2015.a) Green Book. Barcelona: PAH. 
 
PAH (2015.b) STOP EVICTIONS! STOP BLACKSTONE! SI SE PUEDE! Retrieved 
from: www.facebook.com/events/996448097050746/permalink/996456400383249 
 
Papastergiadis, Nikos (2014) “Thomas Hirschhorn and Jacques Ranciére: Artists and 
Philosophers as Companions in the Love of the Infinitude of Thought,” Theory, Culture 
& Society, 31 (7/8), pp. 97–100. 
 
Parker, Ian & Shotter, John (1990) Deconstructing Social Psychology. London: 
Routledge. 
 
Pavón-Cuéllar, David & Equihua, Estrella (2013) “Subversive psychoanalysis and its 
potential orientation toward a liberation psychology: From a Lacanian reading of Martín-
Baró to a committed use of Jacques Lacan,” Theory & Psychology, 23 (5), pp. 639–656. 
 
Plessner, Helmuth (1958) “On the Relation of Time of Death,” Man and Time, Papers 
From the Eranos Yearbooks. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.  
 
Poe, Danielle (2011) “Can Luce Irigaray's Notion of Sexual Difference be Applied to 
Transsexual and Transgender Narratives?” Philosophy Faculty Publications, Paper 13. 
Retrieved from: http://ecommons.udayton.edu/phl_fac_pub/13  
 
Pollan, Michael (2002) The botany of desire: A plant's-eye view of the world. New York: 
	 334	
Random House. 
 
Popp-Madsen, B. A. (2014) “The Nature of the State of Nature: Hobbes, Sovereignty and 
Biopolitics,” Tidsskriftet Politik, 17 (1), pp. 49–56. 
 
Povinelli, Elizabeth (2006) The Empire of Love. London: Duke University Press.  
 
Pradel-Miquel, Marc (2016) “Crisis, (re-)informalization processes and protest: The case 
of Barcelona,” Current Sociology Monograph 2017, 65 (2), pp. 209–221 
 
Psicólogas y Psicólogos sin Fronteras (2016) El Recate De Las Personas. YouTube 
video. Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ksL2VAf7jkQ    
 
Quarantelli, E.L. (2001) The Sociology of Panic. University of Delware Disaster 
Research Center. Preliminary Paper #283.  
 
Rancière, Jacques (2013) Aisthesis: Scenes from the Aesthetic Regime of Art. London: 
Verso.  
 
Rancière, Jacques (1999) Disagreement: Politics and Politics. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press.  
 
Raunig, Gerald & Ray, Gene (2009) Art and Contemporary Critical Practice. London: 
Mayfly. 
 
Read, Jason (2016) The Politics of Transindividuality. Leiden: Brill.  
 
Rember, John (2011) “Consensus and other Realities,” Dark Mountain Journal, Issue 2, 
pp. 11–19.  
 
Renn, Jürgen & Manfred Laubichler (2014) “Extended Evolution and the History of 
Knowledge,” Vienna Circle Yearbook 2014.  
	 335	
 
Reuters (2013, 18 April) Spain approves new mortgage law without key protester 
demands. Retrieved from: http://www.reuters.com/news/picture/spain-approves-
newmortgage-law-without?articleId=UKBRE93H0Y820130418  
 
Rivolta Femminile (1991) “Let’s Spit on Hegel,” Bono, Paola & Kemp, Sandra (Eds.) 
Italian Feminist Thought: A Reader. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers.  
 
Roberts, William Clare (2010, November) “An original situation creates its own 
predecessors: Aristotle after Simondon,” paper presented at the Society for 
Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, Montreal, QC. 
 
Russell, Bertie & Reyes, Oscar (2017, 16 August) Fearless Cities: The New Urban 
Movements. Retrieved from: https://www.redpepper.org.uk/fearless-cities-the-new-urban-
movements 
 
Sala, Eduard & Tutor, Aritz (2016) “El uso de la imagen como eje de cambio de poder: el 
caso de la Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca,” Carte Semiotiche Annali, 4, pp. 88–
102.  
 
Schmitt, Carl (2006) The Nomos of the Earth. New York: Telos Press. 
 
Schultz, Karsten (2017) “Decolonizing political ecology: ontology, technology and 
‘critical’ enchantment,” Journal of Political Ecology, 24, pp. 124–143. 
 
Scott, James C (1989) “Everyday Froms of Resistance,” The Copenhagen Journal of 
Asian Studies, 4, pp. 33–62. 
 
Searle, John (1995) The Construction of Social Reality. New York: Free Press. 
 
Seurat, Clémence (2016) “Fictioning is a Worlding,” Werkmeister, Sarah (Ed.) 
	 336	
Ecologising Museums. Ghent: L’Internationale Online.  
 
Sharp, Hasanah. (2012) “Eve’s Perfection: Spinoza on Sexual (In)Equality,” Journal of 
the History of Philosophy, 50, (4). 
 
Saito, Yuriko (2007) Everyday Aesthetics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Sassen, Saskia (2014) Expulsions. Cambridge MA: Belknap. 
 
Sennett, Richard (2018) Building and Dwelling: Ethics for the City. London: Penguin 
Random House. 
 
Shepard, Benjamin (2015) Community Projects As Social Activism. New York: Sage 
Publishing.  
 
Shiffman, Ronald, Bell, Rick, & Brown, Lannce Jay (Eds.) (2012) Beyond Zuccotti Park: 
Freedom of Assembly and the Occupation of Public Space. New York: New Village Press. 
 
Sholette, Gregory (2011) Dark Matter. London: Pluto Press.  
 
Sholette, Gregory (2012) After OWS: Social Practice Art, Abstraction, and the Limits of 
the Social. Retrieved from: http://www.e-flux.com/journal/31/68204/after-ows-social-
practice-art-abstraction-and-the-limits-of-the-social 
 
Shukaitis, Stevphen (2013) “Can the Object Be a Comrade?” Ephemera. 13 (2): pp. 437–
444. 
 
Simondon, Gilbert 1992 [1989], ‘The Genesis of the Individual’, Incorporations, edited 
by Jonathan Crary and Sanford Kwinter, New York: Zone Books, pp. 297–319. 
 
Simondon, Gilbert (2011) Two Lessons on Animal and Man. Minneapolis: Univocal 
Publishing.  
 
	 337	
Sinha, Chris (2015) “Ontogenesis, symbiosis and the epigenetic dynamics of biocultural 
niche construction,” Cognitive Development,36, pp. 202–209. 
doi:10.1016/j.cogdev.2015.09.006  
 
Sitrin, Marina (2012) Everyday Revolutions. London: Zed Books. 
 
Smaje, Chris (2015, 30 December) After Paris. Retrieved from: http://dark-
mountain.net/blog/after-paris   
 
Smaje, Chris (2017, 3 January) 2016: A sheep’s vigil. Retrieved from: http://dark-
mountain.net/blog/2016-a-sheeps-vigil   
 
Smith, Daniel (2014, 17 April) It’s the End of the World as We Know It… and He Feels 
Fine. Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/20/magazine/its-the-end-of-the-
world-as-we-know-it-and-he-feels-fine.html   
 
Smith, Justin E. H. (2016) The Philosopher: A History in Six Types. Oxford: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Sonjasdotter, Åsa (2016) From Flesh to Flesh. Comissioned by Henie Onstad Art  Centre, 
Askim, Norway, for the exhibition Astrup Fearnley, Norwegian Landscapes. 
 
Southwark Notes (2016, 14 December) Empowerment for Surrender. Retrieved from: 
https://southwarknotes.wordpress.com/2016/12/14/empowerment-for-surrender/  
 
Spanish Constitution of 1978. 
 
Spinoza, Baruch (1951) A Theologico-Political Treatise and A Political Treatise. New 
York: Dover Publications. 
 
Spinoza, Baruch (2001) Ethics. Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions. 
	 338	
  
Srnicek, Nick & Williams, Alex (2013) “#ACCELERATE: Manifesto for an 
accelerationist politics,” Johnson, Joshua (Ed.) Dark Trajectories: Politics of the Outside. 
New York: Name Publications, pp. 135–55. 
 
Srnicek, Nick & Williams, Alex (2015) Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World 
Without Work. London: Verso.  
 
Stakemeier, Kerstin & Marina Vishmidt (2016) Reproducing Autonomy. London: Mute.  
 
Staudenmaier, Peter (1995) “The ‘Green Wing’ of the Nazi Party and its Historical 
Antecedents,” Biehl, Janet & Staudenmaier, Peter (Eds.) Ecofascism: Lessons from the 
German Experience. San Francisco, AK Press. 
 
Sterelny, Kim (2012) “Language, gesture, skill: the co-evolutionary foundations of 
language,” Philisophical Transactions, 367 (1599), pp. 2141–2151.  
 
Stotz, Karola (2010) “Human nature and cognitive-developmental niche construction,” 
Phenom Cogn Sci, 9, pp. 483–501. 
 
Suarez, Maka (2014) “Movimientos Sociales y Buen Vivir,” Revista de Antropología 
Experimental, 14, pp. 71–89. 
 
Surel, Olivier (2014) “Let A Hundred Natures Bloom,” Krisis 2014, 2, pp. 14–28.  
 
Surova, Galina & Ulke, Christine & Hegerl, Ulrich (2017) “Differentiating hypo-and 
hyperaroused fatigue in major depression and in the context of organic diseases,” Clinical 
Neurophysiology, 128 (393). doi:10.1016/j.clinph.2017.06.206  
  
Swyngedouw, Erik (2005, October) “Governance Innovation and the Citizen: The Janus 
Face of Governance-beyond-the-State,” Urban Studies, Vol. 42, No. 11, 1991–2006. 
	 339	
 
Swyngedouw, Erik (2010) “Apocalypse Forever?: Post-political Populism and the 
Spectre of Climate Change,” Theory Culture Society 2010 27: 213. 
doi:10.1177/0263276409358728 
 
Tagonist, Anne (2017, 10 January) 2016: the year Magic broke into Politics. Retrieved 
from: http://dark-mountain.net/blog/2016-the-year-magic-broke-into-politics//  
 
The Base (2017, 14 April) The Last Days of a White World. Retrieved from: 
http://www.basepublication.org/?p=452 
 
Thoburn, Nicholas (2010) “Communist Objects and the Values of Printed Matter,” Social 
Text 103, Vol. 28, No. 2. doi:10.1215/01642472-2009-065 
 
Thompson, Nato (2015) Seeing Power. London: Melville House. 
 
Tiqqun (2012) Theory of Bloom. Berkeley: LBC Books.  
 
Todd, Zoe (2015) “Indigenizing the Anthropocene,” Davis, Heather & Turpin, Etienne 
(Eds.) Art in the Anthropocene. London: Open Humanities Press.  
 
Toscano, Alberto (2008) “The Open Secret of Real Abstraction,” Rethinking Marxism: A 
Journal of Economics, Culture & Society, 20 (2), pp. 273–287. 
 
Toscano, Alberto (2011a) “Now and Never,” Benjamin Noys (Ed.) Communization and 
its Discontents. Wivenhoe: Minor Compositions. 
 
Toscano, Alberto (2011b) Logistics and Opposition. Retrieved from: 
http://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/logistics-and-opposition 
 
Tronti, Mario (1972) “Workers and Capital,” Telos, 14, pp. 23–62. 
	 340	
 
Turpin, Etienne (2013) Architecture of Mineralization. Leipzig: Journal of Aesthetics & 
Protest Press.  
 
Tsing, Anna Lowenhaupt (2015) The Mushroom at the End of the World.  Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Tylor, Edward Burnett (1920) Primitive Culture. London: John Murray.   
 
La Vanguardia (2013, 2 February). Ada Colau llama “criminal” y “supuesto experto” a un 
representante de la banca. Retrieved from: 
www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20130205/54366394882/adacolau-criminal-
representante-banca.html 
 
Vásquez-Vera et. al. (2016) “Foreclosure and Health in Southern Europe: Results from 
the Platform for People Affected by Mortgages,” Journal of Urban Health: Bulletin of the 
New York Academy of Medicine, 93 (2), pp. 312–330. 
 
Virno, Paolo (2002) General Intellect, Exodus, Multitude, Interview with Paolo Virno. 
Retrieved from: http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpvirno2.htm 
 
Virno, Paolo (2004) Grammar of The Multitude. New York: Semiotext(e). 
 
Virno, Paolo (2007) “General Intellect,” Historical Materialism, 15 (3), pp. 3–8. 
 
Virno, Paolo (2008) Multitude Between Innovation and Negation. Los Angeles: 
Semiotext(e). 
 
Virno, Paolo. (2009) “Angels and the General Intellect: Individuation in Duns Scotus and 
Gilbert Simondon,” Parrhesia Journal, 7, pp. 58–67. 
 
	 341	
Virno, Paolo, Branden W. Joseph and Alessia Ricciardi (2005) “Interview with Paolo 
Virno,” Grey Room, 21, pp. 26–37. 
 
Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo (1992) From the Enemy’s Point of View: Humanity and 
Divinity in Amazonian Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo (2012) “Radical Dualism: A Meta-Fantasy on the Square 
Root of Dual Organizations,” 100 Notes–100 Thoughts, 56. 
 
Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo (2014) Cannibal Metaphysics. Minneapolis: Univocal. 
 
Walters, William (2004) “Some Critical Notes on Governance,” Studies in Political 
Economy 73, pp. 27–47. 
 
Wark, McKenzie (2015, 27 October) Inventing the Future. Retrieved from: 
http://www.publicseminar.org/2015/10/inventing-the-future/   
 
Watts, Vanessa (2013) “Indigenous place-thought & agency amongst humans and non-
humans (First Woman and Sky Woman go on a European world tour!),” Decolonization: 
Indigeneity, Education & Society, 2 (1) pp. 20–34.  
 
Weheliye, Alexander (2014) Habeas Viscus. London: Duke University Press. 
 
Weibel, Peter (Ed.) (2015) Global Activism. Karlsruhe: ZKM. 
 
Wilderson III, Frank B. (2014) The Black Liberation Army and the Paradox of Political 
Engagement. Retrieved from: http://ill-will-editions.tumblr.com/post/81534866038/the-
black-liberation-army-the-paradox-of  
 
Woodard, Ben (2012) Slime dynamics: Generation, mutation, and the creep of life. 
Winchester: Zero Books. 
	 342	
 
Wright, Steve (2002) Storming Heaven: Class Composition and Struggle in Italian 
Autonomist Marxism. London: Pluto Press. 
 
Wynter, Silvia (2003) “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom,” CR: 
The New Centennial Review, 3 (3), pp. 257–337. 
 
Wynter, Silvia (1995) “1492: A new world view,” Hyatt, Vera & Nettleford, Rex (Eds.) 
Race, Discourse and the Origin of the Americas. London: Smithsonian Institution 
Scholarly Press.  
 
Wynter, Silvia & McKittrick, Katherine (2015) “Unparalleled Catastrophe for Our 
Species? Or, to Give Humanness a Different Future: Conversations,” McKittrick, 
Katherine (Ed.) On Being Human in Praxis. London: Duke  University Press. 
 
Wurtzburg, Susan & Campbell, Lyle (1995) “North American Indian Sign Language: 
Evidence for its Existence before European Contact,” International Journal of American 
Linguistics, 61 (2), pp. 153–167. 
 
Zalasiewicz, Jan & Williams, Mark & Haywood, Alan & Ellis, Michael (Eds.) (2011) 
“The Anthropocene: a new epoch of geological time?” Phil. Trans. R. Soc, 369 (1938). 
doi: 10.1098	
 
Zalasiewicz, Jan & Williams, Mark et. al. (2008) “Are We Now Living in the 
Anthropocene?” GSA Today, v. 18, no. 2, doi: 10.1130/GSAT01802A.1 	
Žižek, Slavoj (2010) Living in End Times. (2010) London: Verso.	
